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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This thesis investigates the subject of legal stratagems (ḥiyal) in Islamic jurisprudence, in general 
and more particularly the ḥiyal used to evade the usury (ribā) prohibition. The context of this 
thesis is the nascent Islamic finance industry in which these ḥiyal play a leading role. The ḥiyal 
have been appropriated from the classical Islamic legal corpus without appreciating their 
historical contextual framework. This thesis seeks to explicate that framework and clarify the 
purpose and role of those ḥiyal as envisaged in the discourse of the classical Islamic jurists. The 
ḥiyal are shown to be premised upon a teleology which demarcates them as normative exits, 
makhārij. The makhārij are conditioned by the systematic reasoning of the Ḥanafī jurists, which 
both justifies their utility and provides their juridical remit.  
 
The ḥiyal of ribā are demonstrated to have been utilised primarily as substitutes for philanthropy, 
and not in the commercial sector. The commercial sector relied on the Islamic prescriptions for 
equity investment partnerships which precluded the need for interest based loans. Although the 
jurists sanctioned the ḥiyal of ribā for the poor, they did so at the expense of systematic 
consistency. This meant that these ḥiyal, as opposed to the makhārij, are not regarded as 
normative exits, but rather, as transitory concessions.  The use of these ḥiyal as financial norms 
is therefore unwarranted. The substantive repercussions of this juridical reassessment were 
demonstrated using the historical experience of the Ottomans, where the long term use of the 
ḥiyal of ribā resulted in the negative socio-economic conditions associated with usurious 
economies. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The revival of Islamic jurisprudence and its foremost contemporary application, it may well 
be argued, is taking place in the realm of Islamic finance.
1
 Muslims, in asserting their piety 
and religious consciousness are demanding the application of Islamic law, not only in their 
personal lives, but also in their public dealings. Although in the secular vernacular, such 
religious intrusions are strictly anathema, Islamic jurisprudence compels otherwise. Islamic 
law advocates equity finance and categorically prohibits usurious debt finance. All guaranteed 
returns on invested wealth are therefore proscribed and jurists demand that investment be 
made only in the form of mutual risk-bearing partnerships. The idea of bearing risk is clearly 
abhorrent to high street banks. In attempting to accommodate Muslim requirements, high 
street banks have teamed up with various Sharīʿa scholars with the resulting financial 
products aiming to satisfy both parties. Banks idealise minimum or zero risk contracts 
whereas Islamic law demands bilateral exposure to risk. With banks leading the way, Islamic 
law has been manipulated in such a way as to minimise the effective risk-exposure banks 
face. This manipulation is apparently justified as it walks the line of legal literalism without 
manifestly crossing the boundary.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 Muhammad Taqi Usmani, An Introduction to Islamic Finance (Karachi: Idaratul Maʿarif, 1999), 238. For a less 
positive view of the direction of Islamic finance law, see Kilian Bälz, Sharia Risk? How Islamic Finance has 
Transformed Islamic Contract Law Occasional Publications 9 (Cambridge MS: ILSP Harvard Law School, 
2008) [article online]; available from http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/ilsp/publications/occasional.php; 
Internet; last accessed 02 May 2010. 
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Rationale 
Legal stratagems, or ḥiyal, have been heavily deployed in the nascent Islamic financial 
industry and the voice of opposition to their continued use grows incessantly louder.
2
  There 
is a concern that they may well have become an industrial norm by providing the default 
templates for the future design of all new Islamic financial instruments. In 1998 Vogel 
pertinently asked ‗... whether the classical religious debate about the hiyal needs to be 
reopened … [as] it is sometimes difficult to decide if a particular artifice merely overcomes 
inconvenience in the law or wholly defeats its purposes‘.3 Later, in the sixth Harvard 
University Forum on Islamic Finance (2004), Walid Hegazy presented a paper in which he 
reiterated the need to avoid the use of exceptional (i.e. non-normative) rules,  saying that they 
would ‗... result in a system defined by anomalies and exceptions and render unreasonable the 
claim that such a system was Islamic.‘4 In the ensuing discussion of Hegazy‘s paper, Nizam 
Yaqubi, a leading jurist in the field of Islamic finance, urged the author to include in his paper 
a study of the difference between ḥiyal and makhārij (lit. exits).5  
 
                                                 
2
 The dominant practices of Islamic banks are not therefore in profit-sharing vehicles such as muḍāraba and 
mushāraka, but rather, in mark-up transactions such as murābaḥa and ijāra. Estimates on their usage vary 
although the dominance of the mark-up sales is undisputed. See, for example, Muhammad Imran Ashraf Usmani, 
Meezanbank’s Guide to Islamic Banking (Karachi: Darul Ishaat, 2002), 125 (The author states that 66% of all 
transactions are for murābaḥa alone); Muhammad Saleem, Islamic Banking: A $300 Billion Deception (USA: 
Xlibris, 2005), 7 (The author mentions that as much as 80% of Islamic banking is on the basis of murābaḥa). 
Meezanbank’s Guide to Islamic Banking (Karachi: Darul Ishaat, 2002), 125 (The author states that 66% of all 
transactions are for murābaḥa alone); Muhammad Saleem, Islamic Banking: A $300 Billion Deception (USA: 
Xlibris, 2005), 7 (The author mentions that as much as 80% of Islamic banking is on the basis of murābaḥa). 
3
 Frank E. Vogel, Samuel L. Hayes III, Islamic Law and Finance: Religion, Risk, and Return (The Hague: 
Kluwer Law International, 1998), 40. 
4
 Walid Hegazy, ―Fatwas and the Fate of Islamic Finance: A Critique of the Practice of Fatwa in Contemporary 
Islamic Financial Markets,‖ in Islamic Finance: Current Legal and Regulatory Issues, ed. S. Nazim Ali 
(Cambridge MS: Islamic Finance Project (ILSP) Harvard Law School, 2005), 140. 
5
 For Yaqubi‘s comments, see Islamic Finance Conference: Current Legal and Regulatory Issues: A Short 
Report (Harvard, 2004), 2, [article online]; available from http://ifp.law.harvard.edu/login/sixth_harward; 
Internet; last accessed 02 May 2010. Hegazy duly complied and both, in the published version of his paper and 
in a later paper, he briefly addresses the issue of ḥiyal and makhārij. In both works, he argues that whereas the 
latter represent legitimate solutions, the former are unlawful as they are based upon proscribed means or intend 
an unlawful outcome. See Walid Hegazy, Fatwas and the Fate of Islamic Finance, 138; idem, ―Contemporary 
Islamic Finance: From Socioeconomic Idealism to Pure Legalism,‖ Chicago Journal of International Law 7, no. 
2 (2006-7): 596. 
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In the autumn of 2008 a group of jurisconsults in Pakistan issued a verdict declaring the 
practices of Islamic banks illicit. They followed up their verdict with a lengthy work which 
set out to systematically address the problems with the current modi operandi of these banks. 
One cornerstone of their argument was that, although the ḥiyal were permitted in certain 
circumstances, they could not be taken as a normative foundation upon which further edifices 
could be erected.
6
 They went on to say that they regarded the dominant Islamic financial 
instruments of murābaḥa and ijāra as ‗pure ḥiyal‘.7 In defence of these modi operandi, Mufti 
Taqi Usmani, conceded that he did not totally disagree with his detractors, although he 
preferred a more nuanced approach. He argued that although the modi operandi of the Islamic 
banks was not ideal, this did not preclude their legal validity.
8
 He reinforced his verdict with 
reference to specific rulings in the Ḥanafī juridical tradition which apparently permit the use 
of certain ḥiyal.9  
 
Despite the centrality of the ḥiyal in the modi operandi of Islamic banks, no serious in-depth 
study of the ḥiyal has been forthcoming. Indeed, in subsequent Islamic finance conferences 
the need to reopen the classical debate about the ḥiyal has been reiterated.10 One author 
recently pleaded that: ‗The authenticity of Islamic finance may be restored if the issue of hila 
is brought out into the open and lawful hila is transparently distinguished from unlawful 
                                                 
6
  Written by associates to the office of Iftāʾ at the Islamic University ʿAllāma Muḥammad Yūsuf Binnorī Town 
Karachī, Murawwaja Islāmī Bankārī: Tajziyātī Muṭālaʿa, Sharʿī Jāʾiza o Fiqhī Naqd o Tabṣira (Karachi: 
Maktaba Bayyināt, 2008), 168. 
7
 Ibid, 227. 
8
 Muhammad Taqi Usmani, Islāmī Bankārī: Tarīkh o Pas-Manẓar awr Ghalaṭ Fahmiyo kā Izāla (2009), 36-38, 
[book online]; available from http://www .deeneislam.com/ur/misc/BOOKS/Islamic_Banking/; Internet: last 
accessed 04 May 2010. 
9
 Ibid, 40-42. At that very time that this defence was issued, the very historical precedent which he refers to, 
namely the Ottomans‘ useage of the ḥiyal, was, fortuitously, a part of this study.  
10
 Abdurrahman Habil, ―The Tension between Legal Values and Formalism in Contemporary Islamic Finance,‖ 
in Integrating Islamic Finance into the Mainstream: Regulation, Standardization and Transparency, ed. S. 
Nazim Ali (Cambridge MS: Islamic Finance Project (ILSP) Harvard Law School, 2007), 109. 
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hila.‘11 Although the views of the past jurists vis-à-vis the ḥiyal are well known, the 
framework, purpose and role of these ḥiyal remains elusive. A gap therefore exists between 
the practice of the Islamic banks and the requisite theoretical framework upon which its modi 
operandi are premised. This study will attempt to fill that lacuna. 
 
Research Question 
It must be stated, at the outset, that we will not be examining contemporary Islamic financial 
instruments, but rather, delineating from the classical sources of Islamic jurisprudence a 
framework through which the appropriate usage of the ḥiyal can be determined. The question 
that we will seek to answer is whether the ḥiyal used to circumvent the prohibition of ribā, are 
a part of the Ḥanafī jurists‘ normative doctrine. This question will require us to explore the 
Ḥanafī theory of ribā and also to examine the ḥiyal in general as a jurisprudential 
phenomenon. This study will focus on the Ḥanafī School of jurisprudence as they are the 
chief protagonists of the ḥiyal and the genre‘s most prolific authors. Having said that, the 
other Schools‘ opinions will also be mentioned for comparative and analytical purposes. 
Comparing and contrasting their opinions will also demonstrate the distinct legal 
methodology of each School and how this is singularly critical in determining their respective 
approaches to both ribā and the ḥiyal. 
 
Structure of the Study 
To answer the above research question, this study has been divided into three parts 
representing the main areas of investigation: 
 Part one explores the concept of ribā in Islamic jurisprudence. 
                                                 
11
 Abdurrahman Habil, ―Authenticity of Islamic Finance in Light of the Principle of Daman,‖ in Islamic 
Finance: Innovation and Authenticity ed. S. Nazim Ali (Cambridge MS: Islamic Finance Project (ILSP) Harvard 
Law School, 2010), 108. 
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 Part two presents the diachronic development of the ḥiyal polemic and examines the 
ḥiyal as an independent legal genre. 
 Part three deals with the ḥiyal of ribā. 
The main contours of these three parts will now be briefly mentioned. It is important to keep 
this framework in mind throughout the work so as not to get lost in the details. 
 
Part One: Ribā in Islamic Jurisprudence 
There are many works available now in English which deal with ribā and even some which 
purport to explicate the theory of ribā.12 Most of these works, however, do not go beyond a 
simple presentation of the views of the jurists vis-à-vis ribā in the Qurʾān and the Sunna and 
their respective determinations of its ratio legis (ʿilla). Our presentation will attempt to 
construct a far wider theory of ribā from the Ḥanafī sources, which ties together their 
hermeneutical methodology and the juridical application of their ribā doctrine. In chapter one, 
therefore, we will begin by investigating the hermeneutical approach of the Ḥanafīs and 
attempt to demonstrate just how they constructed their definition of ribā according to its 
usage in the Qurʿān and the Sunna. In chapter two, their application of the ribā doctrine in the 
various branches of Islamic commercial law will be compared with that of the other Schools. 
This approach will allow us to see the systematic structure which underpins the legal 
discourse of the Ḥanafīs and the other Schools, and observe the significance of legal 
methodology in the jurists‘ differences. We will also present another noteworthy theory of 
ribā, namely that of Ibn al-Qayyim. His theory is important because it shows an alternative 
                                                 
12
 See, for example, Abdulkader Thomas, ed., Interest in Islamic Economics: Understanding Riba (London: 
Routledge, 2006); Ziauddin Ahmad, ―The Qur‘ānic Theory of Ribā,‖ Islamic Quarterly 20, no. 22 (1978): 3-14; 
A. G. Muslim, The Theory of Interest in Islamic Law and the Effects of the Interpretation of this by the Hanafi 
School up to the end of the Mughal Empire (PhD diss., University of Glasgow, 1974); Nabil Saleh, Unlawful 
Gain and Legitimate Profit in Islamic Law: Riba, Gharar and Islamic Banking (Cambridge: CUP, 1986); Imran 
Ahsan Khan Nyazee, The Concept of Ribā and Islamic Banking (Islamabad: Niazi Publishing House, 1995). 
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legal methodology at work, and because both he, and his teacher Ibn Taymiyya, wrote major 
treatises to refute the ḥiyal. 
 
Part Two: The Ḥiyal: Polemic and Genre 
The second part of the investigation will begin with an examination of the ḥiyal polemic. In 
chapter three, the polemic will be presented through the works of the ḥiyal opponents. The 
central concern here is to show the diachronic nature of the polemic and how it becomes more 
nuanced as time goes by. Starting from the traditionists al-Bukhārī and Ibn Baṭṭa, where the 
polemic begins in its rudimentary form, we move on to the works of Ibn Taymiyya and his 
student Ibn al-Qayyim, where the argument is far more developed and refined. The polemic 
ultimately ends with al-Shāṭibī, who attempts to underwrite it with his distinct teleological 
theory of the maqāṣid al-Sharīʿa. These nuanced views will then be compared with the 
Ḥanafī‘s defence of the ḥiyal. The Ḥanafīs‘ views on the role and justification of the ḥiyal will 
be discerned from the major treatises they authored in the ḥiyal. 
 
We will then look at the ḥiyal genre and its purpose in chapter four. In relation to this, we will 
scrutinise the Orientalists‘ assertions regarding the purpose of the ḥiyal genre and the vitality 
of Islamic commercial law. The views of the Orientalists provide a useful backdrop against 
which the genre can be examined. To challenge their assertions we will examine the very first 
Kitāb al-Ḥiyal and its putative author. This will allow us to understand the nature of the genre 
and the source of its substantive content. For comparative purposes, this will be followed by 
an examination of the reception of the ḥiyal in the other Schools of Islamic law by noting their 
contributions to the genre. We will then assess the substantive contents of the Ḥanafī genre 
and examine the Ḥanafī stance on the controversial ḥiyal. Finally we will discern the actual 
relation of the ḥiyal genre to the standard Ḥanafī works. 
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Part Three: The Ḥiyal of Ribā 
In the final part of our study we will use the results of the preceding chapters to assess the 
validity and usage of the ḥiyal of ribā. In the main, the ḥiyal which are central to 
contemporary Islamic finance are the double-sales of ʿīna and tawarruq, and the sale with a 
right of redemption known as the bayʿ al-wafāʾ.13 These transactions will be examined in 
chapter five from the perspective of the standard Ḥanafī doctrine and also their later regional 
usage. Our main concern is to understand why the jurists permitted them and what function 
they played. To do this we will use an analytical model which demarcates the utility of the 
ḥiyal and provides us with a context for the rulings of the Ḥanafī jurists who permitted them. 
The analytical model is not restricted to merely explaining the earlier usage of the ḥiyal; but 
more significantly, it can be employed to circumscribe their juridical remit. 
 
In chapter six, the analytical model will be used to examine the Ottoman practice of the cash 
waqf.
14
 This institution played a significant role in the development of the Balkan cities under 
the Ottomans, although it did so using various ḥiyal. The cash waqf and its various ḥiyal 
adjuncts were officially sanctioned in the Ottoman Empire and not surprisingly resulted in a 
major juristic controversy. The analytical model developed in chapter five, will be applied to 
the controversy to explain the phenomenon of the cash waqf and the use of the ḥiyal. The 
                                                 
13
 To appreciate the importance of these transactions, see Usmani, An Introduction to Islamic Finance, 87-88, 
120-26; idem (spelt in this publication as Mohammed Taqi Othmani), ―Methods of House Building Financing 
According to Shari‘ah,‖ in Islamic Banking Modes for House Building Finance, ed. Mahmoud Ahmad Mahdi 
(Jeddah: IRTI, 1995), 70-74(61-74); Saiful Azhar Rosly and Azizi Che Seman, ―Juristic Viewpoints on Bayʿ al-
ʿĪnah in Malaysia: A Survey,‖ IIUM Journal of Economics and Management 11, no. 1 (2003): 87-111; Saiful 
Azhar Rosly and Mahmood Sanusi, ―Some Issues of Bayʿ al-ʿĪnah in Malaysian Financial Markets,‖ Arab Law 
Quarterly 16, no. 3 (2001): 263-280; Mahmoud A. El-Gamal, Islamic Finance: Law, Economics, and Practice 
(Cambridge: CUP, 2006), 70-74. 
14
 The cash waqf is currently being touted as a model for Islamic finance innovation, see Magda Ismail Abdel 
Mohsin, Cash Waqf: A New Financial Product (Kuala Lumpur: Prentice Hall, 2009); Dian Masyita, Muhammad 
Tasrif and Abdi Suryadinata Telaga, A Dynamic Model For Cash Waqf Management as One of the Alternative 
Instruments for the Poverty Alleviation in Indonesia (paper submitted to the 23
rd
 international conference of the 
Systems Dynamics Society, Boston: MIT, July 17-21, 2005); ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Hābīl, ―Waqf al-Nuqūd al-Ahlī 
wa Ahammiyyatuhū li al-ʿAmal al-Maṣrifī al-Islāmī,‖ Awqāf 9 (2005): 147-155; Murat Cizakca, ―The Relevance 
of the Ottoman Cash Waqfs (Awqaf al-Nuqud) for Modern Islamic Economics,‖ in The Proceedings of the Third 
International Conference on Islamic Economics, ed. S.A.H. Al-Junaid (Kuala Lumpur: International Islamic 
University, 1992), 393-413. 
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widespread use of the latter, will also allow us to develop the analytical model further. The 
controversy is especially significant as it shows how the jurists dealt with a novel financial 
institution and critically measured it against the demands of Ḥanafī normative doctrine. This 
critical attitude is precisely what is currently required in Islamic finance. 
 
Literature Review 
The aim of this thesis is to present the legal framework and the historical context of the ḥiyal 
of ribā and we will therefore be utilising both legal and historical sources. In our initial 
explication of the Ḥanafī theory of ribā we will be using two types of legal genre to 
appreciate the distinct hermeneutical approach of the Ḥanafīs and also that of the other 
Schools. The first of these genres is that which deals specifically with the principles of 
jurisprudence i.e. the uṣūl al-fiqh. We will be using the earliest extant explication of Ḥanafī 
uṣūl al-fiqh; the al-Fuṣūl fī al-Uṣūl of al-Jaṣṣāṣ (d.370 AH).15 The other legal genre relates to 
the jurisprudence of the Qurʾān, and again it is the work of al-Jaṣṣāṣ, his Aḥkām al-Qurʾān, 
which will be utilised here.
16
 Scholars from the other Schools of Islamic law also authored 
works in the Aḥkām al-Qurʾān genre and these will be used to provide the opinions of the 
other Schools. The remainder of the Ḥanafī theory, in terms of the delineation of the ratio 
legis and the application of the ribā doctrine in the various branches of commercial law, will 
be discerned from the general works of fiqh. In this regard we will be using the most 
authoritative sources of the Ḥanafī School; the al-Mabsūṭ of al-Sarakhsī and the Badāʾiʿ al-
Ṣanāʾiʿ fī Tartīb al-Sharāʾiʿ of al-Kāsānī.17 These works are comprehensive compendia and 
                                                 
15
 Abū Bakr Aḥmad ibn ʿAlī al-Rāzī al-Jaṣṣāṣ, Uṣūl al-Fiqh al-Musammā bi al-Fuṣūl fī al-Uṣūl, 4 vols. (Kuwait: 
Wizārat al-Awqāf wa al-Shuʾūn al-Islāmiyya, 1994). 
16
 Abū Bakr Aḥmad ibn ʿAlī al-Rāzī al-Jaṣṣāṣ, Aḥkām al-Qurʾān, 5 vols. (Beirut: Dār Iḥyāʾ al-Turāth al-ʿArabī, 
1992). 
17
 Abū Bakr Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad ibn Abī Sahl al-Sarakhsī, Kitāb al-Mabsūṭ, 30 vols. In 15 (Beirut: Dār al-
Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 2001); ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn Abū Bakr ibn Masʿūd al-Kāsānī, Badāʾiʿ al-Ṣanāʾiʿ fī Tartīb al-Sharāʾiʿ, 
10 vols. (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 2000). 
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are renowned for their theoretical approach in systematically explicating the doctrine of the 
Ḥanafīs. 
 
For our discussion of the ḥiyal polemic, we will be relying mainly on six works: 
1. Ibn Baṭṭa‘s Ibṭāl al-Ḥiyal;18 
2. al-Bukhārī‘s Kitāb al-Ḥiyal (a chapter in his compendium of authentic aḥādīth);19 
3. Ibn Taymiyya‘s Bayān al-Dalīl ʿalā Buṭlān al-Taḥlīl,20 
4. Ibn al-Qayyim‘s Iʿlām al-Muwaqqiʿīn;21 
5. Ibn al-Qayyim‘s Ighāthat al-Lahfān;22 
6. al-Shāṭibī‘s al-Muwāfaqāt.23 
All of these works are primary expositions and henceforth they can be used, not only as a 
source for the author‘s viewpoints, but also to note the diachronic nature of the ḥiyal polemic. 
The increased nuance in their arguments can thus be used to identify the general trend of the 
polemic chronologically. 
 
For the Ḥanafī paradigm of the ḥiyal, we will be using the following works: 
1. al-Shaybānī‘s al-Makhārij fī al-Ḥiyal;24 
                                                 
18
 Abū ʿAbdullah ʿUbayd Allah ibn Muḥammad ibn Baṭṭa al-ʿUkbarī, Ibṭāl al-Ḥiyal (Beirut: Muʾassasat al-
Risāla, 1996). 
19
 Muḥammad ibn Ismāʿīl ibn Ibrāhīm al-Bukhārī, Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī (Liechtenstein: Thesaurus Islamicus 
Foundation, 2000). 
20
 Aḥmad ibn ʿAbd al-Ḥalīm ibn ʿAbd al-Salām ibn Taymiyya, Bayān al-Dalīl ʿalā Buṭlān al-Taḥlīl (Beirut: al-
Maktaba al-ʿAṣriyya, 2007), 22. This book is also known as Iqāmat al-dalīl ʿalā ibṭāl al-taḥlīl, and is the second 
part of vol. 3 in the author‘s al-Fatāwa al-Kubrā. 
21
 Shams al-Dīn Abū ʿAbdullah Muḥammad ibn Abī Bakr ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, Iʿlām al-Muwaqqiʿīn ʿan 
Rabb al-ʿĀlamīn (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 2004). 
22
 Shams al-Dīn Abū ʿAbdullah ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, Ighāthat al-Lahfān min Maṣāʾid al-Shayṭān (Cairo: 
Maktaba al-Thaqāfa al-Dīniyya, 2001). 
23
 Abū Isḥāq Ibrāhīm ibn Mūsā al-Shāṭibī, al-Muwāfaqāt fī Uṣūl al-Sharīʿa (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 
2004). 
24
 1) Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥasan al-Shaybānī, al-Makhārij fī al-Ḥiyal, ed. Joseph Schacht (Das kitāb al-maḫāriğ 
fil-ḥijal des Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥasan aš-Šhaybānī. In Zwei Rezensionen (Hildesheim: Georg Olsm 
Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1968). The Arabic portion of this work has been printed with similar pagination as 
Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥasan al-Shaybānī, al-Makhārij fī al-Ḥiyal, ed. Joseph Schacht (Leipzig, Baghdad: al-
Muthanna Library, 1930). 
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2. al-Khaṣṣāf‘s al-Ḥiyal wa al-Makhārij;25 
3. al-Sarakhsī‘s Kitāb al-Ḥiyal (a chapter in his al-Mabsūṭ);26 
4. Saʿīd ibn ʿAlī‘s Jannat al-Aḥkām wa Junnat al-Khiṣām;27 
5. Ibn Māza‘s Kitāb al-Ḥiyal (a chapter in his al-Muḥīṭ al-Burhānī).28 
These works are critically important as they present the endogenous view of the ḥiyal authors 
regarding the nature of the ḥiyal both as a genre and as a juridical technique. An examination 
of the nature of their substantive contents will reveal the Ḥanafī approach to the ḥiyal. In 
addition to these works, we will also make reference to the chapters on the ḥiyal which are 
found in the responsa (fatāwā) literature. As the discussion moves on to assess the nature of 
the ḥiyal genre and the assertions of the Orientalists, we will compare the published al-
Makhārij fī al-Ḥiyal of al-Shaybānī with the latter‘s work al-Aṣl. The portion of this work 
which is relevant has not yet been published and hence we will be referring to the manuscripts 
of this work. 
 
The sources mentioned above will all be used to explicate the legal framework of the ḥiyal. 
For the historical context of these ḥiyal we will use a wide range of secondary sources. These 
secondary sources have all been selected on the basis that they represent an accurate reflection 
of research into primary historical sources. Part of our criticism of the Orientalists, is their use 
of anecdotal evidence in determining the historical practice of Islamic law. We have therefore 
endeavoured to utilise those research-based studies which are based upon primary sources 
such as the following: 
                                                 
25
 Abū Bakr Aḥmad ibn ʿAmru al-Shaybānī al-Khaṣṣāf, Kitāb al-Ḥiyal wa al-Makhārij, ed. Joseph Schacht (Das 
Kitāb al- hiial ṷal- mahāriğ), (Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1968). 
26
 Abū Bakr Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad al-Sarakhsī, Kitāb al-Ḥiyal min al-Mabsūṭ, printed together with , al-
Makhārij fī al-Ḥiyal, by al-Shaybānī, ed. Joseph Schacht. 
27
 Saʿīd ibn ʿAlī al-Samarqandī, Jannat al-Aḥkām Junnat al-Khiṣām fī al-Ḥiyal wa al-Makhārij, ed. Ṣafwat Kūsa 
and Ilyās Qablān (Beirut: Dār Ṣādir; Istanbul: Maktabat al-Irshād, 2005). 
28
 Burhān al-Dīn Maḥmūd ibn Ṣadr al-Sharīʿa Ibn Māza, al-Muḥīṭ al-Burhānī li-Masāʾil al-Mabsūṭ wa al-
Jāmiʿayn wa al-Siyar wa al-Ziyādāt wa al-Nawādir wa al-Fatāwa wa al-Wāqiʿāt Mudallala bi-Dalāʾil al-
Mutaqaddimīn, 25 vols. (Karachi: Idārat al-Qurʾān, 2004). 
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 Ottoman court records; 
 Cairo Geniza documents; 
 Family archives; 
 Waqf documents (waqfiyya); 
 Contemporary historical accounts. 
Using these documents provides a far more accurate assessment of historical practice and thus 
provides a reliable base for further analysis. 
 
Methodology 
There are two main methodologies employed in this study; the first relates to the legal 
framework and the second to the historical context. In any study of a legal discourse the most 
important aspect is to recognise the hierarchy of legal sources. In Islamic jurisprudence each 
School of law as its own criteria for determining the hierarchy of both the jurists and the 
various works they have authored.
29
 These hierarchies take into consideration the epistemic 
stature of the author-jurist and the reception of the specific text in the School. This last point 
is important as it should not be taken for granted that the authority of a work rests solely upon 
the stature of its author. The texts used in this work have been selected with due regard to 
these hierarchies. In addition to appreciating these hierarchies, it is equally important to 
recognise the variation within a School‘s juristic tradition with regards to different regions 
and time periods. We have therefore used those legal texts which have been authored by local 
                                                 
29
 Muḥammad Amīn Ibn ʿĀbidīn, ―Sharḥ al-Manẓūma al-Musammā bi-ʿUqūd Rasm al-Muftī,‖ in Majmūʿa 
Rasāʾil ibn ʿĀbidīn, idem (Beirut: Dār Iḥyā al-Turāth al-ʿArabī, nd), vol. 1, 9-52; ʿAbd al-Ḥayy al-Laknawī, ―al-
Nāfiʿ al-Kabīr li-man Yuṭāliʿ al-Jāmiʿ al-Ṣaghīr,‖ as an introduction to al-Jāmiʿ al-Ṣaghīr by Muḥammad ibn 
Ḥasan al-Shaybānī (Beirut: ʿĀlam al-Kutub, 1986), 5-31; Muḥammad Bakhīt al-Muṭīʿī, Risāla fī Bayān al-Kutub 
allatī Yuʿawwal ʿalayhā wa Bayān Ṭabaqāt ʿUlamāʾ al-Madhhab al-Ḥanafī wa al-Radd ʿalā Ibn Kamāl Bāshā 
(Damascus: Dār al-Qādirī, 2008), 65-101; Norman Calder, ―The ʿUqūd rasm al-muftī of Ibn ʿĀbidīn,‖ Bulletin of 
the School of Oriental and African Studies 63, no. 2 (2000): 217-228; idem, ―al-Nawawī‘s Typology of Muftīs 
and its Significance for a General Theory of Islamic Law,‖ Islamic Law and Society 3, no. 2 (1996): 137-55. 
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jurists when discussing regional issues, such as those specific to Transoxania or to the 
Ottomans. 
 
In the historical aspects of this inquiry our methodology is to analyse and present the research 
of contemporary researchers.  The historical aspects of this study are those which pertain to 
the economic history of the medieval Islamic commercial system and also to the economic 
and legal history of the Ottoman cash waqf practice. With regard to the history of the 
medieval Islamic commercial system, the sources for this inquiry have been critically selected 
based upon the probative sources they employ. The use of material based upon primary 
sources allows us to challenge the paradigm of the Orientalists which was to a large extent 
premised upon anecdotal evidence. To facilitate our analysis of these historical practices we 
will be using (and developing) an economic model of Tag el Din which lays down a basic 
framework for relating the ribā prohibition to its Islamic alternatives. Although Tag el Din‘s 
model is an economic model designed for planning an Islamic economy, we will be using it 
here for historical analysis and to develop a framework for demarcating the utility of the 
ḥiyal.  
 
In addition to these methods, we have also used some philological analysis for determining 
the authorship of the al-Makhārij fī al-Ḥiyal attributed to al-Shaybānī.30 This involves an 
examination of the history of the text, and the language used in the text when referring to the 
ḥiyal. The context of this analysis is determined using biographical and other historical 
sources, which allude to, or comment on, this specific text and which also mention other 
                                                 
30
 For the historical use of philology in Oriental Studies, see Baber Johansen, ―Politics, Paradigms and the 
Progress of Oriental Studies: The German Oriental Society (Deutsche Morgenlärdische Gesellschaft) 1845-
1989,‖ M.A.R.S. 4 (1995): 81-83; idem, ―Islamic Studies. The Intellectual and Political Conditions of a 
Discipline,‖ in Penser l’Orient: Traditions et actualité des Orientalismes français et allemand, ed. Youssef 
Courbage and Manfred Kropp (Beirut: Institut Français du Proche-Orient & Orient-Institut, 2004), 69-74, 81-91; 
Edward W. Said, ―Islam, the Philological Vocation, and French Culture: Renan and Massignon,‖ in Islamic 
Studies: A Tradition and its Problems, ed. Malcolm H. Kerr (California: Undena Publications, 1980), 53-72.  
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jurists who have compiled works in this genre. This allows us to understand the beginnings of 
the genre and its relationship to the Ḥanafī normative doctrine. 
 
In all, this study uses an interdisciplinary method utilising various methodologies (juridical, 
historical, economic and philological) depending on the specifc requirements of each chapter 
or section. When considered as a whole, they allow for a broader analysis which encompasses 
the complete narrative of the ḥiyal. The result is a coherent account of the legal framework 
and the historical context the ḥiyal. 
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RIBĀ IN ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
RIBĀ IN THE QURʾĀN AND THE SUNNA 
 
 
 
In this chapter the prohibition of usury in the Qurʾān and Sunna will be examined. The main 
concern is to present the approach of the various schools of law (madhhab, pl. madhāhib) in 
understanding the meaning of the term ribā. Although the focus of our investigation in this 
thesis is undoubtedly on the Ḥanafī theory of ribā, the opinions of the other major schools 
will also be mentioned for contrast and comparison. The ensuing presentation will hence 
explicate their respective articulations of the term ribā, while also highlighting the 
methodological variation in their hermeneutical strategies. In the first section of this chapter 
we will examine the jurists‘ views on the meaning of ribā in the Qurʾānic prohibition. This 
will be followed in the second section by an examination of the prophetic prohibition of ribā. 
In conclusion to this chapter, we will present the Ḥanafī definition of ribā premised upon the 
explication given in the preceding two sections. 
 
1.1 Ribā in the Qurʾān 
The treatment of ribā as mentioned in the Qurʾān will be looked at through the discourse of 
the jurists‘ exegesis of the word ribā.1 Jurists have analysed the Qurʾānic injunction in the 
language of uṣūl al-fiqh. This uṣūlī analysis has a manifest import on the theories of ribā 
                                                 
1
 Juristic exegeses are generally entitled Aḥkām al-Qurʾān and form a distinct genre in the exegetical literature. 
These commentaries were written to show, not only that the hermeneutical basis of Islamic law is the specific 
injunctions in the Qurʾān, but also that the different methodological approaches of their authors towards the text, 
is what gives rise to juridical points of difference, ikhtilāf al-fuqahāʾ that occurs between the madhāhib. The 
importance of the genre is then realised in the inter-madhhab polemic and in demonstrating the immediacy of, 
not only Islamic jurisprudence on the whole to the Qurʾān, but also of juristic differences in the detailed 
substantive law to specific verses. For a summary introduction to the genre and the various authors and their 
contributions, see Muḥammad Zāhid al-Kawtharī, introduction to Aḥkām al-Qurʾān by Abū ʿAbdullah 
Muḥammad ibn Idrīs al-Shāfiʿī (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1980), 14. 
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subsequently developed and shows the relationship, presupposed by the jurists, between the 
various prohibitions of ribā found in the Qur‘ān and the prophetic Sunna. The key question 
addressed by the jurists is in regards to the meaning of the term ribā and whether this meaning 
is known from its contextual setting (i.e. the economic practices of pre-Islamic Arabia), in 
which case it is designated as ʿāmm, or whether the term is ambiguous and in need of further 
clarification, in which case it is termed mujmal. 
 
1.1.1 ʿĀmm and Mujmal 
In the general commentaries (tafsīr) on the Qurʾān, three types of usurious transactions are 
mentioned as having been in vogue contemporary to the ribā injunction: 
1. An increase on the principal due to a default in repaying a loan.2 
2. An increase on the principal due to a default in the payment due from a credit sale.3 
3. An increase in the age of an animal due to default of supply, i.e. if a two year old 
camel was originally due; a defaulter is obliged to give a three year old.
4
 
These specific instances need to be borne in mind as a central aspect of the ensuing 
presentation is focused on whether the ribā prohibition of the Qurʾān dealt only with these 
specific transactions, in vogue at the time of revelation, or whether they addressed a wider 
meaning, yet to be elaborated. 
 
In uṣūl al-fiqh the term ʿāmm is understood to be the opposite of khāṣṣ. The former carries a 
general meaning, applying to genera and types, as opposed to khāṣṣ which applies to specific 
individuals or distinctive units. However, before evaluating whether a word is general or 
specific (ʿāmm or khāṣṣ), the jurists need to decide whether the meaning of the word is known 
                                                 
2
 Abū Jaʿfar Muḥammad ibn Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, Jāmiʿ al-Bayān ʿan Taʾwīl Āy al-Qurʾān (Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, 1984), 
vol. 3, 101 (verse 2:275), vol. 3, 89-90 (verse 3:130); al-Jaṣṣāṣ, Aḥkām al-Qurʾān, vol. 2, 184. 
3
 al-Ṭabarī, Jāmiʿ al-Bayān fī Tafsīr al-Qurʾān, vol. 3, 101, 89-90; al-ʿAsqalānī, al-ʿUjāb, 227. 
4
 al-Ṭabarī, Jāmiʿ al-Bayān fī Tafsīr al-Qurʾān, vol. 3, 90; al-Jaṣṣāṣ, Aḥkām al-Qurʾān, vol. 2, 183-4. 
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or not. This means that a word whose meaning is unknown or obscure in its juridical (or even 
lexical) import cannot be classified as either ʿāmm or khāṣṣ. To argue that the term ribā is 
ʿāmm is to infer that its meaning is known and that it carries a general import.5 What is crucial 
to the exegetical discourse, is that by designating ribā as ʿāmm, the jurists are asserting that its 
meaning at the instance of revelation was fully known and not in need of further clarification. 
This means that the prohibition of ribā mentioned in the Qurʾān relates directly to the general 
types of contracts in vogue at the time of revelation. 
 
In contradistinction to this claim, the opposing jurists assert that the term ribā is mujmal, i.e. 
that it contains an element of ambiguity and is in need of further clarification. The upshot of 
this claim is that the Qurʾānic prohibition of ribā may be applied to additional types of 
contracts not current to the period of revelation or more significantly it may be applied to 
contracts which were in existent but not recognised or designated by the Arabs at the time to 
be usurious. Having understood the basis for the ʿāmm/mujmal discourse, the views of the 
different Schools will now be examined.
6
 
 
1.1.2 The Mālikīs 
In his Aḥkām al-Qurʾān, Ibn al-ʿArabī explains that the linguistic meaning of ribā is ‗an 
increase (al-ziyāda)‘ and mentions that the scholars have differed regarding the word ribā, 
whether it is ʿāmm or mujmal.  Representing the Mālikī School, he proceeds to defend their 
                                                 
5
 al-Jaṣṣāṣ in his work on uṣūl al-fiqh makes it clear that what is ʿāmm is also a naṣṣ (mā yatanāwaluhū al-
ʿumūm fahuwa naṣṣ ayḍan). The naṣṣ being a clear statement and the opposite of the mujmal; see al-Jaṣṣāṣ, al-
Fuṣūl fī al-Uṣūl, vol. 1 59. 
6
 The importance of the mujmal as an uṣūlī tool can recognised by the fact that, as early an authority as ʿĪsā ibn 
Abān (a student of al-Shaybānī) is recorded to have written a treatise titled Kitāb al-Mujmal wa al-Mufassar. 
Additionally, Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal, in praising the different aspects of al-Shāfiʿī‘s knowledge, lauded ‗his 
knowledge of uṣūl al-fiqh; like the nāsikh and the mansūkh, and the mujmal and the mufassar and his acceptance 
of the single narration‘. These facts testify to the generally accepted importance of the mujmal in early Islamic 
jurisprudence. See, Murteza Bedir, ―An Early Response to Shāfiʿī: ʿĪsā b. Abān on the Prophetic Report 
(Khabar),‖ Islamic Law and Society 9, no. 3 (2002): 290; for the statement of Aḥmad see Aḥmad ibn ʿAbd al-
Ḥalīm ibnTaymiyya, Majmūʿat al-Fatāwā (Cairo: Maktabat Ibn Taymiyya, 1978), vol. 20, 330. 
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position that the word is ʿāmm and not mujmal. The current of his argument is that the Qurʾān 
was revealed to a people in their language, and business and trade was something known to 
them. Trade was recognised to be an exchange of countervalues exemplified in the following 
three generic transactions:  
 commodity7 for commodity, 
 commodity for debt,  
 commodity for usufruct (i.e. hire).   
The important point being that trade is conducted with the purpose of increasing one‘s wealth, 
and the means of that, is via the exchange of countervalues. The author then contrasts the 
increase of trade with the increase of ribā, by saying that the latter is also: 
‗an increase, and the meaning of it in the [Qurʾānic] verse is every increase which is not equated with 
a countervalue, because increase is not prohibited in essence … [otherwise] it would not be correct to 
equate it with [any] countervalue‘.8  
His argument is that the meaning of ribā is disclosed by dichotomising it with trade. Trade is 
therefore to be understood as the increase of wealth through the exchange of countervalues as 
opposed to usury. In the latter there is no countervalue in the transaction in lieu of the increase 
over the principal and it is hence this increase which is singularly regarded as ribā. This he 
asserts is known from the language of the verse itself and would have been immediately 
perceptible to its Arab audience. 
 
 The later Mālikī jurist al-Qurṭubī, expanding on the theme says that ribā in the Qurʾānic 
injunction was for a known meaning; ʿāmm i.e. that which the Arabs were practising in their 
                                                 
7
 The word used by the author in this passage is ʿayn, this does not exactly correspond to commodity, as we will 
later explain, but it suffices our purpose here. 
8
 Abū Bakr Muḥammad ibn ʿAbdullah Ibn al-ʿArabī, Aḥkām al-Qurʾān (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya. 1984) 
vol. 1, 320-321. 
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trade, and subsequently it applies to that which was prohibited by the Prophet (pbuh).
9
 The 
important point being that the ribā prohibited in the Qurʾān injunction is linked to certain 
transactions while that prohibited by the Sunna relates to another set of transactions, 
qualitatively different from the former.  
 
1.1.3 The Shāfiʿīs  
al-Shāfiʿī does not make a clear statement in his works on whether the term ribā is ʿāmm or 
mujmal. In both his Aḥkām al-Qurʾān and his work on uṣūl al-fiqh, al-risāla, he only 
discusses the verse pertaining to ribā (2:275) but not the term ribā itself.10 Here it becomes 
clear that al-Shāfiʿī‘s overriding concern is to emphasise the epistemological relationship 
between the Qurʾān and the Sunna. With regard to the verse declaring the prohibition of ribā 
(2:275) he proffers the following possibilities: It could either be 
1. an ambiguous (jumla)11 rule subsequently clarified by the Prophet (pbuh), or 
2. a general (āmm) rule by which something specific (khāṣṣ) is intended and hence the 
Prophet (pbuh) clarified what was intended, or 
3. a general (āmm) rule,  permitting all transactions except those expressly prohibited by 
the Prophet (pbuh).
12
 
                                                 
9
 Abū ʿAbdullah Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad al-Anṣārī al-Qurṭubī, al-Jāmiʿ li Aḥkām al-Qurʾān (Dār al-Kitāb al-
ʿArabī, 1952), vol. 3, 358. 
10
 The Aḥkām al-Qurʾān attributed to al-Shāfiʿī is actually a compilation by al-Bayhaqī, although the latter does 
claim that al-Shāfiʿī himself did author a similar work. See al-Shāfiʿī, Ahkām al-Qurʾān, 19; Abū ʿAbdullah 
Muḥammad ibn Idrīs al-Shāfiʿī, al-Risāla (Beirut: al-Maktaba al-ʿIlmiyya, 1939), 232. Also see Majid Khadduri, 
Islamic Jurisprudence: al-Shāfiʿī’s Risāla, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Islamic Texts Society, 1961), 190-191. 
11
 The word jumla is used here in the place of mujmal. Both of these words have a dual usage; they indicate 
ambiguity as well as generality, and hence in the latter sense can be used as a synonym for ʿāmm. This latter 
usage may well cause confusion although the intended meaning can usually be garnered from the context. See al-
Jaṣṣaṣ, al-Fuṣūl fi al-Uṣūl, vol. 1, 63. In his now published thesis on al-Shāfiʿī‘s al-Risāla, Joseph Lowry 
appears to be unsure on both the meanings and relationships of these words. See his Early Islamic Legal Theory: 
The Risāla of Muḥammad ibn Idrīs al-Shāfiʿī (Leiden, Brill, 2007), 104-117.  
12
 al-Shāfiʿī, Aḥkām al-Qurʾān, 135. 
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al-Shāfiʿī then goes on to say, that whichever of these approaches is correct, the upshot is that 
Allah has directed his creation to the obedience of his Messenger (pbuh).
13
 This 
epistemological focus also comes through in his treatise on uṣūl al-fiqh. Again using the same 
verse (2.275) he declares that the general scope of Qurʿānic permission to trade is limited by 
the specific injunctions of the Prophet (pbuh).
14
  
 
Later Shāfiʿī scholars, reflecting their eponym‘s ambiguous stance, differed regarding the 
categorisation of ribā. al-Māwardī has recorded the extensive difference of opinion between 
the leading Shāfiʿī scholars,15 and although he does not immediately attempt to resolve the 
discord, he does, on numerous occasions in his compendium, declare ribā to be ʿāmm.16 The 
Shāfiʿī jurist known as Ilkiyā al-Harrāsī agreed with al-Māwardī‘s assessment, stating that the 
correct opinion is that ribā is ʿāmm despite narrating the opposite view from al-Shāfiʿī.17 The 
later Qurʾān commentator Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī in his monumental work al-Tafsīr al-Kabīr 
also narrates that al-Shāfiʿī‘s own personal opinion is that ribā is mujmal. al-Rāzī, as opposed 
to al-Harrāsī, agrees with al-Shāfiʿī and presents numerous proofs to support the point and 
concludes that before giving a specific verdict on any particular transaction, recourse must be 
made to the Prophet‘s (pbuh) clarifications.18 
 
1.1.4 The Ḥanafīs 
In his Aḥkām al-Qurʾān, al-Jaṣṣāṣ explains that ribā, in the juridical sense, encompasses more 
meanings which can be lexically accounted for. To corroborate his assertion he provides two 
                                                 
13
 Ibid, 136. 
14
 al-Shāfiʿī, al-Risāla, 232; Khadduri, al-Shāfiʿī’s Risāla, 190-191. 
15
 Abū al-Ḥasan ʿAli ibn Muḥammad ibn Ḥabīb al-Māwardī, al-Ḥāwī al-Kabīr (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-
ʿIlmiyya, 1999), vol. 5, 7-10. 
16
 Ibid, vol. 5, 81, 217, 289. 
17
 Muḥammad al-Ṭabarī Ilkiyā al-Harrāsī, Aḥkām al-Qurʾān (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 2001), vol. 1, pt. 
1, 233. 
18
 Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, al-Tafsīr al-Kabīr (Cairo: al-Maṭbaʿa al-Bahiyya al-Miṣriyya, nd.), vol. 7, 99. 
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main evidences: The first is a prophetic tradition in which delay (nasāʾa) is called ribā, and 
the second is a statement of the Companion ʿUmar (ra) in which he says that: ‗the verse of 
ribā was one of the last to be revealed and the Prophet was taken before he could clarify it for 
us:  so leave ribā and that which you doubt (rība).‘19 al-Jaṣṣāṣ concludes that because ʿUmar 
(ra) was a native speaker of the Arabic language, had the word ribā remained in its original 
linguistic sense then its legal meaning would not have needed further clarification. 
Additionally, he argues that its legal usage to describe delay, nasāʾā is not discernible from its 
lexical meaning. Similarly, in regard to a contract to supply an animal, if the supplier sought 
an extension on the delivery date, it was the practice of the Arabs to demand in increase in the 
age of the animal to be delivered. The increase in the age of the animal to be delivered 
represents an increase in value and acts as a compensation for the delay in delivery. al-Jaṣṣāṣ 
contends that, even though this was the practice of the Arabs, it was not known, or regarded 
by them, to be ribā.20 This means that the scope of the term in its revelatory context was 
greater than its contemporaneous usage.  The word, he concludes, has thus been removed 
from its linguistic meaning and has become a ‗juridical term‘, known in the language of uṣūl 
al-fiqh as an ism sharʿī. 
 
1.1.4.1 Mujmal in Ḥanafī Uṣūl 
In his work on Ḥanafī uṣūl, al-Dabbūsī notes that the linguists consider the mujmal to be 
similar to the gharīb; who, he explains, is an individual who becomes estranged from his 
homeland such that he can only be traced by enquiry.
21
 Likewise, he contends, the word ribā 
has become remote due to its relocation from its previous lexical assignment to a new 
                                                 
19
 al-Jaṣṣāṣ, Aḥkām al-Qurʾān, vol. 2, 183. 
20
 Ibid, vol. 2, 183-84. 
21
 Abū Zayd ʿUbaydullah ibn ʿUmar ibn ʿIsā al-Dabbūsi, Taqwīm al-Adilla fī Uṣūl al-Fiqh (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub 
al-ʿIlmiyya, 2001), 118; E. W. Lane, Arabic~English Lexicon (Cambridge: Islamic Texts Society, 1863-93), vol. 
2, 2243, third column. 
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meaning which remains inchoate and subject to further clarification.
22
 This does not, however, 
mean that those who heard the verse at the point of its revelation were not obliged to act upon 
it until its meaning was clarified. As al-Jaṣṣāṣ explains: ‗... the mujmal is that word, whose 
ruling can be utilised in relation to its situational emergence and which is dependant upon 
clarification in [cases] other than that.‘23 Later on in his treatise, he spells this out further by 
insisting that the mujmal may be implemented in the minimum portion that is known, while 
yet holding out for further clarifications.
24
 Essentially this means that ribā, as practised and 
understood in pre-Islamic Arabia was explicitly prohibited with immediate effect, but also 
that the door remained open for additional transactions to be included under its rubric. 
 
al-Jaṣṣāṣ then splits the mujmal into two types:  
1. That in which the obscurity is due to the word itself, such that those to whom it is 
addressed are unaware of its meaning. 
2. That in which the obscurity is not due to the word itself, but rather, due to an external 
factor.   
After giving various examples of the former category, he goes on to say ‗... and from this type 
are the juridical terms (asmāʾ al-sharʿ) which are enacted for meanings not endowed [purely] 
through language.‘25 Common examples of these juridical terms include the words ṣalāt 
(prayer), zakāt (alms), and ṣawm (fasting).26 These words which only have religious 
applications are significant examples as they show that a juridical term has no meaning other 
than that given to it by Islamic law. The linguistic meaning in these terms is regarded as 
                                                 
22
 al-Dabbūsi, Taqwīm al-Adilla, 118. 
23
 al-Jaṣṣāṣ, al-Fuṣūl fī al-Uṣūl, vol. 1, 64. 
24
 Ibid, vol. 1, 328. 
25
 Ibid, 65; also see Marie Bernand, ―Ḥanafī Uṣūl al-Fiqh through a Manuscript of al-Ğaṣṣāṣ,‖ Journal of the 
American Oriental Society 105, no. 4 (1985): 629.  
26
 al-Jaṣṣāṣ, al-Fuṣūl fī al-Uṣūl, vol. 1, 68-69. 
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obsolete when these words are found in the sacred texts, unless of course there is an indication 
that the original meaning is intended.  
 
Putting ribā into this category is significant as it means that this term has only one meaning 
and that meaning is to be applied wherever the word is found in the sacred texts. This is 
clearly mentioned later on in al-Jaṣṣāṣ‘ treatise, when he is dealing with the net rule (ḥukm) of 
the mujmal. Here, he says regarding the juridical terms, that once these words have become 
established in their juridical meanings, then whenever they are used, that meaning will be 
assumed to be its primary meaning.
27
 The implication here is that the word ribā is discerned 
to have a single meaning, not one specific to the Qurʾān and another specific to the Sunna, but 
rather one which encompasses all the various explications of ribā found in these two sources.  
 
al-Jaṣṣāṣ goes on to say that there are two consequences of the mujmal:  
1. The requirement to immediately subjugate one‘s soul or prepare one‘s mind for the 
impending ruling once the clarification appears. 
2. Once the clarification occurs then the obligation is connected to the preceding 
injunction.
28
 
The second of these two points is critically important to our discussion, as it connects the 
clarification to the original Qurʾānic prohibition and shows that the Ḥanafīs intend to interpret 
ribā as a juridical term in which all subsequent Prophetic additions are linked to the original 
Qurʾānic injunction.  
 
 
 
                                                 
27
 Ibid, vol. 1, 334. 
28
 al-Jaṣṣāṣ, al-Fuṣūl fī al-Uṣūl, vol. 2, 73.  
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1.1.5 Summary of the ʿĀmm/Mujmal Dispute 
From this section we can see, summarily, that the Mālikīs have invariably declared ribā to be 
ʿāmm.  Directly opposed to them are the Ḥanafīs who deem it to be mujmal. The Shāfiʿīs, 
however, appear to be in disagreement with some scholars arguing on each side.
29
 In terms of 
identifying these results with the general characteristics of the different schools of law, it is 
clear that both the Ḥanafīs and the Mālikīs have coherently articulated a position in their uṣūl 
which, as will be witnessed later on, has a manifest import on their detailed legal rules. The 
Shāfiʿīs, it is clear, do not have a consistent stance on this point and, correspondingly, their 
elaboration of their substantive doctrine is not as firmly wedded to such general principles as 
the other two Schools. 
 
1.2 Ribā in the Ḥadīth 
The Qurʿānic prohibition of ribā was made in the context of the contemporary practice of 
Arabian commerce. In the ḥadīth literature these pronouncements are endorsed and 
augmented by additional rules which serve to extend the ambit of the ribā rules. These 
additional rules are the subject of this section and the aḥādīth in which they are mentioned are 
presented below together with an explanation of their application.  
 
1.2.1 Ribā al-Faḍl and Ribā al-Nasāʾa 
The following aḥādīth mention the additional forms of ribā proscribed by the Sunna: 
1. ʿUbāda ibn al-Ṣāmit (ra) relates that the Messenger of Allah (pbuh) said ‗Sell gold for 
gold, silver for silver, wheat for wheat, barley for barley, dates for dates and salt for 
                                                 
29
 al-Qurṭubī claims that the majority of jurists (jamhūr al-fuqahā’) consider ribā to be ʿāmm. See his al-Jāmiʿ li 
Aḥkām al-Qurʾān, vol. 3, 356. This does not, however, appear to be correct, and in fact from the Mālikī School 
Ibn Rushd al-Ḥafīd, was in agreement with the Ḥanafī opinion. See Abū al-Walīd Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad ibn 
Rushd, al-Muqaddimāt al-Mumahhidāt (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 2002), vol. 2, 179. 
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salt, like for like, in equal amounts [and] hand to hand. If the genera differ then sell as 
you wish as long as it is hand to hand.‘30 
2. Abū Saʿīd al-Khudrī (ra) relates that the Messenger of Allah (pbuh) said ‗[Sell] gold 
for gold, silver for silver, wheat for wheat, barley for barley, dates for dates and salt 
for salt, like for like, hand to hand. And whosoever increases or demands an increase 
has engaged in usury. The taker and the giver are, in [the act], equal.‘31 
These aḥādīth make two requirements in the sale of these specific commodities: the first 
requirement, for the items to be sold ‗like for like‘, demands quantitative equality in the items 
exchanged. The second requirement that the transaction be ‗hand to hand‘ necessitates that the 
delivery of the goods be made in the contractual session. These two requirements are clear 
from the wording of the ḥadīth itself and the ribā which ensues from a failure to observe these 
requirements, is known as ribā al-faḍl and ribā al-nasāʾa, respectively. Ribā al-faḍl hence 
refers to the excess that results from quantitative disparity, whereas ribā al-nasāʾa refers to a 
delay in delivery or payment beyond the contractual session. 
 
These aḥādīth, self-evidently, explicate the above forms of ribā with reference to transactions 
in which both items of exchange belong to one genus, i.e. when gold is exchanged for gold or 
silver for silver or wheat for wheat etc. On such transactions, the ḥadīth stipulates that the 
items exchanged must be the same weight or volume; 5kg of gold must therefore be 
exchanged for 5kg of gold, no more and no less. If 5kg of gold are sold for 6kg of gold, the 
extra 1kg amounts to ribā al-faḍl. This is true even if the transaction is conducted with 
immediate delivery of both items. If 5kg of gold are exchanged for 5kg of gold and one of the 
items is delivered after the contractual session this violates the requirement of a ‗hand to 
hand‘ exchange and constitutes ribā al-nasāʾa. Again, this is the case even though both items 
                                                 
30
 Muslim ibn al-Ḥajjāj al-Qushayrī al-Naysābūrī, Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim (Liechtenstein: Thesaurus Islamicus 
Foundation, 2000), vol. 2, 676 (ḥadīth no. 4148). 
31
 Ibid, vol. 2, 676 (ḥadīth no. 4149). 
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are quantitatively equal, i.e. the mere fact of a delay in the delivery is regarded as ribā al-
nasāʾa, even though the amounts exchanged are equivalent. 
 
1.2.2 The Two Groups 
All the Schools of Islamic law agree that the six commodities mentioned in the two aḥādīth 
are divided into two groups; group one consists of gold and silver and group two of wheat, 
barley, dates and salt. They also agree that ribā only occurs from an exchange of commodities 
from within each group and that if items are exchanged between the groups there is neither 
ribā al-faḍl nor ribā al-nasāʾa. So, in an exchange of a group one item for a group two item, 
such as gold for barley or silver for wheat, there is no ribā and the exchange is not 
conditioned by quantitative equivalence or immediate delivery. In the matrix below the 
transactions in which ribā cannot occur are marked with an X. 
 
 Group One Group Two 
 Gold Silver Wheat Barley Dates Salt 
Group Gold RF + RN RN X X X X 
One Silver RN RF + RN X X X X 
 Wheat X X RF + RN RN RN RN 
Group Barley X X RN RF + RN RN RN 
Two Dates X X RN RN RF + RN RN 
 Salt X X RN RN RN RF +RN 
Table 1. Ribā and the Six Commodities (RF – ribā al-faḍl, RN – ribā al-nasāʾa)32 
 
                                                 
32
 The only point of disagreement in this table is that the Mālikīs regard wheat and barley as one jins and hence 
both types of ribā may occur in their exchange. See Ibn Rushd, al-Muqaddimāt, vol. 1, 358. 
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This table shows where ribā cannot occur and also where the different types of ribā can 
occur. The importance of dividing the commodities into two groups should now be apparent 
as ribā does not operate between the items of each group. After dividing the commodities into 
two groups, the maxim mentioned in the first ḥadīth – If the genera differ then sell as you 
wish as long as it is hand to hand – can be applied to each group separately. For example, in 
group one, if gold is exchanged for silver, which are regarded as different genera, then there is 
no possibility of ribā al-faḍl occurring but there is of ribā al-nasāʾa. This means that within 
the group, quantitative equivalence is not necessary in exchanges of different genera, but 
delivery of both items must be made in the contractual session otherwise there will be ribā al-
nasāʾa. Similarly within the second group; if, for example, wheat is exchanged for salt, or 
barley for dates, the quantities may vary, but the transaction must be hand to hand. The result 
is that the proscription of ribā al-faḍl requires quantitative equivalence between items 
belonging to the same genus, whereas the proscription of ribā al-nasāʾa is not limited to 
exchanges within a specific genus but rather to exchanges within a group. Therefore, within 
each group, both ribā al-faḍl and ribā al-nasāʾa can occur in exchanges of items of the same 
genus whereas only ribā al-nasāʾa can occur if the genera are different. 
 
1.2.3 Ratio of the Two Groups 
Apart from the Ẓāhirīs and a few other jurists, most of the scholars agree that the rules of ribā 
al-faḍl and ribā al-nasāʾa are extendable to other commodities.33 They differ, however, in 
identifying the ratio. In general, the approach of the various jurists can be expressed in three 
opinions which identify the critical characteristics of group one and two, respectively, as 
follows: 
                                                 
33
 Qatāda, Ṭāwūs, and ʿUthmān al-Battī, together with Dawūd al-Ẓāhirī, are the prominent antagonists to 
extending the rules beyond these six commodities. See ʿAbd al-ʿAẓīm Jalāl Abū Zayd, Fiqh al-Ribā (Beirut: 
Muʾassasat al-Risāla Nāshirūn, 2004), 124-6. 
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1. Currency and foodstuffs, 
2. Weight and measure, 
3. Currency and foodstuffs, but only if sold by weight or measure. 
The first opinion is held by the Mālikīs, the Shāfiʿīs, and is one of three opinions in the 
Ḥanbalī School. Although it is not the preferred opinion of the Ḥanbalīs, it is favoured by Ibn 
al-Qayyim. The second opinion is held by ʿAmmār (ra) from the Companions, the Kufan 
jurists Ibrāhīm al-Nakhaʿī and Sufyān al-Thawrī, and the Madīnan traditionist al-Zuhrī. It is 
also the opinion of the Ḥanafīs and the dominant opinion in the Ḥanbalī School. The last 
opinion belongs to the eminent Madīnan jurist Saʿīd ibn al-Musayyab, Abū Thawr and is one 
of the minor opinions in the Ḥanbalī School.34 
 
To demonstrate the markedly different approach of the Schools we will present their views 
and consider their hermeneutical evidences. The Ḥanbalīs, whose three opinions coincide with 
that of the other Schools, will not be given a separate treatment, although the theory of Ibn al-
Qayyim, a prominent reformer within the School, will be elaborated separately. The Mālikīs 
and Shāfiʿīs, who have similar opinions, will be presented together to show both their 
commonalities and their differences. Finally, the method of the Ḥanafīs will be elucidated. 
The importance of the ratio is borne out when we see how the ribā rules are extended not only 
to other commodities but also into other areas of the law. This presentation will also serve to 
highlight the critical points of divergence between the Schools and the textual evidences they 
adduce in support of their opinions. 
 
When putting forward their opinions, jurists employ different argumentative methods. The 
first, and more forceful, is to present a proof-text (dalīl) in the form of a verse of the Qurʾān 
                                                 
34
 For a simplified useful presentation, which includes all four madhāhib and also covers the Ẓāhirīs and the 
Ibādis, see, Saleh, Unlawful Gain and Legitimate Profit, 15-16. 
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or narrations from the ḥadīth literature. These often include non-prophetic narrations, such as 
opinions or rulings given by the companions or even the successors.
35
 The second is to use 
systematic arguments, istidlāl, which attempt to demonstrate the harmony of the jurists‘ 
inference to the established hermeneutically-based legal superstructure. Both forms of 
argument will be presented for each School. 
 
1.2.3.1 The Mālikī-Shāfiʿī Method 
The Mālikīs and the Shāfiʿīs identify the pertinent characteristics of the first group to be their 
universal recognition as currency (thamaniyya), and in the second group that all the 
commodities are foodstuffs (ṭuʿmiyya).36 The proof-text for this will be shown followed by an 
examination of how each of these Schools subsequently develops its own application of the 
rules. 
 
1.2.3.1.1 The Dalīl for the Mālikī-Shāfiʿi Ratio 
al-Shāfiʿī, in his magnum opus, the kitāb al-Umm, narrates a number of aḥādīth relating to the 
ribā prohibition and then sets out to explain the basis of the two groups. He begins with gold 
and silver and explains that they are different to all other things because they constitute the 
price of other things. By this he means that these metals are unique in their function as 
currencies for purchasing other goods. This distinct inherent utility, he argues, precludes that 
any other items should be regarded as analogous to them.‘37 The Mālikīs employ similar 
reasoning as can be seen in the work of the Andalusian Ibn Rushd. He similarly argues that 
gold and silver are not analogous to other commodities and supports his argument by 
invoking juridical unanimity on the point that gold and silver may be exchanged for all 
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 These are known as ḥadīth mawqūf and ḥadīth maqṭūʿ respectively.  
36
 Wahba al-Zuḥaylī, al-Fiqh al-Islāmī wa Adillatuhū, 4th ed. (Damascus: Dār al-Fikr, 1997), vol. 5, 3716-3719.  
37
 Abū ʿAbdulllah Muḥammad ibn Idrīs al-Shāfiʿī, Kitāb al-Umm (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1993), vol. 
3, 24-25. 
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fungibles sold by weight or measure with a delay in delivery.
38
 The implication being that 
even the jurists who regard the ratio as weight and measure, make an exception to the rules 
for gold and silver in recognition of their unique function as ubiquitously acceptable 
currencies. 
 
The second ratio of the Mālikīs and Shāfiʿīs is foodstuffs and finds a textual basis in the 
following prophetic tradition: 
Maʿmar ibn ʿAbdullah (ra) related that … I used to hear the Messenger of Allah (pbuh) say ‗[Sell] food 
for food [only if it is] like for like.
39
 
This ḥadīth shows that the underlying factor in group two of the six commodities is the fact 
that they are foodstuffs. The ruling given here demands equivalence in exchanges of all 
foodstuffs of one genus, and is not specifically restricted to the six items mentioned in the 
other tradition. This implies that the previous tradition is merely a specific application of a 
more general rule enunciated here. 
 
The ruling in this ḥadīth is linked to a derivative word (ism mushtaqq), which is ṭaʿām, 
foodstuff and the principle according to the scholars of uṣul al-fiqh is that ‗when a ruling is 
linked to a derivative word it indicates that the meaning, from which the word is derived, is 
the ratio of the ruling‘.40 For example, in the Qurʾānic verse which deals with the punishment 
for stealing, the verse reads: al-sāriq wa al-sāriqa faqṭaʿū aydiyahumā – The male and female 
thief, you must cut [off] their hands (5:38). The scholars of uṣūl argue that the ratio for cutting 
is theft, sariqa, because firstly, the verse mentions the punishment linked to a derivative word, 
namely al-sāriq, and secondly because the meaning which is in this word, is not the thief but 
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 Ibn Rushd, al-Muqaddimāt al-Mumahhidāt, vol. 1, 347, 359. 
39
 Muslim, Ṣaḥīḥ, vol. 2, 678 (ḥadīth no. 4164). 
40
 ‗Anna al-ḥukm idhā ʿallaqa bi ism mushtaqq dalla ʿalā anna al-maʿnā alladhī ushtuqqa minhū al-ism huwa 
‘illa al-ḥukm. See al-Zuḥaylī, al-Fiqh al-Islāmī, vol. 5, 3719; al-Māwardī, al-Ḥāwī al-Kabīr, vol. 5, 86. 
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rather the action of theft itself.
41
 The ratio is hence derived from a ruling which is expressly 
connected, in a proof-text, to an ism mushtaqq. Applying this argument to the ḥadīth 
mentioned above, the demand for equivalence in linked to the derivative word ṭaʿām, which 
means foodstuff, and the ḥadīth therefore indicates this to be the characteristic which is causal 
to the ribā rules.  
 
The Mālikīs and Shāfiʿīs agree on this much, but in identifying the scope of the ratio of 
foodstuff, their doctrines substantially diverge. For the Shāfiʿīs, foodstuff includes anything 
which is capable of being a source of nourishment as opposed to being limited to food proper, 
and so may include medicines and seasonings.
42
 If one looks at the uṣūlī argument given 
above, then strictly speaking it favours the interpretation of the Shāfiʿīs because the principle 
is to derive the ratio from the meaning in the derivative word and not from the derivative 
word itself. So instead of making food the ratio, it is more accurate to allocate it to the 
linguistic root meaning of ṭaʿām which is ṭuʿm. This is the descriptive element of the word 
food, as opposed to food itself and implies a wider application. 
 
The Mālikīs, on the other hand, only adopt this broad meaning (with the exception of 
medicines) with regard to ribā al-nasāʾa. When it comes to ribā al-faḍl, they restrict the 
meaning of foodstuff with two conditions; namely that it should be a staple food and also that 
it should be storable.
43
 They infer this from the ḥadīth of the six commodities, where the four 
foodstuffs mentioned are wheat, barley, salt and dates. All of these items are characterised by 
the fact that they are staple and storable. The Mālikīs further argue that these items are 
functionally representative; in that, wheat and barley fulfil the basic dietary requirements and 
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 al-Zuḥaylī, al-Fiqh al-Islāmī, vol. 5, 3719; al-Māwardī, al-Ḥāwī al-Kabīr, vol. 5, 86. 
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 al-Shāfiʿī, Kitāb al-Umm, vol. 3, 25-6. 
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 Ibn Rushd, Bidāyat al-Mujtahid, trans. Imran Ahsan Khan Nyazee (Reading: Garnet Publishing, 1996), vol. 2, 
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thus represent foodstuffs such as rice and corn; dates are both sweet and storable and 
represent foodstuffs such as sugar, honey and raisons, and salt, which is a necessary 
ingredient in the preparation of food, indicates other seasonings, like pepper and herbs.
44
 
 
1.2.3.1.2 The Istidlāl for the Mālikī-Shāfiʿi Ratio 
The istidlāl for the two ratios of food and money is, as expected, similar in both Schools. 
They argue that the Sharīʿa has augmented the conditions of normal contract permissibility in 
these six specific commodities with two extra provisions requiring equivalence and immediate 
delivery. Now, it is already known that whenever extra stipulations are mandated, the reason 
is invariably due to a meaning in the exchange items which implies a heightened risk, ziyādat 
al-khaṭr. This can be noted, for example, in the marriage contract, where over and above the 
normal conditions of offer and acceptance, the Sharīʿa demands that a woman‘s guardian 
conduct her marriage contract on her behalf and also that the marriage be attested by two 
upright witnesses. These two extra provisions act as safeguards in a contract which is of 
palpably more significance than an ordinary commercial contract.  
 
Following this reasoning leads them to search for a cause in these contracts which makes 
them of such critical importance that extra conditions are stipulated in their trade. They 
subsequently observe that the ribā rulings pertain to currency and foodstuffs. The preservation 
of human life is premised upon the availability of staple foods and the role of money, as a 
medium of exchange, is central to the economic activity of a society.
45
 Both of these 
categories are of great importance to the material well being of each and every human being, 
such that there must be some form of protection in their trade. The two additional stipulations, 
therefore, act to prevent the spread of possible injustices in the economic supply of these 
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 See Abū Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Wahhāb ʿAlī ibn Naṣr, al-Maʿūna (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 2004), vol. 
2, 5-6; Abū Zayd, Fiqh al-Ribā, 157. 
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objects. By extensions, all other commodities which are similar in attribute, either as 
foodstuffs or currencies and are not mentioned in the ḥādīth literature explicitly, are also 
governed by the rules of ribā as they too are regarded as vitally important. 
 
Additionally, it can be observed that because the extra stipulations are due to the ziyādat al-
khaṭr of the exchange commodities, genus plays only a secondary role and is not regarded as a 
distinct ratio, but is rather designated as a necessary condition (sharṭ).46 Genus is hence only 
operative as a subsequent condition of ribā al-faḍl if one of the two ratios (i.e. foodstuffs or 
currency) is already present. If, for example, someone sells two food items, like barley and 
salt, or two monetary items like gold and silver, then the presence of the ratio in both cases 
means that delay is not permitted, although quantitative disparity is allowed due to the items 
belonging to different genera. If wheat for wheat is sold, or silver for silver, then we can see 
that the ratio is again present in both cases, and hence delay is proscribed. Additionally, 
because the items are of the same genus, there needs to be quantitative equivalence. This 
means that exchanging items belonging to the same genus will not be subject to the rules of 
ribā unless they are considered to be foodstuffs or currency. So the exchange of iron for iron 
or wool for wool or camels for camels can be done with quantitative disparity and with 
deferred delivery.  This is different to the Ḥanafīs, for whom genus itself is one of the ratios.  
 
1.2.3.2 The Ḥanafī Method 
The Ḥanafīs, it will be recalled, determine the ratio in the six commodities to be linked to the 
mode of measurement. In group one (gold and silver) both items are sold by weight, whereas 
in group two, all the items are sold by volume. The ratio inferred here is called qadr and 
refers to the susceptibility of the object to quantifiable measurement either by weight or 
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 This is specifically mentioned as the opinion of the Shāfiʿīs and also appears to be the opinion of the Mālikīs. 
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volume. The second ratio is genus. As with the presentation of the Shāfiʿī‘s opinion, firstly 
their textual evidences will be presented, then their istidlāl will be shown. 
 
1.2.3.2.1. The Dalīl for Genus 
The hermeneutic basis for the ratio of genus, is primarily what has already been mentioned in 
the two aḥādīth of Abū Saʿīd al-Khudrī  (ra) and ʿUbāda ibn Ṣāmit  (ra), where the ruling was 
given that ‗if the types differed then sell as you wish‘. The type, ṣinf, is taken here to mean the 
genera mentioned in the ḥadīth, as all the items mentioned belong to different genera.47 It may 
be recalled that Shāfiʿī himself, noticing the importance of the genus in the ribā equation, did 
not neglect it completely, but rather made it a condition as opposed to a cause. This subtle 
distinction is not merely a pedantic uṣūlī rearrangement as it does have an impact on the 
substantive rulings. For the Shāfiʿīs and the Mālikīs, it relegates genus to a secondary role; 
effective only in the presence of a ratio. What the Ḥanafīs are proposing is that genus itself is 
a ratio, effective on its own, like qadr. This means that whenever products of the same genus 
are sold, delay is prohibited, even if they are not fungibles sold by weight or volume.
48
 Hence, 
cloth, animals, eggs, in fact, all commodities now fall into the preserve of the ribā prohibition 
if sold within the same genus, although the ribā which is occasioned by genus is only ribā al-
nasāʾā. 
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 For a discussion on genera, see Baber Johansen, ―The Valorization of the Human Body in Muslim Sunni 
Law,‖ in Law and Society in Islam ed. Devin J. Stewart, Baber Johansen and Amy Singer (Princeton: Markus 
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 Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥasan al-Shaybānī, al-Ḥujja ʿalā Ahl al-Madīna (Beirut: ʿĀlam al-Kutub, 1968), vol. 2, 
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The Ḥanafīs find textual support for this in the following evidences: 
1. Ḥasan (ra) narrated from Samra (ra) that the Messenger of Allah (pbuh) prohibited the 
sale of animals for animals with a delay.
49
  
2. Jābir ibn ʿAbdullah (ra) narrates that the Messenger of Allah (pbuh) said ‗[There is] no 
problem [in exchanging] animals, two for one, hand to hand, [whereas] there is no 
goodness in it, [if it is] deferred.
50
  
These aḥādīth prohibit the sale of animals for animals with a delay. The Ḥanafīs infer that the 
prohibition of delay here is ribā al-nasāʾā, as the second ḥadīth clearly permits a quantitative 
inequality – ‗two for one‘. It should also be noted that because qadr is absent (i.e. animals are 
not fungible) there must be another ratio at work here. Also worth mentioning, is that the 
ratios which the Mālikīs and Shāfiʿīs propose are not present either, as live animals are neither 
money nor foodstuff. So apart from the ratios of measurement, foodstuff and currency what 
else could be the cause of the prohibition of delay, the Ḥanafīs infer that the only other 
possible effective cause is that the commodities belong to the same genus. 
 
The Ḥanafīs opinion is further corroborated by the rulings given by various Companion and 
Succesor jurists:  
1. [It is narrated] that ʿAmmār ibn Yāsir (ra) said ‗one slave [maybe] better than two 
slaves, and one camel [maybe] better than two camels, and one garment [maybe] 
better than two garments, [and hence, there is] no problem in [exchanging them, as 
long as it is] hand to hand, because ribā is only in the delay except in what is 
measured or weighed.
51
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 Abū Jaʿfar Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad al-Ṭaḥāwī, Sharḥ Maʿānī al-Āthār (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 
2006), vol. 3, 328-332. 
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 al-Shaybānī, al-Ḥujja, vol. 2, 495. For the provenance of these traditions, see ibid, 495, n.6. 
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 Abū Bakr ʿAbdullah ibn Muḥammad ibn Abī Shayba, al-Kitāb al-Muṣannaf fī al-Aḥādīth wa al-Āthār (Beirut: 
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2. I (the narrator) asked Abū Hurayra (ra) about selling one sheep for two sheep with a 
delay; he prohibited me and said ‗No! Unless it is hand to hand‘.52 
3. [It is narrated] from Mujāhid that he said ‗[There is] no problem [in exchanging] one 
egg for two eggs, [if it is] hand to hand.
53
 
4. Ibn ʿUyayna says ‗I asked Ayyūb about [exchanging] one garment for two garments 
with a delay and he said [that] Muḥammad used to disapprove of it.54 
 
The first tradition, from the companion ʿĀmmār ibn Yāsir (ra), appears to be in congruity 
with the position of the Ḥanafīs. By giving three examples of commodities, all of which are 
non-fungible, it becomes clear that the ratio of qadr is immediately discounted. Also, because 
the items are neither foodstuffs nor money, the ratio of the Mālikīs and Shāfiʿīs is dispelled. 
So we are left with three commodities which are being sold within their own genus. The 
ruling that emerges is that quantitative excess is permitted but a delay in delivery is not. This 
is taken from the companion‘s words ‗ribā is only in delay‘ i.e. when the items are non-
fungible and of the same genus. The next three traditions, in sheep, eggs and garments, all 
express the same ruling. 
 
1.2.3.2.2 The Dalīl for Qadr 
The proof-text for the second ratio of qadr is located in the following Prophetic tradition and 
the subsequent ruling of a leading Madīnan jurist. 
1. [It is narrated] from ʿUbāda (ra) and Anas ibn Mālik (ra) that the Prophet (pbuh) said 
‗[Sell] what is weighed like for like, if it is one genus, and [sell] what is measured in 
the same manner, but if the [items] are two different genera then there is no problem.
55
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2. Maʿmar informed us that al-Zuhrī said ‗Everything which is weighed is to be dealt 
with in the [same] way as gold and silver, and everything which is measured is to be 
dealt with in the [same] way as wheat and barley.  56  
In the first ḥadīth, the condition of equivalence has been stipulated with regard to wazn and 
kayl, i.e. weight and volume. This is an explicit mention of ribā al-faḍl with regards, not to 
food or money, but to the measurement of these fungibles. The subtlety of distinguishing 
between the method of measuring and the commodities themselves is an important point in 
the Ḥanafī jurists‘ argument. The second ḥadīth shows one of the great Successor jurists 
making an analogy in line with the Ḥanafī opinion, although somewhat predating them in this. 
His differentiation of things measured by weight to be treated as gold and silver, while those 
things measured by volume to be treated like wheat and barley, is clear in identifying the 
critical feature dividing the six commodities into two groups. 
 
This leads us to the second evidence which is based upon a hermeneutical method from uṣūl 
al-fiqh, known as iqtiḍāʾ al-naṣṣ. This method is used to make an addition to the text, which 
is required in order to give it a coherent meaning. Without this required addition, the sentence 
would not give a conceptually valid meaning and hence fail in its juridical function.
57
 This is 
similar to the method of ḥadhf of the grammarians, which assumes additions to the text for 
syntactical purposes. In the uṣūlī notion of iqtiḍāʾ the necessity arises, not out of syntax, but 
rather to discern the juridical import of the prophetic ruling. al-Sarakhsī presents this proof as 
follows: 
In his (i.e. the Prophet (pbuh)) statement: ‗Sell wheat for wheat‘, the sale is not conducted using [simply 
the term] wheat because this term may be used for a single grain, which no-one would sell [on its own] 
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… and even if it was sold as such, it would not be permitted because it is not a legally recognised object 
of sale.
58
 And it is known by necessity that the meaning of wheat is the legally recognised object of 
sale. And its exchange value cannot be determined except through measurement … and hence it is as 
though he (the Prophet (pbuh)) said – Sell gold weighed for gold and wheat measured for wheat.59 
These additional adjectives, to the words gold and wheat, now give them the explicit quality 
of being measured and weighed commodities. Using another uṣūlī principle, he states that ‗the 
adjective of a noun operates in the capacity of a ratio … and thus what is established by 
iqtiḍāʾ al-naṣṣ, is equivalent to what has been explicitly mentioned.60 By this technique, the 
ratio of the Ḥanafīs is read directly into the proof-text. 
 
1.2.3.2.3 The Istidlāl for Measurement and Genus 
al-Sarakhsī begins his presentation of the istidlāl by clarifying a subtle point, which although 
it may appear to be pedantic, is actually quite significant as it highlights the paradigmatic 
basis of the Ḥanafī approach. He points out that the ruling of ribā, contrary to what many 
might assume, is not a prohibition of excess, ḥurmat al-ziyāda, but rather an obligation of 
equivalence, wujūb al-mumāthala.61 His point is not to negate the other, but merely to say that 
the latter is the cause of the former and not the other way round, as is commonly assumed.  
Clearly these are two sides of the same coin, as any excess will nullify the equivalence and 
vice versa, a lack of equivalence can only be due to an excess in one of the countervalues.
62
 
His specific emphasis on the wujūb al-mumāthala, however, portrays a deeper analytical 
point. 
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Equivalence is described by al-Kāsānī as a normative requirement in contracts of 
commutative exchange.
63
 The notion of equality is major concern of the Ḥanafī jurists and is 
pursued thoroughly by them in the elaboration of contractual rights, obligations and 
permissibility.
64
 If the inequality of an exchange contract results in a material benefit for one 
of the two parties and is superfluous to the actual exchange, then this excess is deemed to be 
without a compensation and hence akin to usury. al-Kāsānī explains that: ‗sale is a contract of 
exchange by way of compensation and equality in the two countervalues … and so it is 
appropriate to deem every stipulated excess ribā‘.65 The significance of this approach is that it 
translates the usury prohibition, not as a specific requirement in the trade of certain 
commodities, but rather, ribā is deemed to be a violation of the normative requirement of 
contractual equality underlying all commercial exchange contracts. This implies that the 
scope of the usury prohibition is conceptually as large as commercial law itself. 
 
If the import of the usury prohibition affects all commercial exchange contracts, the question 
arises as to why the ḥadīth specifically mentions only six items. The Ḥanafīs argue that the 
crucial point behind the ḥadīth is in articulating objective criteria for the legal measure of 
equivalence. Only non-equivalence which is objectively ascertained can be averted,
66
 as 
opposed to that which is judged by subjective assessment. The Ḥanafīs‘ explanation of what 
constitutes the legal measure of equivalence is premised on, and explains, the ḥadīth of the six 
commodities.  
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The objective equivalence of objects can only be discerned for objects which are replaceable 
in kind i.e. those that are fungible. For example, 1 kg of wheat is, for commercial exchange 
purposes, deemed to be equivalent to another kg of wheat; likewise one dirham is equivalent 
to another. These items are regarded as legally equivalent such that in cases of destruction, 
compensation is awarded in kind as opposed to monetary value. This legal equivalence, the 
Ḥanafīs argue, is premised upon evaluating an object from two ontological aspects; its 
external form (sūra) and its meaning (maʿna). Equivalence in the external form is determined 
through quantified measurement, whereas equivalence in meaning is by identifying the 
genus.
67
 A person who negligently destroys 5kg of wheat, for example, will be charged with 
replacing it with that which is equivalent in terms of both its external form i.e. 5kg and its 
internal meaning i.e. its genus as wheat. An object which matches these two aspects of form 
(qadr) and meaning (genus), presents a commercially acceptable equivalent. The Ḥanafīs thus 
infer the ratio of the usury prohibition to be qadr and genus as these are the sole determinants 
of legally-recognised objective equivalence. 
 
In the six commodities mentioned in the ḥadīth it will be noted that all the items are fungibles, 
and so are replaceable in kind, and hence their inclusion in the ribā prohibition. al-Sarakhsī 
concludes that: 
When it is established that the rule [of ribā] is an obligation of equivalence and it is inconceivable to 
apply a ruling in the absence of its locus, we come to know, a priori, that any object which does not 
accept [a measure of] equivalence, is not a commodity [susceptible to] ribā.‘
 68
 
The rational argument given here for the notion of equivalence is, it must be noted, 
conditioned by the ḥadīth. This means that the measure of equivalence is determined by the 
text as opposed to rationality or market custom. This becomes apparent in two ways: 
                                                 
67
 Ibid, vol. 7, 62; al-Sarakhsī, al-Mabsūṭ, vol. 6, book 12, 139. 
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 al-Sarakhsī, al-Mabsūṭ, vol. 6, book 12, 139. 
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1. Firstly, when qualitative disparities occur in exchanges of quantitatively equal objects. 
For example, to exchange 5 kg of high quality gold for 5kg of low quality gold is 
acceptable to the Ḥanafīs and not considered usurious, although it could be argued that 
there is a clear advantage to one party. The Ḥanafīs, in fact, demand that as a 
condition to the ratio being effective, the notion of quality be dropped when objects in 
the same genus are exchanged for each other.
69
  
2. Secondly, other forms of measurement, such as length and counting are not included 
as measures indicative of equivalence. The only forms of measurement which are 
legally recognised for determining equivalence are weight and volume. These are 
therefore known exclusively as legal measures, al-miʿyār al-sharʿī. 
 
For the Ḥanafīs, their rational argument conditioned by the ḥadīth, forms the basis for 
extrapolating the riba rules into other areas of commercial law. As will be shown later, the 
two points mentioned above, which show that the measures of objective equivalence  are 
restricted to those upheld in the ḥadīth, is evidenced in their substantive doctrines and 
explains some points of divergence with the other schools. 
 
1.2.3.2.4 Applying the Ḥanafī Ratios 
al-Qudūrī has summarised the modus operandi of these rules in three sentences: 
1. If the two ratios, i.e. legal measure and genus, are absent then both excess and delay 
are allowed.  
2. If both ratios are present, then both excess and delay are prohibited.  
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3. If only one characteristic, either legal measure or genus is present, then excess is 
allowed and delay is prohibited.
70
 
Commenting on these rules al-Marghīnānī concludes that ribā al-faḍl occurs only when both 
ratios are present, whereas ribā al-nasāʾā occurs in the presence of a single ratio.71  
 
Immediate exchange can thus be mandated if both exchange items are the same genus, or if 
they are sold by the same type of measurement. So in an exchange of gold for silver, where 
the legal measure is present but genus is absent, the presence of only one ratio means that 
equivalence is not necessary but  exchange must be immediate, otherwise there will be ribā 
al-nasāʾā. The same rules apply if wheat is sold for dates, only the ratio of legal measure is 
present whereas genus is absent, and so only ribā al-nasāʾā needs to be avoided. Now in the 
scenario where we have the same genus, but different legal measures, again equivalence is not 
an issue but ribā al-nasāʾā is. This means than in exchanges of non-fungibles within the same 
genus, the only condition is that delivery must be immediate. For example one hundred 
metres of satin can be exchanged for ten metres of the satin, or seven pieces of fur for 8 pieces 
of fur, the only proviso being that the exchange of goods occur within the contractual session.  
 
When both ratios are present then both conditions must be observed, so both quantitative 
equivalence and immediate delivery are required. This occurs when fungibles, and only 
fungibles, are exchanged with their own genus. Hence, in addition to the six commodities 
mentioned in the ḥadīth, ribā al-faḍl will also apply in an exchange of copper for copper, or 
rice for rice, or cement for cement etc; these must all be exchanged for equal amounts and 
without deferment.
72
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 Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad al-Qudūrī, al-Mukhtaṣar (Multan: Maktaba Ḥaqqāniyya, nd), 74. 
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 Burhān al-Dīn Abū al-Ḥasan ʿAlī ibn Abī Bakr al-Marghīnānī, al-Hidāya (np. Miṣbaḥ, nd), vol. 2, 79. 
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1.2.4 Summary of the Jurists‘ Positions 
In this section, the hermeneutical approach of the four schools to the prohibition of ribā in the 
ḥadīth has been examined. The Ḥanbalīs have been noted for vacillating in identifying the 
ratio legis without a specific approach identifiable with their school, although individuals 
within the School do adopt specific opinions. Ibn al-Qayyim, for example, takes a very 
distinct approach and this will be dealt with later on. From the other three schools, the Mālikīs 
and Shāfiʿīs adopt a similar approach, identifying foodstuffs and currency as the effective 
ratios. The former, however, establish a particularly nuanced framework in delineating the 
scope of these ratios relative to the different types of ribā. Finally the Ḥanafīs build the ratio 
through the notion of contractual equality, in which objective assessment of material excess is 
the underlying concern. The ḥadīth is interpreted in this light and hence weight and volume 
(the measure for the six commodities) are identified as sharīʿa endorsed measures.  
 
1.3 Integrating Ribā al-Qurʾān and Ribā al-Sunna 
The outcome of the Ḥanafīs analysis on the Qurʾānic prohibition is that the verse prohibits a 
number of specific transactions, but that these transactions are not the defining notion of ribā. 
Three transactions were previously mentioned, which were contemporaneous to the ribā 
injunction. Instead of applying the injunction to all three transactions separately, the Ḥanafīs 
probe for a common denominator present in all three which is the locus of the rule. When 
looking at all three transactions what is common to each transaction, is that when the debt 
becomes due, the creditor demands that the debtor either pay up or extend the deadline by 
increasing the amount due. This is captured in their saying: ‗either pay up or increase [what is 
                                                                                                                                                        
considered to be fungibles, but also the mode of measurement is not to be changed. So gold and silver will 
always be sold by weight and the other group (wheat, barley, dates and salt) by volume. In a dissenting opinion 
Abū Yūsuf declares that even these items are subject to ʿurf. See ibid, vol. 2, 80. 
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due]‘.73  This type of ribā is often referred to as either ribā al-Jāhiliyya or ribā al-nasīʾa. In 
addition to this form of ribā, two additional types of ribā are proscribed in the prophetic 
ḥadīth, namely ribā al-faḍl and ribā al-nasāʾa.74 
 
These are three generic meanings to which the term ribā refers to in the texts. However, after 
mentioning these three, al-Jaṣṣāṣ, goes on to conclude that ‗... on the whole, what the term 
ribā in the law, comprises of, is delay (al-nasāʾa) and excess (al-tafāḍul).‘75 It seems that ribā 
al-Jāhiliyya has been subsumed under the Sunna types of ribā. To appreciate this, the 
meaning of these terms in a simple sale of gold for gold will be examined. 
 Ribā al-faḍl is an excess in the same genus of fungibles (of weight or volume) in a 
spot transaction; so a transaction of 5kg of gold for 6kg of gold with immediate 
payment constitutes ribā al-faḍl. 
 Ribā al-nasāʾa is when 5kg of gold is exchanged for 5kg of gold and the delivery of 
either item is not immediate but rather deferred beyond the contractual session. 
 Ribā al-Jāhiliyya occurs, for example, when 5kg of gold is due either from a loan or a 
credit sale and the creditor grants the debtor additional time to pay his debt in lieu of 
an increase in the amount owed to 6kg.  
In this final form what has occurred is that 5kg has been exchanged for 6kg with a stipulated 
delay. The rules of ribā al-faḍl demand that 5kg should be exchanged for 5kg, which means 
that the additional 1kg constitutes an excess, faḍl. We also notice that according to the rules of 
ribā al-nasāʾa this transaction should have occurred immediately due to both exchange items 
belonging to group one, which means that this contract also contains nasāʾa. This implies that 
in ribā al-Jāhiliyya both faḍl and nasāʾa are operative. Additionally, and more critically to 
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 The common phrase in Arabic is: immā an taqḍī wa immā an turbī. 
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 ‗Wa ism al-ribā yaʿtawiruhū fī al-sharʿ maʿān, aḥaduhā al-ribā alladhī kāna ʿalayhi ahl al-jāhiliyya wa al-
thānī al-tafādul … wa al-thālith al-nasāʾa.‘ al-Jaṣṣāṣ, Aḥkām al-Qurʾān, vol. 2, 184. 
75
 Ibid, vol. 2, 184. 
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note however, is the fact that not only are these two present, but, that the additional amount 
that constitutes the faḍl, is given in lieu of the additional time period which constitutes the 
nasāʾa. Hence ribā al-Jāhiliyya is composed of the essential elements (faḍl and nasāʾa) of the 
other two forms of ribā, albeit with each acting as the countervalue of the other.76 This has 
been summed up by Prof. Nyazee, who describing the functioning of nasāʾa and faḍl says: 
‗They are like the two arms or hands of ribā. Ribā sometimes uses one hand and sometimes the other, 
but true ribā exists when both hands are clasped together.77 
 
1.3.1 Credit sales, Ribā and the Time Value of Money 
From the outset of the ribā prohibition, questions were raised as to the substantive difference 
between a credit sale and the rules of ribā. The Meccan traders are noted in the Qurʾān as 
saying: ‗Surely trade is the same as usury‘.78 
Let us compare the two transactions: 
 A normal credit sale in which a watch is sold for £60 to be paid for after two months. 
 A credit sale where following the end of the time period an additional time period is 
added on, in lieu of an extra payment, e.g. the same watch bought for £50 with one 
month credit. When the debtor defaults, the creditor extends the period for an extra 
month adding ten pounds to the cost, totalling £60. 
Now in both examples the result is that the watch is purchased for £60 to be paid after two 
months. The first transaction is however, permissible and the second is ribā. Although both 
transactions appear to be the same, one of these transactions places time as an express 
countervalue whereas the other does not, and it is this transaction which is prohibited. This 
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 ‗Fa kānat al-ziyāda badal min al-ajal‘, see al-Jaṣṣāṣ, Aḥkām al-Qurʾān, vol. 2, 186. 
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 Imran Ahsan Khan Nyazee, The Concept of Ribā and Islamic Banking (Islamabad: Niazi Publishing House, 
1995), 28. Note that Nyazee regards nasīʾah and nasāʾ, as interchangeable, whereas they are not. This is a 
common error and the cause of much confusion. Nasāʾa is a delay, whereas nasīʾa is when the delay is in 
exchange for an excess. See Rafīq Yūnus al-Miṣrī, Fiqh al-Muʿāmalāt al-Māliyya (Damascus: Dār al-Qalam, 
2005), 111. 
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 ‗Qālū innamā al-bayʿ mithl al-ribā‘ (2:275); Abū Zayd, Fiqh al-Ribā, 74-6. 
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means that the debtor is not really just buying a watch for £60, as in the normal credit sale, 
rather he is purchasing a watch plus one month (additional) delay for £60. The price is also 
split into two components; £50 for the watch and £10 for the delay. Faḍl is present in the 
extra £10 and nasāʾa in the extra one month delay and each one is acting as the countervalue 
of the other, and this constitutes ribā al-Jāhiliyya. 
 
From this analysis of ribā al-Jāhiliyya the Ḥanafīs also extract the specific point that time 
does not qualify as māl, the res in commercio, and that its commoditisation is implicitly 
annulled in the Qurʾānic prohibition. al-Ṭaḥāwī describing ribā al-Qurʾān says that when the 
debtor asks for a respite in lieu of an increase in the dirhams he owes, he is, in effect, ‗buying 
time with money‘.79 al-Jaṣṣāṣ also highlights this point in his commentary of the verse which 
orders people to give up what remains of ribā (2:277), where he infers that the verse is 
thereby ‗prohibiting that a countervalue be taken for time‘.80 The prohibition of time 
commoditisation is pursued relentlessly by the Ḥanafīs in their substantive doctrines, and is 
one of the hallmarks of their systematic application of the ribā injunction.    
 
The central components of the ribā theory have now been identified; both components; faḍl 
and nasāʾa, are demonstrably operative in the ribā prohibited in the Qurʾān and the Sunna. 
The difference between the two is that the transactions prohibited in the former are those in 
which the excess amount is given in lieu of the delay. This is called ribā al-Jāhiliyya or ribā 
al-nasīʾa. This latter term is not to be confused with ribā al-nasāʾa, which together with ribā 
al-faḍl, is what is prohibited in the Sunna. In the Sunna the components of Qurʾānic ribā have 
been singled out and the transactions in which they occur individually are prohibited. Having 
shown that both the ribā in the Qurʿān and that in the Sunna can be reduced to two types; faḍl 
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 ‗Fa yakūn mushtariy li al-ajal bi māl‘, see al-Ṭaḥāwī, Sharh Maʿānī al-Āthār, vol. 3, 334. 
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and nasāʾa, the Ḥanafīs then go on to derive a definition from these two types, which they 
designate as the actual meaning of ribā as a juridical term. 
 
1.3.2 The Definition 
al-Sarakhsī has given the following definition for ribā: Ribā is that stipulated excess [which 
is] devoid of a countervalue in [a contract of] sale.
81
 
There are four elements to this definition: 
1. al-faḍl – the excess, 
2. al-khālī ʿan al-ʿiwaḍ – devoid of a countervalue, 
3. al-mashrūṭ  – stipulated, 
4. fī al-bayʿ – in a sale transaction. 
Each point will be analysed to show its jurisprudential context and its importance in the 
definition. 
 
1.3.2.1 al-Faḍl – The Excess 
The meaning of al-faḍl in this definition applies both to material excess, and also to an excess 
in time.
82
 al-Sarakhsī explaining the usage of the word al-faḍl in the prophetic ḥadīth83 says 
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 ‗al-Ribā huwa al-faḍl al-khālī ʿan al-ʿiwaḍ al-mashrūṭ fī al-bayʿ‘, see al-Sarakhsī, al-Mabsūṭ, vol. 6, book 12, 
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upon] a legal measure, for one of the two contractors, in an exchange contract‘ (Muḥammad ibn ʿAbdullah al-
Tumurtāshī, Tanwīr al-Abṣār wa Jāmiʿ al-Biḥār, printed with the commentary of Muḥammad ibn ʿAlī al-
Ḥaṣkafī al-Durr al-Mukhtār (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub alʿIlmiyya, 2002), 340). al-Marghīnānī has specified that the 
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known by the legal measure. al-Sarakhsī‘s definition can thus be taken as the basic formula as it concerns all the 
essential elements of the later definitions. The later additions signify a need to stress certain aspects previously 
assumed or understood, but later mentioned explicitly to remove any doubt. They are important insofar as they 
demonstrate an agreement on the underlying concepts and signify different attempts to capture those concepts in 
a single definition. These additions, which are no doubt correct, do not, however, change the substantive notion 
of ribā and hence it is al-Sarakhsī‘s definition which will be used. 
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 Rafīq Yūnus al-Miṣrī, states that: ‗It appears that it is difficult, to define ribā, [in a] single definition [which] 
encompasses all three types of ribā, and [thus] the attempts of the jurists remain obscure and difficult to 
comprehend‘. He then goes on, to use al-Sarakhsī‘s definition to show the meaning of ribā al-faḍl, assuming that 
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that this ‗incorporates excess in amount and it incorporates excess in state, such that one of 
the two [represents] cash and the other delay, and both of them are intended by the [prophetic] 
statement‘.84 By virtue of this interpretation, i.e. that excess refers both to the commodity and 
the time factor, al-Sarakhsī ensures that his definition covers the quantitative excess in ribā 
al-faḍl and the excess of delay in ribā al-nasāʾa and also when they occur together in ribā al-
Jāhiliyya.85 Another important point is that the meaning of faḍl is not to be understood 
linguistically, as any excess, but rather, as that excess which is specified by the law to be an 
excess.
86
  
 
1.3.2.2 al-Khālī ʿan al-ʿIwaḍ – Devoid of a Countervalue 
In commercial exchange the jurists identify a legal countervalue using the term māl 
mutaqawwim.
87
 This binary term is made up of two separate concepts; 1) māl, which refers to 
any object; goods and property as long as they have a tangible utility (al-intifāʾ ḥaqīqa), and 
2) mutaqawwim, which means that the object‘s utility is upheld by the law (al-intifāʿ sharʿ) 
and hence the object carries an exchange value.
88
 These two terms operate individually and 
are not always complementary, such that not all things considered as māl are regarded by the 
law as having an exchange value, and conversely, not all things with an exchange value are 
māl. This means that countervalues in a synallagmatic contract fall into one of four 
typologies: 
                                                                                                                                                        
faḍl in the definition refers to ribā al-faḍl alone. See the author‘s al-Ribā wa al-Ḥasm al-Zamanī fī al-Iqtiṣād al-
Islāmī (Damascus: Dār al-Maktabī, 2000), 11-12. 
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 ‗Wa al-faḍl al-ribā‘. 
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 al-Sarakhsī, al-Mabsūṭ, vol. 6, book 12, 130. 
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 Rafīq Yūnus al-Miṣrī, al-Jāmiʿ fī Uṣūl al-Ribā, 2nd ed. (Damascus: Dār al-Qalam, 2001), 169. 
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 This is perhaps why al-Tumurtāshī has included it in his definition by adding the proviso, using a legal 
measure.  
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 Abū Zahra, al-Milkiyya, 48-50. 
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1. Those which are neither māl nor are they mutaqawwim; such as a free person or 
Oxygen in the air.
89
 These are not susceptible to any type of contractual exchange. 
2. Objects which are māl but are not mutaqawwim. Wine and pigs are considered māl but 
for Muslims they have no taqawwum, i.e. the law does not uphold their utility, and 
hence they have no exchange value. These items can only be exchanged by non-
Muslims for whom the law does guarantee their exchange value.
90
 
3. Things which are mutaqawwim but are not considered māl. This manifests in non-
commercial transactions in which a monetary value is designated by the law for 
objects which are not māl, yet are valorised. These monetary values are known by 
specific terms such as diya (blood money), arsh (compensation), mahr (nuptial 
payment) and occur in what Baber Johansen has termed, contracts of social 
exchange.
91
 
4. Objects which are both māl and mutaqawwim, such as food, metals, horses etc. 
Objects which accept this dyadic appellation exclusively qualify for commoditisation 
in contracts of commercial exchange and form the res in commercio. 
 
This typology has a two-fold significance with reference to the definition of ribā. The first is 
that only legally recognised commodities are regarded as valid countervalues (ʿiwaḍ) and 
hence subject to the rules of riba.
92
 Secondly, anything which is an acceptable ʿiwaḍ can act 
as a countervalue and its presence, irrespective of its actual value, necessitates the absence of 
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ribā. This particular aspect of the definition will become important later on when the specific 
substantive rules are examined.
93
 
 
1.3.2.3 al-Mashrūṭ – Stipulated 
This term implies that the excess must be stipulated in the contract to be considered as ribā. In 
a loan transaction when returning payment of the debt, it is an acknowledged rule that not 
only is it allowed to return more than the debt, but also, that it is recommended to do so. In 
numerous instances when the Messenger of Allah (pbuh) had loaned an animal, he returned 
one that was better than it saying that the best of mankind are those who are better in fulfilling 
their dues.
94
 In another tradition it is reported that the Prophet (pbuh) bought a camel on credit 
from his companion Jābir ibn ʿAbdullah (ra) for four dīnārs. When they reached Medina the 
Prophet (pbuh) ordered Bilāl (ra) to pay Jābir (ra) with an increase, whereupon he gave him 
four dīnārs and added one qīrāṭ.95 al-Shaybānī, commenting on a similar ḥadīth, says ‗there is 
no harm in it [as long as] it is not a stipulation which he is bound to. And that is the opinion of 
Abū Ḥanīfa.‘96 If, however, the extra amount to be returned is stipulated from the outset then 
it is clearly ribā.97 Another important point is that if the local custom is one where usury is the 
norm, and gifts are expected in return for loans then it would also be illicit to proffer a gift 
even if the intention behind it is gratuitous. This is expressed in the saying of the jurists that: 
prevailing customs are equivalent to expressed conditions; al-maʿrūf ka al-mashrūṭ.98  
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 See Saiful Azhar Rosly, ―ʿIwaḍ as a Requirement of Lawful Sale: A Critical Analysis,‖ IIUM Journal of 
Economics and Management 9, no. 2 (2001): 187-201. 
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 Muslim, Ṣaḥīḥ, vol. 2, 683-84 (ḥadīth no. 4192, 4194, 4195, 4196).  
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 Ibid, vol. 2, 682-82 (ḥadīth no. 4185). 
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 Muḥammad ibn al-Hasan al-Shaybānī, The Muwaṭṭa of Imām Muḥammad (London: Turath Publishing, 2004), 
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In sales, the juridical norms affect the form that the stipulation can take. According to the 
Ḥanafīs, any additions made to the object of the sale contract are subsumed into it, 
irrespective of the giver‘s intention.99 Such additions are hence mashrūṭ in the sale and all 
corresponding rights and liabilities apply. In a sale of gold for gold, if the buyer volunteers an 
extra gram of gold for free, even if it is not a condition of the contract, it would still be 
impermissible. A report regarding the prominent Companion Abū Bakr al-Siddīq (ra) states 
that he was involved in selling two silver anklets; after placing them on one side of the scales, 
they were slightly outweighed by the silver dirhams on the other side. The buyer then says to 
him regarding the extra amount: 
‗That‘s for you; I permit it for you‘. He (ra) replied ‗[even] if you permit it for me then definitely Allah 
does not permit it for me, I have heard the Messenger of Allah (pbuh) say ‗gold for gold weight for 
weight, and silver for silver, weight for weight, he who increases and the one who accepts it are in the 
fire‘‘.100 
This narration shows the point, as this is a sale transaction without a previously stipulated 
condition for the extra amount. However, as the Ḥanafīs say, the additions to a contract are 
subsumed into it and hence the extra silver the buyer is offering is actually included into the 
contract and violates the equivalence necessary when silver is sold for silver. Abū Ḥanīfa 
regards not only additions but also reductions as contractual obligations as both of these 
would offset the necessary equivalence with the result that the contract would be void. al-
Shaybānī, however, reasons that because a reduction is gratuitous in nature, it should, a priori, 
be designated as a gift and thus separate to the contract.
101
 
 
                                                 
99
 al-Qudūrī, al-Mukhtaṣar, 73.  
100
 al-Ṣanʿānī, al-Muṣannaf, vol. 8, 124. 
101
 Zayn al-Dīn ibn Ibrāhīm ibn Muḥammad ibn Nujaym, al-Baḥr al-Rāʾiq Sharḥ Kanz al-Daqāʾiq (Beirut: Dār 
al-Kutub al-ʾIlmiyya, 1997), vol. 6, 142; al-Zuḥaylī, al-Fiqh al-Islāmī, vol. 5, 3689-90; ‗Abd al-ʿAẓīm, Fiqh al-
Ribā, 262-3. Imām Abū Yusūf invalidates the additions and reductions and allows the initial contract.  
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To conclude, it can be said that term mashrūṭ applies both to loans and sales. In loans the 
stipulation is either expressly stated, or a customary norm, whereas in sale contracts all 
additions are automatically mashrūṭ. Since loans and sale transactions essentially serve 
opposite purposes, the rules governing them are understandably different. In loan transactions, 
which are gratuitous in nature, additions are automatically perceived as gifts, unless 
stipulated. In sales, the opposite is true as sale transactions are based upon exchange and all 
additions to the contract become part of the exchange, unless of course an express statement is 
given to the contrary. 
 
1.3.3.4 Fī al-Bayʿ – In a Sale Transaction 
The significance of this term is merely to say, that had the above transaction (regarding 
additions to sales) been concluded by expressly stating that the extra amount was a gift, then 
it would not be regarded as ribā.102 Gift transactions are not included in the ribā prohibition 
even if they are honoured by a reciprocal gesture (al-hiba bi al-ʿiwaḍ).103 If, however, the gift 
exchange is stipulated as commutative from the outset (al-hiba bi sharṭ al-ʿiwaḍ), it becomes 
subject to the normal rules of sale.
104
 
 
1.3.4 Ribā Proper and Quasi-ribā 
The Ḥanafīs draw a unique distinction between the different forms of ribā based upon their 
interpretation of objective equivalence determined using the legal measure. This hierarchy 
stands in stark contrast to the other Schools, Ibn al-Qayyim and most modernist jurists. The 
latter base their distinction on a legislative hierarchy which leads to a bifurcation of ribā into 
ribā al-Qurʾān and ribā al-Sunna. For the Ḥanafīs, having established that the ratio of ribā is 
                                                 
102
 al-Tumurtāshī, Tanwīr al-Abṣār, 430. 
103
 al-Sarakhsī, al-Mabsūṭ, vol. 6, book 12, 91. 
104
 ‗Wa idhā wuhiba bi-sharṭ al-ʿiwad … kāna fī ḥukm al-bayʿ‘, see al-Qudūrī, al-Mukhtaṣar, 119; also ‗fa idhā 
sharaṭa al-ʿiwaḍ yakūnu bayʿ‘, see al-Sarakhsī, al-Mabsūṭ, vol. 6, book 12, 92-4. 
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underpinned by an objective measure of equivalence they divide the ribā rules into those 
which deal with an objectively discernable inequality and those ribā rules which apply to 
cases which lack objective measurement. 
 
Ribā proper (ḥaqīqī) is thus applied to exchanges of the same genus with an excess amount or 
a time delay. Between five kilograms of gold and six kilograms of gold there is an objectively 
measurable increase of one kilogram, using the legal measure of weight. Additionally, five 
kilograms of gold sold as cash in exchange for five kilograms of gold delivered after one 
month, gives the benefit of an extra month; described by al-Kāsānī as the ‗preference of 
immediacy over delay‘.105 These exchanges occur in the same genus, where inequity is 
objectively discernible whereas in contracts of different genera, this situation is rather 
different; how, for example, can inequity be observed in an exchange of five kilograms of 
gold for six kilograms of silver, or one litre of milk for two litres of petrol. 
 
The Ḥanafīs note that in transactions of different genera objective equivalence is not possible 
as the weight of one commodity does not correspond in value or meaning to the weight of 
another commodity, and hence ribā al-faḍl does not operate across different genera. The ribā 
al-nasāʾa which applies to the sale of different genera is not ribā proper but rather quasi-ribā 
(shubhat al-ribā). This means that the Sharʿīa has prohibited both ribā proper and quasi-ribā. 
This bifurcation is not, as can be seen based upon hermeneutical provenance but rather on 
their developed notion of objective equivalence. 
                                                 
105
 ‗Faḍl al-ḥulūl ʿalā al-ajal‘, al-Kāsānī, Badāʾiʿ, vol. 7, 55. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
APPLYING THE THEORY 
 
 
 
Having established the general framework of the Hanafī theory, its application into the body 
of commercial law will now be examined. One of the significant outcomes of the Ḥanafīs 
approach is that by presenting a definition of ribā which takes its prerogative from a Qurʿānic 
injunction, there is a perceptible increase in the importance and legislative force of the ribā 
rules. It will be shown how in a number of disputed cases in substantive law, the Ḥanafīs, 
invariably give priority to the ribā rules, and the specific application of their theory. Six cases 
will be discussed as examples of how the Ḥanafīs use their theory and also to show the 
approach of the other Schools: 
1. Forward sale – salam, 
2. The concessionary exchange known as bayʿ al-ʿarāyā, 
3. Debt: qarḍ and dayn, 
4. Contractual stipulations – shurūṭ, 
5. Pledge – rahn, 
6. Currency exchange – ṣarf. 
 
Before delving into the substantive law, some fundamental juridical concepts need to be 
clarified. First is the distinction of goods into fungibles and non-fungibles and secondly is the 
notion of personal obligation, dayn and its relation to fungibility. 
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2.1.1 Mithliyyāt and Qīmiyyāt 
Non-fungibles, qīmī, are items sold in specie, which means that the contract of sale relates to 
specific items and not to a generic quantity. If they are destroyed they are not replaced by 
similar goods, but compensation is based upon the specific items value. al-Sarakhsī notes that 
the value of an object is indeed called qīma (a derivative of the verb qāma, to stand) because 
‗it stands in the place of the actual good, the ʿayn‘.1 In terms of jurisprudence, items which are 
qīmī are designated as ʿayn, and always sold in specie as specific goods. Because the liability 
which relates to them is for a specific good they themselves are never considered to be a dayn. 
 
Fungibles are items which are determined in a contract through their weight, volume and 
number and are termed mithlī; meaning that which has an equivalent and is therefore 
replaceable in kind.
2
 Because fungibles are replaceable in kind, this means that they are often 
sold as personal obligations. Personal obligations are termed dayn and are dichotomised with 
items sold in specie, ’ayn. 
 
2.1.2 ʿAyn, Dayn and Taʿyīn 
According to the Ḥanafīs, fungibles are of two types; those which accept specification or 
individualisation, taʿyīn, and those which do not. Fungibles which do not accept taʿyīn, i.e. 
they cannot be specified, are always sold as personal obligations, dayn, whereas those that do 
accept specification can either be sold as a dayn or as specific goods. Gold and silver, either 
as ore or when minted, constitute the first category, other fungibles fall into the second. Gold 
and silver are such that even if they are specified by the contracting parties they resist 
                                                 
1
 ‗al-Qīma summiyat qīma li qiyāmihā maqām al-ʿayn‘, see al-Sarakhsī, al-Mabsūṭ, vol. 6, book 12, 203. 
2
 See Abū Zahra, al-Milkiyya, 54-58; Black‘s Law Dictionary defines fungibles as: Moveable goods which may 
be estimated and replaced according to weight, measure, and number. Things belonging to a class, which do not 
have to be dealt with in specie. Henry Campbell Black, Black's Law Dictionary: Definitions of the Terms and 
Phrases of American and English Jurisprudence, Ancient and Modern, 6
th
 ed. (St. Paul, Minn: West Pub. Co., 
1990) s.v. ―fungibles‖, 675. 
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specification,
3
 although in specific forms such as silverware or jewellery they may be 
specified.
4
 Zufar, a leading Ḥanafī jurist, together with al-Shāfiʿī take the opposite opinion 
and regard both gold and silver, in all its forms, as subject to specification.
5
 
 
A dayn is thus a personal obligation composed either of gold, silver, or a non-specified 
fungible.
6
 Fungibles, such as wheat, barley, salt etc., can all be sold as personal obligations, or 
they can be sold as specific goods. It is up to the contracting parties to determine this by a 
process of taʿyīn. If the fungibles are specifically appropriated to the contract they become its 
object and are regarded as a ʿayn.7 This means that delivery must be made in specie, not in 
kind, and that their destruction prior to delivery would annul the contract.
8
 If the items are not 
specified and are sold as a dayn then the destruction of these objects is immaterial and the 
seller is under obligation to deliver an equivalent.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3
 ‗Wa al-nuqūd lā tataʿayyan fi ʿuqūd al-muʿāwaḍāt bi al-taʿyīn‘, see al-Sarakhsī, al-Mabsūṭ, vol. 7, book 14, 
21. 
4
 al-Sarakhsī also mentions that if minted coins are given to a money changer as a commodate loan (i.e. not for 
consumption), then they are regarded as specific and the exact same coins need to be returned. al-Sarakhsī‘s 
formulation of the principle (see previous note) takes this into account as he restricts the rule to contracts of 
exchange (ʿuqūd al-muʿāwaḍāt). See al-Mabsūṭ, vol. 6, book 11, 155. 
5
 al-Zuḥaylī, al-Fiqh al-Islāmī, vol. 5, 3373. 
6
 See Baber Johansen, The Salam Contract: Law and Capital Formation in the Abbasid Empire (11
th
 and 12
th
 
Centuries), 13, trans. Harvey L. Mendelsohn, [article online]; available from http://law.harvard.edu/faculty/ 
bjohansen/pubs.php; Internet; last accessed 03 May 2010. 
7
 A similar approach can be seen in the Common law; a textbook on commercial law states that: Whether assets 
are fungibles depends not on their physical characteristics but upon the nature of the obligation owed with 
respect to them. It matters not whether the subject of the contract is grain, flour or a motor car, or whether it is 
tangible or intangible. In a contract for the sale of unascertained, or generic goods, the goods are ex hypothesi 
fungibles, since the duty of the seller is to sell and deliver not a specific chattel identified at the time of the 
contract but an article (i.e. any article) which answers to the contract description. Roy Goode, Commercial Law, 
3
rd 
ed. (London: Penguin, 2004), 59-60. 
8
 See Muhammad Wohidul Islam, ―Dissolution of Contract in Islamic Law,‖ Arab Law Quarterly 13, no. 4 
(1998): 348. 
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2.2 Forward Sale – Salam 
Salam is a forward contract in which the seller takes payment for goods which he promises to 
supply in the future.
9
 What makes this contract critically distinct is that what is being sold is a 
personal obligation, a dayn.
10
 In a normal sale contract an ʿayn is sold for a dayn and the 
object of the sale (mabīʿ) is invariably the ʿayn. In salam, however, the object of the sale is 
the dayn. In order to escape the prohibition of selling a dayn for a dayn,
11
 the price must be 
paid immediately. The object is then to be delivered at an agreed time and in conformity with 
the stipulated conditions. The contract allows poor farmers to sell their produce in advance 
and thereby provides them with ready finance, while allowing the investor to purchase goods 
at a reduced price. Because salam is a sale of fungibles with a delay, the danger of ribā al-
nasāʾa entering the contract becomes a paramount concern of the jurists.  
 
The Kitāb al-Aṣl of al-Shaybānī is the first comprehensive work of substantive law in the 
Ḥanafī School and represents the backbone of Ḥanafī doctrine.12 At the outset of the chapter 
on sales and salam, al-Shaybānī precedes his presentation of the detailed law with two 
citations: The first is the ḥadīth mentioned earlier relating to ribā and the six commodities. 
The second is a statement from the Successor jurist Ibrāhīm al-Nakhaʿī which harmonises the 
ribā injunction with the salam contract. al-Nakhaʿī sets out the rules of salam in the language 
of the Ḥanafī ratio: 
                                                 
9
 See a detailed treatment of this contract, see S. M. Hasanuz Zaman ―Bayʿ Salam: Principles and Practical 
Application,‖ Islamic Studies 30, no. 4 (1991): 443-61.  
10
 Ibid, 21-2 
11
 For the prohibition of selling a debt for a debt, see the ḥadīth in al-Ṣanʿānī, al-Muṣannaf, vol. 8, 90; also see 
Ziyād Ibrāhīm Miqdād, Bayʿ al-Dayn: Aḥkāmuhū wa Taṭbīqātuhū al-Muʿāṣira (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-
ʿIlmiyya, 2003), 55-6. 
12
 In fact, it is the first in Islamic jurisprudence per se. 
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Conduct salam in what is [sold by] measure for what is [sold by] weight, and conduct salam in what is 
[sold by] weight for what is [sold by] measure. Do not conduct salam in what is [sold by] measure for 
what is [sold by] measure, nor in what is [sold by] weight for what is [sold by] weight.
13
 
When items are sold using the same legal measure, there is a danger of ribā al-nasāʾa. In the 
salam contract, this is averted by ensuring that the commodities sold have different legal 
measures. Weighed items are hence not to be sold for other weighed items, but rather for 
items measured by volume and vice versa. The fact that the salam contract is premised upon a 
delayed delivery precludes, by way of the ribā al-nasāʾa prohibition, that both items belong 
to the same group. 
 
The obvious possibility of ribā al-nasāʾa is not lost on the other schools of jurisprudence 
either, all of whom, mutatis mutandis, also develop similar rules to prevent ribā al-nasāʾa in 
their juridical prescriptions for salam. For the Mālikīs and Shāfiʿīs this means that the 
contract should not have, as both its object and price, foodstuffs.
14
 
 
2.2.1 Salam in Animals 
According to the Ḥanafīs it is prohibited to exchange animals with a delayed delivery. al-
Ṭaḥāwī, however, states that this is not based upon the prohibition of selling two items of the 
same genus with a delay. Otherwise, he argues, it would be permissible to sell animals 
belonging to different genera with a delay. The prohibition, rather, is related to the selling of 
an animal as a personal obligation.
15
 Animals are individual creatures and each one is 
recognisably different from another of the same species. It goes without saying that the four 
schools agree on the fungibility of commodities sold by weight, measure length, and 
                                                 
13
 Abū ʿAbdullah Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥasan al-Shaybānī, Kitāb al-Aṣl al-Maʿrūf bi al-Mabsūṭ (Beirut: ʿĀlam al-
Kutub, 1990), vol. 5, 6. 
14
 This includes foods that are fungibles, non-fungibles, storable or perishable. Ibn Rushd, al-Muqaddimāt, vol. 
1, 350; Abū Zayd, Fiqh al-Ribā, 180-1. 
15
 al-Ṭaḥāwī, Sharḥ Maʿānī al-Āthār, vol. 3, 330-2. 
APPLYING THE THEORY 
 
59 
 
number.
16
 When it comes to animals, however, the Mālikīs, Shāfiʿīs, and Ḥanbalīs, as 
opposed to the Ḥanafīs, all assert that an animal can be sold as a personal obligation.17 The 
former base their opinion on the strength of the aḥādīth allowing such a transaction. The 
Ḥanafīs also cite aḥādīth which support their opinion and uphold their systematic reasoning.18  
 
The Ḥanafīs maintain that animals, and in fact all non-fungible items, can not be sold as a 
personal obligation, dayn. al-Sarakhsī argues that when a fungible is sold as a dayn, it is sold 
against a description. This description is possible because fungibles are identified as being 
units of a type which are all interchangeable. At the point of delivery, if the fungible matches 
the description of its type then the sale is automatically concluded. If not, then a fungible 
which does match the description needs to be given. This, however, is not the case in sales 
based upon the description of an animal. In fact, al-Sarakhsī contends, it is almost impossible 
for the description to correspond perfectly with the actual dimensions of the animal delivered. 
The resulting discrepancy represents an excess for one of the parties which is not accounted 
for in the contract and thus the excess does not have a countervalue.
19
 The possibility of this 
excess occurring means that the rules of ribā are applied to the contract. The ribā alluded to 
here is what the Ḥanafīs call quasi-ribā and, as explained earlier, leads only to a prohibition of 
delay.
20
 This application of the definition of ribā, to explain a point of jurisprudence which 
already has a textual basis – albeit in aḥādīth which are weaker than the aḥādīth of the other 
schools – is important in that it demonstrates the approach of the Ḥanafīs and their method of 
achieving systematic consistency. 
                                                 
16
 al-Zuḥaylī, al-Fiqh al-Islāmī, vol. 5, 3374. Articles sold by number, are deemed to be fungibles if they are 
mutaqārib, i.e. very similar, to the point where individually they do not have distinct values, like eggs, walnuts, 
etc.  
17
 Ibid, vol. 5, 3621. The Mālikīs additionally allow all chattels and animals that can be precisely described. See 
Ibn Rushd, al-Muqaddimāt, vol. 1, 350-1. 
18
 al-Shaybānī, al-Ḥujja, vol. 2, 479-98. 
19
 al-Sarakhsī, al-Mabsūṭ, vol. 6, book 12, 139. 
20
 al-Marghīnānī, al-Hidāya, vol. 2, 79. 
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2.3 The Concessionary Exchange, Bayʿ al-ʿArāyā 
In an exchange of different types of dates, the rules of ribā demand both quantitative 
equivalence and immediate delivery. The requirement for quantitative equivalence means that 
dates can not be sold through an estimation (juzāf) of their quantities and that ascertaining 
equivalence using the legal measure is a necessary condition of contractual validity.
21
 In 
addition to this requirement, all the schools of law, except the Ḥanafīs, also prohibit the sale 
of fresh dates (ruṭab) for dried dates (tamr) even if they are sold in equal quantities.22 This is 
due to the retrospective disparity which occurs due to a decrease in the volume of fresh dates 
as they subsequently dry up.
23
 
 
Bayʿ al-muzābana is also a sale of fresh dates for dried dates although the fresh dates are still 
on the date-palms and their sale thus entails an estimation of their quantity.
24
 This sale has 
been specifically proscribed in the ḥadīth as it clearly infringes the rules of ribā.25 For the 
Ḥanafīs, the requirement of equivalence is violated because the quantities are sold by 
estimation.  For the other schools the prohibition relates to the prohibition of selling fresh 
dates for dry dates and also because the items are sold by estimation. 
 
The bayʿ al-ʿarāyā is a sale which appears to be similar to the bayʿ al-muzābana and although 
the schools agree that it is permissible, they differ in understanding just what it refers to. 
                                                 
21
 al-Zuḥaylī, al-Fiqh al-Islāmī, vol. 5, 3685. 
22
 Abū Yūsuf and al-Shaybānī, disagree with Abū Ḥanīfa on this point and also prohibit this transaction, 
although later on al-Ṭaḥāwī upholds the eponym‘s opinion. See al-Shaybānī, al-Muwaṭṭa, 335-6; al-Ṭaḥāwī, al-
Mukhtaṣar, 77. 
23
 The reasoning itself is propounded in a prophetic ḥadīth, see Ibn Abī Shayba, al-Kitāb al-Muṣannaf, vol. 4, 
333-4. 
24
 The meaning of muzābana given here is the one which is generally agreed upon although there is considerable 
disagreement regarding its meaning. See Abū al-Walīd Sulaymān ibn Khalf al-Bājī, al-Muntaqā: Sharḥ Muwaṭṭa 
Mālik (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1999), vol. 6, 186-205; Muḥyī al-Dīn ibn Sharaf al-Nawawī, al-Majmūʿ 
Sharḥ al-Muhadhdhab (Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, 2000), vol. 11, 31-35; Shams al-Dīn Abū al-Farj ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 
Ibn Qudāma al-Maqdisī, al-Sharḥ al-Kabīr (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub alʿIlmiyya, nd), vol. 4, 152; Abū Zayd, Fiqh 
al-Ribā, 285-6. 
25
 al-Ṣanʿānī, al-Muṣannaf, vol. 8, 104; Abū Zayd, Fiqh al-Ribā, 286; in a version of the ḥadīth recorded by al-
Ṭaḥāwī, the Prophet (pbuh) adds ‗dhālika al-ribā‘, Sharḥ Maʿānī al-Āthār, vol. 3, 294.  
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According to the Shāfiʿīs and the Ḥanbalīs, it is a concession for those who need to purchase 
fresh dates while all that they possess are a surplus of dried dates. The concession thus 
permits the sale by estimation and limits the amount of fresh dates that can purchased in a 
single transaction.
26
 The Shāfiʿīs, however, do not restrict this trade to the needy but rather 
permit it for the rich and the poor and allow them to use this concession as frequently as they 
please.
27
 The Ḥanbalīs, on the other hand, argue that because the concession is premised on 
the need of the purchaser it should not be given general sanction.
28
 The Mālikīs discern that 
the concession is based, not on economic need, but rather on alleviating inconvenience. The 
background to the concession, according to them,  is that an owner of a date-palm grove gives 
in charity the specific produce of one or more date-palm trees. He subsequently finds the 
repeated entry of the donee a nuisance. To avoid this inconvenience he estimates the amount 
of dates on the specified trees and in exchange gives the donee an equivalent amount of fresh 
dates.
29
  
 
Irrespective of their explications, what all three Schools agree upon, is that the permission for 
this transaction is a concession from the ribā rules in two aspects; firstly, from the prohibition 
to sell fresh dates for dried dates and secondly to sell these items by estimation. What is 
noteworthy is that both of these strictures are based upon the rule of ribā al-faḍl and the 
concessions therefore represent a relaxation of the ribā rules. In fact, for the Mālikīs, the 
ʿarāyā concession presents itself as a model for further exemptions to the ribā injunctions in 
cases of mitigating hardship.
30
 
 
                                                 
26
 The limit is five awsuq of dates per transaction. See al-Ṭaḥāwī, Sharḥ Maʿānī al-Āthār, vol. 3, 277; Ibn 
Qudāma, al-Sharḥ al-Kabīr, vol. 4, 153.  
27
 al-Shāfiʿī, Kitāb al-Umm, vol. 3, 66-7. 
28
 Ibn Qudāma, al-Sharḥ al-Kabīr, vol. 4, 152-3. 
29
 al-Bājī, al-Muntaqā, vol. 6, 156-60; Ibn Rushd, Bidāya, vol. 2, 260-63. 
30
 al-Bājī, al-Muntaqā, vol.6, 158. 
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The Ḥanafīs explanation of the bayʿ al-arāyā is essentially the same as the Mālikīs, except 
that the Ḥanafīs do not regard the initial charity of the date-palm owner as conferring 
ownership of the dates. The owner is therefore at liberty to substitute other dates in their place 
as he pleases. The owner, who is inconvenienced by the donee‘s presence, estimates the 
quantity of dates that the specified trees would yield and replaces them with an equivalent 
amount of fresh dates.
31
 This explanation posits the ʿarāya, in the category of charity rather 
than sale and implies that it is not a contract of commutative exchange.
32
 Whereas the other 
schools accept the possibility of a concession to the ribā rules, the Ḥanafīs prefer to offer an 
alternative explanation which allows them to maintain their systematic application of the ribā 
rules. 
 
2.4. Debt: Qarḍ and Dayn 
The term dayn has been mentioned earlier as a personal obligation, and is a general term used 
to indicate an outstanding debt without regard to its source.  The term qarḍ also refers to an 
outstanding debt, although it is restricted to debts arising from loans and not credit 
transactions or forward sales, and is therefore a specific type of dayn.
33
 
 
2.4.1 Qarḍ 
The gratuitous loan is the philanthropic Qurʾānic norm and usury is its diametric opposite. 
This dichotomy demands that the two be analytically incongruent and systematically 
differentiated. However, in real terms, it appears that a loan could easily be expressed as an 
exchange of currency (ṣarf) of equal quantities of the same genus with a time delay; which 
technically is ribā al-nasāʾa. In order to distinguish between the two, it would be impossible 
                                                 
31
 al-Ṭaḥāwī, Sharḥ Maʿānī al-Āthār, vol. 3, 295-99. 
32
 al-Shaybānī, The Muwatta, 333-4; idem, al-Ḥujja, vol. 2, 547-550; al-Kāsānī, Badāʾiʿ, vol.7, 86. 
33
 Najm al-Dīn Abū Ḥafṣ ʿUmar al-Nasafī, Ṭilbat al-Ṭalaba fī Isṭilāḥāt al-Fiqhiyya (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-
ʿIlmiyya, 1997), 255. 
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to prohibit any delay from a loan, as that would amount to a repayment in the contractual 
session in which the money is loaned. The answer proffered by some of the early jurists was 
to regard the loan as due immediately although its repayment is inevitably delayed. This 
means that no specific time limit is acceptable and even if a time limit is agreed by the lender 
and the borrower, it is a priori an ineffective clause. Ibrāhīm al-Nakhaʿī, is reported to have 
said ‗a loan is due immediately [ḥāll], even if [the parties agree] to a time‘.34  
 
The Ḥanafīs, following their Kufan predecessor, give the same ruling.35 al-Jaṣṣāṣ, in trying to 
show the hermeneutical basis of this ruling, says that ‗what indicates the invalidity of 
assigning a time [to the loan] is the saying of the Prophet (pbuh) ‗surely ribā is only in 
delay‘36  and he did not differentiate between sales and loans and hence it [applies] to both‘37 
The Ḥanafīs find agreement in this point with the Shāfiʿīs and also, in one narration, from 
Aḥmad, although the opposite has also been reported from him. The Mālikīs, and notably the 
later Ḥanbalīs Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn al-Qayyim, do permit a time delay on loans.38 
 
Rafīq Yūnus criticises the previous explanations for why there should be no time limits on 
loans, noting that the real distinction is that loans are philanthropic whereas sales are 
commercial.
39
 Yūnus, however, fails to develop this into a juridical framework which means 
that the intentions of the lender and the borrower become critical in determining whether the 
                                                 
34
 Ibn Abī Shayba, al-Muṣannaf, vol. 4, 324. This is also the opinion of al-Awzāʿī, see ʿAbdullah ibn 
Muḥammad al-ʿUmrānī, al-Manfaʿa fī al-Qarḍ (Riyadh: Dār Ibn al-Jawzī, (1427 AH), 180.  
35
 ‗al-Qard fa inna taʾjīlahū lā yaṣiḥḥ‘, see al- Qudūrī, al-Mukhtaṣar, 73; al-Ṭaḥāwī, Mukhtaṣar, 84; al-Sarakhsī, 
al-Mabsūṭ, vol. 7, book 14, 42. 
36
 ‗Innamā al-ribā fī al-nasīʾa‘. 
37
 al-Jaṣṣāṣ, Aḥkām al-Qurʾān, 468. 
38
 For other scholars who also permit this, see al-Miṣrī, al-Ribā wa al-Ḥasm al-Zamanī, 37; idem, al-Jāmiʿ, 227-
232. 
39
 al-Miṣrī, al-Ribā wa al-Ḥasm al-Zamanī, 37; idem, al-Jāmiʿ, 230. 
APPLYING THE THEORY 
 
64 
 
exchange is commercial or altruistic.
40
 In the work of al-Sarakhsī, however, we find that not 
only is this point noted but that it finds expression in a systematic interpretation of the loan. 
 
Islamic jurisprudence distinguishes between commodate loans and non-commodate loans; the 
former are known as ʿāriya and the latter as qarḍ. The difference being that in ʿāriya a 
specific good, a ʿayn is given to a borrower who benefits from its usufruct. The borrower, in 
turn, must return the exact same good once he has finished with it. In qarḍ loans, the usufruct 
can only be obtained through the consumption of the goods, and hence the borrower is only 
obliged to return an equivalent.
41
 The question becomes that if the qarḍ is not a specific good 
then does this mean that it is a dayn? If the answer is in the affirmative, it implies that qarḍ is 
a contract of a dayn for a dayn with a delay which is exactly the same as a currency exchange 
with a delay. To overcome this problem, the Ḥanafīs grant the qarḍ a dual nature; in its 
outward form (ṣūra) it is regarded as a dayn, whereas in its juridical designation (fī al-ḥukm) 
it is a ʿayn.42 By considering it outwardly as a dayn recognises the fact that what is returned in 
reality, is not the actual item loaned, but rather, its equivalent. This is then regarded jurdically, 
to be the very item that was loaned (ʿayn al-maqbūḍ).43  
 
Its designation as an ʿayn is important in that it links the qarḍ into the Ḥanafī jurisprudential 
framework in another way. According to the Ḥanafīs only a dayn can accommodate a time 
delay, as opposed to a ʿayn which must be delivered immediately following the conclusion of 
a contract.
44
 The qarḍ, now designated as a ʿayn, cannot therefore by definition, like the 
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ʿāriya, have a time limit.45 Although earlier jurists, as mentioned above, had the opinion that 
loans are necessarily free from time limits, the jurisprudential re-structuring of the qarḍ by the 
Ḥanafīs means that this rule is now neatly tied into their theoretical legal framework. 
 
To conclude, the legal analysis of the Ḥanafīs focuses on drawing substantive jurisprudential 
distinctions between qarḍ and a currency exchange with a time delay. The result is that 
instead of resigning the matter to the intention of the two contracting parties, two points of 
divergence are noted: 
1. Qarḍ is a transaction which does not admit of a time delay and is hence due at the 
creditor‘s immediate discretion. 
2. Money given in a qarḍ is regarded juridically to be a ʿayn as opposed to money owed 
from contracts of commercial exchange which are termed dayn. 
 
2.4.2 Dayn – Ḍaʿ wa Taʿajjal 
One of the conditions for a valid credit sale is that the credit must have a time limit which is 
stipulated from the outset.
46
 Although the jurists unanimously permit the deferred price to be 
higher than the cash price, they do not infer that the addition is in lieu of the time gap.
47
 The 
deferment is merely a condition which binds both parties, giving respite to the buyer and a 
price increase to the seller. The issue at hand is whether the creditor and debtor can agree, 
before the expiry of the time period, to reduce the debt in return for immediate repayment.
48
 
This practice is known as ḍaʿ wa taʿajjal, i.e. to reduce (the debt) and hasten (the payment). 
This issue has been contentious from the very beginning of Islamic jurisprudence with the 
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earliest authorities divided over its legitimacy. From the companions Ibn ʿAbbās (ra) allowed 
it, whereas ʿUmar (ra), his son ʿAbdullah (ra) and Zayd ibn Thābit (ra) all prohibit it.49 
Among the four schools there seems to be unanimity over its prohibition, although there is a 
dissenting narration from Aḥmad.50 Notably, Ibrāhīm al-Nakhaʿī allowed it, as did the later 
Ḥanbalīs, Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn al-Qayyim. 
 
al-Shaybānī argues that this practice is prohibited due to the disparity between the debt and 
the settlement amount. He says ‗it is as though he is selling a small [amount] immediately for 
a large[r amount] deferred‘.51 This means that the transaction is interpreted as though it 
contains both ribā al-faḍl and ribā al-nasāʾa. Later, al-Jaṣṣāṣ explains in clear terms the 
underlying reason for the prohibition: 
The reduction has only been made in lieu of the time, and this is the meaning of ribā which Allah the 
exalted has clearly proscribed. There is no disagreement that if a thousand dirhams were due 
immediately and he said to him [i.e. the creditor] ‗give me a deferment and I will increase you in it by a 
hundred‘, that it is not permissible, because the hundred is a compensation for the time. Likewise, 
reduction has the [same] meaning as increase because he has made it a countervalue for time.
52
 
As was noted earlier, the commoditisation of time is proscribed as an element in the Qurʾānic 
prohibition of ribā.53 Ibn al-Qayyim argues however, that ḍaʿ wa taʿajjal is the exact opposite 
of ribā; the latter is an increase in a debt for an increase in delay, whereas the former is a 
decrease in the debt for a decrease in the delay and such reductions represent creditor 
empathy rather than exploitation.
54
  
 
                                                 
49
 al-Shaybānī, The Muwatta, 337. 
50
 There is also a narration that Shāfīʿī allowed it, but this is only recorded in the works of the Mālikīs and his 
own work seems to suggest the opposite. See Abū Zayd, Fiqh al-Ribā, 401-2. 
51
 al-Shaybānī, The Muwatta, 337. 
52
 al-Jaṣṣāṣ, Aḥkām al-Qurʾān, 467. 
53
 Also see Abu Umar Faruq Ahmad and M. Kabir Hassan, ―The Time Value of Money Concept in Islamic 
Finance,‖ The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 23, no. 1 (2006): 66-89. 
54
 A similar statement is recorded from the companion Ibn ʿAbbās (ra), see Abū Zayd, Fiqh al-Ribā, 403; and for 
an alternative reason for this concession see al-Miṣrī, al-Jāmiʿ, 324-5. 
APPLYING THE THEORY 
 
67 
 
2.5 Contractual Stipulations – Shurūṭ 
A prophetic maxim states that Muslims are bound by their contractual stipulations as long as 
the condition does not make something licit which is illicit, or vice versa, it forbids what is 
permissible.
55
 This maxim is augmented by other aḥādīth which prohibit stipulations in sale 
contracts and making sales conditional upon loans.
56
 The jurists differ in their interpretation 
of these aḥādīth regarding the extent of contractual liberty delegated to individuals.57 
Although it is agreed that certain stipulations are permitted, such as demanding a pledge or a 
guarantor in lieu of a credit sale, the method of distinguishing between acceptable and 
unacceptable conditions is itself disputed. The Ḥanafī treatment of stipulations effectively 
yields three categories:
58
 
1. Acceptable stipulations: Further divided into four sub-types: a) those which are 
normative requirements; b) those mentioned specifically in a proof-text; c) those that 
conform (mulāʾim) with the purpose of the contract and d) customary stipulations. 
2. Void or annulled stipulations: These carry no benefit for either party but may run 
counter to contractual requirements resulting in some harm to one of the parties. 
3. Invalid Stipulations: This includes any stipulation which does not fit into one of the 
four categories mentioned above in 1), and more specifically, results in an additional 
benefit for one of the parties.  
 
In categories one and two, the contract is deemed to be valid, although the stipulation in 
category one is effective whereas in category two it is annulled. In category three, the 
stipulations result in an invalid transaction which can only be remedied by removing the 
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offending condition. The important thing to notice here is that the classification singles out 
‗stipulations which carry an additional benefit for one party‘ as the sine qua non of the 
prohibition of contractual stipulations.
59
 
 
With respect to the above three categories, the Shāfiʿīs regard stipulations in category one 
(apart from d) as valid, whereas stipulations in category two and three lead to contracts which 
are void and have no legal effect. The lack of distinction between the two categories means 
that they regard these stipulations, per se, as an infringement to the rules of exchange. They 
justify their stance as the ḥadīth which prohibits contractual stipulations is a general statement 
without any indication of distinct categories. The Mālikīs directly oppose the Ḥanafīs and 
Shāfiʿīs by validating stipulations with an additional benefit for one party. With regard to 
category two, they agree with the Shāfiʿīs and regard these contracts as void. The Ḥanbalīs 
are the most liberal in allowing stipulations. In general they allow all stipulations as long as 
they are solitary;
60
 if two conditions are imposed (which are from category 2 and/or 3) then 
the contract is void. Ibn Taymiyya goes one step further and permits stipulations outright, 
asserting that the freedom to contract is a necessary corollary of the Qurʾānic mandate for 
trade based upon mutual consent (tarāḍī). He thus allows all stipulations in contracts as long 
as the object of sale is permissible.
61
 
 
Without delving deeply into the substantive doctrines of the different Schools, a number of 
conclusions regarding the method adopted by them can be inferred. Although a number of 
aḥādīth can be marshalled to support all their opinions, what is more critical is the 
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hermeneutics behind their treatment of these texts. What is relevant to this study is to 
demonstrate that the Ḥanafīs, singularly, have sought to interpret this branch of contract law 
with reference to their ribā doctrine. For the Shāfiʿīs, the dictates of the ḥadīth prohibiting 
stipulations become paramount, and hence all stipulations not exempted by a specific proof-
text are deemed to invalidate the contract. The Mālikīs differ with them, but only in regard to 
the type of exemptions found in the proof-texts. Their approach is substantially the same 
inasmuch as it makes the prohibition of contractual stipulations paramount and then looks for 
textual concessions as exemptions to the norm. In direct opposition to this, is the method of 
Ibn Taymiyya, which is to declare that the guiding principle in contractual stipulations is 
permissibility and only when a condition opposes either the legal purpose of the contract or a 
textual injunction, will the contract be invalidated.
62
   
 
For the Ḥanafīs the normative of commutative exchange is contractual equality (wujūb al-
mumāthala) and the rules relating to contractual stipulations are interpreted according to this 
norm. If one party stipulates an additional benefit over and above the requirement of the 
exchange contract, this stipulated addition has no countervalue in the transaction and is thus 
deemed by them to be ribā.63 By applying their definition of ribā to this issue the Ḥanafīs are 
not merely explaining the underlying reasoning to the injunction, but are also suggesting a 
yardstick for differentiating between the different types of stipulations. This leads to a 
divergence with the other schools, not only in doctrine but also in method. In explaining why 
the stipulations mentioned in category two lead to the annulment of the stipulation and not the 
contract, al-Kāsānī reasons that it is: 
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‗a stipulation with no benefit in it for anyone and so it does not require invalidation [of the contract]. 
This is because annulling the transaction in stipulations such as these is because they incorporate ribā, 
which is an additional stipulated benefit in the contract, with no compensating countervalue. This is not 
present in this [type of] stipulation because there is no benefit in it for anyone, [the only issue is that] it 
is an invalid condition. This does not affect the contract and hence the contract is permitted and the 
condition annulled.
64 
What transpires is that stipulations are placed on the measure of equivalence; if they disturb 
the balance and violate the required mumāthala, the contract is deemed to be invalid, if not, 
the stipulation itself is annulled and the contract stands.  
 
2.6 Pledge – Rahn 
The validity of stipulating a pledge is unanimously upheld by the jurists, what concerns us 
here is whether they permit the pledgee to benefit from the pledge. The jurists allow pledges 
to be given for most types of debts whether they are credit sales, forward sales or loans.
65
 The 
pledge, which represents a form of security, is to be returned once the debt has been paid. If 
the pledgee benefits from the pledge during this period, the additional benefit constitutes an 
excess without a countervalue and is deemed to be ribā.66 
 
The Ḥanafīs treat the pledge as any other stipulation, in that if the additional benefit is a 
contractual stipulation it is prohibited as it is ribā, whereas if the pledger gives the pledgee 
non-contractual permission to benefit from the pledge it is allowed. Additionally, they apply 
the rule that contemporary practice and custom are equivalent to contractual stipulation and if 
in a particular locale it becomes customary for the pledgee to benefit from the pledge then in 
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such places the pledgee will be prohibited a priori from benefiting from the pledge.
67
 In fact 
some of the Ḥanafī jurists prohibited the pledgee from benefiting from the pledge outright, 
whether the pledger grant him permission or not, arguing that it is ribā and thus not subject to 
the pledger‘s permission. Others argued that it was reprehensible even if permitted or that it 
was permissible legally but not morally.
68
 
 
The Mālikīs and the the Shāfiʿīs agreed with the Ḥanafīs in general although they allow the 
pledgee to benefit from the pledge in contracts of sale as opposed to debt and if the benefit is 
stipulated in the contract and it is for a known period. They permit this by arguing that it can 
be interpreted as though it is a contract of sale and hire, where the item pledged is regarded as 
under hire and the rent is apportioned from the object of the sale.
69
 This reinterpretation is 
precluded from applying to loans as there is no object of sale in it. In terms of the pledger 
granting permission to the pledgee to benefit from the pledge, the Mālikīs prohibit this 
whereas the Shāfiʿīs allow it. 
 
The Ḥanbalīs like the other schools also prohibit the pledgee from benefiting from the pledge 
except that they make an exception in the case where the pledge is an animal. In this case they 
allow the use of the animal for carriage and also for its milk to be consumed.
70
 This opinion is 
upheld by Ibn al-Qayyim as it premised upon their reading of a prophetic ḥadīth although the 
other schools interpret it differently.
71
 The Ḥanbalīs also, like the Mālikīs, do not allow the 
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pledgee to benefit from the pledge with the permission of the pledger in debts arising from 
loans.
72
 
 
The danger of ribā accruing on the pledge can be seen from the stance of the four schools and 
their caution in allowing the pledgee to benefit from it while the pledger is indebted to him. 
The potential exploitation of the pledge in this scenario is not lost on the Schools of law and 
later on their concerns will be seen to be justified when we examine the case of the antichretic 
pledge, known as the bayʿ al-wafāʾ. 
 
2.7 Currency Exchange – Ṣarf 
There is a general agreement amongst the schools that both quality and workmanship are 
disregarded in sales of ribā commodities. This means that gold and silver, whether they be of 
a high or low quality and whatever their form, either as jewellery, minted coins, bullion or 
raw metal, are always to be sold in equal quantities. The ḥadīth of the six commodities clearly 
prescribes equivalence in quantity. This legal imperative is, in the language of the uṣūlīs, a 
muṭlaq command, i.e. it is absolute with no textual qualifications.  Factors, such as quality and 
form, which undoubtedly impact the commercial value of these metals, are necessarily 
negated from consideration when determining equivalence. Equivalence, it will be recalled is 
restricted to the legal measures of weight and volume. The corollary of this, however, is that 
quantitative equivalence may be achieved despite a disparity in the commercial value of the 
exchanged items. 
 
The lack of coins minted by the early Islamic state meant that individuals were often forced to 
mint their own coins from private mints. In this regard, Mālik is reported to have granted a 
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concession for those in urgent need, to exchange raw gold for minted coins with an additional 
amount of gold to cover the production cost of the mint. This dispensation from the normal 
rules is due to a mitigating necessity, a technique observed previously in the Mālikī approach 
to the ʿarāyā and in line with their general principles. This ruling was however overturned by 
the later Mālikīs on the grounds that a) the increased presence of government mints overcame 
the previous extenuating circumstances and b) the violation of the rules of ribā al-faḍl is 
unwarranted.
73
 al-Qurṭubī, clearly incensed by the concession, declares it to be pure ribā and 
defends the School‘s eponym by saying that the narration from him is unknown and not 
authenticated.
74
 
 
In a case where somebody destroys another person‘s gold or silver jewellery, the question 
arises whether compensation should be according to its weight or its value. If a gold ring is 
replaced by an equivalent weight of raw gold, it is clear that the market value of the latter will 
be far less than the former. If it is replaced according to the market value of the ring, more 
gold will be required than was contained in the original. This, however, violates the 
requirement for quantitative equivalence. The Ḥanafīs rule that in order to provide equitable 
compensation, it is the market value which must be replaced. The replacement, however, must 
not violate the rules of ribā al-faḍl and so the payment must be made in a different currency, 
i.e. by using silver.
75
 This solution achieves both aims of equitable compensation and 
maintains the systematic application of the ribā rules. This example shows that even in cases 
of compensation, priority is given to the systematic application of the ribā rules. 
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2.7.1 Gold, Pearls and Embellished Swords 
Having established that quality and value are redundant in transactions of ribā commodities, 
the jurists differed on the application of this principle in sales of items which contain gold or 
silver. These are exemplified in the works of jurisprudence by two items; a necklace 
consisting of gold and pearls and an embellished sword. The first represents an example of an 
object in which the gold can be separated and the second where it can not. The first example 
finds explicit mention in a ḥadīth, where the companion Faḍāla ibn ʿUbayd al-Anṣārī (ra) 
narrates that:  
‗I bought, on the day of Khaybar, a necklace of gold and pearls for twelve dīnārs. Subsequently, I 
separated it (i.e. the gold from the pearls) and found that it (the gold) was more than twelve dīnārs. I 
mentioned that to the Prophet (pbuh) and he said: It is not to be sold until it is separated‘ 76 
The jurists differed in regards to their interpretation of this ḥadīth. For the Ḥanbalīs and the 
Shāfiʿīs the ruling is clear; objects containing gold should not be exchanged for gold unless 
the gold is separated and sold for an equal weight of gold and the remainder of the object sold 
separately.
77
 If the items cannot be separated then the object should not be sold for gold but 
with silver, or vice versa if the object is adorned with silver. The Mālikīs give a similar ruling 
for separable objects, whereas for inseparable objects, or those in which the separation would 
damage the object, they took into consideration the relative quantity of gold in the object of 
sale. If the gold constitutes less than one third then it is considered to be subordinate (tabaʿ) to 
the object and equivalence is disregarded as a necessary condition.
78
 If the amount of gold or 
silver is more than one third then the sale is not permitted. 
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al-Ṭaḥawī demonstrates that alternative narrations of the ḥadīth show that the injunction ‗not 
to sell until separate‘ is not uniformly recorded in all the lines of transmission of the ḥadīth. 
From this, he infers that far from being a distinct substantive rule, the prohibition is basically 
a cautionary measure, where the unknown quantities of gold may lead to ribā al-faḍl. 
Whether the gold or silver can be separated or not, is immaterial for the Ḥanafīs, the crucial 
issue is determining equivalence. They state that if equivalence can be ascertained through a 
judicious inspection of the objects of sale, then as long as the gold or silver in the price is 
more than the gold or silver in the object, the sale is allowed.
79
 
 
This line of argument, however, involves more than simply estimating the quantities of gold 
or silver. A major aspect of the problem is not merely to ensure that the ribā commodities are 
sold with due regard for equivalence, but also to determine whether the individual value of 
each component in the transaction needs to be taken into account. In a sale where two items 
are purchased for a single price, the price distributes itself proportionally between the items 
according to their respective values.
80
 For example, if a table and chair are purchased for a 
combined price of £100, the price is distributed across the two items depending on their 
relative values. If the table has a market value of £90 and the chair a value of £30 then clearly 
the ratio of their values is three to one. This means that from the price of £100, three quarters, 
£75, will be apportioned to the table and the remaining quarter, £25, to the chair.  
 
Apart from the Ḥanafīs, all the other schools insist that this standard rule is also effective in 
transactions of gold and silver.  Hence, even if the gold is assumed to be more than the gold in 
the object, when the price is distributed across the items it may transpire that the amount 
apportioned to the gold in the object is not equal to it. For example, if a sword contains 5kg of 
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gold and the other materials that make up the sword are worth 2½kg of gold, the ratio of the 
value of the gold with the rest of the sword is two to one. If this sword as a whole is 
exchanged for 6kg of gold, the price is distributed in the ratio of two to one. The result is that 
4kg of the price are apportioned to the 5kg of gold and the remaining 2kg to the remainder of 
the sword. This, however, constitutes ribā al-faḍl. 
 
The Ḥanafīs argue that in exchanges of the commodities of ribā, value is not taken into 
consideration and only equivalence in weight is relevant. Although they agree that 
distribution by value is the norm of commercial exchange, they prioritise the demands of the 
ribā rules to negate the notion of value from this transaction. In the example above, they 
assert that the apportioning of the price is irrespective of the proportional ratios of their 
values, and hence 5kg of gold from the price is equated with 5kg of gold in the sword, and the 
remaining 1kg of the price is allocated to the remainder of the sword. As long as there is 
enough gold in the price to cover the gold in the sword and some left over to allocate to the 
remainder of the sword they permit it.  
 
al-Ṭaḥāwī argues for this point using the following simple example:81 A 2kg bullion of gold is 
exchanged for two dīnārs. The dīnārs weigh 1 kg each, but one is of a higher quality than the 
other and is twice its value. If, as the other Schools argue, the proportional value of each 
separate item is considered in distributing the price, then two thirds of the gold bullion should 
be allocated to the higher quality dīnār and one third to the low quality dīnār. This means that 
the high quality 1kg dīnār is allocated to 1⅓kg of the gold bullion and the lower quality 1kg 
dīnār to ⅔kg of the gold bullion. This quantitative disparity, which occurs if the price is 
apportioned according to value, is tantamount to ribā al-faḍl. This according to al-Ṭaḥāwī 
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would invalidate the sale, whereas in actual fact this sale is unanimously upheld by the jurists.  
The Ḥanafīs therefore argue that when distributing the price over numerous items of 
exchange, the value of each item must not be taken into consideration and instead sales 
involving usurious commodities should be analysed solely with regard to the legal measure. 
 
2.7.2 At the Systematic Periphery 
The line of argument outlined above can be seen in a report that Abū Ḥanīfa said that it is 
permitted for X to sell 100 dirhams plus 1 dīnār to Y, in exchange for 1000 dirhams. X‘s 100 
dirhams are allocated to 100 dirhams from Y‘s 1000 dirhams and X‘s dīnār is allocated to 
Y‘s remaining 900 dirhams.82 This reasoning, however, when taken to its logical conclusion 
may lead to some undesirable results. Once value is negated, it quickly becomes apparent that 
there is a possibility of exploiting this explanation. al-Shaybānī, for example, was asked how 
he felt about a transaction of a number of dirhams for a number of dirhams in unequal 
weights, with the owner of the lower quantity compensating for the difference with some 
copper coins. He replied that although it was substantively permissible it was reprehensible. 
The interlocutor then asked him how it felt in his heart, to which he replied ‗like a 
mountain‘.83 
 
The clear danger, not lost on the Imām, is of circumventing the requirement of equivalence by 
inserting nominal items into the contract which are relatively insignificant in price, such as a 
copper coin or a handkerchief. al-Shaybānī‘s dislike of this transaction is mirrored in al-
Kāsānī‘s delineation of such transactions into the following types: 
 permissible without reprehension 
 permitted but reprehensible 
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 invalid 
The demarcation between a permissible exchange without reprehension and one that is 
allowed but reprehensible is based on whether the additional item is, by market standards, of 
similar exchange value as the extra amount of gold or silver. If the additional item is only a 
nominal item, such as a single copper coin or a walnut and clearly not equivalent to the extra 
amount of gold or silver, then the sale is reprehensible. If the additional item is of no 
commercial value, i.e. not considered māl mutaqawwim, then the transaction is invalid.84 
 
The important point to note is that although it may be clear that an item has been inserted into 
the transaction nominally, and only for the purposes of exploiting the substantive doctrine of 
the Ḥanafīs, they still permit it, albeit reprehensively. Their commitment to their systematic 
reasoning is clearly expressed by their refusal to prohibit this transaction. The Madinan jurists 
including Mālik held this transaction to be prohibited saying that it is a means (dharīʿa) to 
ribā. al-Shaybānī, in a telling rejoinder to them, repeatedly asserts that jurisprudence is not 
formulated based upon doubts or possible outcomes and the accusations that they may 
occasion.
85
 It is, rather, the result of a methodically consistent application of legal theory. 
Commenting on the method of the Ḥanafīs in contrast to their predecessors, Ansari 
pertinently, although somewhat exaggeratedly, states that: 
‗Again and again established practices were disregarded, considerations of administrative and judicial 
convenience were set aside, and even the demands of ethical considerations ignored by Abû Ḥanîfah 
in favour of the dictates of systematic consistency.‘86 
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2.8 Summary of the Ḥanafī Theory of Ribā 
The Ḥanafī theory of ribā has been traced through the exegetical and jurisprudential 
compendia. The approach of this School is characterised by an attempt to present an 
analytically coherent account for the different types of ribā mentioned in the texts of the 
Qurʾān and the Sunna. Having articulated their hermeneutical interpretation, they apply their 
doctrine into the various branches of commercial law. A number of examples were selected to 
demonstrate the application of the theory and also to compare and contrast their approach 
with the other Schools of Islamic law. From this presentation of their substantive doctrine a 
number of conclusions can be drawn.  
 Systematic consistency backed by the Qurʾānic prerogative (based on ribā being 
mujmal) results in the pursuance of substantive doctrines which defy concessionary 
jurisprudence and prioritise coherency. 
 They attempt to incorporate an objective component into the meaning of ribā and 
establish the means of objective equivalence through the legal measure and also to 
restrict it to this.  
 They negate quality and value in the equation, such that the legal measure takes 
precedence in all contracts of exchange of ribā commodities, even when accompanied 
by non-ribā commodities as well. 
 By making ribā a sub-narrative of the norm of contractual equality, they pursue all 
material gains resulting from commercial exchange which have no contractual 
countervalue and designate them as ribā; most profoundly witnessed in the field of 
contractual stipulations (shurūṭ). 
 They regard time commoditisation as a major component of the ribā prohibition. 
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2.9 Ibn al-Qayyim‘s Theory of Ribā 
 
In this final section, Ibn al-Qayyim‘s theory of the ribā prohibition will be briefly presented. 
Ibn al-Qayyim was the illustrious successor of the Ḥanbalī reformer Ibn Taymiyya, a fact 
amply reflected in much of his scholarly output. Ibn Taymiyya, himself, had a great number 
of opinions which were distinct from the Ḥanbalī School‘s juridical and theological doctrines 
which were the cause of great controversy, both in his time and up to the present day. The 
theory of ribā is no less significant and many of the nineteenth and twentieth century 
reformist scholars inclined to his approach and believed it offered a transitory relief from the 
strict application of the Sharīʿa rules.87 This, in a period, when Muslims were adjusting to 
evermore pervasive norms of usury-based finance projected from the West through colonial 
and indeed post-colonial institutions. 
 
2.9.1 Two Types of Ribā 
Ibn Qayyim lays out the basis of his theory at the very outset of his essay on ribā:  
‗Ribā is of two types; manifest (jalī) and discrete (khafī). As for the manifest, it is proscribed due to the 
great harm that is in it, [whereas] the discrete is proscribed [only] because it leads to the manifest 
[type]. Hence prohibition of the former is intended (qaṣd) and the latter is precautionary (wasīla)‘88 
The dichotomy presented by Ibn al-Qayyim reflects what is often expressed by the jurists as 
ribā al-Qurʾān and ribā al-Sunna. The former is also known as ribā al-Jāhiliyya or ribā al-
nasīʾā, whereas the latter is referred to, in its constituent two types, as ribā al-faḍl and riba 
al-nasāʾa. Although this may appear to be invoking a legislative hierarchy in differentiating 
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between the two, Ibn al-Qayyim has a different point to stress. He quotes Aḥmad as 
identifying the former type as the ribā regarding which there is no doubt, and which 
corresponds to the formula ‗pay up or increase‘.89 This, he contends, is the crux of the ribā 
prohibition due to the inevitable inequitous social and economic consequences which result 
from the perpetual increases the debtor incurs as his financial situation deteriorates.  
 
Ribā al-faḍl, he argues, will not in itself lead to those consequences directly as the excess is 
given on the spot and time is not the issue. However, had traders been permitted to trade for 
an excess in gold for gold, it would not be long before they developed a greed to offer an 
excess in lieu of a time delay. Ribā al-faḍl is hence only prohibited because it will lead to ribā 
al-nasīʾa.90 Similarly, ribā al-nasāʾa, he explains, if permitted, would mean that gold would 
be traded for gold and food for food, even though at equal quantities but with a time delay. 
Once the time delay expired, it would inevitably lead to the creditor giving the debtor an 
ultimatum on default of ‗pay up or increase‘, and hence, this too would ultimately lead to ribā 
al-nasīʾā.91 He suggests that to prevent people falling into ribā al-Jāhiliyya they were weaned 
off delayed transactions of similar commodities (in type) through the ribā al-nasāʾa 
injunction, and then they were weaned off taking an excess in the same genus through the 
ribā al-faḍl injunction.92 Prohibiting these two types of sales, he surmises, is solely for the 
purpose of ‗closing the avenues‘ (sadd al-dharīʿa) which might lead to ribā al-Jāhiliyya. 
 
2.9.2 The Ratio 
In determining the ratio, he opts for the opinion of the Shāfiʿīs and the Mālikīs, i.e. currency 
and foodstuffs. He goes on to explain why these are the critical features using arguments 
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similar to those already mentioned by their original protagonists. In essence, his purpose is to 
show that social and economic realities are determining factors in the ribā prohibition. Gold 
and silver are universal currencies and as such they are the standard against which all other 
commodities are valued. Had ribā al-faḍl been permitted in different qualities of gold, this 
would have lead to trading in currencies, which, as witnessed by the trade of copper coins in 
his age, leads to great harm and oppression. Money is not to be traded in, he argues, as it is 
not a commodity, but rather a measure of exchange value, and it is their capacity to act as 
currencies which is the effective ratio in their prohibition. He goes on to say that foodstuffs, 
which are often the only means of trade for Bedouins and villagers who have no dirhams or 
dīnārs, needs to be exchanged in the contractual session to prevent it becoming a vehicle of 
credit which will lead to ribā al-nasīʾā.  
 
Ibn al-Qayyim‘s identification of the ratio and his stress on the economic functions of money 
is not for the purpose of extending the rules, but rather, to link the explanation of these ratios 
to his dichotomy of ribā into two types. 
 
2.9.3 Necessity and Need 
An agreed upon principle in Islamic jurisprudence is that in life-threatening situations 
mandatory prohibitions are temporarily sanctioned. The unanimous agreement on this 
principle stems from its enunciation in various verses in the Qurʾān, which allow a person in 
dire need to consume prohibited foods, or when a person is forced by an enemy to renounce 
his belief, a concession is granted to outwardly utter the words while keeping faith in his 
heart.
93
 This principle may also be applied to the rules of ribā; if a person finds no other way 
of acquiring food to keep himself alive, then in such a situation ribā would be permitted for 
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him up to acquire the minimum that would suffice his need. Ibn al-Qayyim, however, wishes 
to extend the mandate of these concessionary rules based upon life-threatening necessities. 
Concessions should also be granted where a general public benefit or need requires it. Such 
concessions, however, will apply only to those proscriptions which are precautionary and do 
not independently, represent the ultimate purpose of the law. Ibn al-Qayyim presents 
numerous examples where such a principle is observable from various branches of the law.
94
 
The examples are rulings which the jurists would unanimously agree upon, although none 
prior to him, having enunciated any such underlying principle for further application. 
 
The importance of Ibn al-Qayyim‘s bifurcation of ribā, into intended and precautionary, can 
now be realised. Ribā al-faḍl is to be permitted where a public benefit or need demands it 
whereas ribā al-nasīʾa is not.95 He begins his application of this principle, with an issue in 
which the concession to the ribā rules is provided by a prophetic judgement. The ʿarāyā 
concession has already been discussed and was noted as being a model which the Mālikīs had 
used in developing concessions to the stringent application of the ribā rules in cases of 
hardship. The example is useful for Ibn al-Qayyim, in that it provides a textually based 
precedent for the application of his principle to a ribā transaction. The pertinence of the 
example is enhanced when it is noted that the ʿarāyā concession relates to ribā al-faḍl and not 
to ribā al-nasīʾa. This lends legitimacy to his bifurcation of ribā and to the application of his 
principle to only one type. 
 
2.9.4 Jewellery and Workmanship 
Previously it was noted that the jurists, in unanimity, regarded all forms of gold, irrespective 
of their form, as subject to the requirement of equivalence by weight. Ibn al-Qayyim deviates 
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from this consensus and attempts to show that jewellery should be exempt from the rules of 
ribā. It will be recalled that when determining the ratio of ribā, he gives specific emphasis to 
the economic and social problems underpinning the usury prohibition. His aim is to maintain 
a tight link between the purpose of the divine laws and the specific substantive doctrines and 
hence his attempt to regard sales of jewellery as extraneous to the ribā injunction.  
 
The crux of his hermeneutical argument is that in the aḥādīth which prohibit ribā in 
exchanges of gold and silver, reference is made to prevailing currencies and their raw 
counterparts and not to jewellery. This is because the workmanship (ṣunʿa) that goes into 
their production, transforms them from currency to commodity and therefore, like any other 
commodity, they may be sold without the need for quantitative equivalence.
96
 He argues 
vehemently that it would be absurd to expect someone to sell his jewellery for an equivalent 
weight of raw gold or silver and thereby lose the value of the workmanship: 
The intelligent [person] would not sell this [jewellery] for its weight of the same genus because it is 
foolish and a waste of the workmanship and the legislator is wiser than to bind the community to that 
… The legislator does not say to the craftsman: sell your work for an equal weight and lose your 
workmanship, and he does not say: do not work as an artisan; leave it, and neither does he say: 
connive to sell your product for a greater weight with numerous stratagems (ḥiyal).97 
 
His reference to the ḥiyal is important here as he repeatedly mentions them juxtaposed with 
his own principle, effecting thereby a comparison of techniques for alleviating problems felt 
by the public in maintaining strict adherence to the ribā rules elaborated by the jurists. His 
qualm is that the jurists who oppose him, deploy stratagems to circumvent the law which they 
themselves have determined. His suggestion, is that the focus of the ribā prohibition should 
revolve around the Qurʾānic type, as this is the original vice being addressed. The Sunna 
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complements this original ruling by blocking the means which are likely to lead to the 
Qurʾānic type. His argument is that, instead of instituting ḥiyal, one should turn to the law 
itself. The law provides relief in the form of concessions whenever there is an overwhelming 
public need (al-maṣlaḥa al-rājiḥa) as evidenced in the ʿarāyā dispensation. 
 
2.9.5 Ibn al-Qayyim and Reform 
In other branches of commercial law it becomes clear that on most of the issues discussed 
earlier where the Ḥanafīs make the ribā rules paramount, the opposite can be said of Ibn al-
Qayyim. In the contract daʿ wa taʿajjal, as already stated, all of the Schools prohibit this 
whereas Ibn al-Qayyim, and indeed his mentor Ibn Taymiyya, permit this. In contractual 
stipulations the Ḥanafīs are noted for attempting to make strict contractual equivalence a 
normative requirement of the ribā prohibition, the opposite can be seen from the Ḥanbalī 
reformers, who take a decidedly liberal stance, allowing all stipulations in principle where the 
object of sale is valid. Ibn al-Qayyim‘s stance on ʿarāya has been noted and not surprisingly, 
in opposition to the Ḥanafīs, he chooses to interpret the exchange as a concession from ribā 
rather than as an act of charity. Also with the regard to the pledge, they differ with the Ḥanafīs 
in allowing the pledgee to benefit from the pledge if the latter is an animal. The final issue 
with regard to loans, he adopts the opinion of the majority that time limits on loans are 
permitted and concludes that the only difference between a loan and an exchange of 
currencies with ribā al-nasāʾa is the intention of the parties concerned.98 This again is in 
contradistinction to the Ḥanafīs who leave no room for the intention of parties in determining 
the legality of transactions. This point assumes critical importance in the subject of the ḥiyal, 
where accusations regarding the purpose and intention of the ḥiyal contracts lead to sustained 
polemics between the protagonists and their opponents. 
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Ibn al-Qayyim‘s legal methodology stands in stark contrast to the method of the Ḥanafīs. This 
is observable both in his ribā typologies and also in his substantive rulings. For Ibn al-
Qayyim, the purpose of the law, as opposed to its specific enactments, is given priority when 
understanding the nature of the ribā injunction. This concern is also reflected in his 
substantive rulings, where concessions are liberally granted where the purpose of the law 
deems it necessary. For the Ḥanafīs, law must be based upon objective assessments. Ribā is 
not bifurcated according to its legislative purpose, but rather according to whether it is 
objectively discernible or not. In the substantive rules a similar approach is observable. The 
law is applied consistently according to their juridical definition of ribā. Ibn al-Qayyim 
disagrees with this approach as it often leads to iniquitous results. In these situations, he 
confidently demonstrates that his approach is vindicated as it provides solutions in the form of 
concessions and does not require the use of stratagems. The latter, although, consonant with 
the letter of the law, defy the purpose for which the laws themselves are revealed. This 
contrasting approach is critically important and needs to borne in mind as we embark on a 
discussion of the ḥiyal. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
RECEPTION OF THE ḤIYAL: THE POLEMIC 
 
 
 
In this chapter the polemic occasioned by the ḥiyal will be examined. The polemic begins 
with a chapter in al-Bukhārī‘s collection of ḥadīth in which the author adduces a number of 
ḥadīth to refute the methodology of the ḥiyal proponents and which appear to anticipate the 
use of certain ḥiyal. The opposition of the traditionists to the ḥiyal is subsequently articulated 
in specific works. An early extant example, the Ibṭāl al-Ḥiyal of Ibn Baṭṭa will be discussed 
and the author‘s substantive arguments noted. The polemic at its apex in the works of the 
Ḥanbalī reformers Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn al-Qayyim will then be examined. Finally, al-
Shāṭibī‘s views on the ḥiyal will be presented, as his inquiry into the maqāṣid, the higher 
purposes of the law, is crucial for grounding the ḥiyal in their normative context. 
 
3.1 al-Bukhārī and his Kitāb al-Ḥiyal 
The leading Ḥanafī jurist in al-Bukhārī‘s home town was Abū Ḥafṣ al-Kabīr, a direct student 
of al-Shaybānī. He was also an authoritative narrator of all the latter‘s major works and the 
sole narrator of the ḥiyal treatise attributed to him. al-Bukhārī, in his youth, is reported to have 
studied jurisprudence with Abū Ḥafṣ and later to have travelled in his search for knowledge 
with the latter‘s son, Abū Ḥafṣ al-Ṣaghīr.1 al-Bukhārī would therefore have known Ḥanafī 
jurisprudence and the types of ḥiyal they were advocating. He would also have been 
acquainted with the more controversial ḥiyal such as those occasioning the reaction of his 
fellow traditionists. In his compendium of authentic traditions, al-Bukhārī devotes a chapter to 
                                                 
1
 ʿAbd al-Fattāḥ Abū Ghudda, introduction to Kashf al-Iltibās ʿammā Awradahū al-Imām al-Bukhārī ʿalā baʿḍ 
al-Nās, by ʿAbd al-Ghanī al-Ghunaymī al-Maydānī (Aleppo: Maktab al-Maṭbūʿāt al-Islāmiyya, 1993), 7-8. 
RECEPTION OF THE ḤIYAL: THE POLEMIC 
89 
 
the ḥiyal gathering therein the traditions he regards as antithetical to the methodology of the 
ḥiyal protagonists. The material is arranged into fifteen sections where he narrates one or 
more aḥādīth to demonstrate a specific point. On some occasions he mentions the opposing 
opinion of ‗some people‘; an elliptical reference to those who disagree with him, which is 
generally taken to refer to the Ḥanafīs, although not exclusively so.2 Although this is a term 
he uses throughout his compendium, the number of times it occurs in the Kitāb al-Ḥiyal, 
fourteen, exceeds the number of times it occurs in the rest of his work.
3
 This fact alone shows 
the significance of the ḥiyal as a point of contention between the Ḥanafīs and the 
traditionists.
4
  
 
The following table shows the section headings, the number of aḥādīth narrated in the section 
and how often al-Bukhārī mentions the opinion of ‗some people‘. This latter point serves to 
indicate whether a specific contention is being addressed or not. The use of the term ‗some 
people‘ is not spread evenly throughout these sections, and in fact, the fourteen times that it 
does occur is limited to only six sections. The remaining sections are consequently of little 
relevance to the juridical notion of the ḥiyal, but rather qualify by considering the broader 
linguistic sense of the term. 
 
 
                                                 
2
 See Maḥmūd ibn ibn Aḥmad Badr al-Dīn al-ʿAynī, ʿUmdat al-Qārī Sharḥ Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī, 112/24, [book 
online]; available from http://www.islamport.com/isp_eBooks/srh/; Internet; last accessed 04 May 2010; Abū 
Ghudda, Taqdima, 7-8. Also for the various explanatory texts dealing with this term, see ibid, 12-15. 
3
 ʿAbd al-Majīd Maḥmūd, al-Ittijāhāt al-Fiqhiyya ʿinda Aṣḥāb al-Ḥadīth fī al-Qarn al-Thālith al-Hijrī, cited in 
Abū Ghudda, Taqdima, 32. 
4
 See ibid, 16-32; also see Christopher Melchert, The Formation of the Sunnī Schools of Law, 9th-10th Centuries 
C.E. (Leiden: Brill, 1997), 9. Although the author identifies the ḥiyal as a bone of contention between the aṣḥāb 
al-raʾi and the aṣḥāb al-ḥadīth, his use of the sources is both uncritical and inaccurate. The former relates to his 
acceptance of al-Khaṭīb‘s evidently biased narrations regarding the ascription of the Kitāb al-Ḥiyal to Abū 
Ḥanīfa, and the latter to his understanding regarding the use of the verb iḥtāla in regards to ḥadīth. The author 
translates this as ‗using legal devices to nullify hadith‘ (p.9), whereas legal devices have nothing to do with the 
science of ḥadith and its use in his source‘s context is in its original linguistic sense. 
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Section Subject Matter ‗Some People‘ 
1 Abstaining from ḥiyal: based upon the ḥadīth of intention. 0 
2 On prayer 0 
3 On Zakāt – alms tax 3 
4 On nikāḥ – marriage 2 
5 On restricting the water of a well 0 
6 Deception in raising the price (najsh) 0 
7 Deception in sales 0 
8 Prohibition of the guardian exploiting a female minor 0 
9 Returning stolen property to its owner upon recovery 1 
10 Using deceptive arguments to win a court case 0 
11 On nikāḥ  3 
12 Deceiving one‘s spouse 0 
13 Fleeing from plague 0 
14 Gifts and pre-emption - shufʿa 4 
15 A tax-collector using ḥiyal to receive gifts 1 
Table 2. al-Bukhārī‘s Kitāb al-Ḥiyal 
Upon further examination we can note that section four and eleven relate to marriage, and that 
the issues discussed in section fifteen relate to pre-emption and thus belong to the preceding 
section, and although section fourteen relates to ‗gifts and pre-emption, the subject under the 
heading of gifts, actually relates to zakāt. In total, the number of subjects in which al-Bukhārī 
takes issue with the Ḥanafīs is therefore reduced to four (3, 4(&11), 9, 14). In the remaining 
sections, in which the term ‗some people say‘ is not used, the subject matter relates either; to 
issues with which the author disagrees with a specific Ḥanafī ruling (2)  or where the 
linguistic usage of ḥiyal is being applied to an issue (5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 12, 13). These issues are 
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not relevant to this study and will not be tackled as other studies have dealt with them and 
discussed them at length.
5
 The four points that remain are: 
1. Zakāt – alms-tax, 
2. Nikāḥ –  marriage 
3. Returning stolen property to its owner upon recovery 
4. Shufʿa – pre-emption 
We will now discuss points two and three in reverse order. 
 
Point three, relating to stolen property, is not about an actual ḥīla proposed by the Ḥanafīs, but 
rather, the possible exploitation of a juridical stance the Ḥanafīs take with regard to 
misappropriated property. According to the rules of jurisprudence, property which is usurped 
must be returned to its rightful owner. If, however, the item is not forthcoming and the thief 
claims it to be destroyed or lost, the owner is entitled to compensation. The Ḥanafīs argue that 
if the owner accepts the compensation, he forfeits his right to the item should it reappear. al-
Bukhārī‘s objection is that this viewpoint may be regarded as a ḥīla by an individual who 
wishes to acquire an object which the owner refuses to sell. If he misappropriates the item and 
then claims that the article is destroyed or lost, he will be ordered to compensate the owner. If 
the latter accepts the compensation, the ownership of the object passes to the thief, who may 
then produce the item and claim it as his own. In the example furnished by al-Bukhārī, a 
female slave is stolen whom the thief subsequently claims has died, once he compensates the 
owner with her market price, the slave girl legally belongs to him.
6
 Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī, a 
renowned Shāfiʿī commentator on al-Bukhārī‘s compendium, discusses the point in detail and 
                                                 
5
 See al-ʿAynī, Umdat al-Qārī, 108/24-125/24; Aḥmad ibn ʿAlī ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī, Fatḥ al-Bārī Sharḥ Ṣaḥīḥ 
al-Bukhārī (Riyadh: Dār al-Salām, 1997), vol. 12, 408-439. 
6
 Muḥammad ibn Ismāʿīl ibn Ibrāhīm al-Bukhārī, Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī (Liechtenstein: Thesaurus Islamicus 
Foundation, 2000), vol 3, 1407. 
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explains that this not a ḥīla for the thief. It is rather, due to the Ḥanafī juridical principles of 
contract and the Ḥanafī‘s would condemn any such exploitation of the rules as a sin.7  
 
There are two sections (4, 11) on nikāḥ in al-Bukhārī‘s Kitāb al-Ḥiyal, in which the author 
discusses three distinct issues. As with the point three, none of these issues are ḥiyal proposed 
by the Ḥanafīs, but rather, are possible loopholes which may appear due to their particular 
juridical views. The first issue addressed, is the marriage contract known as shighār,8 the 
second, mutʿa,9 and the third, marriage by a judicial decree based upon false testimony. None 
of these are put forwarded as ḥiyal by the Ḥanafīs, but they all represent points of contention 
with the other Schools. As Ibn Ḥajar notes, the inclusion of shighār in this section is difficult 
to justify especially since the Ḥanafīs do not permit it, per se, but rather mandate that if it is 
contracted the conditions of the contract will be annulled and the marriages in their correct 
legal form will be effected. Ibn Ḥajar then presents a possible scenario where the shighār may 
appear to take the form of a ḥīla, although even then, not as a tool advocated by the Ḥanafīs, 
but rather as an exploitation of their juridical rules.
10
  The argument against mutʿa is aimed at 
an opinion of Zufar which appears to permit a time restricted marriage (nikāḥ muʾaqqat), 
although on further inspection, it, like in the previous example, means that the marriage is 
effected while the stipulation of time is held to be void. Although Zufar‘s opinion in this issue 
is not the official ruling in the School, clearly what he is not upholding is mutʿa marriage and 
al-Bukhārī‘s equating his verdict relating to nikāḥ muʾaqqat with the latter is itself, 
questionable.
11
   
                                                 
7
 See Ibn Ḥajar, Fatḥ al-Bārī, vol. 12, 423. The Ḥanafī commentator, Badr al-Dīn al-ʿAynī, treats the issue 
briefly stating only that: ‗He (al-Bukhārī) intends by ‗some people‘ Abū Ḥanīfa [although] his mentioning of this 
chapter here has no justification because it is not the place for it; all he intended by it was to disparage the 
Ḥanafīs‘. al-ʿAynī, ʿUmdat al-Qārī, 115/24. 
8
 Shighār is to when a girl is wedded on the condition that the sister of the groom is wedded to her brother. 
9
 Nikāḥ al-mutʿā is to contract a marriage for a limited period of time. At the end of the time period the contract 
automatically expires. 
10
 See Ibn Ḥajar, Fatḥ al-Bārī, vol. 12, 417-8. 
11
 Ibid, vol. 12, 419; al-ʿAynī, ʿUmdat al-Qārī, 112-3/24.  
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The last issue related to nikāḥ is the use of false witnesses to testify to a marriage. The 
Ḥanafīs are of the opinion that in a case where a man claims a woman to be his wife and she 
denies the claim, then once a judge has given a verdict in favour of the man based upon 
witness testimony, a man may have licit relations with his wife which are morally and legally 
correct. That being the case, it would be possible then for any individual to marry the girl of 
his choice by using such false witnesses in the knowledge that the verdict of the judge will 
legalise and give religious sanction to his sexual relations with the women. Again this is not a 
ḥīla put forward by the Ḥanafīs, but a result of their position regarding the ethical and legal 
value of a qāḍī’s verdict; a subject far greater than this single instance of possible misuse.  
 
These examples are important in understanding the nature of the ḥiyal polemic as they show 
that in many instances what is being argued against is not an actual ḥīla advocated by the 
School, but rather, the possible stratagems that persons acting mala fide may employ. al-
Shaybānī, himself identifies material in the jurisprudence of the Medinese jurists which he 
regards as potential routes for exploitative ḥiyal, although the authors of such opinions never 
intended them as such.
12
 Likewise, for most jurists the ʾīna contract is perhaps the most 
manifest ḥīla for ribā, yet it is part and parcel of al-Shāfiʿī‘s normal doctrine; not advocated 
as a ḥīla, because, as is well known, he was generally opposed to the ḥiyal. The point being 
that although jurists themselves have not identified some of their own normative doctrines as 
valid ḥiyal, their opponents have often highlighted them as such. 
 
Having discussed the issue of indemnity and nikāḥ, that leaves two topics, zakāt and shufʿa. 
These two issues represent the substantive material of al-Bukhārī‘s chapter as they relate to 
actual ḥiyal suggested by the Ḥanafīs and are perhaps the most controversial ḥiyal permitted 
                                                 
12
 See for example al-Shaybānī, al-Ḥujjā, vol. 2, 503-509. Where he comments: ‗mā ahwan hadhihī al-ḥīla fī al-
ribā in kānat tajūz‘ – what a simple ruse for usury were it permissible. 
RECEPTION OF THE ḤIYAL: THE POLEMIC 
94 
 
by them. After a thorough study of al-Bukhārī‘s Kitāb al-Ḥiyal, a recent scholar, ʿAbd al-
Majīd Maḥmūd, similarly concluded that: 
There is not in the ḥiyal for which al-Bukhārī reproached the Ḥanafīs, what can possibly be counted 
amongst the ḥiyal which are attributed to them, except what is connected to zakāt and shufʿa … As for 
what is besides these two issues, then the opinion of the Ḥanafīs in them is not from the ḥiyal type, even 
though their opinion may facilitate the way for a ḥīla for the one who desires it.13 
 These two ḥiyal, as well as those used to avoid the usury prohibition, are perhaps the most 
controversial of all the ḥiyal, not only between the Schools, but also within the Ḥanafī School 
itself. We will discuss these two topics in the next chapter when we deal with ḥiyal genre. 
  
3.1.1 al-Bukhārī‘s Juridical Stance 
To have composed a chapter of fifteen sections of which only two genuinely reflect the 
Ḥanafīs position may seem to be a rather weak case. In defence of al-Bukhārī‘s approach, it 
may be argued that his purpose is not to merely highlight actual or potential ḥiyal, but rather, 
to demonstrate that the problem lies more profoundly in the juridical approach of the ḥiyal 
protagonists.
14
 This can be inferred from the fact that the initial section relates to intention and 
is entitled ‗the section on abstaining from ḥiyal and for each individual is that which he 
intends; [both] in his belief and in other than it.‘ al-Bukhārī then goes on to narrate the ḥadīth 
of the Prophet (pbuh) which states that: 
‗O mankind, indeed actions are by their intentions and for a person is only that which he intended. So 
whoever migrates to Allah and his Messenger, his migration will be to Allah and his Messenger, and 
                                                 
13
 Maḥmūd, al-Ittijahāt al-fiqhiyya, 50. 
14
 See Scott C. Lucas, ―The Legal Principles of Muḥammad B. Ismāʿīl al-Bukhārī and their Relationship to 
Classical Salafī Islam,‖ Islamic Law and Society 13, no. 3 (2006): 289-324. Lucas mentions that there are three 
chapters in al-Bukhārī‘s work which he regards as an ‗articulation of legal theory‘ (p.290). These are Kitāb al-
Iʿtiṣām bi-l-Kitāb wa al-Sunna, Kitāb Akhbār al-Āḥād, and Kitāb al-Ḥiyal (p.290, n. 1). Lucas goes on to discuss 
the first two chapters, but not the latter. He does, however, note later on that he regards all of the chapters in the 
Kitāb al-Ḥiyal as a demonstration by al-Bukhārī of ‗[i]nvalid techniques of ijtiḥād and inappropriate sources of 
Islamic law.‘ (p.297, n. 34). 
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whoever migrates to temporal thing, to acquire it, or to a woman, to marry her, then his migration will 
be to that to which he migrated‘.15 
After quoting this ḥadīth al-Bukhārī moves on to the next section without giving any 
commentary or mentioning his purpose for quoting it. The critical importance of this ḥadīth to 
the subject of the ḥiyal and its perceived neglect at the hands of the ḥiyal protagonists, is not, 
however, lost on the reader and this is perhaps what the chapter then goes on to substantiate: 
Those who disregard the role of an individual‘s intention in determining the legality of his 
actions, will either promote ḥiyal directly or their jurisprudence will necessarily give rise to 
them. The role of intention is a crucial aspect of the ḥiyal opponents‘ argument and al-
Bukhārī‘s quoting of the ḥadīth is clearly intended to give a decisive verdict regarding it. 
 
3.2 Ibn Baṭṭa‘s Ibṭāl al-Ḥiyal 
Ibn Baṭṭa (d.387 AH), a prominent Ḥanbalī jurist and traditionist,16 wrote his refutation to the 
ḥiyal in response to a specific ḥīla proffered by a Muftī which involved the marriage 
dissolution procedure known as khulʿ. A man had sworn an oath that his wife would be 
divorced thrice if he did not kill an innocent Muslim with whom he had had a dispute. 
Regretting his oath and not wanting to carry out the killing or that his wife should be 
permanently divorced, he petitioned the Muftī to provide him with a way out. The Muftī 
suggested that the man should get his wife to ask for a khulʿ by which their marriage could be 
terminated. He reasoned that once the khulʿ was given and the marriage ended, the oath would 
be rendered inoperative. The man could then remarry his wife and be absolved from his 
oath.
17
 
 
                                                 
15
 al-Bukhārī, Ṣaḥīḥ, vol 3, 1405 (ḥadīth no. 7039). 
16
 See his biography in Abū Yaʿlā, Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanābila, vol. 2, 125-132. 
17
 Ibn Baṭṭa, Ibṭāl al-Ḥiyal, 49-50. 
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Although Ibn Baṭṭa is responding to this specific ḥīla, his extensive answer includes a rebuttal 
of the ḥiyal in general. He therefore begins by explaining the problems with the Muftī‘s 
solution and then draws a general conclusion from which he sets out to refute the ḥiyal as a 
whole. A large portion of his work is also taken up in explicating his perspective on the nature 
of the jurists‘ role and the traits and characteristics they should aspire to.18 
 
3.2.1 Ibn Baṭṭa‘s Juridical Rebuttal 
Ibn Baṭṭa summarily dismisses the solution given by the Muftī because it ignores the fact that 
merely by requesting the solution, the petitioner has broken his resolve to kill his opponent, 
meaning that the triple divorce had already been effected.
19
 He then goes on to deal with the 
answer put forward by the Muftī. His first assertion is that no real jurist or jurisconsult would 
give such a fatwā, as the job of the jurist is to teach and guide to that which is true,20 and not 
to teach ḥiyal which are a deception to God and his Prophet (pbuh).21 He substantiates this 
assertion with two key arguments: Firstly, God has prescribed khulʿ for a specific situation 
which is clearly mentioned in the Qurʾān (2:229), and its usage in this ḥīla contradicts that 
legal purpose.
22
 Ibn Baṭṭa quotes numerous traditions and ruling from the jurists to 
corroborate his point.
23
 In one tradition the Prophet (pbuh) says ‗what is wrong with people 
that they play with the limits of Allah and mock his signs [by saying]: I grant you khulʿ, I take 
you back, I divorce you‘.24 Ibn Baṭṭa is making a very important point here, namely that the 
laws of God have been set for a specific purpose and that they should only be used for that 
                                                 
18
 Ibid, 50-92, 131-143. The total length of the epistle is 98 pages and thus his treatment of the jurists represents 
more than a half of the total work. 
19
 Ibid, 92-93. 
20
 ‗Taʿlīm al-ḥaq wa al-dalāla ʿalayh‘, see ibid, 93. 
21
 Ibid, 94. 
22
 ‗Qad waḍaʿ al-khulʿ fī ghayr mā ṣanaʿ Allāh lahū wa qaṣad‘. This is a point he makes repeatedly throughout 
his epistle which shows its importance to his argument. See ibid, 96, 105, 111, 116, 125. 
23
 Ibid, 96-105. 
24
 Ibid, 106-7. In the following tradition he quotes, the words of mockery are: I divorce you, I take you back, I 
divorce you, I take you back. 
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purpose, and to use them contrarily or for one‘s own purpose is tantamount to playing with, or 
mocking, the divine law.  
 
His second point is that a distinguishing characteristic of the ḥiyal is that in their outward 
forms they conform to the law, whereas internally, they do not. He compares this approach to 
the behaviour of the hypocrites, who outwardly profess themselves to be Muslims, whereas 
inwardly, they are not. The result of this technique is that, according to its outward 
manifestations, an action may be legally permitted, whereas religiously it is reprehensible. At 
this juncture he mentions the specific warning from the Prophet (pbuh) regarding the ḥiyal: 
Do not commit that which the Jews committed, such that you make permissible the prohibitions of God 
by the smallest of ḥiyal.25  
Following this he goes on to discuss some of the Jewish ḥiyal which this ḥadīth maybe 
alluding to. The Qurʾān itself refers to the cause of one of these ḥiyal: 
Ask them (O Muhammad) of the township that was by the sea, how they did break the Sabbath, how 
their big fish came unto them visibly upon their Sabbath day and on a day when they did not keep 
Sabbath came they not unto them. Thus did We try them for that they were evil-livers.
26
 
The Jews were rebuked for setting out their fishing nets on the day before the Sabbath. The 
fish would be trapped as they appeared on the Sabbath and the Jews would then take them 
from the nets on the next day. By this argument the Jews intended to violate the Sabbath, not 
openly, but by outwardly conforming to the law while intending the opposite. The Jewish 
tendency to interpret their religious rules in this way is highlighted in a tradition where the 
                                                 
25
 ‗Lā tartakibū mā irtakabat al-yahūd fa-tastaḥillūn maḥārim Allāh bi adnā al-ḥiyal‘,  see Ibn Baṭṭa, Ibṭāl al-
ḥiyal, 112. This Jewish use of numerous legal fictions has been discussed by many authors, and with specific 
regard to the usury prohibition  they have been fully documented in Hillel Gamoran, Jewish Law in Transition: 
How Economic Forces Overcame the Prohibition Against Lending on Interest (New York: Hebrew Union 
College Press: 2008). For Jewish legal fictions in general, see Ze‘ev W. Falk, Introduction to the Jewish Law of 
the Second Commonwealth (Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1972), vol. 1, 22; Bertram B. Benas, ―The Legal Device in 
Jewish Law,‖ Journal of Comparative Legislation and International Law 11, no. 1 (1929): 78; B. Felsenthal, 
―The Law of Release, as Understood and Practised in the Apostolic Age,‖ The Old Testament Student 3, no. 5 
(1884): 147; Solomon Goldman, ―The Legal Fiction in Jewish Law,‖ in Presentation Volume to William Barron 
Stevenson, ed. C. J. Mullo Weir (Glasgow: Glasgow University Oriental Society, 1945), 63; Ephraim E. Urbach, 
The Halakhah: its Sources and Development (Tel-Aviv: Modan, 1996), 253.  
26
 (7:163), trans. by Marmaduke Pickthall. 
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Prophet (pbuh) says: May God curse the Jews they prohibit the fat of the sheep and [instead] 
they consume its price.
27
 Commenting on this incident Ibn Baṭṭa remarks that God only cursed 
them because they used a ḥīla to ‗consume‘ the fat.28 In these examples Ibn Baṭṭa is 
demonstrating that what is important is not mere outward conformation to the letter of the 
law, but rather to inwardly accept the substantive import of the law and that it, like the 
outward, must equally be upheld. 
 
He demonstrates the importance of inward conformity using a tradition in which the Prophet 
(pbuh) prohibits a person, who has just concluded a sale contract, from immediately departing 
from the other party out of fear that the latter may rescind the contract. From this, he infers 
that this prohibition is premised upon the intention to use the departure as a ḥīla to prevent the 
other party from rescinding the contract. Had there been no such intention, the departure 
would be both normal and acceptable.
29
 This is an important step in the argument of the 
detractors of the ḥiyal, as the notion of intent, like in al-Bukhārī‘s work, is identified as an 
important factor in assessing the legitimacy of actions. Ibn Baṭṭa supports this inference by 
quoting Aḥmad‘s statement when asked about this ḥadīth, in which he replies: it is the 
invalidation (ibṭal) of ḥiyal‘.30 
 
Ibn Baṭṭa‘s approach thus contains three principal arguments:  
1. The legal rules must be used as per their prescription and divine mandate and the ḥiyal 
do the exact opposite. 
                                                 
27
 Ibn Baṭṭa, Ibṭāl al-ḥiyal, 113. ‗Consuming its price‘ is explained in a similar narration which says: May God 
fight the Jews, whereas fat was prohibited to them, they melted it and sold it. See Ibn Taymiyya, Bayān al-Dalīl, 
35. 
28
 Ibn Baṭṭa, Ibṭāl al-ḥiyal, 113-14. 
29
 Ibid, 116. 
30
 Ibid, 117. 
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2. The ḥiyal are a deception as they outwardly simulate licit actions whereas inwardly 
they aim to legalise the proscribed. 
3. The intentions of the parties are critical in determining the legality of actions. 
 
3.2.2 Ibn Baṭṭa on the Jurists 
Apart from his juridical arguments, another important aspect of Ibn Baṭṭa‘s epistle is his views 
regarding the jurists and the nature of the office they hold. At the outset of the epistle he 
outlines that the most significant characteristic of the jurist is his God-consciousness and his 
scrupulousness in this regard; the jurist is one who is imbued with the fear of God. Just how 
this translates into a juridical methodology is explicated in his concluding chapter. Here he 
quotes a number of jurists who advise that one should refrain as much as possible from giving 
verdicts or delving into complex and difficult issues and that whoever tries to answer every 
possible question is a madman.
31
  
 
But more telling than this are his quotes which advise against pursuing exits (makhārij) for 
people. The Madīnan jurist Rabīʿa is thus advised: ‗If a man asks regarding an issue, do not 
exert yourself in giving him an exit but let your exertion be in extricating yourself.‘32 Ibn 
Baṭṭa even attempts to vindicate this position with reference to a tradition which says that 
‗speech is the agent of tribulation‘. He infers from this, that the difficulties which befall an 
individual are due to carelessness in speech and if a person swears an oath mindlessly, then 
the consequences that he faces are his own doing. This, Ibn Baṭṭa claims, belies all those who 
employ ḥiyal to avoid breaking their oaths and those who seek exits from their oaths and 
thereby try to avoid the harm that their oaths may entail.
33
 
                                                 
31
 Ibid, 131-40. 
32
 Ibid, 133-34. 
33
 Ibid, 141-42.  
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3.3 The Ḥanbalī Reformers and the Ḥiyal 
 Ibn Taymiyya wrote an extensive polemic against the ḥiyal which focuses on the particular 
ḥīla known as taḥlīl. This ḥīla is used to permit the remarriage of a triple divorcee to her 
former husband. Additionally though, he also addresses the subject of the ḥiyal in a more 
general juridical framework. Prior to the works of Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn al-Qayyim, no 
systematic analysis of the ḥiyal had been attempted.34 The works of Ibn Baṭṭa and al-Bukhārī 
relied mainly on textual proofs, while also recognising the need for a deeper analysis by 
highlighting the importance of intentions and motives. In the work of the Ḥanbalī reformers 
we find a comprehensive treatment of the ḥiyal in terms of its jurisprudential implications.  
 
Ibn Taymiyya, and subsequently followed by his protégé Ibn al-Qayyim, builds his case 
against the ḥiyal on three distinct pillars: 1) the purposes of the law, maqāṣid al-Sharīʿa, 2) 
the role of intentions, niyya, and 3) the uṣūlī tool of blocking the means, sadd al-dharāʾiʿ. 
Although each pillar represents a distinct argument against the ḥiyal, the Ḥanbalī reformers 
use them as mutually complimentary pillars to build a comprehensive paradigm to stand in 
contrast to their opponents. The first two elements, maqāṣid and niyya, are used to 
demonstrate how the ḥiyal are intrinsically antithetical to Islamic law, whereas the dharāʾiʿ 
argument is to show the incoherency of the ḥiyal with the general trend of the law. Each pillar 
will be examined in turn and their importance to the ḥiyal polemic noted. 
 
                                                 
34
 A manuscript written by a Ḥanbalī Abd al-Raḥmān ibn Ibrāhīm ibn Uthmān  under the title al-Radd ʿalā man 
Tamassak bi-Madhhabay Imāmayn Abī Ḥanīfa wa al-Shāfiʿī fī Istibāḥat al-Ribā bi-al-Ḥiyal, has been edited and 
published. The manuscript is dated 674/1275 and therefore predates the work of both of these authors. Although 
no information beyond the name of the author is given. I have been unable to find any other biographical 
information regarding this author and the editor of the manuscript has notified me (in a personal communication) 
that he also could find no other information regarding the author. The arguments given by Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn 
al-Qayyim are similar to those given in this earlier treatise, although the latter is certainly not as lengthy or as 
thorough as the former two. The precise relationship of this treatise and its author to Ibn Taymiyya and his 
treatise awaits further investigation. See Saffet Kӧse, ―Hile-i Şer’iyye Konunsunda İlginç Bir Risâle,‖ Islam 
Hukuku AraĢtımaları Dergisi 1 (2003) 231-255. 
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3.3.1 Maqāṣid al-Sharīʿa 
Maqāsid al-Sharīʿa refers to the purposes, aims and objectives of Islamic law and represents 
an attempt by certain jurists to decipher a teleology from the positive injunctions of the 
Sharīʿa. Ibn Taymiyya was a keen proponent of the maqāṣid theory and also of its 
jurisprudential corollary maṣlaḥa.35 The importance of the maqāṣid to Ibn Taymiyya‘s 
arguments against the ḥiyal become apparent from the very outset of his volume devoted to 
their refutation. Ibn Taymiyya, like Ibn Baṭṭā associates the ḥiyal with its pejorative meanings 
of deception and trickery. The meaning which is common to all these terms, he avers, is that 
of someone who performs a good action outwardly, while inwardly intending the opposite in 
order to achieve his objective.
36
 He goes on to show how the two terms ḥiyal and khidʿa are 
used interchangeably and how one early scholar even describes the book of ḥiyal as a book of 
deception.
37
 His point is to stress, as he says, that ‗to deceive God is prohibited and the ḥiyal 
are an attempt to deceive God‘.38  
 
What is more important though, is how he explains this point and links it to the maqāṣid in a 
profound way: Statements are the medium through which contracts, treatises and marriage are 
concluded and their effect is to allow and permit the use of what would otherwise be 
prohibited. A person who makes these statements and yet does not intend the realities behind 
these contracts, nor intends their maqāṣid, for which these very words have been designated, 
but rather intends the opposite, is guilty, according to him, of in fact mocking the signs of 
                                                 
35
 For his arguments in defence of the maqāṣid, see Ibn Taymiyya, Majmūʿa Rasāʾil wa al-Masāʾil (Cairo: 
Maṭbaʿa al-Manār, nd), part 3, 30 (each part has separate pagination). For his use of maṣlaḥa, see  al-Matroudi, 
The Ḥanbalī School of Law, 80; Abū Zahra gives a detailed account of Ibn Taymiyya‘s standpoint vis-à-vis al-
maṣlaḥa al-mursala, see his, Ibn Taymiyya: Ḥayātuhū wa ʿAṣruhū – Ārāʾuhū wa Fiqhuhū (Cairo: Dār al-Fikr al-
ʿArabī, nd); 495-500; Benjamin Jokisch, ―Ijtihād in Ibn Taymiyya‘s Fatāwā,‖ in Islamic Law: Theory and 
Practice, ed. Robert Gleave and Eugenia Kermeli (London: I.B.Tauris, 2001), 128. 
36
 Ibn Taymiyya, Bayān al-Dalīl, 22. 
37
 Ibid, 23. 
38
 Ibid, 24. 
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God because contracts and agreements are from the signs of God.
39
 In essence, Ibn Taymiyya 
is arguing that the outward forms of contracts and marriages themselves are not what God has 
legislated; rather, it is the underlying purposes and realities which they serve. The medium by 
which contracts occur is through human communication, specific forms of which have been 
mandated by the law in order to ensure mutual understanding of the contracting parties 
regarding the underlying meanings of their actions. If a person has no intention of upholding 
those meanings or even effecting them, but rather involves himself in the procedure for a 
purpose which contradicts the very purpose of the outward form, then this clearly is a case of 
deception. The ḥiyal, he argues, all fit into this description. 
 
3.3.1.1 Outward Forms Vs Underlying Meaning 
A number of textual proofs are garnered to demonstrate that changing the outward forms or 
the names of things does not affect their ruling. Ibn Baṭṭa narrates a ḥadīth in his work 
regarding the Jews being prohibited from selling the fat of the sheep, in response to which 
they merely sold it after melting it down. Ibn Baṭṭa, it will be recalled, regarded this as a ḥīla. 
Ibn Taymiyya explains that when they were prohibited from sheep fat they deviously 
interpreted it to mean its oral consumption and deemed fat to refer only to its original solid 
state. The original term used in the prohibition is shaḥm, which refers to fat in its original 
state, whereas once it has been melted it is called wadak They hence melted it down and sold 
it, thereby consuming its price as opposed to consuming the fat itself. Ibn Taymiyya argues 
that they ignored the fact that if God prohibits one to benefit from something, then there is no 
difference between benefiting from its essence or its countervalue, or between its solid and 
melted state, and that is so irrespective of a change in nomenclature.
40
 The purpose behind the 
ruling was to prohibit the Jews from taking any benefit whatsoever from the fat. Ibn 
                                                 
39
 Ibid, 25. 
40
 Ibn Taymiyya, Bayān al-Dalīl, 35-7. 
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Taymiyya uses this example to demonstrate that the laws of God relate to meanings and 
purposes and not merely to outward forms and names. 
 
To support this, he presents a number of ḥadīth which prophesy that a time will come when 
some Muslims will permit alcohol, usury, bribery, killing and adultery, by giving them 
alternative names.
41
 Bribes, adultery, and usury will hence euphemistically be renamed as 
gifts, marriage and sale, respectively. Ibn Taymiyya commenting on these traditions says: 
This is exactly what proponents of the ḥiyal do, because they intend to observe the rules by adhering to 
them merely through [their] words and they claim that what they have permitted is not included in what 
has been prohibited even though the intellect knows that the meaning of it is the [same as] the meaning 
of the prohibited thing and that it was the[ir actual] purpose.
42
 
He goes on to stress that renaming a things does not in itself result in a change in the rule,
43
 
because institutions like sale and marriage have very distinct characteristics (khaṣāʾis) which 
define them, and if these are not present then these terms will not apply. Similarly, if the 
characteristics of wine or usury are observable then the ruling relating to them will apply and 
not the rule of their euphemistic alternatives. Ibn al-Qayyim, who relies heavily on his 
mentor‘s works, concurs with his analysis on this point. Ribā, he points out, is not prohibited 
merely due to its contractual form or wording, rather, what is prohibited is its reality, its 
meaning and its purpose, and these three aspects are equally present in the ḥiyal of ribā as 
they are in its overt form. This, he goes on, is not lost on the contracting parties or on anyone 
who witnesses their conduct and God knows that what they actually intend is nothing other 
than the prohibited ribā except that they have arrived at it through an unintended contract, to 
which they have given a false name. It is known, he concludes, that this does not remove the 
                                                 
41
 Ibid, 38-43. 
42
 Ibid, 43. 
43
 ‗Tabdīl al-nās li al-asmāʾ lā yūjib tabdīl al-aḥkām‘, see ibid, 44. 
RECEPTION OF THE ḤIYAL: THE POLEMIC 
104 
 
injunction, nor does it remove the essential harm which is the cause of its prohibition, rather, 
it increases the harm due to the deception that it entails.
44
 
 
Both of the Ḥanbalī authors stress that the substantive rules of the Sharīʿa are based upon its 
purposes and objectives and do not relate merely to the outward forms and procedures. If the 
Sharīʿa rules are aimed at achieving certain socio-economic results this means that a failure to 
adhere to the rules will result necessarily in the rise of the precise socio-economic problems 
which the Sharīʿa seeks to prevent. Will the use of ḥiyal protect the community from these 
social and economic ills or augment their rise? What the Ḥanbalī reformers are arguing is that 
the ḥiyal are contemptuous of the purposes of the Sharīʿa and their usage will result in the 
very same results as those produced by overt violations of the law. This is a very important 
consequentialist type of argument and we will later note its critical relevance when assessing 
the validity of the Ottoman cash waqf. 
 
3.3.1.2 Using the Maqāṣid to Delineate the Ḥiyal 
In addition to using the maqāṣid as a benchmark for identifying those ḥiyal which are 
impermissible, Ibn Taymiyya also asserts that any ḥiyal which are used in pursuit of the 
maqāṣid through legal methods are not to be regarded as ḥiyal. He raises this point to refute 
al-Sarakhsī‘s paradigm of the ḥiyal as exits. In fact all ḥiyal which are used in pursuit of the 
maqāṣid are not to be designated as ḥiyal, whether their protagonists call them as such or 
not.
45
 Ibn Taymiyya‘s argument is not one of mere words, (i.e. use of the word ḥiyal) but 
rather one of substance, he is therefore not opposed to the ḥiyal as a genre, but rather the 
usage of specific ḥiyal which violate the maqāṣid.  
 
                                                 
44
 Ibn al-Qayyim records the successor traditionist Ayyūb as having earlier stated: ‗Law ataw al-amr ʿalā 
wajhihī kān ahwan‘, see Ibn al-Qayyim Ighāthat al-Lahfān, 277-9. 
45
 Ibn Taymiyya, Bayān al-Dalīl, 126-7. 
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This becomes apparent in his treatment of equivocal speech, where he asserts that it is 
subjected to the five-fold scale of legal values. Its usage would thus be obligatory (wājib) if 
used to prevent a killer locating his would-be victim; in other situations it may be 
recommended (mustaḥab) or permissible (mubāḥ), alternatively though, it may also be 
prohibited, especially in situations where complete disclosure is necessary. The discerning 
factor he invokes is the presence of a maṣlaḥa, i.e. the prevention of harm, either for the 
listener or for the speaker.
46
 This is justified because the maqāṣid of the law are geared 
towards the prevention of harm and also because, while equivocation does contain a type of 
deception, it is not the same as overtly lying and therefore constitutes the lesser of two evils.
47
  
 
Ibn Taymiyya uses the maṣlaḥa yardstick to both justify the use of equivocal speech and more 
crucially, to limit its juridical remit and thereby prevent its usage in synallagmatic contracts.  
If equivocal speech is used to circumvent what the law mandates, such as zakāt and shufʿā, or 
to permit what has been prohibited such as ribā and the remarriage of the triple-divorcee, 
then, he infers, the maṣlaḥa is clearly lost and in its place the mafsada remains. He argues 
therefore that the utility of equivocal speech is based upon the latitude which exists in the 
meanings of the words and how they are understood.
48
 In contradistinction to this, are the 
words which are effective in contracts which permit no equivocation. He quotes Aḥmad as 
saying that the use of equivocal language does not apply to sale transactions.  Sale and 
marriage are words which have legally defined meanings, if a person uses them to mean usury 
or as a conduit for remarriage (taḥlīl) respectively, his use of these words goes beyond the 
domain of their possible legal meanings. This, he argues, is because if these actual words (i.e. 
usury, or taḥlīl) are used then the contracts would be invalid. Using alternative euphemisms in 
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 Ibid, 116-7. 
47
 This is a principle strongly endorsed by the maqāṣid theory, see ʿIzz al-Dīn ibn ʿAbd al-Salām, Qawāʾid al-
Aḥkām fī Maṣāliḥ al-Anām, (Cairo; Maṭbaʿā al-Istiqāma, nd), 48-9, 79-83. 
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contracts is therefore comparable to lying and not equivocation; in the former, words which 
do not encompass the reality are used, whereas in the latter, there is a possibility that they do. 
Sale, he argues does not encompass usury, nor does marriage encompass one being an 
intermediary for remarriage. The ḥiyal are, analogically speaking, akin to lying and not to 
equivocation.
49
 This is a very powerful argument from Ibn Taymiyya which ties together both 
the maqāṣid and maṣlaḥa, with the words used in a contract, to provide a coherent argument 
against the use of ḥiyal in bilateral contracts. 
 
Using this approach, however, Ibn Taymiyya concedes the legitimacy of the numerous ḥiyal 
which do not violate the maqāṣid. These ḥiyal, he states, do not fall under the purview of what 
he is referring to as ḥiyal in his refutation. Consequently, his treatise focuses on what are the 
more controversial ḥiyal; the ʿīna contract and the taḥlīl marriage, whilst also referring 
occasionally to those relating to zakāt and pre-emption. It is clear that what these authors are 
averse to is a limited number of ḥiyal and not the genre or technique itself. This can be noted 
by Ibn Taymiyya‘s reference to the good ḥiyal (al-ḥiyal al-ḥasana)50 and more clearly by the 
large number of ḥiyal proposed by his student Ibn al-Qayyim; over one hundred in his Iʿlām 
al-Muwaqqiʿīn and over eighty in his Ighāthat al-Lahfān.51 Ibn al-Qayyim‘s introductory 
formula reveals their essential viewpoint, he states that the ḥiyal are evaluated according to 
the purpose for which they are invoked; if the maqṣūḍ is good then the ḥīla is also good and if 
it is bad then the ḥīla is also bad, if the purpose is obedience and worship then the ḥīla is 
likewise, whereas if the purpose is disobedience and iniquity so is the ḥīla.52 In short, the 
Ḥanbalī reformers conclude that the ḥiyal, both as a genre and as a legal technique, are value 
neutral and that what is actually critical to their legality is the individual purposes they serve. 
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 Ibid, 117-8. 
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 Ibn Taymiyya, Bayān al-Dalīl, 119. 
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 See pages 672-740 and 302-360, respectively. Surprisingly, he even provides a ḥīla for taḥlīl to be instigated 
by the divorcee, see, his Iʿlām al-Muwaqqiʿīn, 739.  
52
 Ibn al-Qayyim, Ighāthat al-Lahfān, 302. 
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3.3.2 Intentions and Motives 
Ibn Taymiyya sets out to conclusively demonstrate that intentions determine the legitimacy of 
contracts and that their impact is not restricted to mere moral reproval. It is generally known 
that the Ḥanafīs and Shāfiʿīs do not nullify contracts based upon unlawful intents, whereas the 
Mālikīs and Ḥanbalīs do.53 However, as Nabil Saleh judiciously notes, their difference is not 
regarding unlawful intentions when they are overtly expressed, as these would be 
unanimously rejected, but rather on the probability or suspicion of an unlawful intention.
54
 
For the Ḥanafīs and the Shafiʿīs, contracts and transactions are always deemed to be lawful in 
the absence of an expressed unlawful intent. This however is directly opposed by the Mālikīs 
and Ḥanbalīs who nullify contracts if the parties harbour an intention to violate the law, 
whether that intention is made overt or not is immaterial to the legal ruling. Ibn Taymiyya 
defends this position and his presentation is hence focused on demonstrating that intent has a 
significant role to play in the validity of contracts. 
 
Ibn Taymiyya demonstrates the importance of intentions firstly through the use of textual 
sources which stress its centrality both to the religious value of an action and also to its legal 
ruling. By religious value is meant the consequences of the action in the next life, whereas the 
legal ruling relates to its temporal evaluation. The ḥadīth quoted by al-Bukhārī is, in this 
context, very important as it stresses that all actions are evaluated by their intentions and is 
taken by the ḥiyal antagonists to apply in the religious sense and also in the legal sense. Ibn 
                                                 
53
 For a detailed exposition see, Oussama Arabi, ―Intention and Method in Sanhuri‘s Fiqh: Cause as Ulterior 
Motive,‖ Islamic Law and Society 4, no. 2 (1997): 200-223; Muhammad Waḥīd al-Dīn Siwār, al-Taʿbīr ʿan al-
Irāda fī al-Fiqh al-Islāmī, (ʿAmmān: Maktaba Dār al-Thaqāfa, 1998); Paul R. Powers, Intent in Islamic Law: 
Motive and Meaning in Medieval Sunnī Fiqh (Leiden: Brill, 2006), 97-121. Powers, although relying heavily on 
Arabi‘s work, questions whether his characterisation of the Ḥanafīs is correct. His conclusion however, is based 
upon his clearly errant reading of al-Kāsānī‘s discussion on the topic, where he reads al-Kasānī‘s statement 
waqaʿat al-ḥāja as ‗waqaʿtu al-ḥāja‘ which he translates as ‗I insist on the specification [of the contract] by 
niyya‘. See Ibid, 109-10.  
54
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Taymiyya quotes two ḥadīth which explicitly show the religious importance of having the 
correct intention at the time of entering into a contract. 
1. ‗Whoever marries a woman for a dowry which he intends not to give to her, is a 
fornicator and whoever incurs a debt intending not to fulfil it, is a thief‘. 
2. ‗Whoever takes the wealth of people intending [at the time] its repayment, God will 
pay it on his behalf, [whereas] whoever takes it intending to destroy it, God will 
destroy him.‘55  
 These aḥādīth clearly show the important role of one‘s intention and the religious value 
attached to them. Although the outward forms of contracts may satisfy the legal conditions for 
validity, it is clear from the ḥadīth, that those performed mala fide will ultimately be judged 
according to the intent behind them. 
 
He then goes on to show how intent can govern the legal ruling of an action and determine the 
subsequent outcome. Three examples will suffice, although he provides a host of others: 
1. A muḥrim (person in the state of iḥrām) is prohibited from hunting although he is 
permitted to consume the meat of the prey if it is hunted by a non-muḥrim. If the latter, 
however, makes the intention at the time of the hunt, that the meat is specifically for 
the former then, according to some jurists, it becomes prohibited for the muḥrim to 
consume.
56
 
2. The rules of ribā al-nasāʾa prohibit fungible items of the same genus to be exchanged 
without immediate delivery. The same, however, is permitted when the intention 
behind it is to give a gratuitous loan. Both contracts involve one party acquiring 
dirhams, for example, and then returning their equivalent after the conclusion of the 
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 Ibid, 59-60. The editor notes that first ḥadīth is to be found in the Musnad al-Bazzār, with a weak chain, and 
the second in the collections of al-Bukhārī, Ibn Mājah and Aḥmad. 
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contract. The difference between the rulings is based upon the intention of the parties. 
The first transaction is commercial and hence premised upon exchange and profit, 
whereas the second is philanthropic.
57
 
3. Transactions of the coerced (mukrah) and the joker (hāzil) are disregarded, precisely 
due to their lack of intent.
58
 
Ibn Taymiyya concludes that from these examples that intents do impact the legal ruling of 
actions and contracts and this, he says, uproots the very basis of the ḥiyal, because someone 
who uses a ḥīla, not only, does not intend the purpose of the contract which it is designed to 
serve, but over and above that, he intends its exact opposite. The result is that instead of 
realising the purpose of the contract, he does the opposite and seeks thereby to deny 
someone‘s legal right or to permit for himself what is not licit for him. The validator 
(muḥallil), hence, does not only, not intend the marriage he contracts, as the coerced or joker 
does, but rather he also intends to divorce his would be wife. Similarly the person who uses 
the ʿīna transaction does not intend by the sale to acquire ownership of the intermediary 
items, but rather to give, say a £100 pounds cash in order to receive £200 later on, which is 
nothing but ribā.  
 
The response of the Sharīʿa to the ḥiyal is to invalidate the transaction if both parties are 
guilty of acting mala fide, and if it be unilateral then the transaction will stand but the real 
purpose will be countered. Hence the transaction of a person who sells part of his wealth to 
avoid the alms-tax, or divorces his wife to disinherit her, will be upheld although he will still 
be liable to pay the tax, and his divorced wife will retain her inheritance right.
59
 Ibn al-
Qayyim, again concurs with his mentor: 
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Whoever ponders over the Sharīʿa and is endowed with a juridical noesis (fiqh al-nafs), will observe 
that it nullifies the goals of the ḥiyal proponents and counters them [by establishing] it‘s opposite. … 
[For example,] the invalidation of a bequest, if the beneficiary kills his benefactor … [or] the 
nullification of an affirmation of money [owed] by a terminally ill [person] to his inheritor, because he 
uses it as a ḥīla to make a bequest for him.60 
He also goes one step further and claims that not only is it the Sharīʿa which enacts the 
opposite ruling but also the divine destiny (qadr) of the offender will result in the opposite of 
his unlawful intent.
61
 
 
3.3.3 Blocking the Means – Sadd al-Dharāʾiʿ 
The phenomenon of sadd al-dharīʿa is well established in the Sharīʿa, as not only are the 
major sins prohibited, but so is whatever is likely to lead to them: Fornication is prohibited as 
are all actions which can lead to it, such as an unwarranted gaze at a marriageable woman or 
to be in seclusion with her. Likewise alcohol consumption is prohibited and so its production 
and trade. Although there are many examples which corroborate it as a phenomenon in the 
Sharīʿa, not all jurists agree to its use as a jurisprudential tool. The Mālikīs and Ḥanbalīs are 
in favour of it whereas the Ḥanafīs and Shāfiʿīs oppose it.62 This divergence of opinion 
notably reflects their difference of opinion on the role of intent. 
 
The sadd al-dharāʾiʿ argument builds upon the previous two and complements them and 
shows that not only are the ḥiyal inherently counter to the Sharīʿa, but also that they are 
opposed by the general trend of the Sharīʿa as embodied in this principle. Ibn al-Qayyim 
states: 
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The ḥiyal are routes (wasāʾil) to the prohibited [whereas] sadd al-dharāʾiʿ is the opposite of that and so 
between the two chapters is the greatest contradiction. The legislator has prohibited the wasāʾil even if 
[what is] prohibited is not intended by them, because [ultimately,] they lead to them. So what if the 
prohibited [thing] itself is the intended [purpose].
63
 
These wasāʾil are, however, of different grades and do not necessarily lead to a prohibited 
consequence. If an action definitively leads to an illicit end, then all the jurists agree on the 
prohibition of the route.
64
 It is regarding the case when there is only a probability that it may 
lead to that unlawful end that the jurists differ; the Ḥanafīs and Shāfiʿīs do not use this 
principle to pre-emptively prohibit such routes, whereas the Mālikīs and Ḥanbalīs do.  
 
Ibn Taymiyya divides the routes into three types; 1) those which inevitably lead to the illicit; 
these are prohibited outright, 2) those which may or may not lead to the prohibited, but 
generally and normally do so; these are also prohibited and 3) those which only lead to the 
illicit sometimes; if they result in a preponderant benefit (maṣlaḥa rājiḥa) then they are 
permitted otherwise these too are prohibited. The purpose of this discussion, Ibn Taymiyya 
tells us, is that the law prohibits all of these routes even in the absence of an individual‘s 
intention due to the fear that it may lead him to an illicit act. If a person purposely intends to 
ultimately arrive at the illicit through a ḥīla, then this is more worthy of being blocked than 
the routes and if the routes themselves are prohibited, then the ḥiyal, which purposely exploit 
these routes, should be proscribed a fortiori.
65
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3.3.4 Summary of Ibn Taymiyya‘s Approach 
Ibn Taymiyya‘s and Ibn al-Qayyim‘s arguments against the ḥiyal are far more advanced than 
those which preceded them. They examine the ḥiyal through a range of jurisprudential 
discourses based upon the advances and development of legal science that had occurred prior 
to their time. This leads to a far more nuanced argument against the ḥiyal, but also to a 
differentiation of the ḥiyal into those which are acceptable and those which are necessarily 
anathema. Using a three-pronged approach they attempt to show that those ḥiyal which serve 
to violate the law, either by evading one‘s legal duty or by circumventing the right of anther, 
must be definitively proscribed.  
 
The juridical structure upon which their arguments rest, is primarily informed by the teleology 
of the maqāṣid. Studies in uṣūl al-fiqh were increasingly focusing on the maqāṣid and their 
importance to the ijtihād process. Ibn Taymiyya, a clear advocate of this approach, combines 
them into a solid narrative together with the necessity of lawful intent. The ḥiyal are premised 
upon ignoring both of these crucial aspects and are hence intrinsically void. To advocate the 
ḥiyal is to deny that the Sharīʿa has a purpose other than its transmitted positive injunctions, 
and to ignore the role of intent is to separate the temporal from the religious; in the latter all 
agree that it is intent which will be critically effective in securing one‘s reward. The final 
corroborative proof is found in the principle of sadd al-dharīʿa, where they demonstrate that 
as a legal trend, the ḥiyal are ontologically opposed to the firmly established jurisprudential 
tool of sadd al-dharīʿa. The latter seeks to close any possible routes which may lead to the 
illicit whereas the former seek to open and exploit those routes. 
 
In the final analysis, however, it must be recalled that as the polemic has advanced, the degree 
of recognition amongst the detractors, for certain ḥiyal has increased. Specifically, those ḥiyal 
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are tolerated which have a normative utility and provide valid exits to the myriad of problems 
faced in sincerely following the sacred law. Ibn al-Qayyim is noted in this regard for 
proffering numerous ḥiyal himself in both his works against the ḥiyal. In a recent study of the 
ḥiyal relating to the rules of personal status (aḥwāl shakṣiyya), the author Ṣāliḥ Būshīsh, 
praises Ibn al-Qayyim for laying down both types of ḥiyal; permissible and impermissible, 
and extols his permissible ḥiyal for their complexity. These are solutions which are composed 
of several ḥiyal linked together and are a mark of distinguish in Ibn al-Qayyim‘s ḥiyal.66 This, 
he avers, is a due to the time-lag between Ibn al-Qayyim‘s own work and that of the Ḥanafīs, 
which meant that at the time of composing his treatise, he would have had before him all of 
their works from which he could eclectically extract suitable ḥiyal.67 Other studies on Ibn al-
Qayyim‘s ḥiyal have also confirmed that many of them have been taken straight from the 
works of the Ḥanafīs.68 The point here is not to note the reliance of the latter on the former, 
but rather to highlight the diachronic development, both of the genre and the polemic. 
 
3.4 The Maqāṣid and al-Shāṭibī 
By the time of al-Shāṭibī (d.790), research into both the maqāṣid and the ḥiyal had reached 
their apex. In the works of Ibn Taymiyya, the integration of both subjects had already begun, 
where the former was used as a yardstick to evaluate the latter. Inquiry into the maqāṣid 
reached their pinnacle in al-Shāṭibī‘s work on uṣūl al-fiqh, al-Muwāfaqāt. al-Shāṭibī dealt 
briefly with the ḥiyal and although he does not provide a lengthy analysis, his views are 
important in that they represent the culmination of the diachronic development of the jurist‘s 
                                                 
66
 Ṣāliḥ ibn Ismāʿīl Būshīsh, al-Ḥiyal al-Fiqhiyya: Ḍawābiṭuhā wa Taṭbīqātuhā ʿalā al-Aḥwāl al-Shakhṣiyya 
(Riyadh: Maktabat al-Rushd, 2005), 162-3, 256. 
67
 This is also suggested by another author, see Muḥammad ibn Ibrāhīm, al-Ḥiyal al-Fiqhiyya fī al-Muʿāmalāt 
al-Māliyya (Tunis: Dār Suḥnūn; Cairo: Dār al-Salām, 2009), 231. 
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 Ibid, 177, 199-200, 249-51, 290-292; also see Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Wahhāb al-Baḥīrī, al-Ḥiyal fī al-Sharīʿa 
al-Islāmiyya wa Sharḥ mā Warad fīhā min al-Āyāt wa al-Aḥādīth (np. Maṭbaʿa al-Saʿāda, 1974), 307. 
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understanding and assessment of the maqāṣid and the ḥiyal. All that is left for al-Shāṭibī to do 
is to fit the ḥiyal into his expansive work on the maqāṣid and provide a narrative for them. 
 
In the short section devoted to the ḥiyal al-Shāṭibī summarises the arguments surrounding the 
ḥiyal drawing on the work of his predecessors.69 His arguments in this regard, need not, then, 
be reproduced.
70
 Following his presentation of the evidences proscribing the ḥiyal he 
concludes that they relate to those ḥiyal which demolish a sharīʿa principle or oppose a sharīʿa 
maṣlaḥa. If, however, they do neither of these, then they are neither included in the 
proscription, nor are they invalid.
71
 The ḥiyal are thus divided by al-Shāṭibī into three 
categories; those which are unanimously nullified, those which are unanimously upheld, and 
finally, those in which the jurists differ. al-Shāṭibī, then sets out to explain this third category 
through the paradigm of the maqāṣid. 
 
The fact that the there is a difference of opinion regarding the legality of this third group is 
because it is not categorically clear whether it opposes a maṣlaḥa or not. The proponents are 
of the opinion that it does not oppose a maṣlaḥa, whereas their opponents argue that it does. 
al-Shāṭibī‘s purpose here is not to deliberate over the various debates, but rather, to explain 
the nature of the difference and its significance: 
It is not correct to say that those who permit the use of a ḥīla in certain issues concur [with the claim] 
that it opposes in that [specific instance] a purpose of the law-giver. Rather they permit it only based 
                                                 
69
 In discussing al-Shāṭibī‘s legal theory, Hallaq asserts that according to al-Shāṭibī ‗The practice of ḥiyal, of 
arbitrary eclecticism of the four schools‘ positive legal doctrines, as well as the virtual abandonment of the law is 
…  an outcome not only of the abstract character of legal theory, but also of its highly theological, non-
humanistic outlook.‘ In another work he presumes that al-Shāṭibī‘s defence of certain ḥiyal is due to the fact that 
they had crept into Mālikī authoritative doctrine. Hallaq‘s viewpoint is unsurprising given that he uncritically 
subscribes to Schacht‘s ḥiyal thesis. See the following, respectively, Wael B. Hallaq, ―The Primacy of the 
Qurʾān in Shāṭibī‘s Legal Theory,‖ in Islamic Studies Presented to Charles J. Adams, ed. Wael B. Hallaq and 
Donald P. Little (Leiden: Brill, 1991), 89; Wael B. Hallaq, A History of Islamic Legal Theories (Cambridge: 
CUP, 1997), 187; idem, Model Shurūṭ Works, 119. 
70
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 Ibid, 451. 
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upon an inquiry into its purpose and [knowing] that the issue is subsumed under the type of ḥiyal in 
which the purpose of the law-giver is known.
72
  
It is unbefitting to think that the masses would openly oppose the law, let alone that the great 
scholars would also do so. Similarly, he argues, that those who oppose a ḥīla only do so when 
they deem it to be against the maqāṣid. Without taking sides, al-Shāṭibī is effectively arguing 
that both sides argue from the same epistemological premise, although they differ in its 
application. He goes on to demonstrate this by discussing two of the most controversial ḥiyal; 
taḥlīl and bayʿ al-ājāl. For both, he elabrates the various maṣāliḥ which are used to argue in 
favour of them, whilst recognising that those are argue against them also have their evidences.  
 
al-Shāṭibī concludes his treatment of the ḥiyal by saying that his reason for discussing the 
ḥiyal is due to the lack of Ḥanafī and Shāfiʿī works available in the western lands (al-Maghrib 
and al-Andalus).
73
 The Mālikīs in the West may well decry the ḥiyal of their eastern juridical 
counterparts without even knowing their detailed legal reasoning behind them. This is 
accentuated by the fact, he argues, that a jurist who is accustomed to only type of legal 
methodology will be averse to the work of the other schools due to his ignorance regarding 
their methodology.
74
 al-Shāṭibī‘s purpose is to give the benefit of the doubt to both sides by 
arguing that what underpins and is central to both arguments, is the teleological pursuit of the 
maqāṣid. 
 
The question which arises out of this is whether the ḥiyal protagonists do actually recognise 
the maqāṣid in their jurisprudence or not. It should be recalled that maṣlaḥa, as a source of 
law, is only recognised by the Mālikīs and the Ḥanbalīs, whereas the Ḥanafīs and the Shāfiʿīs 
reject it altogether. Additionally, the Ḥanafīs did not contribute at all to the development of 
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the maqāṣid discourse in their uṣūl works, whereas the Shafiʿīs played a leading role. How 
then, can the Ḥanafī borne ḥiyal be justified through the maqāṣid? Although it seems that al-
Shāṭibī‘s defence for the ḥiyal proponents contradicts their own historical record in 
recognising the role of the maqāṣid, his stance may yet be vindicated. Aḥmad al-Raysūnī, in 
his analysis of al-Shāṭibī‘s maqāṣid theory, discusses the Ḥanafīs and their position vis-à-vis 
the maqāṣid: 
In fact, the uṣūliyyūn of the Ḥanafite school were less mindful of the objectives of Islamic law than 
were the scholastic theologians
75
 I have reviewed a number of their writings, including both earlier and 
later scholars, but have found nothing of note on this score despite the fact that among jurisprudents,  it 
is the Ḥanafites who have most frequently interpreted Islamic legal rulings – both those having to do 
with daily transactions and those dealing with forms of worship – in terms of their bases and 
objectives.
76
 
al-Raysūnī‘s claim is not however backed up with any detailed examples and its application to 
the ḥiyal needs to be investigated further. As we take up the argument of the Ḥanafīs and their 
defence of the ḥiyal, the centrality of these teleological concerns can be observed. 
 
3.5 The Ḥanafī Defence of the Ḥiyal 
The argument of the Ḥanafīs will be presented initially through al-Shaybānī‘s introduction to 
the work of ḥiyal ascribed to him, known as al-Makhārij fī al-Ḥiyal. Building upon this, later 
authors also discussed the paradigm of the ḥiyal and using the works of authorities such as al-
Jaṣṣāṣ, al-Khaṣṣāf and most importantly al-Sarakhsī, the perspective of the school as a whole 
will be explicated. 
 
 
                                                 
75
 By this he means the other three schools as their uṣūl al-fiqh works are based upon the method of the 
scholastic theologians.  
76
 Ahmad al-Raysuni, Imam al-Shāṭibī’s Theory of the Higher Objectives of Islamic Law (London: IIIT, 2005), 
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3.5.1 al-Shaybānī‘s Prolegomena 
al-Shaybānī‘s discussion begins with the interlocutor asking whether there is a ḥīla for a 
person who repudiates his wife by saying: ‗You are divorced‘. He answers in the affirmative 
saying that the person should follow up his repudiation by immediately saying ‗if God wills‘ 
(in shāʾ Allāh). al-Shaybānī also states that one could use this exception after a statement of 
manumission in order to prevent its legal effect. Statements of Marriage, divorce and 
manumission are considered irrevocable in Islamic law, such that their utterance even in jest 
mandates their legal effect. The statements of an individual to his wife, ‗you are divorced‘, or 
to his slave ‗you are free‘, will result, necessarily, in divorce and manumission respectively. 
al-Shaybānī shows, however, that if the speaker immediately follows up one of these phrases 
with the exception ‗if God wills‘ then their legal effect will be mitigated. He supports this 
position by mentioning that the Companions ʿAlī, Ibn Masʿūd, and Ibn ʿAbbās (ra) and the 
Successor Ibrahīm al-Nakhaʿī all held the same opinion.77 To justify why such exceptions 
should be permitted, he narrates a number of traditions from the Prophet (pbuh) extolling the 
virtues of marriage while deprecating divorce as the worst of all permissible deeds.
78
 Its 
mitigation through legal means should therefore be facilitated to maintain the former and 
avoid the latter. He then cites a ḥadīth in which the Prophet (pbuh) is reported to have said: 
Whosoever swears an oath and then says: ‗if God wills‘, has gotten out of his oath‘.79 The 
Successor jurist Ṭāwūs is asked by Layth ibn Saʿd whether this ḥadīth applies to divorce and 
manumission, and he replies that it does. The same jurists from the Companions and 
Successors, mentioned previously, are quoted as concurring that exceptions are permitted in 
                                                 
77
 al-Shaybānī also mentions the scholars who hold the opposite opinion; Ibn Sīrīn, al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī and 
Shurayḥ. The latter held that this would be possible only if the exception preceded the statement. al-Shaybānī, 
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oaths.
80
 The purpose being to show that the principle of presenting an exit from a legally 
binding statement, is general in its import and not specific to one issue. 
 
The next step in al-Shaybānī‘s argument is to show how the intent of a person taking the oath 
can affect its meaning. The interlocutor asks: 
What is your opinion regarding a person who is asked to swear an oath, [and although] he wants to 
swear the oath, he wants to intend something else by it. Be he an oppressor or the one oppressed, what 
should he do? 
He said: Yaʿqūb (i.e. Abū Yūsuf) told us from Abū Ḥanīfa from Ḥammād from Ibrāhīm that he said: If 
a person is asked to take an oath and he is oppressed, then his oath will be according to what he has 
intended, [whereas] if he is asked to take an oath and he is the oppressor then the oath will be according 
to the intention of the one requesting the oath.
81
 
al-Shaybānī demonstrates the legitimacy of this principle by quoting a prophetic tradition 
which says that ‗your oath is upon that which your companion attests‘.  The narrator says that 
he was unsure about its meaning, so he asked the Kufan traditionist Sufyān al-Thawrī who 
explained it using the same principle as al-Nakhaʿī.82 al-Thawrī was a traditionist jurist and 
his concurrence on this point gives al-Shaybānī‘s argument added credence.83 
 
In a critical final question to al-Thawrī, the narrator asks him regarding oaths with equivocal 
meanings, in which the person taking the oath is neither an oppressor nor an oppressed. al-
Thawrī replies that there is no harm in it.84 al-Shaybānī corroborates al-Thawrī‘s opinion by 
adducing a number of aḥādīth: 
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Reconsidered,‖ The Muslim World 100, no. 1 (2010): 145-56; Christopher Melchert, ―Traditionist-Jurisprudents 
and the Framing of Islamic Law,‖ Islamic Law and Society 8, no.3 (2001): 383-406. 
84
 al-Shaybānī, al-Makhārij, 4. 
RECEPTION OF THE ḤIYAL: THE POLEMIC 
119 
 
1) The Prophet is reported to have been asked regarding a specific verse in the Qurʾān to 
which he replied ‗I will not leave [the mosque] until I inform you [about it].‘ After 
getting up from his discussions in the mosque he got and headed for the exit. No 
sooner had he (pbuh) placed one foot out of the mosque, than he informed the 
questioner regarding the verse.
85
 
2) A number of narrations are mentioned in which a man was caught by his wife with his 
slave girl. His wife demanded that he demonstrates that he was not in a state of ritual 
purity be reciting from the Qurʾān. If he was in a state of impurity it would be due to 
him having had sexual intercourse with the slave-girl. The man, who indeed had had 
intercourse with the slave-girl did not want his wife to know. So instead of reciting 
from the Qurʾān, he read some lines of poetry in a manner that led his wife to believe 
that he was actually reciting from the Qurʾān. Later on he enquired from the Prophet 
(pbuh) regarding his ruse. The Prophet (pbuh) saw no harm in it and in one narration 
remarked that this was indeed from ‗maʿārīḍ al-kalām‘, equivocal speech.86 
With regards to this last statement, al-Shaybānī quotes the Companion ʿUmar (ra) as having 
said: ‗Indeed in equivocal speech there is what suffices a Muslim man from lying‘.87 In the 
final section of his prolegomena, he quotes a number of earlier authorities who support his 
assertions, either verbally or through their actions.
88
 
 
In summary, al-Shaybānī‘s introduction goes through four steps. 
1. Allowing exceptions in divorce and manumission. 
2. Permissibility of exceptions in all oaths. 
3. Interpreting the oath according to the intention of the oppressed. 
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4. The general use of equivocal speech to avoid lying. 
Much of the substantive material in the Shaybānī‘s treatise revolves around these four aspects 
and thus oaths, in general, and in particular with regards to divorce and manumission, 
represents the largest portion of his work. 
 
3.5.2 Prescribing Exits - Taʿlīm al-Makhārij 
Ibn Baṭṭa‘s viewpoint regarding the role of the jurist is an important aspect of his argument. 
The Ḥanafī‘s view of the jurists, both in general and with specific regard to the ḥiyal, is in 
stark contrast to the views of Ibn Baṭṭa. The general view of the Ḥanafī jurists can be gleaned 
from al-Sarakhsī‘s commentary on al-Shaybānī‘s book of acquisition, Kitāb al-Kasb. He 
narrates in his commentary that it was said to al-Shaybānī: ‗If only you had authored 
something in abstention (zuhd) and piety (warʿ)‘, to which he replied: ‗I have composed the 
book of sales (Kitāb al-Buyūʿ)‘.89 The question put to al-Shaybānī would have been in 
response to the works produced by the traditionists such as ʿAbdullah ibn Mubārak and 
Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal under the title Kitāb al-Zuhd. What al-Shaybānī‘s answer shows is that for 
the Ḥanafīs adherence to the law in all of ones temporal dealings is itself a pious endeavour. 
 
 al-Sarakhsī reports that subsequent to this question al-Shaybānī began composing the Kitāb 
al-Kasb. In this work he discusses the importance and necessity of earning a livelihood and 
that one should not rely solely on divine intervention for their worldly provision without 
undertaking material action. al-Sarakhsī castigates the ignorant ascetics for restricting the 
permission to work to the minimum that is necessary.
90
 For the Ḥanafīs piety is not merely to 
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abstain from temporal pleasures or worldly acquisitions, but rather, to adhere to the sacred 
law in ones dealings whilst partaking and engaging in the temporal world. The Prophet (pbuh) 
was not sent with difficult monasticism but rather with lenient monotheism, al-Sarakhsī 
narrates.
91
 In fact the jurists‘ purpose is to guide the ignorant in precisely how to acquire their 
worldly provisions through the means approved of by the sharīʿa.92 
 
This general concern of the jurists manifests very specifically in the area of the ḥiyal in, what 
the Ḥanafīs call, taʿlīm al-makhraj, i.e. to prescribe an exit for one in difficulty. It is this 
notion which underpins their paradigm of the ḥiyal and which they attempt to establish as a 
normative aspect of the jurists‘ work. There are three key proof texts which are used to 
substantiate the normativity of taʿlīm al-makhraj: 
1. The plan of the Prophet Yūsuf (as) to retain his brother.93 
2. The oath of the Prophet Ayyūb (as).94 
3. A prescription of the Prophet Muḥammad (pbuh) in selling dates.95 
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3.5.2.1 The Plan of Prophet Yūsuf (as) 
The Qurʾān gives a detailed account of the plan used by the Prophet Yūsuf (as) to retain his 
younger brother Binyāmīn.96 Unbeknown to his ten brothers, Yūsuf (as) had become the 
minister in charge of distributing the food rations in the drought season in Egypt. Yūsuf (as) 
had demanded from them that when they returned in the following year that they must bring 
their youngest brother Binyāmīn with them. They thus returned with Binyāmīn in their 
subsequent visit and it was on this occasion that Yūsuf (as) used his plan to retain Binyāmīn 
in Egypt. The essence of the plan was that a cup belonging to the king of Egypt was placed in 
the luggage of Binyāmīn.  Once the brothers had taken their supplies and were about to depart 
they were called back and told that a cup of the king was missing and that their bags would be 
checked. Their luggage was searched and the cup was retrieved from the bag of Binyāmīn. 
Yūsuf (as) had told his brothers that the punishment for the offender would be according to 
their own law, the law of their father, Prophet Yaʿqūb (as) and not according to the law of 
Egypt. According to the latter a thief was to be beaten and fined whereas in the former the 
thief was to be enslaved.
97
 The punishment for Binyāmīn was therefore that he would be held 
by Yūsuf (as) as he had planned from the outset.  
 
Following the narration of this event in the Qurʾān the verse reads: ‗and thus did We plan for 
Yūsuf‘,98 from which a number of commentators have averred that this ḥīla was divinely 
inspired.
99
 This, as such, constitutes a direct incidence of prescribing an exit. al-Jaṣṣāṣ 
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comments that this is an indication of the permissibility of using a ḥīla as a conduit to the licit 
or in appropriating one‘s rights.100 
 
3.5.2.2 The Oath of Prophet Ayyūb (as) 
The Prophet Ayyūb (as) spent a great number of years in tribulation throughout which his 
wife remained steadfast by his side.
101
  However, in one instance he became angry with his 
wife and swore that he would give her one hundred lashes. The Qurʾān mentions that in order 
to avoid him breaking his oath, he should strike his wife with a bunch of twigs or stalks 
instead.
102
 This divine command to Ayyūb (as) is incontrovertibly a prescription for exiting 
from his oath.
103
 The importance of this example accentuates when we see that on different 
occasions the Prophet (pbuh) himself issued a similar ruling with regard to the ḥadd 
punishment for fornication. In cases where the perpetrator was physically unable to withstand 
the hundred lashes, he (pbuh) ordered that the guilty be struck once with a bundle of a 
hundred sticks. The Yemeni traditionist al-Shawkānī, commenting on this says ‗... this 
practice is from the legally permissible ḥiyal which Allah has permitted the like of‘ referring 
to the exit given to Ayyūb (as).104  
 
Another important point which is taken from the exit provided to the Prophet Ayyūb (as) is 
that regard was given to the words of the oath, as opposed to his intention behind them. The 
successor jurist ʿAṭāʾ was once asked about a man who took an oath that he would not clothe 
his wife until she stood at ʿArafa. He replied that he should take her there and stand with her 
and thus absolve himself of his oath. The questioner replied that in his oath he did not intend 
by ʿArafa, merely the place but rather meant the day of ʿArafa, i.e. the ninth day of the ḥajj 
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pilgrimage. ʿAṭāʾ responds by asking him that when Ayyūb (as) swore to strike his wife a 
hundred times did he intend to strike her with a bundle; no, rather he was ordered 
(subsequently) to take a bundle and strike her with it. He then goes onto say ‗indeed the 
Qurʾān has pronounced‘.105 As in the other examples, regard is given not to the intention 
behind the oath, but rather to the words which constitute it, and the maximum legal scope they 
embody is what gives rise to the exit. 
 
3.5.2.3 Selling High Quality Dates for Low Quality Dates 
Both al-Khaṣṣāf and al-Jaṣṣāṣ present the following ḥadīth to substantiate the Ḥanafī position 
on the ḥiyal. This ḥadīth is well known to the traditionists and like the previous two examples 
demonstrates the normativity of prescribing an exit. The ḥadīth relates to an exchange of high 
quality dates known as janīb, for low quality dates known as jamʿ: 
Abū Hurayra narrated regarding the Prophet (pbuh) that a person, employed to [oversee] Khaybar, came 
to him with some janīb dates. The Messenger of Allah (pbuh) said ‗Are all the dates of Khaybar like 
this?‘ he said ‗No by Allah! O Messenger of Allah (pbuh), indeed we obtain one ṣāʿ for two ṣāʿs, [or] 
two ṣāʿs for three. To which he (pbuh) said: Don‘t do that, [rather] sell al-jamʿ for dirhams and then 
buy with these dirhams the janīb.106 
Commenting on this ḥadīth al-Jaṣṣāṣ notes that the Prophet (pbuh) prohibited the transaction 
due to ribā al-faḍl and also taught him a ḥīla so he could legally acquire the dates.107 The 
Prophet (pbuh) recommends that the buyer should avoid the ribā al-faḍl prohibition by taking 
an alternative approach; firstly he should sell his dates for cash and then use this cash to buy 
the other dates. This tradition is critically important as it captures the response of the Prophet 
(pbuh) to a transaction of ribā and also the solution he (pbuh) personally proposed to 
overcome the problem. Ibn Māza also quotes this ḥadīth in his introduction to his lengthy 
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chapter on the ḥiyal. Again focusing on the notion of taʿlīm al-makhraj, he comments on the 
solution given by the Prophet (pbuh), saying: ‗it is to prescribe a stratagem‘, and that the 
ḥadīth is an unequivocal proof-text on the matter.108 
 
3.5.3 al-Khaṣṣāf on Intentions 
In our earlier discussion on the ḥiyal polemic the centrality of intention and motive to the 
argument of the opponents to the ḥīyal was noted. al-Khaṣṣaf deals with the issue of intention 
and its role in determining the legality of transactions in his introduction to his ḥiyal 
treatise.
109
 The first point which becomes apparent in al-Khaṣṣāf‘s presentation is that he 
unequivocally regards the intention to act mala fide as reprehensible, although the act which 
accompanies the intention is legally upheld. Although al-Kaṣṣāf makes it clear that he regards 
such intentions and motives as reprehensible, he qualifies this by saying that their 
reprehension is based only on juristic opinion.
110
  
 
He then goes on to show the textual evidence from which this ‗opinion‘ is inferred. However, 
his substantive point is not that the intention is reprehensible, but rather, that it is an ‗opinion‘ 
as opposed to a clear text. This is then contrasted with the general rules of the Sharīʿa which 
are based upon clear proof-texts. He demonstrates that intentions do not prevent legal causes 
occasioning their effects, with reference to an instance where intention itself is clearly 
prohibited. He refers to a verse of the Qurʾān in which a husband is prohibited from harming 
his wife by retaining her and not granting her a divorce. He then quotes the Successor jurist 
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Masrūq, as having given the background to the verse, of a man who repudiates his wife and 
then just as her waiting period (ʿidda) is about to terminate, he takes her back. The husband 
has no intention of remaining with her, but takes her back solely to spite her. al-Kaṣṣāf‘s point 
is that, even though the husband‘s intention is clearly condemned, it still does not mean that 
his act of taking her back is invalid. He therefore raises the question that if an intention which 
is textually prohibited does not intervene between a legal cause and its contingent effect then 
how can an intention which is based upon juristic opinion do so.
111
 
 
al-Khaṣṣāf makes another strong argument regarding intentions impeding legal causes. 
Looking at the arguments of his detractors, he notes that they refer to various substantive 
rulings which appear to anticipate an improper motive, suggesting thereby, that intentions do 
indeed have a role to play. The example he discusses, refers to a woman who is triply 
divorced and in her waiting period when her husband passes away. The Sharīʿa has noted the 
possibility that a man may divorce his wife shortly before his death merely to disinherit her; it 
therefore provides that should he die while she is still in her waiting period, then she will not 
be denied her rightful share of his estate. al-Khaṣṣāf, however, uses this very case to bolster 
his own stance. He points out that in this case, the rule, as laid down by the Sharīʿa, has no 
relation to the intention of the husband; for whether he divorced her genuinely or merely to 
disinherit her, the rule is the same, namely that she will inherit him as long as she is in her 
waiting period.
112
 
 
In fact, he argues, to show that intentions do have a legal consequence, one would have to 
find a rule which is contingent upon sound intent such that in its presence the ruling will result 
in its legal effect and in its absence that it will not. He then shows that cases where it often 
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appears that intent is taken into account are not so, as the rule is applied even if one acts with 
a genuinely licit motive.
113
 This means that although a rule may appear to be premised upon 
an improper motive this does not mean that the rule will not apply when the intent is absent. 
Conversely, the normal rules of sales, and marriage, etc in which a sound intent is assumed, 
are not interdicted if a person acts with unlawful intent. The upshot is that although it may be 
that the Sharīʿa rules are premised upon certain assumed motives and intents, these latter do 
not act as legal causes and hence, they neither occasion, nor preclude, legal effects. 
 
3.5.4 al-Sarakhsī‘s Paradigm 
al-Sarakhsī‘s magnum opus, al-Mabsūṭ, is perhaps the most authoritative reference of all 
Ḥanafī legal works and compendia.114 Written as a commentary on the al-Kāfī – an 
abridgement of al-Shaybānī‘s works – al-Sarakhsī presents the substantive rulings of the 
School in a consolidated juridical framework. Within his compendium, he not only discusses 
the ḥiyal in different chapters but also includes a separate chapter devoted to them. The latter 
was edited and published by Schacht and appended to the work of al-Shaybānī. Although al-
Sarakhsī‘s chapter is far shorter than al-Shaybānī‘s, he includes numerous additional 
evidences for the ḥiyal and together with the references to the ḥiyal in his compendium a 
broader framework can be garnered from his work. There are two key aspects which 
distinguish al-Sarakshī‘s presentation. Firstly he draws a clear difference between ḥiyal as 
exits and rukhṣas and secondly, he expands the notion of exits from reactionary prescription 
to one of normative explication. 
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3.5.4.1 The Ḥiyal and Concessions 
al-Sarakhsī presents the evidences which support the use of equivocal language and concludes 
that there is no problem in using such language to save oneself from lying, because lying is 
prohibited and no dispensation or concession can be permitted in it.
115
 What is critical about 
al-Sarakhsī‘s statement is his dichomotising of exits and concessions. Both of these juridical 
methods provide solutions to exigencies, although the method of the Ḥanafīs is clearly to 
provide an exit as opposed to grant a concesion. This line of argument is very important as we 
have already seen in the Ḥanafī application of the ribā rules, where they prefer to maintain 
systematic consistency rather than allow concessionary exceptions.  
 
Although exits are being dichotomised with concessions, it is important to appreciate the fine 
line which often stands between them. The exits contrast with concessions in that the former 
are clearly premised upon the extension of the systematic rules, whereas the latter abandon 
them. This distinction is vitally important as it implies that the exits given by the Ḥanafīs 
must be systematically consistent with their normative principles and doctrines. In the next 
chapter the concern of the ḥiyal authors in this regard will be noted. If, in a given ḥīla, the 
systematic rules are not upheld, the ḥīla cannot be regarded as a normative exit, but is rather 
categorised as a temporary concession. The concessions differ from the exits, in that their 
validity is restricted to the mitigating circumstances which occasion them. Later on, when we 
examine the ḥiyal of ribā, the question of, whether these ḥiyal constitute an exit or a 
concession, will be addressed.  
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3.5.4.2 The Sharīʿa and its Exits 
al-Sarakhsī presents a number of other incidents from the Qurʾān and the ḥadīth to show the 
pervasive use of exits and then goes on to explain the paradigm underpinning them. The idea 
of an exit is to be found in the sharʿīa rules themselves, he asserts, and thus, the ḥīla for a 
person who loves a woman and wants to approach her, is for him to marry her. Or, if he 
desires a slave girl, then the ḥīla is for him to purchase her. Conversely, the ḥīla for someone 
who dislikes his wife and wants to exit from his marriage, is to divorce her. He goes on to say 
that: 
Hence, he who disapproves of the ḥiyal in the [substantive] rulings has indeed disapproved, in reality, 
of the rules of the sharīʿa. And this type of doubt only befalls one due to a lack of reflection.116 
The key point which al-Sarakhsī is emphasising here is that when the Sharīʿa makes an action 
or a specific means or method illicit, it also provides a licit alternative. In the place of 
fornication it prescribes marriage and while proscribing adultery it sanctions polygamy. These 
exits are thus a necessary corollary of each prohibition, not to evade or circumvent the rules, 
but rather to facilitate adherence to them. The underlying message is that man need not 
suppress his carnal desires or worldly ambitions, but rather that he should pursue them within 
the means given to him by the Sharīʿa. These means can, according to this paradigm, be found 
necessarily within the Sharīʿa itself. 
 
A good example of how this paradigm is interwoven into the substantive rules can be seen in 
the arguments regarding the ratio of ribā. We have already covered the positions of the 
various Schools regarding the ratio and one of the arguments advanced by al-Sarakhsī against 
the Shāfiʿī and Mālikī position is relevant to our discussion here. In an exchange of non-
fungible fruit, such as an apple for an apple or watermelons for watermelons, the latter two 
Schools prohibit this transaction because the ratio, in their opinion, is foodstuffs. However, 
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not only do they prohibit the transaction, but additionally, they offer no alternative method for 
a valid exchange. Regarding this al-Sarakhsī remarks that: 
‗These are not from the commodities of ribā and the proof of it is that the law-giver did not lay down 
the law of ribā without linking it to an exit (makhlaṣ). Therefore any ratio which prescribes a law in a 
place which has, in principle, no exit, is an invalid ratio.‘117 
His statement that the law is linked to an exit, is a reference to the ḥadīth of the six 
commodities, where the prohibition to exchange these commodities is immediately followed 
by an exit, which is that they be sold ‗like for like‘ and ‗hand to hand‘. al-Sarakhsī‘s point is 
that when deducing the underlying ratio of a rule, it should be borne in mind that the ratio 
should not be one which renders the exit to the prohibition ineffective, but rather, one which 
maintains its utility.  
 
The viewpoint of the Ḥanafīs is that the Sharīʿa prohibitions are not merely positive 
injunctions, but that they are also prescriptive of their legal alternatives. The jurists‘ role is to 
facilitate man in his worldly pursuits by discovering and prescribing these permissible 
alternative means, while also upholding the injunctions of the Sharīʿa as well.118 The use of 
these exits are not therefore absolute, but rather qualified, in that, only if they are used to save 
a person from doing a prohibited action, or provide him with a permissible route, are they 
acceptable. Those which are used to usurp the rights of others or to create doubts in regard to 
them, or which seek to conceal or disguise an invalid act, are regarded as reprehensible.
119
 
Simple evasions, circumventions or ruses are hence precluded in al-Sarakhsī‘s paradigm; it is 
ḥiyal qua makhārij (i.e. stratagems that are exits) that are being endorsed, the latter having a 
normative value in the Sharʿīa‘s juridical structure. 
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3.6 Conclusion to the Ḥiyal Polemic 
In this chapter we have discussed the ḥiyal polemic from its inception in the works of the 
traditionists. The treatment of the ḥiyal in the works of al-Bukhārī and Ibn Baṭṭa was 
presented and the importance of juridical method and the notion of intent were made apparent. 
The work of the later Ḥanbalī reformers, Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn al-Qayyim was then presented 
in which the arguments of the opponents to the ḥiyal were given their fullest explication. This 
focused on three aspects; the maqāṣid, intents and motives, and sadd al-dharīʿa. The ḥiyal as 
a juridical method was noted for its violation of the requirements of the first two aspects and 
in direct opposition to the third aspect. The polemic in the works of these authors reaches its 
apex, both in terms of the coherency of its arguments and in terms of delineating its subject 
matter. The latter is identified by using the yardstick of the maqāṣid, and the authors find 
themselves not only permitting certain ḥiyal but in the case of Ibn al-Qayyim endorsing and 
contriving numerous complex ḥiyal himself as exits to possible exigencies. Finally, al-
Shāṭibī‘s contribution to the discourse is noted. This author recognises that the ḥiyal are 
ultimately premised upon a recognisable teleology and that the authors of such works are 
certainly not writing mala fide. In fact an important point raised by this author is that the 
opposition to the ḥiyal is generally due to the inaccessibility of the Ḥanafīs works in this 
genre. Had their opponents known their works and appreciated their methodology al-Shāṭibī 
assumes their reaction would not be the same. 
 
The Ḥanafīs for their part defended the use of the ḥiyal by positing them as makhārij, exits. 
They demonstrate a degree of hermeneutical legitimacy for these exits and suggest that 
instructing people in the usage of these exits is a normative aspect of the jurists‘ societal role. 
They also argue that the injunctions that have been sent down are always accompanied with a 
legal alternative. These alternatives represent the exits by which one is expected to fulfil ones 
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requirements. The ḥiyal are an extension to this concept and require that the jurist find 
legitimate means by which people can achieve their legal objectives. The Ḥanafīs also make 
clear that these exits should not be used to deny anyone their legitimate rights or avoid one 
fulfilling one‘s legal duties. Whether the Ḥanafīs live up to these maxims will be observed in 
the next chapter, as we examine the substantive content of the ḥiyal genre. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
RECEPTION OF THE ḤIYAL: THE GENRE 
 
 
 
In this chapter we will begin by examining the Orientalist‘s views regarding the nature of 
Islamic law in terms of its theory and practice. The particular focus will be on their assertions 
regarding Islamic commercial law and its relation to customary practice and the role of the 
ḥiyal in accommodating the former to the latter. The Orientalists description of the purpose 
and function of the ḥiyal genre, will therefore be explored. This will lead us to examine the 
very first work on the ḥiyal which has come down to us and identify its authorship, purpose 
and contents. We will also present the trend of the other schools of law vis-à-vis the ḥiyal. A 
number of ḥiyal which are central to the controversy of the ḥiyal as a genre will be presented 
and the position of the Ḥanafīs towards them explored. The chapter will conclude with an 
examination of the contents of the various ḥiyal works as a basis for characterising the genre 
as a whole. 
 
4.1 Occidental Contentions 
The colonisation of Muslim lands was the cause and raison d‘être for occidental works on 
Islamic law.
1
 The Colonial powers desired control of indigenous legal systems as they ware 
seen as the most efficient conduit by which they could entrench their hold and control over 
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the conquered peoples.
2
 The initial focus of Orientalist scholars was therefore to produce 
explications of Islamic law which would give colonial judges direct access to the law without 
the need for recourse to indigenous jurists.
3
 Following these early explications; articles, 
handbooks and lectures were published which focused on the history of Islamic law, its 
origins and development, the different schools of law and their doctrines and the various legal 
œuvres in contemporary usage.4 The most significant author to emerge from this colonialist-
Orientalist nexus was the Dutch scholar Snouck Hurgronje, who was both a product of, and an 
active participant in, the Dutch colonial venture in Indonesia.
5
 
 
Hurgronje is regarded as one of the founding fathers of the academic study of Islamic law in 
the occident.
6
 There are a two of aspects of Hurgronje‘s characterisation of Islamic law which 
are critical to this study. The first is his assessment that the term ‗Islamic law‘ is not an 
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accurate representation of the fiqh, as the latter represents a system of ethics not law. He 
therefore determined the fiqh to be a deontology; a doctrine of duties which was unsusceptible 
to rational analysis or logical principles, but rather, represented the inscrutable and 
(consequently) immutable will of God.
7
 The second aspect, which arises from the first, is that 
due to its rigid and imperceptible nature, the law was not susceptible to diachronic 
development. This meant that as society changed and progressed, an inevitable cleavage 
occurred between the idealised fiqh doctrines and actual social practice.
8
 The fiqh was 
therefore restricted in its application to worship and private matters, such as family law, 
inheritance and waqf, in contrast to public matters such as constitutional or criminal law 
where it had little or no influence.
9
 As for commercial law, Hurgronje considered it to be a 
‗dead letter‘,10 and with specific regard to the usury prohibition he blamed the jurists for 
‗inventing a wide choice of means of circumventing the letter of the law which gave rise to a 
special branch of legal literature (ḥīlas).‘11 
 
4.1.1 The Fiqh as a Legal System 
Hurgronje not only stressed that the fiqh was not a legal system, but he also regarded it as 
‗senseless‘ to analyse Islamic law with European legal concepts as it was more akin to Canon 
or Mosaic law.
12
  Although most Orientalists
13
 understood from Hurgronje‘s presentation that 
he did not discern a legal system within the fiqh, Schacht, his dutiful protégé, strenuously 
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11
 Hurgronje, Selected Works, 69; Schacht, Introduction, 76-85, 200, 210, 260. 
12
 See J. Brugman, Snouck Hurgronje’s Study of Islamic Law, 88. 
13
 See for example, ibid, 88-89; Baber Johansen, ―The Muslim Fiqh as a Sacred Law,‖ in idem, Contingency in a 
Sacred Law: Legal and Ethical Norms in the Muslim Fiqh (Leiden: Brill, 1999), 42-46. 
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defended Hurgronje from this inference.
14
 Schacht, himself, had already reluctantly conceded 
that in the fiqh there is ‗a clear distinction between the purely religious sphere and the sphere 
of law proper‘.15 In his apology, Schacht dialogically reconstructs Hurgronje‘s viewpoint in 
line with his own conclusions.
16
 This, however, is untenable as it does not reflect Hurgronje‘s 
approach to the question of doctrine and practice which is premised on his understanding that 
the fiqh is only an ethical system, a deontology.  
  
For Hurgronje, both the fiqh, and its proponents the fuqahāʾ, resorted to ethical suasion, rather 
than judicial practice, as the medium for effecting their idealised doctrines: ‗[T]he influence 
of the sharīʿa is essentially moral, and its strength depends on the piety of the individual‘.17 
His judgements regarding the vitality of Islamic commercial law were hence underpinned by 
anecdotal observations of the practices of individuals. There are two main sources for this 
type of evidence; the first appears as comments made by the jurists regarding the religious 
condition of their contemporary society.
18
 He thus uses al-Ghazālī‘s remarks in the eleventh 
century that ‗anyone concluding commerce in accordance with the law was looked upon as 
ridiculous by all other merchants‘, as evidence of Islamic commercial law being a dead 
letter‘.19 Schacht, who also accepts the probative value of these contemporaneous 
observations, declares that ‗hostile references to practice in works of Islamic law are an 
important source of information on it for the Middle Ages‘.20  
 
                                                 
14
 See his review of de Bellefonds‘ Traité de Droit Musulman Comparé, 416-7. 
15
 Joseph Schacht, An Introduction to Islamic Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), 201. His comments 
preceding this statement convey the reluctance with which he makes this admittance.  
16
 ‗Snouck Hurgronje has never … denied that the fiqh contains elements of law (in the narrow meaning of the 
term), but he has insisted that the fiqh as a whole is not a system of law as we understand it but a system of 
religious duties (which, incidentally, comprises duties in the field of law).‘ See his review of de Bellefonds‘ 
Traité de Droit Musulman Comparé, 417-418. 
17
 Hurgronje, Selected Works, 74. 
18
 Hurgronje, Selected Works, 57, 265-6, 292. 
19
 Hurgronje, Selected Works, 260, trans. in Udovitch, Partnership and Profit, 7.  
20
 Schacht, Introduction, 85. 
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The second source of anecdotal evidence is in European chronicles of the Orient written by 
both colonialists and travellers. Hurgronje, himself, made a record of his own observances in 
both Mecca and Indonesia.
21
 In Mecca, having observed Indian and Yemeni moneylenders 
using various ḥiyal to circumvent the usury law, he concludes that ‗many usurers have no 
scruple about violating the canon-law and the interpretation of it gives them every sort of 
opportunity of getting round it.‘22 In Indonesia he reported similar activities by the 
Achenese.
23
 
 
Schacht‘s recognition of a sphere of law, as opposed to a purely religio-ethical sphere, 
however, impacts directly on the question of doctrine and practice. More importantly it raises 
questions on how to ascertain the relationship between the two. Whereas Hurgronje was 
content to invoke anecdotal evidence, the appraisal of a functioning legal system requires 
substantively greater sources. This is not to downplay the importance of the anecdote, but 
rather to reallocate it in the probative hierarchy. The degree of societal conformity to the fiqh 
does have an important meaning; as its doctrines are not positivist but definitively normative, 
but the process of communicating its norms is not merely spiritual exhortation, it also, and 
perhaps more importantly, includes its judicial application. The question of determining the 
degree of conformity of practice to doctrine therefore rests on more than a modicum of sparse 
anecdotes. The question of the relation of the theory to practice is therefore considerably 
enlarged and requires us to ask just what exactly these terms refer to. 
 
 
                                                 
21
 C. Snouck Hugronje, Mekka in the Latter Part of the 19th Century: Daily Life, Customs and Learning: the 
Moslims of the East-Indian-Archipelago, trans. James Henry Monahan (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1931); idem, The 
Achenese 2 vols, trans. A.W.S. O‘Sullivan (Leiden: Brill, 1906). 
22
 Hurgonje, Mekka, 4-5. 
23
 Hugronje, The Achenese, vol. 1, 271, 293. For a wide gathering of anecdotes on the use of these stratagems, 
see Maxime Rodinson, Islam and Capitalism, trans. Brian Pearce (London: Allen Lane, 1974), 35-45. 
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4.1.1.1 Theory and Practice  
If the fiqh represents the theory or doctrinal corpus of Islamic law, what sources constitute its 
authoritative expression? Initially, Orientalists selected an epitome, a mukhtaṣar, as an 
authoritative statement of the madhhab. Schacht, for example, used as his source for Ḥanafī 
fiqh the Multaqā al-Abḥur; a primer used extensively in the Ottoman curriculum.24 These 
short authoritative manuals are known as mutūn and are selected based upon the wide 
approval they gain within the School. They present the fundamental doctrines of the school as 
extracted form its corpus juris. 
 
Mohammad Fadel described these manuals as representing a form of ‗codified common 
law‘.25 Using the Mukhtaṣar al-Khalīl, he attempted to show that the purpose of these 
authoritative epitomes was to prevent legal indeterminacy through the codification of the 
madhhab‘s corpus juris.26 The mukhtaṣar was to function as a code; a univocal statement of 
Mālikī fiqh, although Fadel himself noted that on many issues univocality was precluded by 
legal pluralism.
27
 Fadel, in a later article, went on to test his thesis, by positing the Mukhtaṣar 
al-Khalīl as the ‗theory‘, and measuring ‗practice‘ by comparing the former work to the 
fatāwā given by the jurisconsults of Granada.28 The result of his study, in summary, was that 
although the jurisconsults did give their verdicts according to the mukhtaṣar, numerous 
divergences were also noted. These were, in general, based upon alternative works from the 
                                                 
24
 Schacht, Introduction, 112; also see ġükrü Selim Has, A Study of Ibrāhīm al-Ḥalabī with Special Reference to 
the Multaqā (PhD diss., University of Edinburgh, 1981), 219-221, 279-281. 
25
 Mohammaed Fadel, ―The Social Logic of Taqlīd and the Rise of the Mukhtaṣar,‖ Islamic Law and Society 3, 
no. 2 (1996): 233. 
26
 Ibid, 224-6. 
27
 Ibid, 226. 
28
 Mohammed Fadel ―Rules, Judicial Discretion, and the Rule of Law in Naṣrid Granada: An Analysis of al-
Ḥadīqa al-mustaqilla al-naḍra fī al-fatāwā al-ṣādira ʿan ʿulamāʾ al-ḥaḍra,‖ in Islamic Law: Theory and 
Practice, ed. Robert Gleave and Eugenia Kermeli (London: I.B.Tauris, 2001), 49-86. 
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Mālikī legal corpus,29 and as such, demonstrated, not that the ‗theory‘ was discordant to 
practice, but rather, that the ‗theory‘ had been unduly restricted in its definition.  
 
Prior to this work, however, Bellefonds had already made the point that the epitomes were 
insufficient for the needs of the jurisconsults, judges, or teachers. It was, he asserted, in the 
system of the commentaries (sharḥ) and glosses (ḥāshiya) that Islamic law was to be found.30 
Orientalists were however reluctant to consider these latter as anything significant, as they 
post-dated the alleged closure of the gate of ijtihād. What they contained was hence derided 
as ‗nothing more than abstract systematic constructions which affected neither the established 
decisions of positive law nor the classical doctrine of uṣūl al-fiḳh.‘31 It is however in the 
system of commentaries and glosses that the corpus of Islamic law is to be found, both as a 
record of its earliest expositions and as an ongoing discourse reflecting its diachronic 
development. For the purposes of this study it is these works which serve as the ‗theory‘ of 
Islamic law, and indeed in our earlier presentation of ribā, it was these works which were the 
essential source. 
 
Having identified the commentaries and glosses as the repositories of theory, where then is 
the ‗practice‘ located? Recent research in Islamic law has focused on three sources for 
evaluating practice. The first and obvious source is the court records; the dīwān of the qāḍī; 
these represent an accurate reflection of historical juridical practice and allow a 
straightforward comparison with the theory.
32
 Although these records are the ideal source for 
                                                 
29
 Ibid, 64-5 
30
 Y. Linant de Bellefonds, ―The Formal Sources of Islamic Law,‖ trans. M. Khalid Mas‗ud, Islamic Studies 15, 
no. 3 (1976): 190-1.  
31
 Schacht, Introduction, 71-2. 
32
 Iris Agmon and Ido Shahar, ―Theme Issue: Shifting Perspectives in the Study of Shariʿa Courts: 
Methodologies and Paradigms,‖ Islamic Law and Society 15, no. 1 (2008): 1-19. Ahmed akgündüz, ―Shariʿah 
Courts and Shariʿah Records: The Application of Islamic Law in the Ottoman State,‖ Islamic Law and Society 
16, no. 2 (2009): 202-30. 
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such a comparison, beyond the archives of the Ottoman courts, little else has been 
preserved.
33
 The second source is in historical documents such as contracts, family archives, 
accounting books and other practical documents which give an accurate insight into the law as 
a living system.
34
 The final source is the responsa literature; these works are written in 
response to real questions posed to jurisconsults and allow researchers to build a picture of the 
role and function of the jurisconsults in the Islamic legal system. Researchers like Hallaq and 
Powers have demonstrated the relationship of the fatāwā works to practice and how these 
works serve as conduits for juridical innovation to enter into the body of substantive 
doctrine.
35
 Additionally Johansen has shown the value accorded by the author-jurists to these 
fatāwā in relation to established legal doctrines.36 
 
In summary the sources for assessing the conformity of theory to practice can be tabulated as 
follows: 
Theory Practice 
1. Authoritative manuals – mutūn 1. Court records – qāḍīs dīwān 
2. Commentaries – sharḥ 2. Historical documents 
3. Glosses – ḥāshiya 3. Responsa literature 
 
 
                                                 
33
 The fact that court records have not survived from the pre-Ottoman period does not mean that they did not 
exist. See Wael B. Hallaq, ―The Qāḍī‘s Dīwān (sijill) before the Ottomans,‖ Bulletin of the School of Oriental 
and African Studies 61, n. 3 (1998): 419-421; 
34
 The Cairo Geniza being an example of such documents, see S. D. Goitein, ―The Cairo Geniza as a Source for 
the History of Muslim Civilisation,‖ Studia Islamica no. 3 (1995): 75-91. 
35
 Wael B. Hallaq, ―From Fatwās to Furūʿ: Growth and Change in Islamic Substantive Law,‖ Islamic Law and 
Society 1, no.1 (1994): 29-65; David S. Powers, ―Fatwās as a Source for Legal and Social History: A Dispute 
over Endowment Revenues from Fourteenth-Century Fez,‖ Al-Qantara 9, no. 2 (1990): 295-340;  David S. 
Powers, ―A Court Case from Fourteenth-Century North Africa,‖ Journal of the American Oriental Society 110, 
no. 2 (1990): 240-43; idem, ―kadijustiz or Qāḍī-Justice? A Paternity Dispute from Fourteenth-Century 
Morroco,‖ Islamic Law and Society 1, no. 3 (1994): 332-366; 
36
 Baber Johansen, ―Legal Literature and the Problem of Change: the Case of the Land Rent,‖ in Islam and 
Public Law. Classical and Contemporary Studies, ed. Chibli Mallat (London: Graham and Trotman, 1993), 31-
36; reprinted in Johansen, Contingency, 448-454. 
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4.1.2 Islamic Commercial Law in Theory and Practice 
The German Orientalist Bergsträsser noted that the practice of Islamic law varied in time and 
place and that a final conclusion on the issue of doctrine and practice was, as yet, premature. 
With regard to commercial law he posited that it lay midway on the scale of practice; neither 
fully observed nor completely neglected.
 37
 Later research would, however, show that Islamic 
commercial law was critically influential in determining both mercantile enterprise 
organisation and trade practices. Although Islamic commercial law covers many different 
areas, the focus of our presentation will be on investment partnerships and credit 
arrangements. This is for two reasons; firstly these areas have been sufficiently researched to 
give a fairly clear picture of historical practice, and secondly, because the forms of investment 
and credit sanctioned by the fiqh, is based, to a large extent, on their being free of ribā. What 
is to be demonstrated is that not only was commercial law practiced in conformity with the 
fiqh, but that its practice also stood as a bulwark against the proliferation of usurious 
alternatives. 
 
The mercantile tradition of medieval Islam is well noted in economic history, both in its 
contradistinction to Christian antipathy to trade and in its influence on the revival of trade in 
the southern Mediterranean shores of eleventh century Europe.
38
 Merchant activity was 
characterised by a number of specific partnership forms which were widespread in the Islamic 
lands and which also enjoyed an unparalleled longevity. Schacht, who could not but admit the 
                                                 
37
 G. Bergsträsser, Grundzüge des Islamischen Rechts, ed. J. Schacht (Berlin, 1935), 3, cited in Udovitch, 
Partnership and Profit, 7. 
38
 Alfred E. Lieber, ―Eastern Business Practices and Medieval European Commerce,‖ The Economic History 
Review n.s. 21, no. 2, (1968): 230-243; S. D. Goitein, ―The Rise of the Early Near-Easter Bourgeoisie in Early 
Islamic Times,‖ Journal of World History 3 (1957): 583-604; Subhi Y. Labib, ―Capitalism in Islam,‖ The 
Journal of Economic History 29, no. 1 (1969): 79-96;  A. K. S. Lambton ―The Merchant in Medieval Islam,‖ in 
A Locust’s Leg: Studies in Honour of S. H. Taqizadeh, ed. W. B. Henning and E. Yarshater (London : Percy 
Lund, Humphries & Co., 1962), 121-130; S. D.  Wyndham Anstis Bewes, The Romance of the Law Merchant: 
Being an Introduction to the Study of International Law and Commercial Law with some Account of the 
Commerce and Fairs of the Middle Ages (London: Sweet and Maxwell Ltd, 1923), 1-11; Fernand Braudel, 
Civilization & Capitalism 15
th
-18
th
 Century: The Wheels of Commerce, trans. Siân Reynolds (Berkley: 
University of California Press, 1992), vol. 2, 555-9.  
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influence of Islamic mercantile practice upon Europe due to the presence of commercial loan 
words in European languages taken from Arabic, quickly discounted its Islamic nature. 
Instead, he argued that it was the customary commercial law which formed the substance of 
the merchant law and not the fiqh; the fiqh, in fact, developed ḥiyal to align itself with the 
customary law: 
Several institutions of this customary commercial law were transmitted to medieval Europe through the 
intermediary of the law merchant, the customary law of international trade … The customary 
commercial law was brought into agreement with the theory of the sharīʿa by the ḥiyal.39 
To assess Schacht‘s claims we will examine the practice of medieval Muslim merchants and 
note the religious significance of their practices. 
 
4.1.2.1 Partnerships 
Working with the Cairo Geniza documents, Goitein documented the nature of enterprise and 
trade in the Fāṭimid and Ayyūbid periods, and demonstrated from the ubiquity of partnerships 
in the Middle Ages that they were the dominant economic model for enterprise.
40
 The 
popularity of the partnership form he attributed to ‗the fact that it substituted in two large 
fields which are covered today by other forms of contracts: employment on the one hand and 
loans on interest on the other.‘41 At the same time that Goitein was working on the Geniza 
fragments, Udovitch was working on the juridical explications of partnerships in the works of 
fiqh.
42
 Using Goitein‘s results and comparing them with his own work, he noted that between 
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 Schacht, Introduction, 78. 
40
 S. D. Goitein, ―Commercial and Family Partnerships in the Countries of Medieval Islam,‖ Islamic Studies 3, 
no. 3 (1964): 315-337; idem, ―Mediterranean Trade in the Eleventh Century: Some Facts and Problems,‖ in 
Studies in the Economic History of the Middle East: from the Rise of Islam to the Present Day, ed. M. A. Cook 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1970), 51-62; idem, ―Bankers Accounts from the Eleventh Century A.D.,‖ 
Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient 9, no. 1/2 (1966): 28-66; idem, A Mediterranean 
Society: The Jewish Communities of the Arab World as Portrayed in the Documents of the Cairo Geniza, vol. 1, 
Economic Foundations (Berkley: University of California Press, 1967), chap. iii. 
41
 S. D. Goitein, Commercial and Family Partnerships, 317. 
42
 Udovitch, Partnership and Profit in Medieval Islam; idem, ―Commercial Techniques in Early Medieval 
Trade,‖ in Islam and the Trade of Asia: A Colloquium, ed. D. S. Richards (Oxford: Bruno Cassirer; 
Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1970), 37-62.  
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the Cairo Geniza documents and the 8
th
 century juridical formulations, not only is there a 
‗remarkable symmetry‘ between the two, but also that there ‗is an almost one-to-one 
relationship between the importance of problems as reflected in the Geniza papers, and the 
amount of space and attention they receive in the law books.‘43  
 
Additionally, the Cairo Geniza documents not only reflected the fiqh prescriptions, but by 
providing the background context to them, also helped to clarify hitherto misunderstood 
juridical formulations: Goitein had previously reported the extensive use of informal business 
co-operation between merchants. This was identified by Udovitch with the juridical contract 
of biḍāʿaʿ. What is significant to note, as Udovitch himself says, is that ‗seemingly casuistic 
discussions assume a new relevance‘.44 Orientalists, who had been quick to denounce the 
casuistry of the jurists and the speculative nature of their works, are now beginning to 
recognise, due to the testimony of contemporaneous documents, the eminently practical 
nature of the jurists‘ discourses and, in this particular case, their important mercantile utility.45 
Udovitch, based upon his research, suggested that the juridical treatises themselves could be 
used as an independent source for the economic history of medieval Islam,
46
 and with the 
regard to the operation of the commenda and partnerships proposed that they be viewed as a 
‗veritable Law Merchant‘.47 
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 Abraham L. Udovitch, ―The ―Law Merchant‖ of the Medieval Islamic World,‖ in Logic in Classical Islamic 
Culture, ed. G. E. von Grunebaum (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrossowitz, 1970),  128. 
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 Udovitch, The Law Merchant, 127-8; idem, ―Formalism and Informalism in the Social and Economic 
Institutions of the Medieval Islamic World,‖ in Individualism and Conformity in Classical Islam, ed. Amin 
Banani and Speros Vryonis, Jr. (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1977), 61-81. 
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 Udovtich, Commercial Techniques, 39; idem, The Law Merchant, 115. 
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Although Udovitch‘s conclusions appear to show that the Islamic law of partnership was not 
merely theoretical, but rather practical, his explanation of why this is the case, is based 
heavily on Schacht‘s theses. Udovitch gives three main reasons why Islamic commercial law 
was consonant with merchant practice: 
1. The religious element of Islamic commercial law was limited to the prohibitions of 
unjustified enrichment (ribā) and the exclusion of any element of chance (gharar).48 
2. In the main it was customs and actual practice which underpinned the legal institutions 
of commenda and partnership.
 49
 
3. One of the key techniques of bringing custom into line with the theory was through the 
use of ḥiyal.50 
These assertions raise two questions: firstly, whether the juridical structure of the commenda 
contract has any religious significance or is it, as Udovitch asserts, merely a product of 
indigenous custom, and secondly, what role the ḥiyal actually played vis-à-vis its structure 
and practicality. 
 
4.1.2.2 Commenda and Muḍāraba 
To truly understand the uniqueness of the muḍāraba contract, we will examine the claim, of 
Udovitch and other Orientalists that this contract was the precursor to the European 
commenda. The purpose will not be to assess that claim, although their argument is not 
without merit, but rather to use their discussions as a source for identifying its critical 
features, medieval usage and mercantile purpose. 
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 Udovitch, The Law Merchant, 124; idem, Commercial Techniques, 40; idem, Partnership and Profit, 254. 
49
 Udovitch, The Law Merchant, 124-5; idem, Partnership and Profit, 254; idem, ―Theory and Practice of 
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In 1953 Alberto Gaiani noted in his article on the muḍāraba, that prior to himself, there were 
only two other advocates of the influence of the muḍaraba on the commenda; Kohler and 
Santillana, and that ‗it would not appear to be only a chance that those few who have paid 
some attention to the Eastern Institution should have advanced the said proposition‘.51 In 
other words, whoever had studied both institutions had come to a similar conclusion, namely 
that the structural similarity of both contracts is highly suggestive of an influence of the 
former on the latter. Udovitch took up the study of the origins of the commenda and wrote an 
influential essay in which he compared the commenda to similar contracts which could 
possibly have been its forerunner.
52
  
 
The commenda contract, can be summarised as a contract in which an investor 
(commendator) gives a sum of money to an agent (tractator) who trades with the capital for 
profit. Upon completion the agent returns the capital to the investor and the profit is divided 
between them according to a preagreed ratio. Udovitch compared the commenda to three 
other contracts as possible sources for it; the Jewish ‘isqa, the Byzantine chreokoinonia and 
the Muslim muḍaraba. Without getting into the details of his presentation, he concluded that 
the closest contract to the commenda was the Muslim muḍāraba.53 The aspect which 
transpires as singularly unique to the commenda and the muḍāraba, while absent from the 
other contracts, is the restriction of liability to the investor.  
 
The Jewish ‘isqa, which is also a contract between an investor and an agent, offers two 
scenarios:  
                                                 
51
 Alberto Gaiani, ―The Juridical Nature of the Moslem Qiràd,‖ East and West 4, no. 2 (1953): 86. Qirāḍ is 
another name for muḍāraba, whereas the former was used in Medina, the latter was native to Iraq. In this work 
only the word muḍāraba will be used. 
52
 Abraham L. Udovitch, ―At the Origins of the Western Commenda: Islam, Israel, Byzantium?,‖ Speculum 37, 
no. 2 (1962): 198-207. 
53
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1. An equal division of profits, while the investor bears two thirds of the liability and the 
agent one third. 
2. An equal division of liability, while the investor receives one third of the profits and 
the agent two thirds.  
Ultimately however the rabbis did not conceive of an arrangement whereby the agent held no 
liability for the principle.
54
 What is also noteworthy is Udovitch‘s comment, that what 
underpinned the Rabbi‘s formulas was the need to ‗obviate any element of indirect usury or 
unfair advantage‘.55 In the other alternative, the Byzantine chreokoinonia, the contract again 
is noted as being between an investor and an agent, liability is borne according to each 
partner‘s share in the profit.56 As with the ‘isqa, the agent in the chreokoinonia also bears a 
portion of the liability.  
 
The Islamic muḍāraba and the European commenda however both share the essential feature 
of limiting the liability to the investor, and it is this which marks them out from the rest. 
Whereas the earliest records of the commenda in Europe date from the tenth century, the 
Islamic muḍāraba is juridically explicated in the earliest works of Islamic jurisprudence two 
centuries earlier. The case for a European borrowing from their eastern neighbours is hence 
very strong. Although Udovitch‘s claim of an eastern source for the commenda has been 
(unconvincingly) challenged,
57
 the central point of distinction of these two contracts, is an 
acknowledged fact. 
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4.1.2.3 Commenda and Usury 
Udovitch‘s claim that the commenda was formed from custom as opposed to religious dictates 
needs to be examined. We have already quoted Udovitch‘s description of the Jewish ‘isqa as 
being based upon the need to avoid the usury prohibition, the same, however, he does not 
infer for the muḍāraba. This is unfortunate as all other researches have immediately 
recognised that the structure of the muḍāraba is based to a large extent on its being an 
alternative to ribā.58 Gaiani, for example, argued that the muḍāraba was distinct from its pre-
Islamic proto-type on the grounds that the liberty enjoyed by the parties in drawing up its 
terms would have been greater due to the absence of the ribā injunction.59 The point being 
that it is the prohibition of ribā which is responsible for the nature of the muḍāraba. Medieval 
canonists also recognised that to make the agent liable for a loss in the principal was 
tantamount to usury.
60
 Udovitch, in arguing that the Islamic muḍāraba was nothing other than 
a reflection of custom, has belied his own thesis as to the origins of the commenda. Had the 
muḍāraba been a reflection of customary practice with no religious basis, why then did the 
fiqh not Islamicise the Jewish ‘isqa or the Byzantine chreokoinonia, or does he mean to 
suggest that Jewish and Byzantine merchants were not trading according to these but rather 
according to the muḍāraba, only that it failed to register in their respective legal works. This 
is highly unlikely, and in fact ignores the role that law plays in determining the social and 
economic norms of practice.  
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partnership in essence as well as in form.‘ See Michael M. Postan, ―Partnership in English Medieval 
Commerce,‖ in Studi in Onore di Armando Sapori (Milan: Instituto Editoriale Cisalpino, 1957), 523.  
59
 Gaiani, The Moslem Qirād, 83. 
60
 The Franciscan canonist and theologian Alexander of Alexandria in his De Usuris, argued that the investor 
was legitimately entitled to a share in the profit due to his retaining ownership of the capital and hence the 
liability for its loss, See Pryor, The Commenda Contract, 17-8. 
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The success of the muḍāraba is not in the jurists bending it to meet the needs of commerce, 
but conversely, in its uncompromising juridical nature; variable distributions of liability are 
simply not accommodated as opposed to its Jewish and Byzantine analogues. This 
uncompromising nature is based squarely on the twin foundations of the usury prohibition and 
the association of profit to liability. It is indeed surprising that Udovitch should have missed 
the critical link between the nature of the muḍāraba and the ribā prohibition, as he himself 
explains the absence of usurious transactions in the Geniza as being due to the fact ‗that the 
economic function which interest-bearing loans fulfilled was adequately served by a variety 
of other licit contracts‘.61 Foremost among these licit alternatives, as his own research and that 
of Goitein has demonstrated, was the muḍāraba. 
 
As the contract moved into Europe from the East, it quickly displaced the usurious sea loan in 
vogue at the time.
62
 Similarly Goitein has recorded that the number of Jewish traders using 
the ‘isqa in the eleventh-twelfth century decreased, as they had opted for, what they described 
as, the qirād al-gōyīm; mutual loan according to Muslim law.63  These facts stand as a witness 
to the muḍāraba being an alternative to usury and also to the dynamic nature of the so-called 
customary practice. What this confirms is that there was no international customary merchant 
law which transcended religio-legal prescription. That trade practices varied between the 
various civilisations is clear from their specific legal treatments of partnership forms, and to 
deny that the custom of Muslim traders was related to the specific religious trade 
requirements of Islamic jurisprudence is unfounded in view of the relationship of these 
practices to the prohibition of ribā. 
 
                                                 
61
 Udovitch, Commercial Techniques, 61. 
62
 Frederick C. Lane, Venice and History, the collected papers of Frederick C. Lane edited by a committee of 
colleagues and former students (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1966), 59-62. 
63
 Goitein, Commercial and Family Partnerships, 318. 
RECEPTION OF THE ḤIYAL: THE GENRE 
149 
 
Earlier we noted that Udovitch had pointed out that the unique aspect of the muḍāraba and 
the commenda which singled them out, is that the liability is borne singularly by the investor. 
In an earlier paper, I have shown how the Ḥanafī jurists have made liability the sine qua non 
of legitimate entitlement to profit, based upon the prophetic dictum al-kharāj bī al-ḍamān.64 
This demonstrates that the concern of these jurists was not simply to avoid usury, but also to 
articulate legitimate forms of enterprise organisation. In a detailed two-part work on business 
organisation Nyazee has shown how these religiously based notions are used by the Ḥanafīs 
to generate a myriad of partnership forms, such as ʿinān, mufāwaḍa, abdān and wujūh, and 
the way a language of liability is used to write these contracts, allowing their manipulation 
and modification to suit a variety of commercial needs.
65
 Udovitch and Çizakça have noted 
that all of these forms were found to exist in historical practice and as such they represented 
an entire system of credit and commerce articulated by the jurists and practiced by the 
merchants.
66
 The widespread usage of these commercial institutions in the Muslim lands has 
been demonstrated in recent research, from Malaca in the east, to Sudan and West Africa.
67
 
These institutions, which were explicated in the early eighth century, survived throughout the 
                                                 
64
 Muhammed Imran Ismail, ―Theories of Profit and a Juristic Understanding of Legitimate Entitlement to 
Profit,‖ Review of Islamic Economics 11, no. 2 (2007): 55-69. 
65
 Imran Ahsan Khan Nyazee, Islamic Law of Business Organization: Partnerships (Islamabad: Islamic 
Research Institute and International Institute of Islamic Thought, 1999); idem, Islamic Law of Business 
Organization: Corporations (Islamabad: Islamic Research Institute and International Institute of Islamic 
Thought, 1998). 
66
 Abraham L. Udovitch, ―Reflections on the Institutions of Credit and Banking in the Medieval Islamic Near 
East,‖ Studia Islamica, 41 (1975): 13; idem, Bankers without Banks; Commerce, Banking and Society in the 
Islamic World of the Middle Ages,‖ in The Dawn of Modern Banking (New Haven and London: Yale University 
Press, 1979), 264; Murat Çizakça, A Comparative Evolution of Business Partnerships: The Islamic World & 
Europe, with Specific References to the Ottoman Archives (Leiden: Brill, 1996), 65-85. 
67
 M.A.P. Meilink-Roelofsz, Asian trade and European influence in the Indonesian Archipelago between 1500 
and about 1630 (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1962), 48-52; Marie Perinbaum, ―The Julas in Western Sudanese History: 
Long-Distance Traders and Developers of Resources,‖ in West African Culture Dynamics: Archaeological and 
Historical Perspectives, ed. B. K. Swartz Jr. and Raymond E. Dumett (The Hague: Mouton Publishers, 1980), 
465-66; Terence Walz, ―Trading in the Sudan in the Sixteenth Century,‖ Annales Islamologiques 15 (1979): 221-
24. 
RECEPTION OF THE ḤIYAL: THE GENRE 
150 
 
medieval period and extended throughout the Ottoman lands where records show their 
vibrancy up to the early Twentieth century.
68
  
 
It is clear then, that the commercial institutions of the Muslim world were not simple eighth 
century customary techniques Islamicised, had they been so they would have been surpassed 
by newer forms of commercial enterprise, as the Jewish ‘isqa and Byzantine chreokoinonia 
had been.  They were rather the product of a dynamic legal system, which took the religious 
concerns of usury and liability and produced a multitude of financial instruments and 
commercial institutions. This allowed credit and commerce to successfully function and 
develop unabated by religious strictures.
69
 Islamic commercial law was hence not a ‗dead 
letter‘ nor was it a veiled expression of customary practices, it was in the final analysis, a 
practical and vibrant system which was, both in its origins and development, Islamic. 
 
4.1.3 The Ḥiyal as a Modus Vivendi 
Both Hurgronje and Goldziher had made vague references to the ḥiyal, but no serious 
attention had been paid to their precise role in Islamic jurisprudence. It was their student, 
Joseph Schacht who took up the study of the ḥiyal, editing and publishing four treatises on the 
subject.
70
 Together with a number of articles, Schacht fervently proposed the ḥiyal as the holy 
                                                 
68
 Haim Gerber, ―The Muslim Law of Partnerships in Ottoman Court Records,‖ Studia Islamica 53 (1981): 109-
119; Çizakça, A Comparative Evolution, 66-77; Ghislaine Lydon, ―Contracting Caravans: Partnership and Profit 
in Nineteenth- and Early Twentieth-Century Trans-Saharan Trade,‖ Journal of Global History 3 (2008): 96-113. 
69
 Compare this with the comments of Khan, who meekly concedes that: ‗Society cannot do without taking loans 
… [and] loans cannot be had without paying interest. History shows us that the experience of every age and 
every country is the same. Thus the precept of the Mohammedan law that all loans shall be free is impracticable.‘ 
see Mir Siadat Ali Khan, ―The Mohammedan Laws against Usury and How They Are Evaded,‖ Journal of 
Comparative Legislation and International Law 3
rd
 Ser. 11, no. 4 (1929): 239. 
70
 1) Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥasan al-Shaybānī, al-Makhārij fī al-Ḥiyal, ed. Joseph Schacht (Das kitāb al-maḫāriğ 
fil-ḥijal des Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥasan aš-Šhaybānī. In Zwei Rezensionen. (Hildesheim: Georg Olsm 
Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1968).  
2) Abū Bakr Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad al-Sarakhsī, Kitāb al-Ḥiyal min al-Mabsūṭ, printed together with the 
previous publication. 
3) Abū Bakr Aḥmad ibn ʿAmru al-Shaybānī al-Khaṣṣāf, Kitāb al-Ḥiyal wa al-Makhārij, ed. Joseph Schacht (Das 
Kitāb al- hiial ṷal- mahāriğ), (Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1968). 
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grail of the theory–practice conundrum.71 The importance he gave to the ḥiyal can be 
observed not only in his continual reference to them, but also in his criticism of his peers who 
failed to appreciate their importance.
72
 He described the ḥiyal as ‗a modus vivendi between 
theory and practice: the maximum that custom could concede, and the minimum … that the 
theory had to demand‘.73 The term, modus vivendi means a way of accommodating two 
conflicting entities, and its usage by Schacht implies that the ḥiyal were not a part of Islamic 
law, but rather exogenous tools used to solve a conflict between the two discordant spheres of 
theory and practice.
74
 Indeed Schacht himself cautions against a clear division of theory and 
practice but rather suggests that they are areas of: 
interaction and mutual interference, a relationship in which the theory showed a great assimilating 
power, the power of imposing its spiritual ascendancy even when it could not control the material 
conditions. This asserted itself, not only in the ḥiyal and in the shurūṭ but … [also] in numerous other 
ways.‘75 
 
Schacht‘s claim that the ḥiyal act as a modus vivendi necessitates that the substantive material 
of the ḥiyal genre be distinct and even perhaps be discordant with the theory as propounded in 
its authoritative expression, i.e. in the epitomes, commentaries and glosses.  This makes it 
                                                                                                                                                        
4) Mahmūd ibn al-Ḥasan al-Qazwini, Kitāb al-Ḥiyal fī al-Fiqh, ed. Joseph Schacht (Das Kitāb al-ḥiial fil-fiqh). 
(Hannover: Orient-Buchhandlung Heinz Lafaire, 1924). 
71
 Schacht was recognised by some Orientalists as a specialist in the ḥiyal. See H. Lammens, ―al-Ḥiyal wa al-
Makhārij,‖ al-Machriq 29 (1931): 643.   
72
 On the following; F. I. Schechter, ―A Study in Comparative Trade Morals and Control,‖ Virginia Law Review 
19 (1933), he remarks ‗competent, except for the omission of ḥiyal. See his Introduction, 284. Also in a review 
of N. Coulson‘s A History of Islamic Law, he remarks ‗in this passage concerning legal practice, I cannot help 
finding the treatment of hiyal or legal devices superficial.‘ J. Schacht, ―Modernism and Traditionalism in a 
History of Islamic Law,‖ Middle Eastern Studies 1, no. 4 (1965): 399.  
73
 Schacht, Introduction, 80. That Schacht was working to corroborate Hurgronje‘s thesis becomes apparent 
when we note that a very similar comment was made by the latter in his discussion on the issue of theory and 
practice. That Schacht used the very same terms in relation to the ḥiyal is itself telling. Hurgronje stated that ‗We 
see then that there exists a middle way between the theory which demands the maximum, and practice which is 
all too often content with the minimum.‘ Hurgronje, Selected Works, 289. 
74
 The Oxford English Dictionary gives the following definition: A way of living; esp. a working arrangement 
between contending parties, which enables them to coexist peacefully pending the settlement of those matters in 
dispute. The following pertinent example of its usage is also presented: To have, then, two fundamental 
principles at once… is impossible; either one must be retained and the other discarded, or else a modus vivendi 
must be found and a separate function assigned to each. 
75
 Schacht, Introduction, 84. 
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critical then, to locate the precise role of the genre vis-à-vis the theory. To do this, an example 
of Schacht‘s framework as understood and used by the Orientalists will be examined, with 
regard to a specific ḥīla. 
 
The ḥīla is mentioned by al-Shaybānī regarding partnerships based upon goods, as opposed to 
money. According to Ḥanafī jurisprudence partnerships are to be based upon either dirhams 
or dīnārs. The reason for this is to ensure that there should be no ambiguity as to the precise 
value of the investment capital. A partnership based upon goods, would mean that at the time 
of contracting the partnership, the monetary contribution of the investors would remain 
unknown, because the investment value, according to the Ḥanafīs, relates to the value of the 
goods and not to the goods themselves. If goods themselves are given as capital then once 
they have been sold for profit, the amount of profit would need to be distributed according to 
the preagreed ratio. To calculate the profit requires the partners to estimate the original value 
of the goods, and subtract this from the total amount received. This may, however lead to 
disputes regarding the original value of the goods and for this reason the Ḥanafīs disallow it.  
 
al-Shaybānī, in his treatise, is asked by the interlocutor about a partnership of goods between 
two men, one of whom has goods worth 5000 dirhams and the other 1000 dirhams. At first he 
replies with the standard answer that a partnership with goods as the capital is not allowed.
76
 
The interlocutor then asks him for a ḥīla: al-Shaybānī proposes that the first partner should 
purchase 
5
/6 of his partner‘s goods in return for 
1
/6 of his own; thereby effecting a co-
ownership in the capital of the partnership with the first partner owning 
5
/6 of the total capital 
and the second owning 
1
/6.
77
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 ‗Lā yajūz al-shirka bī al-ʿurūḍ‘, al-Shaybānī, al-Makhārij, 58. 
77
 Ibid. The purpose of this ḥīla is to allow the traders to sell their goods as part of a partnership. According to 
the standard rules, a partnership can only be formed with money as this allows each trader to know his exact 
contribution to the partnership and allows them to apportion the profits accordingly. If two traders wish to form a 
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According to Schacht‘s thesis, al-Shaybānī‘s answer is contrary to the theory of Ḥanafī 
doctrine and hence this ḥīla is used as an intermediary to negotiate between Ḥanafī theory and 
actual commercial practice. Udovitch argues along these very lines: ‗[T]he enforcement of a 
ban on investments in the form of goods and merchandise would have constituted a severe 
handicap‘, and implies that the theory had to be sacrificed for customary practices.78 
Udovitch, however, goes one step further than Schacht and claims that the assimilation of 
legal stratagems into the body of Ḥanafī doctrine was so complete that this ḥīla would find its 
way into later legal literature
79
 and in some works it even appears without noting that it is a 
ḥīla.80  This appears to be a compelling corroboration of Schacht‘s thesis; hence the theory is 
not only violated by the ḥīla from the very outset, but the ḥīla finds its way into the body of 
the madhhab’s official substantive doctrine and is furthermore disguised as normal doctrine 
with its provenance in the ḥīla literature conveniently overlooked. 
 
What underpins the assertion of both Schacht and subsequently Udovitch, is the depiction of 
the ḥiyal as a modus vivendi, i.e. a body of practical doctrines which are distinct to the theory 
and which act to bring the theory in line with practice. Udovitch‘s claim of diachronic 
assimilation of the ḥiyal into the theory is based upon this very premise. What has not been 
researched by both of these authors though, is the relation of these ḥiyal to the actual body of 
                                                                                                                                                        
partnership with goods as their capital they are prohibited from doing so as the respective value of their goods is 
undetermined and hence when the goods are sold this may lead to a problem in determining the profit due to 
each trader. The solution proffered in this ḥīla is for the traders to put their goods into a co-ownership in which 
both traders agree that they own a fixed proportion of the total goods, but no particular good in particular. The 
co-ownership of the goods means that the ratios of the profit, which accrues from the trade in the co-owned 
goods, will follow the ratios of their ownership. In the example given by al-Shaybānī, the traders own goods with 
different values (i.e. of 5000 dirhams and of 1000 dirhams) and hence when they put their goods into the co-
ownership, the first trader acquires 
5
/6 of the total capital and the second 
1
/6. This means that when some, or all, 
of the goods are sold, the money they receive is automatically distributed according to the preagreed ratios, 
thereby pre-empting the possibility of a dispute. 
78
 Udovitch, Partnership and Profit, 62. 
79
 Here he makes reference to al-Kāsānī‘s Badāʾiʿ al-Ṣanāʾiʿ, written approximately four centuries after al-
Shaybānī‘s treatise. See ibid, 63-64. 
80
 ‗So complete was the assimilation of this legal fiction into the body of Ḥanafī law that in several codes it is 
given without the designation of ḥīla and appears as an accepted feature of positive law.‘ Here he makes 
reference to al-Sarakhsī‘s al-Mabsūṭ written approximately three centuries after al-Shaybānī‘s treatise. See ibid, 
64. 
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the theory in its primary exposition. For the specific example mentioned above, this would 
entail checking whether the ḥīla being proffered by al-Shaybānī is present in his own works 
on Ḥanafī fiqh which represent the bedrock of the madhhab’s theory or doctrine. An 
examination of the published works of al-Shaybānī seems to vindicate Udovitch and 
Schacht‘s assertion as this specific ḥīla is not mentioned in any of his works. The largest of 
al-Shaybānī‘s work the Kitāb al-Aṣl, also known as the al-Mabsūṭ, in its printed form is an 
abridgement of the actual manuscript and represents only a fraction of the complete work.
81
 
This may well explain the absence of the ḥīla from the printed work and so recourse must 
necessarily be made to the original manuscript. Having checked the original manuscript in the 
chapter on muḍāraba, which is notably absent from the printed edition, I found that this ḥīla 
is mentioned, although the shares are mentioned as halves and not sixths.
82
 Additionally, and 
more importantly, is that the solution is mentioned, not as a ḥīla, but as normative doctrine: 
‗If the capital of one of them is dirhams and the capital of the other is merchandise, then there will be 
between them neither a partnership of mufāwaḍa nor a partnership of ʿinān. [But] if he sells half of his 
merchandise for half of his dirhams and they both take possession and form either a partnership of 
mufāwaḍa or a partnership of ʿinān  that would be permissible. And all merchandise, [be it] from real 
estate, animals, goods, or textiles are equivalent, and likewise gold ore and silver ore and jewellery of 
gold or silver,  they are in the status of merchandise in this [context] and no partnership is allowed in 
any of this.[374a] Partnership is not permitted except with dirhams specifically or with dinārs 
specifically, however if each one of them purchases half of his partners capital with half of his 
                                                 
81
 al-Shaybānī‘s  Kitāb al-Aṣl is printed in 5 volumes totalling approximately 2251 pages of sparsely printed text. 
According to al-Kawtharī a manuscript he came across consisted of six volumes each consisting of five hundred 
pages, totalling three thousand pages of manuscript which are generally crammed with text. The manuscript used 
by this author consists of approximately 1000 folios which are comparatively speaking, quite large. See 
Muḥammad Zāhid ibn al-Ḥasan al-Kawtharī, Bulūgh al-Amānī fī Sīra al-Imām Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥasan al-
Shaybānī (Cairo: al-Maktaba al-Azhariyya li al-Turāth, 1998), 62-3. 
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partners capital and they both take possession then their partnership will be mufāwaḍa if they so wish 
or if they wish  ʿinān.83  
 
This raises serious questions regarding both Schacht‘s framework and Udovitch‘s subsequent 
assertions. If the ḥīla is mentioned in the literature which definitively represents the most 
authoritative statement of Ḥanafī jurisprudence, what sense does it make to speak of a modus 
vivendi, when in fact the ḥīla is part and parcel of the normative doctrine. Additionally, 
Udovitch‘s assertion of diachronic assimilation of the ḥiyal from that genre into the normative 
works, also collapses, and in fact, the reverse appears to be the case. Whereas Udovitch had 
talked of the ḥīla appellation disappearing in later works, it appears that the provenance of the 
ḥīla is located, not in a distinct genre, but rather in the authoritative doctrine and without 
being designated as a ḥīla. This is then subsequently appropriated by the ḥiyal genre and later 
authors are then free to identify the ḥīla with either source. Udovitch‘s own quotes support 
this assertion, as it is the earlier al-Sarakhsi who drops the ḥīla designation and the later al-
Kāsānī who adopts it, which in terms of Udovitch‘s claims of diachronic assimilation, 
represents an anachronism. From this preliminary examination, Schacht‘s framework does not 
correlate to the actual relationship of the ḥiyal genre and the normative doctrines as 
demonstrated. This leads us to inquire into the ḥiyal genre itself, its provenance, its contents 
and its purpose. In the next section we will begin this quest by looking at the ḥiyal treatise 
attributed to al-Shaybānī. 
 
4.2 The Kitāb al-Ḥiyal 
In his historical account of the ḥiyal, Ibn Taymiyya posits that the first time that ḥiyal were 
issued as fatāwā or taught and acted upon and their legality assented to, was in the early-
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 Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥasan al-Shaybānī, Kitāb al-Aṣl, MS 664, Fayd Allah Efendi, Millat KutupKhane, Istanbul, 
folios 373b-374a. 
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middle second century AH, corresponding to the end of the era of the minor Successors 
(ṣighār al-Tābiʿīn).84 The response of the successor jurists to those ḥiyal is recorded; Ayyūb 
al-Sakhtiyānī, for example, remarked that ‗they deceive God as though they are deceiving a 
child, had they committed the act overtly it would have been, in my view, less [of a crime] ‘.85 
Interestingly Abū Ḥanīfa is reported to have given the verdict that a jurisconsult who teaches 
such ḥiyal should be interdicted.86 It is also in this time period that the first treatise on the 
ḥiyal was authored. The Kufan qāḍī Sharīk ibn ʿAbdullah is the earliest scholar to have made 
a reference to the Kitāb al-Ḥiyal, saying that it is a ‗book of deception‘. 87 His comments can 
be taken as historical testimony for the books existence and his death in 177 AH, can 
therefore be regarded as the terminus ad quem for the authorship of the Kitāb al-Ḥiyal.88 
Sharīk was not alone in his comments regarding the Kitāb al-Ḥiyal, other prominent jurists 
also condemned the work: 
 When it was said to ʿAbdullah ibn Mubārak (d.181 AH) that the author of the Kitāb 
al-Ḥiyal could have been Satan‘, he replied that such a person would have been more 
evil than Satan.
89
 In another narration he said that not only was the author a 
disbeliever but also anyone who judged according to it, or heard its contents and 
approved of it or helped to spread it contents.
90
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 Ibn Taymiyya, Bayān al-Dalīl, 79, 81. 
85
 Ibid, 23. 
86
 Abū Ḥanīfa is reported to have said that interdiction is invalid for any mature sane free individual except in 
three cases: an ignorant doctor, an impudent jurisconsult (al-muftī al-mājin) who teaches people ḥiyal and 
makhārij and a bankrupt hirer. The first, it is reasoned, corrupts the body, the second, religion and the third, 
people‘s wealth. See Abū Bakr Aḥmad ibn ʿUmar al-Khaṣṣāf, Sharḥ Adab al-Qāḍī (commentary by ʿUmar ibn 
ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz Ḥusām al-Dīn) (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1994), 237. 
87
 Ibn Taymiyya, Bayān al-Dalīl, 23. See his mention in Abū ʿAbdullah Ḥusayn ibn ʿAlī al-Ṣaymarī, Akhbār Abī 
Ḥanīfa wa Aṣḥābihī (Beirut: ʿĀlam al-Kutub, 1985), 139-142. 
88
 For his biography see Taqī al-Dīn ibn ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Tamīmī al-Dārī, al-Ṭabaqāt al-Saniyya fī Tarājim al-
Ḥanafiyya ed. ʿAbd al-Fattāḥ Muḥammad al-Ḥulw (Riyadh: Dār al-Rifāʿī, 1989), vol. 4, 67-71. ʿAbd al-Qādir 
ibn Abī al-Wafāʾ al-Qurashī, al-Jawāhir al-Muḍīʾa, fī Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanafiyya (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 
2005), 167-168. Nurit Tsafrir classifies him as a semi-Ḥanafī, see her The History of An Islamic School of Law: 
The Early Spread of Hanafism (Cambridge MS: ILSP Harvard Law School, 2004) 3, 12, 14. 
89
 See Abū Bakr Aḥmad ibn ʿAlī al-Khatīb al-Baghdadī, Tarīkh Baghdād aw Madīnat al-Islām (Cairo: Maktaba 
Khānjī, 1931), vol. 13, 403. 
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RECEPTION OF THE ḤIYAL: THE GENRE 
157 
 
 The Baṣran traditionist and grammarian al-Naḍr ibn Shumayl (d.203/4 AH)91 
remarked that: ‗In the book of ḥiyal there is such and such a verdict, all of which are 
disbelief.
92
 
  Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal declared that whoever had the book of ḥiyal in his house and gave 
verdicts according to it was a disbeliever.
93
 
 The Ḥanafī judge, Hafṣ ibn Ghiyāth, regarded the book of ḥiyal as a book of iniquity 
(fujūr).94 
The degree of animosity portrayed in these statements is very severe, and reflects not only the 
degree of opposition to the ḥiyal, but more critically, the nature of the ḥiyal they had 
encountered in the Kitāb al-Ḥiyal. Some of the specific ḥiyal advocated in that work have 
been mentioned in the historical accounts, and include the following: 
 A woman requests from her husband a separation (khulʿ) but he refuses, she is then 
advised that she should apostatise from Islam which would automatically mean that 
that her marriage is annulled. Thereafter she should reaffirm her faith.
95
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 He was the Judge of Merv, a traditionist and grammarian with a good opinion Abū Ḥanīfa, See Aḥmad ibn 
Muḥammad al-Naqīb, al-Madhhab al-Ḥanafī (Riyadh: Maktabat al-Rushd, 2001), vol. 1, 58. For his biography, 
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Abnāʾ al-Zamān (Cairo: Maktaba al-Nahda al-Miṣriyya, 1949), vol. 5, 33-38. 
92
 al-Khatīb, Tarīkh, vol. 13, 403. 
93
 Abū al-Ḥusayn Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥusayn ibn Abī Yaʿlā, Ṭabaqāt al-ḥanābila (Beirut: Dār 
al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1997), vol.1, 207. 
94
 Ibid, 83. Ḥafṣ was a student of Abū Ḥanīfa and served as a judge in Kūfa and was hence familiar with the 
work of ḥiyal circulating at the time. See Tsafrir, The History of an Islamic School of Law, 3, 23-4. 
95
 al-Khatīb, Tarīkh, vol. 13, 403-4, Ibn Taymiyya, Bayān al-Dalīl, 82. This specific ḥīla has been condemned in 
the Ḥanafī works and Ibn Samāʿa has reported from Abū Yūsuf that if a woman should use this ḥīla, outwardly 
uttering words of unbelief while in her heart holding onto her faith, then she would be separated from her 
husband and regarded as a disbeliever (mushrika). See Saʿīd ibn ʿAlī, Jannat al-Aḥkām, 217. A more recent 
example of how such ḥiyal can be deployed was their use in British India. An alarming rise in the number of 
female apostates also coincided with an increase in missionary activity; it seems that Christian missionaries 
working in India exploited this ruling and began advising Muslim women who wanted to separate from their 
husbands to become Christians. In response to this situation the Indian Ḥanafī jurist Ashraf ʿAlī Thanvī penned a 
treatise to explain that the ḥīla of apostasy would not permit the woman to marry a different husband even after 
her return to the faith. See Muhammad Khalid Masud, ―Apostasy and Judicial Separation in British India,‖ in 
Islamic Legal Interpretation: Muftis and their Fatwas, ed. Muhammad Khalid Masud, Brinckley Messick and 
David S. Powers (Cambridge Mass: Harvard University Press, 1996), 193-203; Fareeha Khan, ―Tafwīḍ al-Ṭalāq: 
Transferring the Right of Divorce to the Wife,‖ The Muslim World 99, no. 3 (2009): 502-520; Ashraf ʿAlī 
Thanvī, ―al-Ḥīla al-Nājiza li al-Ḥalīla al-ʿĀjiza,‖ in Ḥīla Nājiza Yaʿnī Aurato kā Haq-i Tansīkh-i Nikāḥ 
(Karachi: Dār al-Ishāʿat, 1987), 19-83.   
RECEPTION OF THE ḤIYAL: THE GENRE 
158 
 
 A man took an oath that in no way would he divorce his wife, thereafter a huge sum of 
money was offered to him to break his oath, a muftī then told him, a possible solution 
(i.e. a ḥīla) was for him to kiss his mother in-law. Such an act would immediately 
annul the marriage based upon the rules of marriageable relations.
96
 
These ḥiyal are egregious in the extreme and certainly justify the condemnation of the jurists 
who opposed them. According to Ibn al-Shumayl there were over three hundred of these 
repugnant ḥiyal in the Kitāb al-Ḥiyal, all of which he regarded as disbelief.97 
 
4.2.1 al-Shaybānī and the Kitāb al-Ḥiyal 
In this same time period, the school of Abu Ḥanīfa was gaining ground in many areas of the 
Islamic world and it was at this time that his illustrious student, Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥasan al-
Shaybānī was composing the literary canon of the school. His six books; al-Aṣl (also known 
as al-Mabsūṭ), al-Jāmiʿ al-Kabīr, al-Jamiʿ al-Ṣaghīr, al-Siyar al-Kabīr, al-Siyar al-Ṣaghīr 
and al-Ziyādāt, are known as the ẓāhir al-riwāya and represent the accepted canon of the 
School, and its most authoritative statement.
98
 From amongst his works, a small treatise on the 
ḥiyal was also being transmitted by his Bukhāran Student Abū Ḥafṣ al-Kabīr. The appearance 
of al-Shaybānī‘s treatise precisely at the historical moment when the ḥiyal were gathering 
notoriety, led many later jurists, such as Ibn Baṭṭa99 and al-Khaṭīb100, to assume (and openly 
                                                 
96
 Ibid, 83. 
97
 Ibn Taymiyya, Bayān al-Dalīl, 82. 
98
 See Ibn ʿĀbidīn, Sharh ʿUqūd Rasm al-Muftī, 16. 
99
 Ibn Baṭṭa narrated comments which were allegedly made by Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal explicitly indicting Abū 
Ḥanīfa and his students for their role in the ḥiyal. Ibn Taymiyya has also narrated these statements from Aḥmad, 
although significantly, without reference to Abū Ḥanīfa, but rather more generally to some people from the ahl 
al-raʾi. See Ibn Baṭṭa, Ibṭāl al-Ḥiyal, 119-121; Ibn Taymiyya, Bayān al-Dalīl, 82. 
100
 al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī also attempted to record negative statements of the earlier jurists with specific 
reference to Abū Ḥanīfa.  The statements of ʿAbdullah ibn Mubarāk regarding the infidelity of the kitāb al-ḥiyal, 
mentioned earlier, were recorded by al-Khaṭīb as referring explicitly to a work by Abū Ḥanīfa. al-Khaṭīb‘s 
specific mentioning of Abū Ḥanīfa, is undoubtedly an(other) attempt to malign the Ḥanafīs. Elsewhere in his 
work al-Khaṭīb has gathered a plethora of unfounded narrations targeting the Ḥanafīs in general and Abū Ḥanīfa 
in particular, which only confirm his evident School bias. What is significant, however, is his attempt to indict 
Abū Ḥanīfa in the early ḥiyal controversy. al-Khaṭīb actually authored his own work on the ḥiyal, and he may 
well have been distancing himself, and his School, from the more controversial ḥiyal, by imputing them to the 
RECEPTION OF THE ḤIYAL: THE GENRE 
159 
 
allege) that the Ḥanafīs were the provocateurs of the condemned ḥiyal. This assumption needs 
to be explored and challenged and the provenance and precise nature of al-Shaybānī‘s treatise 
examined. 
 
The works of al-Shaybānī were transmitted from him by his students and as mentioned earlier, 
one of them, namely Abū Ḥafṣ was also transmitting a book of ḥiyal. Other students, however 
rejected that al-Shaybānī had authored such a work and claimed it to be an aspersion on the 
madhhab. al-Jūzajānī reportedly said: 
Whosoever says that Muḥammad authored a book [which] he called al-Ḥiyal, do not believe him, and 
[as for] what is in the hands of the people, it is only [a work] composed by the copyists of Baghdad … 
Indeed the ignorant attribute that to our scholars as an insult, for how can it be conceived that 
Muḥammad could entitle anything from his works with this name and thereby give support to the 
ignorant in what they fabricate [against us].
101
 
In addition to al-Jūzajānī‘s rejection of the work, Muḥammad ibn Samāʿa, another transmitter 
of al-Shaybānī‘s works, reported that al-Shaybānī himself denied the work as belonging to his 
literary corpus, declaring it to be a false ascription.
102
 
 
al-Sarakhsī, however, corroborates the opinion of Abū Ḥafṣ and accepts that al-Shaybānī did 
author a treatise on the ḥiyal, because, he says, rulings which provide an exit strategy from 
sins are acceptable to the majority of scholars.
103
 He does not, however, account for the 
opinion of al-Jūzajānī who is not only cognizant of the text, but clearly rejects it, nor does he 
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discuss the narration from Ibn Samāʿa that al-Shaybānī, himself, decried the book as 
ascriptitious. In attempting to reconcile between these two conflicting opinions, Abū Zahra 
proffers an alternative historical account for the treatise. In his biography of Abū Ḥanīfa, he 
asserts that the text was, as al-Jūzajānī says, composed by the copyists of Baghdad. However, 
in order to verify the material they had gathered, they submitted it to Abū Ḥafṣ who 
confirmed that its contents conformed to Ḥanafī doctrine and were consonant with the very 
material which he himself was transmitting. Abū Ḥafṣ‘ confirmation of the material meant 
that the copyists‘ work could now be narrated with his authorisation.104 Abū Zahra, himself, 
admits that this account is only partially persuasive. The reason, perhaps, is that he fails to 
account for al-Jūzajānī‘s repulsion to the work. The latter, who was clearly aware of the 
treatise, attributed it to the copyists, not for the lack of an authentic narration, but rather to 
distance it from the madhhab and also to disparage its scholarly credibility. 
 
A contemporary of Abū Zahra, Muḥammad Zāhid al-Kawtharī, tried to accommodate both 
opinions and suggested that the opposing statements of al-Shaybānī‘s students actually apply 
to two different works. The work which is known as al-Shaybānī‘s treatise on ḥiyal is indeed 
narrated by Abū Ḥafṣ. The material in this treatise reflects the strategies (makhārij) deployed 
in the School to alleviate unnecessary hardships or to find alternatives using legitimate means 
in conformity with the purposes of the law (ḥikmat al-tashrīʿ).105 What al-Jūzajānī is referring 
to is a different work altogether; this he proffers was a work which the copyists had put 
together containing ḥiyal which operate contrary to the purposes of the law.106 This 
explanation is highly plausible as the book which was collectively condemned was noted for 
containing over three hundred egregious ḥiyal. And although not all these ḥiyal are known, 
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those that are, some of which are mentioned earlier, are not present in any Ḥanafī ḥiyal works, 
but rather are patently rejected and their users condemned. 
 
4.2.2 The Kitāb al-Ḥiyal as the Kitāb al-Makhārij 
Although al-Kawtharī‘s explanation of two different works is acceptable, it still implies that 
al-Jūzajānī was oblivious of al-Shaybānī‘s real work. al-Kawtharī tries to explains this by 
recalling that because Abū Ḥafṣ and al-Jūzajānī spent different times of their lives with al-
Shaybānī, it is not necessary that both should have received the same works from him. Indeed 
al-Jūzajānī narrated the al-Siyar al-Kabīr, the last of al-Shaybānī‘s major works, which Abū 
Ḥafṣ did not, due to the latter‘s early return to Bukhāra.107 This, however, implies that it was 
Abū Ḥafṣ who returned to his native land before al-Jūzajānī, and if Abū Ḥafṣ had heard the 
book of ḥiyal from al-Shaybānī then it was clearly in existence while al-Jūzajānī was studying 
with al-Shaybānī. Considering this together with the fact that al-Jūzajānī was aware of the 
Baghdad copyists work on the egregious ḥiyal, which had clearly caused a stir in the scholarly 
community, it is unlikely that he would have been unaware of an earlier work by al-Shaybānī 
on the same topic. 
 
In the al-Fatāwā al-Hindiyya a ḥīla is referenced to ‗Ḥiyal al-Aṣl‘, and the author notes that 
there is difference between the narration of Abū Ḥafṣ and that of al-Jūzajānī.108 This seems to 
imply that both Abū Ḥafṣ and al-Jūzajānī were transmitting a work known as Ḥiyal al-Aṣl and 
that the ḥiyal work was part and parcel of al-Shaybānī‘s al-Aṣl. This, Ḥiyal al-Aṣl is not a 
reference to the actual treatise narrated by Abū Ḥafṣ as we note that Ibn Māza, in his 
expansive doxographical compendium, quotes from both Abū Ḥafṣ‘ and al-Jūzajānī‘s 
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narrations of Ḥiyal al-Aṣl,109 and additionally refers to another work which he calls ‗The al-
Ḥiyal attributed to Muḥammad‘.110 The latter is no doubt the ḥiyal treatise as an individual 
text transmitted distinctly from the al-Aṣl. This implies that although al-Jūzajānī was unaware 
of the individual ḥiyal treatise, he was narrating a portion of al-Shaybānī‘s al-Aṣl which 
contained some ḥiyal. The question that needs to be addressed is whether there are any 
substantial differences between the individual treatise and the Ḥiyal al-Aṣl. 
 
Having compared al-Shaybānī‘s ḥiyal treatise with the corresponding portion of al-Aṣl, it can 
be concluded that the substantive content of the two are the same, although in the treatise 
there is an additional chapter regarding ḥiyal in gifts.111 In the treatise the order of the 
chapters has been altered, but what is more significant however, is that in the al-Aṣl the word 
ḥiyal is only sparsely employed: Whereas in the treatise the interlocutor asks for a ḥīla, in the 
al-Aṣl he asks for a way (wajh) or a sound and trustworthy method (thiqa). 112 These are 
words which clearly express the notion of an exit i.e. a makhraj, and correspond to the Ḥanafī 
view, as demonstrated in the previous chapter, of the ḥiyal as makhārij. In fact, it would not 
be surprising if the word ḥiyal was not employed at all in al-Shaybānī‘s original and the few 
times in which it now occurs in the al-Aṣl, may be regarded as posthumous accretions 
premised on the acceptance of the later ḥiyal treatises and the increased subsequent usage of 
the term itself. This means that al-Jūzajānī was narrating solutions which were referred to 
using the terms wajh or thiqa and not using the word ḥīla. 
 
al-Jūzajānī narrations of the Ḥiyal al-Aṣl, therefore, refer to the chapters of al-Aṣl which deal 
with makhārij.  It will be recalled that al-Jūzajānī‘s consternation was partly due to the use of 
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the word ḥiyal in the title of the treatise as mentioned explicitly in the quote given by al-
Sarakhsī. The only Kitāb al-Ḥiyal al-Jūzajānī was aware of, was that of the Baghdād copyists, 
and together with the fact that al-Shaybānī, himself, rejected that he had authored that work, 
explains al-Jūzajānī‘s antipathy to the idea that al-Shaybānī had authored a Kitāb al-Ḥiyal. 
This then raises the question of just who was responsible for the individual treatise on the al-
Ḥiyal which is attributed to al-Shaybānī and which purposely replaces the words wajh and 
thiqa with ḥīla. 
 
4.2.3 The Authorship of al-Shaybānī‘s Kitāb al-Ḥiyal 
That the egregious Kitāb al-Ḥiyal was attributed to the Ḥanafīs should be understood in 
relation to the early growth of the Schools of Islamic law. In the early stages, the Ḥanafī 
jurists did not represent a consolidated school in the sense that all of their students were not 
constrained to their specific juridical tradition. Many scholars, who therefore studied under 
the Ḥanafī masters, did not necessarily deem themselves bound to a tradition, but rather 
retained a considerable degree of independence. Ibn Taymiyya has alluded to this very point, 
in his attempt to absolve Abū Ḥanīfa of the more controversial ḥiyal.113 It may well have been 
that the protagonists of the early reprehensible ḥiyal had indeed studied jurisprudence from 
Abū Ḥanīfa or from one of his many students. In response, it appears that leading authorities 
within the Ḥanafī School began to set down an official position on what types of ḥiyal were 
acceptable to ultimately delimit the juridical remit of the genre. 
 
Ibn Quṭlūbughā records in his bibliography Tāj al-Tarājim that al-Shaybānī‘s student, Mūsā 
ibn Naṣr wrote a work entitled al-Makhārij, which Ibn Quṭlūbughā describes as a novel work 
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within the genre.
114
 In addition to this work, the grandson of Abū Ḥanīfa, Ismāʿīl ibn 
Ḥammād is also reported to have written a work on the ḥiyal. The jurists Ibn Abī ʿImrān and 
Qāsim ibn Maʿn appear to mention it in a rather disparaging way, indicating that some of his 
ḥiyal may have been unacceptable.115 This means that in addition to the work of the Baghdad 
copyists, three other treatises were circulating in Iraq; Ismāʿīl ibn Ḥammād‘s, Mūsā ibn 
Naṣr‘s and the one attributed to al-Shaybānī narrated by Abū Ḥafṣ. Out of these three, only 
the latter has survived.
116
 
 
It may be that Abū Ḥafṣ, noting the various works being authored by his contemporaries, 
decided to restrict himself to the makhārij chapter of al-Aṣl, rearranging the chapters and 
incorporating a single additional chapter on gifts. Most significantly the word ḥiyal was 
introduced into the text in place of the synonyms, wajh and thiqa. This would provide an 
authoritative explication of the Ḥanafī ḥiyal and limit the scope of the genre to the normative 
doctrines. He could justifiably transmit the work on behalf of his teacher as the substantive 
contents originated from al-Shaybānī‘s works. He also avoided any controversial novelties 
which meant that his treatise outstripped that of his contemporaries. If Abū Ḥafṣ is indeed the 
hand behind al- Shaybānī‘s treatise, it explains why al-Jūzajānī would have been oblivious to 
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it, as he died seventeen years before Abū Ḥafṣ, and the work may therefore have been 
‗authored‘ after his demise. 
  
4.3 Ḥiyal in the Other Schools 
Having noted the early beginnings of the ḥiyal genre, we will now assess its reception in the 
other Schools. In the earlier chapters on ribā, the juridical methodologies of the four Schools 
played an important role in determining the specific approach of each School to the ribā 
prohibition. Similarly in their approach to the question of the ḥiyal, their responses are a 
reflection of their differing legal methodologies. 
 
4.3.1 The Shāfiʿīs and the Ḥiyal 
The Shāfiʿī School shares with the Ḥanafīs certain juridical features which perhaps predispose 
them to accepting the utility of certain ḥiyal. Like the Ḥanafīs, the Shāfiʿīs do not take 
intentions into consideration when judging the permissibility of contracts; the controversial 
ʿīna contract, for example, was thus upheld by Shāfiʿī himself, even though he was known for 
his opposition to the ḥiyal.117 The opposition of the Shāfiʿīs, like the Ḥanafīs was to the 
egregious ḥiyal and hence, like the latter, they allowed the ḥiyal which they considered to be 
makhārij. This is attested to by the various ḥiyal works produced by them.  
 
Abū Bakr al-Ṣayrāfī (d.330 AH), it appears, was the first Shāfiʿī to author a treatise on the 
ḥiyal. With the genre having gained a degree of acceptability there would have been perhaps 
little opposition to his work.
118
 The next work was written by Abū al-Ḥasan al-Surāqqa (d.410 
                                                 
117
 Ḥusayn Khalaf al-Jabūrī, ―al-Ḥiyal wa Mawqif al-Fuqahāʾ minhā,‖ Majallat Kulliyyat al-Dirāsāt al-Islāmiyya 
5 (1973): 133-34, (Baghdad, Maṭbaʿa al-ʿĀnī, offprint). 
118
 al-Khaṣṣāf had written his work in the middle of the third century, which means that as a genre, the ḥiyal 
would have been fairly well established in the Ḥanafī tradition. 
RECEPTION OF THE ḤIYAL: THE GENRE 
166 
 
AH), followed by the well known work of Abū Ḥātim al-Qazwīnī (d.440 AH).119 This latter 
work is the only ḥiyal work published in the Shāfiʿī School and unlike the Ḥanafīs, one does 
not find chapters on ḥiyal in their fatāwā works which makes al-Qazwīnī‘s work a valuable 
reference for assessing their approach to the ḥiyal. Following al-Qazwīnī‘s treatise, al-Khaṭīb 
is alleged to have written a large work on the ḥiyal in three volumes. And finally Zayn al-Dīn 
al-Munāwī, a Cairene jurist is recorded as having written a work entitled Bulūgh al-Amal bi-
Maʿrifat al-Alghāz wa al-Ḥiyal.120 The Shāfiʿīs were then keen protagonists of the ḥiyal, 
although their ḥiyal, like the Ḥanafīs, were not the controversial type. The ʿīna contract, 
which is a standard Shafiʿī opinion, is not incorporated into al-Qazwīnī‘s work, although in 
the other Schools, this contract is generally considered to be the foremost ḥīla employed to 
circumvent the usury prohibition. 
 
4.3.2 The Mālikīs and the Ḥiyal 
The Mālikīs are generally assumed to be opponents of the ḥiyal and their juridical 
methodology which embraces the concept of sadd al-dharīʿa clearly does not support their 
conceptual basis. However a recent study by Satoe Horii has shown that, although the Mālikīs 
do not use the word ḥiyal in their juridical works, in some cases, the solutions they present are 
similar to those put forward but the Ḥanafīs as ḥiyal.121 In her article Horii concludes that: 
‗The Medinese jurists did not totally reject ḥiyal, but rather evaluated them according to their 
own perspectives‘.122 To substantiate this conclusion she provides six examples of solutions 
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proposed by the Mālikīs, for certain juridical problems, which are either the same as, or very 
similar to, those proposed by the Ḥanafīs.123  
 
The six examples relate to: 1) khulʿ, 2) claims against joint guarantors, 3) muḍāraba with 
goods, 4) sale of unripe grain or fruit before harvesting or picking, 5) marriage stipulations in 
favour of the wife, and 6) sale of a slave so that he may be manumitted.
124
 Now it is clear that 
the Mālikīs did not call their solutions ḥiyal, they merely wrote them as answers to questions 
based upon their juridical method. This, however, is the critical point, because what it shows 
is that the ḥiyal given by the Ḥanafīs were not exceptional or external to the norms of the fiqh, 
rather they were solutions which in many cases agreed with those of the other Schools. The 
difference being that the Ḥanafīs identified them as a specific type and jotted them down in 
their ḥiyal manuals. 
 
Another important aspect of Horii‘s study is in regard to the ḥiyal on which the Mālikī‘s 
differed with the Ḥanafīs. One example which is relevant here relates to the purchase of a part 
of the estate by its executor (waṣī). According to al-Khaṣṣaf if the executor of an estate wants 
to purchase a part of it, he should sell the property to a third party and then repurchase it from 
him. Now, although Mālik does not permit the executor to purchase a part of the estate, Horii 
mentions a case where he did permit it. Ibn al-Qāsim argues that this exception was a 
concession (rukhṣa) due to the difficulty the executor was facing in selling the estate. From 
which, Horii then concludes that: ‗Mālik also taught a ḥīla that he considered was necessary 
under the circumstances‘.125 This perhaps is not an accurate assessment, as Mālik himself, nor 
his student, identify this as a ḥīla. But what is does show is that whereas the Mālikīs opted for 
a simple concession when circumstances dictated, the Ḥanafī‘s opted to use a ḥīla. These 
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juridical methodologies were noted in our previous treatment of ribā; whereas the other 
Schools (and the Mālikīs in particular) permitted concessions to the ribā injunction, the 
Ḥanafīs preferred to uphold the letter of the law and develop solutions through them.   
 
What is critical though, is that both methodologies in this example, and in the previous ones, 
arrived at the same solution.  In another recent study the author Būshīsh also notes that most 
of the jurists, including the Ḥanbalīs and the Mālikīs, have often given solutions which agree 
with the notion of the ḥiyal without however expressly designating them as such.126  
 
4.3.3 The Ḥanbalīs and the Ḥiyal 
The resolute stance of Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal against the ḥiyal has already been mentioned. At 
the same time, however, his leniency towards certain ḥiyal has also been recorded. In one 
instance, for example, while he was sitting with a certain al-Marwazī, someone came to his 
door to inquire after him, although al-Marwazī was trying to avoid him. In response, Aḥmad 
placed his finger in his palm and replied ‗al-Marwazī is not here‘.127 This is a straightforward 
use of equivocal speech and typical of the way it is used in the ḥiyal. Outwardly, Aḥmad did 
not speak an untruth although what he intended in his speech was clearly not what the listener 
would have understood. On another occasion he was asked about a man who swore an oath 
that his wife stood repudiated if he did not have intercourse with her during the daytime of 
Ramaḍān. Breaking the fast through intercourse carries a heavy expiation. Worse than this, 
however, is the divorce of his wife, should he not fulfil his oath. Aḥmad advises him that he 
should undertake a journey and fulfil his oath during that time; the reason being that he will 
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be excused from fasting due to his journey.
128
 This ḥīla allowed the man to fulfil his oath, 
without having to give the expiation, and also to retain his wife.  
 
Some later Ḥanbalīs also accepted these types of ḥiyal; Abū al-Khaṭṭāb (d.510 AH), included 
some ḥiyal at the end of his chapter on divorce, suggesting various techniques on how to 
absolve oneself from an oath.
129
 Najm al-Dīn al-Ṭūfī reports that later Ḥanbalīs censured him 
for it.
130
 Ibn al-Qayyim, however, openly concedes that there is no madhhab which does not 
condone many ḥiyal.131  In his own works there are a plethora of ḥiyal which he personally 
sanctioned, as mentioned in the previous chapter. Ibn Taymiyya also reported that not only 
were there Ḥanbalīs advocating the ḥiyal for oaths, but also ḥiyal which Aḥmad had explicitly 
condemned. Here he mentions, inter alia, the marriage of the validator, nikāh al-taḥlīl and 
various ḥiyal of ribā.132 He also mentions that some Ḥanbalīs had given a ḥīla to circumvent 
the injunction on hunting and fishing for a pilgrim in the state of iḥrām. They suggested that if 
the pilgrim were to set up a fishing net before entering into the iḥrām, the fish subsequently 
caught would be permissible to eat, despite the fact that they are caught after the person has 
entered into the iḥrām. What is so remarkable about this ruling is that it looks suspiciously 
like what the Jews had done in violation of their Sabbath.
133
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The presence of ḥiyal in the Ḥanbalī School, may well be surprising, in fairness however, 
more than any other School they were perhaps the most vocal in their opposition to the more 
controversial ḥiyal. And indeed it is from this School that specific treatises emerged to refute 
the ḥiyal. Ibn Baṭṭa‘s (d.387 AH) work, which has already been mentioned, clearly proved 
popular within the School as works bearing the same title were subsequently authored by qāḍī 
Abū Yaʿlā (d.458 AH) and al-Ṭūfī (d.716 AH). Another Ḥanbalī Abd al-Raḥmān ibn Ibrāhīm 
ibn Uthmān wrote a specific treatise dealing with the ḥiyal of ribā.134  Shortly after which, the 
reformers Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn al-Qayyim also wrote works against the ḥiyal, although their 
approach was far more nuanced. 
 
In summary, we can conclude that after the first work of ḥiyal was composed by the copyists 
of Baghdad, the Ḥanafīs responded by authoring their own works, which gave an accurate 
representation of what the School considered to be the remit, purpose and substantive nature 
of acceptable ḥiyal. The purpose of their works was both to prevent future Ḥanafī scholars 
straying beyond the legitimate scope of the genre and also to differentiate between those ḥiyal 
which had a degree of textual legitimacy and those which were flagrant violations of the 
sacred law. Having established the normative utility of the former type, we see that the other 
Schools began to permit them, although without necessarily designating them as ḥiyal. The 
Mālikīs, who have been shown to proffer certain ḥiyal, do not however identify them as such, 
whereas the Ḥanbalīs, are not averse to using the term when they do take advantage of them. 
The Shāfiʿīs, who have a similar juridical outlook to the Ḥanafīs, not surprisingly take up the 
genre and author several works along similar lines to the Ḥanafīs. 
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4.4 The Controversial Ḥiyal 
The earliest work of ḥiyal put out by the Baghdad copyists was reported to be filled with 
egregious ḥiyal. These ḥiyal were unanimously rejected by all scholars and their proponents 
condemned. The Ḥanafī and Shāfiʿī ḥiyal works are, as mentioned earlier, free from these 
types of ḥiyal. This was a well known fact amongst the jurists and such ḥiyal were not a part 
of the ḥiyal genre at all. There are, however, a number of controversial ḥiyal which are central 
to the ḥiyal polemic and do appear to have been overtly advocated by leading Ḥanafī jurists. 
There are five main ḥiyal which sit at the heart of the ḥiyal polemic: 
1. Bayʿ al-ʿīna – double-sale 
2. Bayʿ al-wafāʾ – sale with a right of redemption 
3. Zakāt – alms-tax 
4. Shufʿa – pre-emption 
5. Taḥlīl – marriage of an intermediary validator  
The first two ḥiyal relate to ribā and will be dealt with in detail in the next chapter. The 
remaining three will be discussed in the context of their opponents‘ arguments. With regard to 
zakāt and shufʿa, reference will be made to al-Bukhārī‘s Kitāb al-Ḥiyal as he mentioned both 
the ḥiyal attributed to the Ḥanafīs and the traditions which are relevant to the polemic. As for 
the issue of taḥlīl, the polemic of Ibn Taymiyya, whose entire treatise was focused upon this 
specific ḥīla, will provide the opposing views. 
 
4.4.1 Zakāt – Alms-tax 
In his Kitāb al-Ḥiyal in the section on zakāt, al-Bukhārī records the following ḥadīth: 
‗Distinct [assets] should not be combined nor should joint [assets] be separated for fear of the 
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alms [due on them]‘.135 This ḥadīth is crucial to al-Bukhārī‘s argument against the ḥiyal which 
are used to avoid paying the zakāt. It constitutes an explicit prohibition from the Prophet 
(pbuh) against manipulating ones wealth to avoid paying the zakāt. After mentioning this 
ḥadīth, al-Bukhārī goes on to quote another four aḥādīth, mentioning repeatedly the opinion of 
‗some people‘ who allow someone to avoid paying the zakāt by dispensing with enough of his 
wealth prior to the completion of the year. The ‗some people‘ mentioned here, clearly an 
elliptical reference to the Ḥanafīs. 
 
Zakāt only becomes due after a certain level of wealth is acquired (niṣāb) and one full year 
passes over this amount. If, however, prior to the completion of the year, someone‘s wealth 
decreases below the niṣāb, then he is absolved from its payment. The ḥīla being objected to 
by al-Bukhārī, is when an individual, purposely disposes of some of his wealth on the eve of 
the year, solely to avoid paying the tax. According to the ‗some people‘ he quotes, a person 
who uses such a trick with the intention of evading the alms-tax, will nevertheless be absolved 
from paying zakāt on his wealth. 
 
There are two points which need to be explored here: the first is to examine the exact opinion 
of the Ḥanafīs in regard to this stratagem, and the second is to note its occurrence in the works 
of the ḥiyal. With regard to the first aspect, it must be borne in mind that the disagreement 
between al-Bukhārī and the Ḥanafīs is regarding the use of such stratagems prior to the 
completion of the year and not after it. Once the year has been completed it is clear that the 
zakāt is due and must be paid. The stratagem here pertains to the owner‘s actions prior to the 
completion of the year. The jurists, however, are in agreement that an owner may dispose of 
his wealth freely at any time he wishes even if he causes it to decrease below the level of the 
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niṣāb. If this occurs prior to the completion of a year then consequently no zakāt on his 
remaining wealth will be due. The point of contention here, is when an owner disposes of his 
wealth prior to the completion of the year, for the sole purpose of circumventing his zakāt 
liability. This stratagem gives rise to two questions: First, what is the sharīʿa ruling regarding 
the person‘s intention, and second, what is its consequent impact on the obligation to pay the 
zakāt. As regards this latter question, it is clear that the different juridical methodologies of 
the jurists will determine the outcome of this question. We hence find, that both the Ḥanafīs 
and the Shāfiʿīs rule that zakāt will not be due because intention plays no role in evaluating 
the legal cause. The fact that his wealth is less than the niṣāb is the only determining factor 
and the persons intention to evade the zakāt is not taken into consideration as he is deemed 
similar to a person who disposed of some of his wealth without intending to evade the zakāt, 
but yet resulted in him owning less than the niṣāb. The two cases are hence deemed to be 
legally indistinguishable. For those jurists who take the owner‘s intentions into consideration, 
the zakāt must be paid. Although they recognise that the wealth is less than the niṣāb, they 
disregard this in light of the motives which led it to be so. The Mālikīs, Ḥanbalīs and 
traditionists are all of this opinion.
136
 
 
The other question relates to the sharīʿa ruling of the intention itself. The Shāfiʿīs, distancing 
themselves from al-Bukhārī‘s criticism, point out that, even though they do not give any legal 
effect to intentions and motives, they do regard the intention itself as blameworthy.
137
 
Likewise, al-Sarakhsī also reports that al-Shaybānī regarded such an intention as 
reprehensible (makrūh); zakāt being an act of worship he considered it inappropriate for a 
believer to avoid it. In al-Khaṣṣāf‘s prolegomena he makes it abundantly clear that to dispose 
of ones wealth with the intention of evading ones zakāt liability is reprehensible. He also 
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stresses, as mentioned in the previous chapter, that although the intention of evasion itself is 
held to be reprehensible this does not mean that the legal effect of his actions are interdicted. 
This means that the zakāt will not be due on his wealth as he does not posses the nisāb. al-
Khaṣṣāf goes on to say that one who does this should fear that he may be regarded as a sinner, 
as the Qurʾān has warned against intending harm to others, and by evading zakāt (or shufʿa) 
one is causing harm to those who would have been its rightful recipients.
138
 
 
As opposed to the dominant opinion of the School, Abū Yūsuf is reported to have saw no 
harm in this ḥīla and considered it similar to cases of pre-emption and other ḥiyal.139 The 
Azharite Abū Zahra notes, however, that this opinion of Abū Yūsuf is referenced by al-
Sarakhsī to a work attributed to Abū Yūsuf known as al-Amālī. Such works are not as 
probative as the ẓāhir al-riwāya and hence their authority within the School is only 
secondary.
140
 Abū Zahra‘s doubt over the accuracy of this narration maybe corroborated by 
the fact that Abū Yūsuf himself, in his Kitāb al-Kharāj when commenting on the ḥadīth 
prohibiting evasion of the alms-tax, says:  
‗It is not permissible for man who believes in Allah and the last day to refrain from [paying] alms or to 
remove it from his ownership to the ownership of another in order to separate it and by that annul the 
alms [due] on it; [the intent being] that each one of them have [an amount] upon which zakāt is not 
obligated. No one should employ ḥiyal to annul the alms in any way [whatsoever].‘
141
  
That spurious narrations were circulating attributing ḥiyal to the Ḥanafīs is not unknown; 
there even appears to have been one attributing tacit approval of a ḥīla to avoid zakāt to al-
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Shaybānī. The narration, however, is from an unknown reporter and contradicts the more 
reliable position known from him, as mentioned earlier.
142
  
 
Having dealt with the substance of the ḥīla, what remains, is to examine its relation to the 
genre. In the three early works on the ḥiyal by al-Shaybānī, al-Khaṣṣāf and al-Sarakhsī, 
neither al-Shaybānī nor al-Sarakhsī composed a chapter on zakāt as opposed to al-Khaṣṣāf. In 
his chapter on zakāt he discusses the following five ḥiyal:  
1. how to give zakāt to a debtor as a reduction in the debt;  
2. the same as 1. but if there are partners in the debt;  
3. how to give a burial shroud as zakāt;  
4. whether one can consider maintenance (nafaqa) of ones close relatives as zakāt;  
5. and whether zakāt can be given to build a mosque.  
His answers to these questions are standard juridical responses and nothing regarding the 
evasion of zakāt is even remotely mentioned.143 What transpires then, is that the single ḥīla 
which is objected to by al-Bukhārī is not mentioned in any of the early works on ḥiyal. This is 
not surprising given that its veracity in the School is tentative to say the least. There is no 
narration from Abū Ḥanīfa which even discusses it; al-Shaybānī has expressed his disapproval 
of it, as has Abū Yūsuf; and the reports which suggest their support for it, are either from 
obscure or secondary sources.  
 
What is established though, is that under their general juridical framework, like the Shāfiʿīs, 
intentions and motives do not play a role in determining legal effects and it this fact which is 
at the heart of the polemic. al-Khaṣṣāf is acutely aware that their juridical position on 
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intentions makes them susceptible to the charge of allowing such ḥiyal. He hence clarifies the 
position of the Ḥanafīs vis-à-vis the ḥīla used to evade the zakāt, while also defending their 
stance on intentions. What is also significant is that he does this in his prolegomena and not in 
his actual substantive chapters. This is important in that it shows that al-Khaṣṣāf was not 
merely defending the charge against a specific ḥīla, but rather, that he was making a more 
general point. By doing so, he recognises in a wider sense, that the juridical methodology 
which gives rise to and embraces the ḥiyal, may also be exploited for illicit purposes. He 
therefore sets out, from the beginning, to defend the School‘s methodology while also 
censuring those with improper motives. 
 
4.4.2 Shufʿa – Pre-emption 
The right of pre-emption allows certain individuals the first right of purchase which the seller 
is mandated to uphold. Just who is given pre-emptory rights, however, is a matter disputed 
among the jurists. al-Bukhārī presents two aḥādīth in his chapter on shufʿa in the Kitāb al-
Ḥiyal; one which negates the neighbour‘s right of pre-emption and the second which 
apparently supports it. Although the Schools of law agree that co-owners have pre-emptory 
rights, only the Ḥanafīs grant the same right to the neighbours of a property. al-Bukhārī‘s 
criticises the Ḥanafīs for uniquely affirming this right and then subsequently devising various 
ḥiyal to circumvent it. He mentions three ḥiyal which are proffered in the Ḥanafī works on the 
ḥiyal and follows them, repeatedly by the ḥadīth which the Ḥanafīs themselves use as proof to 
grant the neighbour the right of pre-emption. This serves to highlight a contradiction in their 
approach and indeed following the final example, al-Bukhārī, makes the forthright remark: 
‗thus they permitted this deception amongst the Muslims‘.144 
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al-Bukhārī has mentioned three different ḥiyal in his compendium and all three are also 
mentioned in the work of al-Shaybānī and al-Khaṣṣāf. These, in basic terms, are as follows: 
1. The buyer should first purchase a small portion of the house and then later on purchase 
the rest; once he becomes a partner in the property his right of pre-emption succeeds 
that of the neighbour and hence alienates him from purchasing the property. The 
neighbour would technically have a right of pre-emption in the original small share 
purchased, although in view of it being insignificant, he is unlikely to claim it. 
2. The seller should give the house as a gift to the buyer, marking off its boundaries and 
handing it over to him. In response the buyer should give him a gift of money, 
corresponding to, what otherwise would have been, the price. Clearly pre-emptive 
rights do not operate in gifts and hence the neighbour loses his right. The only caveat 
is that the gift contract cannot stipulate the return gift, otherwise, it becomes a hiba bi 
sharṭ al-ʿiwaḍ, a gift with a stipulated countervalue.145 This is tantamount to a contract 
of sale and the neighbour would hence be granted his pre-emptory rights.
146
 
3. The sale should be fixed at 20,000 dirhams, although the house is only worth 10,000. 
The high price dissuades the neighbour from claiming his right, while the buyer 
actually only pays 9999 dirhams and one dīnār; the one dīnār replaces the 10,001 
dirhams remaining.
147
  
All three ḥiyal are mentioned in the chapter of shufʿa in both al-Shaybānī‘s and al-Khaṣṣāf‘s 
treatises.
148
 Although these ḥiyal are in al-Shaybānī‘s work, they are presented through a 
series of questions posed by an interlocutor. Most probably it is al-Shaybānī who is asking 
about them and Abū Yūsuf who is answering. The latter is specifically mentioned periodically 
                                                 
145
 This is discussed in chapter 1. 
146
 ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn Abū Bakr ibn Masʿūd al-Kāsānī, Badāʾiʿ al-Ṣanāʾiʿ fī Tartīb al-Sharāʾiʿ (Beirut: Dār al-Maʿrifa, 
2000), vol. 5, 18. (All subsequent references to al-Kāsānī‘s Badāʾiʿ will refer to this edition). 
147
 We have already discussed why the Ḥanafīs permit this contract in chapter two.  
148
 al-Shaybānī, al-Makhārij, 80-1, al-Khaṣṣāf, Kitāb al-Ḥiyal, 200-1, the latter reproduces these verbatim from 
the former. 
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in the text as supporting certain ḥiyal. That these ḥiyal are endorsed in the Ḥanafī School is 
unquestionable, as later texts reproduce them as standard ḥiyal.149 They even find their way 
into the works of the Shāfiʿī Abū Ḥātim al-Qazwīnī and the Ḥanbalī, Ibn al-Qayyim.150  
 
It is well recorded by the Ḥanafī School that al-Shaybānī, himself, regarded the use of ḥiyal to 
preclude pre-emptory rights as severely reprehensible.
151
 Despite that, the Ḥanafī School in 
general appears to have opted for Abū Yūsuf‘s opinion, who endorses them. In al-Shaybānī‘s 
treatise, Abū Yūsuf argues that the seller only undertakes such ḥiyal to prevent himself from 
oppressing the neighbour by denying him his right. So by preventing the right from coming 
into existence he saves himself from doing an injustice to the latter. Another explanation 
given is that at the heart of all commutative exchange lies the wilful consent of the owner to 
part with his property. In a situation where the owner has an aversion to the neighbour, or 
perceives some harm which may result from such a sale, either to himself or to his other 
neighbours, his consent to the sale may not be given wholeheartedly. In order to evade this 
scenario, these ḥiyal are permitted. In fact, the chapter on shufʿa opens with a question posed 
by al-Shaybānī; the terms in which it is framed seem to express this viewpoint: 
I said: What is your opinion [regarding] a man who wants to buy a house and he fears that the 
neighbour may take it by shufʿa,, and he [the buyer] dislikes to prevent him from that and [thereby] 
oppress him [but, on the other hand, he also] dislikes to give him the house. [In both scenarios] 
something which he dislikes will happen to him. Do you have a ḥīla in that [situation]?  
It is in response to this dilemma that Abū Yūsuf gives his answers. The Ḥanafīs go on to 
differentiate between ḥiyal deployed to prevent the right of pre-emption from occurring, and 
                                                 
149
 al-Kāsānī, Badāʾiʿ, vol. 5, 54—6. 
150
 Although not in regard to a neighbour‘s pre-emptory rights, as the Shāfiʿīs and Ḥanbalīs don‘t grant him any, 
but rather in relation to either the rights of the partner, or to avoid a neighbour claiming such a right in a Ḥanafī 
court. See al-Qazwīnī, Kitāb al-Ḥiyal fī al-Fiqh, 14-16; Ibn al-Qayyim, Iʿlām al-Muwaqqiʿīn, 698.  
151
 al-Sarakhsī, al-Mabsūṭ, vol. 1, book 2, 224; Ibn Māza, al-Muḥīṭ al-Burhānī, vol. 11, 107.  
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those which are used after the right has been established.
152
 Some jurists further restricted the 
permission to situations where the neighbour is regarded as a profligate (fāsiq) who may 
cause harm to others.
153
 What is clear is that the framework of the Ḥanafīs is premised upon a 
distinct teleological concern for the rights of both the owner and the neighbour, although in 
their juridical formulations, they clearly give preponderance to the former against the latter. 
This is not surprising as the rights of the former are unanimously agreed upon by the jurists, 
whereas the latter are only upheld by the Ḥanafīs. 
 
4.4.3 Taḥlīl – Marriage of the Validator 
Islamic law does not a permit a triple divorcee to remarry her husband unless and until she 
marries another husband. Once the marriage is consummated, if she is subsequently divorced 
by her new husband, then following the completion of her waiting period (ʿidda), she is 
permitted to remarry her first husband. What Islamic law does not permit, however, is for the 
second marriage to be performed solely to permit the remarriage of the first, a practice known 
as taḥlīl. If the first husband arranges this with the second husband as a strategy to remarry his 
previous wife, then he is designated as the muḥallal lahū while the latter is called the 
muḥallil, the validator. Both of these have been cursed in the Prophetic ḥadīth: ‗Laʿana Allah 
al-muḥallil wa al-muḥallal lahū‘.154  
 
The practice of taḥlīl is the focus of Ibn Taymiyya‘s polemic against the ḥiyal. The jurists 
unanimously condemn those who engage in this practice, although they differ regarding how 
they interpret its application in the legal sphere. Much of Ibn Taymiyya‘s work, as he himself 
declares, is focused on demonstrating that the practice of taḥlīl is forbidden and that the 
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 al-Khaṣṣāf, Kitāb al-Ḥiyal, 81. Ibn Māza, al-Muḥīṭ al-Burhānī, vol. 21, 263. 
153
 Ibn Māza, al-Muḥīṭ al-Burhānī, vol. 11, 107. The author cites this opinion from the renowned, although no 
longer extant, Fatāwā al-Faḍlī. 
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 Reported in Abū Dawūd, Ibn Mājah and al-Tirmidhī who graded it as a good sound ḥadīth (haṣan ṣaḥīḥ), see 
Būshīsh, al-Ḥiyal al-Fiqhiyya, 91, n. 2. 
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resulting marriages, of both the validator and the former husband, are invalid. This is so, 
irrespective of whether they openly declare their intentions or not, and whether their 
agreement precedes the contract or is included in it.
155
 
 
Ibn Taymiyya, however, concedes early on that the scholars have differed in this regard, the 
Ḥanafīs, not unexpectedly, are among those who differ with his own views. He also mentions 
that the Successor jurist Sālim ibn ʿAbdullah ibn ʿUmar, allowed the validator to marry the 
divorcee with the intention of divorcing her and hence permitting her remarriage to her former 
husband, but only on condition that the validator do so unilaterally, i.e. not under instruction 
from the other parties, and also that he keep his intention secret throughout.
156
 He quotes other 
early jurists, such as the Madinese Rabīʿa, Yaḥyā ibn Saʿīd and Abū Zinād, and surprisingly 
Dawūd ibn ʿAlī the founder of the Ẓāhirī School, all in agreement with the opinion of 
Sālim.157 
 
What is at the heart of the issue of taḥlīl is whether intentions and stipulations (shurūṭ) are 
considered to affect the validity of contracts. As can be noted from our previous discussions, 
this is a recurring theme and a major cause of difference in the substantive rules. For the 
Ḥanafīs, like the Shāfiʿīs, the unexpressed intention has little, or no, role to play in 
determining the validity of the contract, and hence if taḥlīl occurs by the planning of any of 
the parties and they conceal their intention, then the contract will be valid. Similarly, 
stipulations to the marriage contracts are generally held to be invalid, the Ḥanafīs uphold the 
marriage contract while invalidating the stipulations.
158
 If, however, they stipulate taḥlīl as the 
purpose of the marriage, then the Ḥanafī authorities differ: Abū Ḥanīfa and Zufar regard the 
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 Ibn Taymiyya, Bayān al-Dalīl, 20. 
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 Ibid, 18. 
157
 Ibid, 19. 
158
 As al-Shaybānī states: ‗All marriages with invalid stipulations are permitted; the conditions are void 
[whereas] the marriage [contract] is upheld.‘ al-Shaybānī, Ḥujja, vol. 3, 221. 
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marriages as valid, although they regard it as severely reprehensible; Abū Yūsuf, regards the 
marriage of the validator as void and hence the divorcee is not permitted to remarry her 
former spouse; al-Shaybānī upholds the marriage of the validator but does not permit the 
divorcee to marry her former spouse.
159
 Although the doctrine of the Ḥanafīs is not a ḥīla, it is 
clear that it may well be seen to be so. Ibn Taymiyya, in his refutation of the taḥlīl claims that 
it can be refuted by showing that all ḥiyal are invalid; the assumption being that the former 
evidently belongs taxonomically to the latter.
160
 This is reinforced when we observe the 
frequency with which it occurs in the Ḥanafī works on ḥiyal. Although what exactly the 
Ḥanafīs discuss in regard to taḥlīl and it being a ḥīla needs to be examined further.  
 
There are two basic types of reference to taḥlīl in the ḥiyal works; firstly there is a simple 
presentation of the doctrine of the school, as in the works of al-Shaybānī and al-Sarakhsī, and 
secondly in the remainder of the works where the standard doctrine is not mentioned, but an 
actual ḥīla for taḥlīl is. al-Shaybānī‘s treatment is interesting in that he only quotes his own 
opinion; the interlocutor asks him the rule if a divorcee or her former husband approaches a 
man asking him to marry her for the purpose of taḥlīl. al-Shaybānī responds that if they make 
such a proposition then she will not be permitted to marry her former husband.
161
 Beyond this 
no other statements are made regarding taḥlīl. This, itself is informative of the genre and 
rebuffs the assertion that the genre deviates from the substantive doctrine and serves to 
legalise what is actually practiced through stratagems. On the contrary, al-Shaybānī upholds 
his own opinion, and even though the opinion of his teacher may facilitate their goal, it is not 
mentioned. al-Sarakhsī‘s work on the ḥiyal does little more than mention the doctrines of the 
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three authorities together with the fact that they all regard stipulations for taḥlīl as severely 
reprehensible.
162
 
 
The other works do not mention the standard doctrine on taḥlīl although they do offer an 
actual ḥīla for a divorcee. al-Khaṣṣāf,163 Abū Layth,164 Saīʿd ibn ʿAlī,165 and Ẓahīr al-Dīn166 
all advise the divorcee to give money to a trustworthy person who agrees to buy a servant and 
marry him to the divorcee. Once the new couple have consummated their marriage, the owner 
gives the servant to the divorcee as a gift, and because ownership and marriage cannot be 
combined, the woman is immediately released from the marriage and free to marry her former 
husband. In another two works, al-Fatāwā al-Sirājiyya and al-Fatāwā al-Hindiyya the ḥīla 
given involves the divorcee marrying her new spouse on the condition that he issue her with a 
conditional divorce which is effected by the consummation of their marriage.
167
 
 
None of these ḥiyal, however, involves the condemned form of involving a validator in a 
marriage which all three parties stage merely for the purpose of taḥlīl. Additionally, neither 
does the first husband nor the intermediate have an active involvement such that their 
intentions are relevant. As for the intention of the woman to remarry her former husband, then 
it specifically was not condemned in a prophetic ḥadīth in which a woman made it known to 
the Prophet (pbuh) that she wished to return to her former husband. For all of these reasons, 
we find Ibn al-Qayyim, not only defending this ḥīla, but additionally claiming that the 
Ḥanbalīs uphold the remarriage of a divorcee who uses it. He also adds that this is the opinion 
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 al-Sarakhsī, Kitāb al-Ḥiyal, 114-5. 
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 Saʿīd ibn ʿAlī al-Samarqandī, Jannat al-Aḥkām, 211. 
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 Abū al-Fatḥ Ẓahīr al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Rashīd‘s al-Fatāwā al-Walwālijiyya (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 
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of the Successor jurist ʿAṭāʾ as well as, Mālik, and Shāfiʿī, in fact, he says, he knows of none 
who oppose it.
168
 Finally, we can also note that al-Shāṭibī asserts that the intention behind this 
taḥlīl is the reconciliation of the estranged husband and wife. According to his yardstick of 
the preponderant maṣlaḥa, he therefore finds it to be in conformity with the maqāṣid.169 
 
To conclude, it is important to note that the ḥiyal works do not condone taḥlīl in the sense of 
the former husband getting together with the validator and his previous wife and performing a 
marriage in which the marriage ends after a given time. In this sense there is no egregious 
violation of the law, but rather, one finds in the later Ḥanafī works a ḥīla which is generally 
accepted by all the jurists and which conforms to the maqāṣid of the Sharīʿa. Another point to 
consider is why al-Shaybānī should include his rejection of taḥlīl in his ḥiyal work. To answer 
this we can recall our earlier assessment regarding the initial purpose of this treatise and the 
genre itself, which suggested that they were meant not only to present valid ḥiyal according to 
the substantive doctrines of the school, but also to set a standard with which to measure the 
ḥiyal. By rejecting the taḥlīl, al-Shaybānī, is clearly setting that limit and frustrating those 
who seek to abuse the ḥiyal. 
 
4.5 Contents of the Ḥiyal Genre 
Having discussed the controversial ḥiyal, we need to assess the remaining general contents of 
the ḥiyal genre. To do this, the following aspects will be examined: 
1. The relationship of the contents of the genre to the School‘s normative doctrine. 
2. The importance of maintaining systematic consistency between the ḥiyal formulations 
and the normative doctrine. 
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3. The endogenous view of the authors of the ḥiyal treatises. 
 
4.5.1 The Genre and the Normative Doctrine 
The main question to be answered here is does the substantive content of the ḥiyal genre 
deviate from the standard doctrines of the School. It was Schacht‘s assertion that the genre 
served as a modus vivendi between theory and practice. We have previously discussed the 
terms, theory and practice, and noted that Udovitch‘s claim, of the ḥiyal originating in the 
genre and subsequently finding their way into the theoretical works, is inaccurate. One 
specific example was discussed which highlighted the inconsistencies in the approach of the 
Orientalists in trying to substantiate Schacht‘s thesis. We will now look at further examples 
within the genre to further assess the claim that the genre was written to reflect actual practice 
and hence differed from the School‘s substantive doctrine. 
 
The al-Muḥīṭ al-Burhānī, an expansive doxographical compendium, contains a large chapter 
on the ḥiyal in which the author analyses the ḥiyal from a number of sources and presents the 
critical opinion of various Hanafī authorities on them.170 The comments made by the author 
on the ḥiyal give us an accurate portrayal of the relationship between the ḥiyal genre and al-
Shaybānī‘s works. In relation to a large number of ḥiyal the author mentions their source 
which either contains the ḥīla exactly as its being quoted or the principles upon which the ḥīla 
is built. The author ascribes numerous ḥiyal to the following sources: 
 al-Aṣl171 
                                                 
170
 A complete edition of this work was first published in 2004; earlier published editions of this work were were 
incomplete and crucially lacked the chapter on ḥiyal. Regarding these previous editions, and a general 
description of this unique work, see Murteza Bedir, ―Bukharan Hanafism and the Mashayikh: An Analysis 
through the Law of Waqf as Expounded by Burhan al-Shari‗a al-Bukhari (d.616/1219),‖ in Studies in Islamic 
Law: A Festschrift for Colin Imber, ed. Andreas Christmann and Robert Gleave, Journal of Semitic Studies 
Supplement 23 (Oxford: OUP, 2007), 6, n. 29, 1-8, 19-21. 
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 See for example, al-Muḥīṭ al-Burhānī, vol. 21, 80, 111, 115, 118, 123, 129-131, 135, 138, 150, 153, 170, 176, 
256, 315, 328.  
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 al-Jāmīʿ al-Kabīr172 
 al-Jāmiʿ al-Ṣaghīr173 
 al-Siyar al-Kabīr174 
 al-Ziyādāt175 
In addition to these works he also makes a number of references to al-Shaybānī‘s works 
which are known as the nawādir.176 Through these references it becomes apparent that the 
norm of the ḥiyal was for them to emanate from the most authoritative sources. This becomes 
clear when the author remarks in one instance that a certain ḥīla is not from al-Shaybānī‘s 
works and then compares it to the standard doctrine and shows that it is at odds with the latter 
and concludes that it is not a sound ḥīla.177 
 
Horii also inquired into the provenance of the ḥiyal.178 She discusses five ḥiyal in 
considerable detail, explaining their occurrence in the various ḥiyal texts and also locating 
them in the original Ḥanafī corpus juris. For this purpose she uses four texts written by the 
earliest authorities; Abū Yūsuf‘s Ikhtilāf Abī Ḥanīfa wa Ibn Abī Laylā; al-Shaybānī‘s al-Aṣl, 
al-Jāmīʿ al-Kabīr and al-Jāmiʿ al-Ṣaghīr.179 The first ḥīla she discusses will be mentioned 
here as an example of her method and the conclusions she draws. The ḥīla relates to the 
difference between the rules of guaranty (kafāla) and debt transfer (ḥawāla).180 The Ḥanafīs 
rule that in a kafāla agreement the creditor has recourse to both the debtor and the guarantor, 
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 Horii‘s work is the result of her PhD thesis Die gesetzlichen Umgehungen im islamischen Recht (ḥiyal) unter 
besonderer Berücksichtigung des Ḥanafīten Saʿīd b. ʿAlī as-Samarqandī (gest. 12.Jhdt.) (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz 
Verlag, 2001). She later published an article based upon her earlier thesis to which will subsequently refer. 
179
 Horii, Reconsideration of Legal Devices, 332. 
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whereas in ḥawāla, he only has recourse to the guarantor. Ibn Abī Laylā, the Kufan judge and 
contemporary of Abū Ḥanīfa, however, was of the opinion that in both cases the creditor 
would only have recourse to the guarantor. Abū Yūsuf, who studied under both jurists, 
remarks in his Ikhtilāf that if the debtor and guarantor stand as guarantee for one another, then 
the creditor has recourse to both and that this solution is acceptable to all the jurists. This 
means that a creditor making a kafāla agreement can ensure that according to both jurists he 
will have the right to pursue his right from both the debtor and the guarantor. Abū Yūsuf‘s 
solution to the problem is later incorporated into al-Shaybānī‘s al-Makhārij.181 Horii is also 
quick to point out that the Mālikīs suggest a similar ḥīla, although without naming it as 
such.
182
 
 
Horii then goes on to examine four other ḥiyal, whilst also locating their original sources:  
1) A ḥīla for the marriage dissolution of a minor is found al-Jāmiʿ al-Ṣaghīr. 
2) A ḥīla for istibrāʾ183 is in al-Aṣl;  
3) A ḥīla for pre-emption is in al-Jāmiʿ al-Kabīr; 
4) A ḥīla for the alms-tax is in al-Aṣl.184 
She also points out that the first ḥīla is also found to exist in the Mālikī School.185 The 
implications of her results are that the substantive doctrine is a major source for the ḥiyal and 
that the need for such exits was dealt with by the earliest authorities, although they themselves 
never identified them as ḥiyal. This applies both to the Ḥanafīs and to the Mālikīs. It is only 
subsequently that the Ḥanafī authors appropriated these solutions from the original sources 
and included them in their ḥiyal works. 
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Another researcher Ṣāliḥ Būshīsh asserted that the differences surrounding the ḥiyal were due 
to the jurists not clarifying what they meant by the term ḥiyal.186 He therefore put forward the 
following definition: 
‗It is an intention to effect the change of a rule to another through a means, [which], in principle, is 
legal.‘187 
His definition was meant to capture the notion of ḥiyal as makhārij and therefore limit the 
discourse to the non-egregious type. He used this definition to investigate the genre and assess 
its contents. What he found was that the ḥiyal did not always correspond to his definition; in 
fact, many of the so-called hiyal in the work of al-Shaybānī were nothing but the application 
of the standard doctrine.
188
 These, he claimed, were mere fatwas and were not to be 
considered as ḥiyal in the technical sense. To explain why they should have been included in 
the genre, he put forward two reasons; firstly he suggested that al-Shaybānī did not have an 
established definition for the ḥiyal and secondly because al-Shaybānī considered that to effect 
a specific Sharīʿa rule by enacting its cause, was itself a ḥīla.189 This latitude in al-Shaybānī‘s 
understanding of the ḥiyal, he argues, caused later scholars to assert the normative nature of 
the ḥiyal.190 Although Būshīsh regards this understanding of the ḥiyal as rather profuse, it 
only underscores what has already by demonstrated here, namely that for the Ḥanafīs, the 
ḥiyal were part and parcel of their normal doctrine and were not considered to be a 
demarcated external field. 
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4.5.2 Maintaining Systematic Consistency 
If the ḥiyal are indeed extracted from al-Shaybānī‘s normative doctrine, and not simple tricks 
to allow covert violations of the law, this should be reflected in the systematic consistency 
between the genre and his works. This means that the principles and juridical norms which 
underpin the normative doctrine should equally apply to the ḥiyal genre. When we examine 
the ḥiyal works this is precisely what is observed. al-Shaybānī, for example, is asked 
regarding the application of a ḥīla which he has mentioned previously, to another situation 
where the agent wishes to lower the price of an item prior to the seller taking possession of it. 
In response al-Shaybānī explicates the differing views of Abū Ḥanīfa and Abū Yūsuf on the 
legality of an agent lowering the price prior to possession, and concludes by saying that the 
ḥīla which he previously suggested can be applied only according to Abū Yūsuf, as it is in 
line with his principles and not according to Abū Ḥanīfa. Similarly, a ḥīla mentioned by al-
Sarakhsī related to muḍāraba, is judged to be according to the principles of Abū Ḥanīfa and 
Abū Yūsuf specifically; in order to accommodate the opinion of al-Shaybānī, he suggests a 
different ḥīla.191 A more pertinent example, however, is al-Sarakhsī‘s rejection of a ḥīla 
suggested by al-Khaṣṣāf. al-Sarakhsī examines the ḥīla and discusses its juridical basis at 
length. al-Sarakhsī notes that the ḥīla is constructed upon a principle which is specific to al-
Khaṣṣaf, and is therefore not in accordance with the accepted principles of the School.192 
 
In the al-Muḥīṭ al-Burhānī the same critical attitude is also demonstrated, both in the concern 
for systematic consistency and in the critical rejection of those ḥiyal which fail to meet with 
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 al-Sarakhsī, Kitāb al-ḥiyal, 129. 
192
 The principle being referred to is highly technical and for that reason, it is all the more persuasive. The 
essence of the principle is explicated by al-Sarakhsī: ‗It is his opinion (i.e. al-Khaṣṣāf‘s) that to intend 
specification (takhṣīṣ) of what is established from the necessary import of speech (muqtaḍā al-kalām), is correct; 
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generality (ʿumūm) and therefore to intend its specification is permissible. … However, what is correct in the 
School, is that the necessary import has no generality and that the intention of specification in what is established 
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the accepted principles. Like al-Sarakhsī, Ibn Māza points out those ḥiyal which are correct 
according to the principles of some, but not all, of the early Ḥanafī authorities: A ḥīla may 
thus be valid according to the principles of Abū Yūsuf but not according to al-Shaybānī,193 or 
vice versa,
194
 or even valid according to both Abū Yūsuf and al-Shaybānī but not according to 
Abū Ḥanīfa.195 Additionally, he reproduces the judicious insights of al-Ḥalwānī, some of 
which may have been gleaned from the latter‘s commentary on al-Khaṣṣāf‘s ḥiyal treatise. al-
Ḥalwānī critically analyses the ḥiyal and expresses his doubt about a number of ḥiyal when 
they do not conform with the accepted principles or standards of the School, or when their 
remit is not accurately circumscribed.
196
 He also points out those which contradict the al-
Mabsūṭ, i.e. al-Shaybānī‘s al-Aṣl, thereby reinforcing the norm that the ḥiyal must be based 
squarely on the most authoritative sources.
197
 
 
4.5.2.1 The Ḥiyal and Juristic Differences 
Another type of ḥīlal which demonstrates the authors concern for upholding the systematic 
consistency of the jurists, are those which serve to overcome their differences of opinion. The 
purpose of these ḥiyal is to protect the rights of the parties to a contract should the incumbent 
judge be from another madhhab, or even from the same madhhab, but hold an opinion which 
may threaten the basis of a transaction or contract. A good example of this, is the ḥīla 
mentioned earlier regarding the difference of opinion between the Ḥanafīs and Ibn Abī Laylā. 
The ḥīla in this case originates as a point mentioned in an earlier work of comparative fiqh, 
and subsequently finds itself included into the genre. The importance of avoiding juristic 
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 See, for example, al-Muḥīṭ al-Burhānī, vol. 21, 82, 186-87. 
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 Ibid, vol. 21, 204, 205. In one case al-Ḥalwānī suggests that a particular ḥīla is valid according to Abū Ḥanīfa, 
but not according to al-shaybānī, and that the opinion of Abū Yūsuf is unclear (muḍṭarib). Another commentator 
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difference is not the sole concern of the Ḥanafīs, and as mentioned earlier the Mālikīs also 
suggest a similar ḥīla. 
 
These types of ḥiyal occur frequently in al-Khaṣṣāf treatise.  al-Khaṣṣāf, a renowned judge of 
Baghdad, would have been aware of the differences amongst the judges and the impact it 
would have on the acceptability of contracts. Many of his ḥiyal are thus prefaced with the 
clarification, either from himself or the interlocutor, that it will be valid according to the 
opinion of the Ḥanafīs and also according to the other jurists.198 In some cases al-Khaṣṣaf‘s 
ḥiyal are to avoid differences amongst the Ḥanafīs. In one example al-Khaṣṣāf agrees with 
Abu Yūsuf‘s rule on a point of law, but acknowledges that others may disagree, he thus 
presents a ḥīla to accommodate for the difference.199 In another example it is Abū Ḥanīfa 
opinion which is accommodated,
200
 while in another, the disagreement is between Abū Yūsuf 
and Zufar.
201
 In the work of al-Sarakhsī, one example relates to the difference of opinion 
being between al-Shaybānī and his two teachers Abū Ḥanīfa and Abū Yūsuf,202 and in another 
between the Ḥanafīs and the other jurists.203 Similar ḥiyal can also be noted in the al-Muḥīṭ al-
Burhānī.204  
 
What is also interesting to note here, is that the purpose of the ḥīla is to maintain one‘s legal 
rights as determined by the madhhab, despite the personal opinions of the incumbent judge. 
We have already observed the use of such ḥiyal by Ibn al-Qayyim who suggests various ḥiyal 
to prevent the Ḥanafī rules of shufʿa applying. This phenomenon is also witnessed in the area 
of shurūṭ where Schacht‘s protégé Wakin, notes that one of the major concerns of the notaries 
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 As a representative sample, see al-Khaṣṣāf, Kitāb al-ḥiyal, 108-114 
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 Ibid, 114. 
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 al-Sarakhsī, Kitāb al-ḥiyal, 110 
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 Ibid, 109. 
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 See, for example, al-Muḥīṭ al-Burhānī, vol. 21, 87, 147-48, 175-76, 179, 289, 347, 351. 
RECEPTION OF THE ḤIYAL: THE GENRE 
191 
 
when writing legal documents, was to frame the contract in such a way that the rights of the 
contracting parties would be upheld, irrespective of the madhhab of the judge: 
[I]f the contract were disputed before a qadi who followed the opinion of one scholar or school, while a 
single clause or element in the document was an expression of another opinion, the qadi might declare 
the entire contract invalid. A model contract had to be valid in all schools simply because business itself 
cut across the borders of all schools.
205
 
Despite Wakin subscribing to Schacht‘s thesis of a cleft between theory and practice, the very 
premise which underpins this statement belies that theory. The very fact that contracts could 
be drawn up to satisfy the juridical differences of scholars from different Schools, operating in 
distant regions, was ultimately based upon the certain knowledge that each scholar would be 
judging according to a specific doctrine.
206
 The practical works on the ḥiyal and shurūṭ, pace 
Schacht, therefore testify to the predictability of the judicial systems in applying Islamic law 
according to the theoretical works of the jurists.
207
 It is this very predictability which allowed 
the jurists to produce solutions in the form of ḥiyal or notarial documents.  That solutions 
were needed to deal with the differences among the jurists was inevitable due to the normative 
juridical pluralism that characterised the Islamic legal system. 
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 Jeanette A. Wakin, The function of Documents in Islamic Law: The Chapters on Sales from Ṭaḥāwīs Kitāb al-
Shurūṭ al-Kabīr (New York: SUNY Press, 1972), 32-4. 
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 Wakin herself admits this while desparately trying to maintain Schacht‘s thesis: ‗The emphasis on the validity 
of the contract, the care for being legally correct shows how closely the Sharīʿa was followed, at least in its 
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Jeanette Wakin, ―Written Documents in Islamic Law,‖ in Actas: IV Congresso de Estudos Árabes Islāmicos 
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 Hallaq who researched into the relation of the shurūṭ manuals and their relation to doctrine and practice 
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Shurūṭ Works and the Dialectic of Doctrine and Practice,‖ Islamic Law and Society 2, no. 2 (1995): 109-134 
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4.5.3 The Endogenous View 
While presenting an analysis on the ḥiyal works, it is important to take note of the articulated 
positions of the ḥiyal authors themselves. These endogenous views are important, not as sole 
determinants of the substantive contents of their works, but rather as testimonies to the 
internal viewpoints and methodologies which the authors subscribe to. These statements can 
be measured against the objective analysis of exogenous researchers as presented in this 
study. The quotes selected here pertain to the teleology of the ḥiyal and also to the substantive 
content of the genre. In relation to the former, the statement of al-Shaybānī quoted earlier, is 
cited by most authors and universally upheld in the School as a benchmark for assessing the 
validity of the ḥiyal. al-Shaybānī, it will be recalled, laid out clearly in his treatise that: 
Whosoever uses a ḥīla in a matter [such that something] reprehensible enters his faith, has not used a 
ḥīla, nor is that regarded as a ḥīla. Indeed a ḥīla is only used to acquire through permissible [means] and 
to abandon the proscribed.
208
 
al-Khaṣṣaf also makes a clear pronouncement at the outset of his treatise: 
A ḥīla is only that by which a man extricates himself from the prohibited and exits via it to the licit. 
Whatever is like this or similar then there is no problem in it. What is reprehensible in that, is that a ḥīla 
should be used in someone‘s right [in order] to annul it, or to use a ḥīla in the proscribed to camouflage 
it, or to use a ḥīla in an [illicit] matter such that a doubt [regarding its reality] enters into it.209  
In the al-Muḥīṭ al-Burhānī, Ibn Māza begins his work with very similar comments, as does 
Saʿīd ibn ʿAlī the author of the Jannat al-Aḥkam. Both authors stress that the ḥiyal are not to 
be used to usurp someone‘s right or to disguise a prohibited action. Their purpose is solely to 
help those who need an exit to help them from falling into the prohibited or for those who 
want to lawfully acquire or uphold their rights.
210
 These quotes make it clear that the authors 
were aware of the doubt regarding the ḥiyal raised by the accusations of their detractors. Their 
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unequivocal statements address those precise concerns and lay down the principles to which 
they commit themselves in their respective works. 
 
For a precise endogenous evaluation of the substantive contents of the ḥiyal genre and their 
relation to the authoritative works of al-Shaybānī, the following quote is taken from Saʿīd ibn 
ʿAlī‘s introduction to his ḥiyal treatise the Jannat al-Aḥkām, : 
The previous Imāms; Abū Ḥanīfa, Abū Yūsuf, Muḥammad, Zufar and al-Ḥasan ibn Ziyād propounded 
their exits (makhārij) in their books without specifying them, and [hence] dispersed them in their 
writings without gathering them together [in a single work]. It is for this [reason] that Abū Bakr al-Iskāf 
said: ‗The ḥiyal rulings are all present in al-Mabsūṭ (i.e. Shaybānī‘s al-Aṣl) except for one ruling and 
that is the ḥīla used to nullify the pre-emption of the partner.211 
The author, having explained that the ḥiyal originated as makhārij dispersed in the works of 
the earliest authorities, goes on to identify his own sources and give the raison d‘être for his 
treatise:  
I have gathered the cases of the ḥiyal and concessions [relating to] worship and transactions, from the 
books of the earlier scholars of the religion and [also] extracted some from the fatāwā works of the later 
scholars; the jurists of the believers (May Allah be pleased with them). I have combined them in this 
book and arranged them into chapters to make it easier for the student to find them and for the one in 
urgent need to access them.
212
    
 
This endogenous account corresponds exactly with our preceding presentation. From this 
quote, four characteristics of the ḥiyal genre can be discerned: 
1. The earliest authorities were responsible for the initial exits and hence the substantive 
material in the early ḥiyal works.  
2. All of these exits can be found in al-Shaybānī‘s al-Aṣl. 
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3. Later scholars also provided exits in their fatāwā works; implying that the ḥiyal genre 
was not considered to be the primary repository for these exits, but rather a distilled 
secondary account. 
4. The genre was for both didactic and practical purposes: In the former, the student 
would learn the methodological technique underpinning the exits, and in the latter, the 
works would provide an immediate reference for pressing exigencies. 
 
4.6 Genre and Polemic Conclusions 
The multitude of evidences presented by the opponents of the ḥiyal appears to make a clear 
case for their injunction. However, when the arguments of the protagonists are noted, what 
generally transpires is that their respective arguments apply to two distinct spheres, although 
there is, admittedly, some degree of overlap. In order to address this hermeneutical paradox, 
the opponents develop distinguishing taxonomies in order to accommodate the growing 
recognition of legitimate exits. Ibn Taymiyya, using maṣlaḥa and wasāʾil as defining 
characteristics, seeks to differentiate those ḥiyal which are egregious from those which 
conform to the purposes of the law, which in his view, are not regarded as ḥiyal despite being 
labelled as such. Ibn al-Qayyim follows the approach of his teacher in this regard and puts 
forward a number of ḥiyal which he deems to be suitable, while also maintaining the polemic 
against the other ḥiyal. 
 
al-Shāṭibī attempts to provide a middle sphere between the licit and illict ḥiyal. This is the 
area of overlap, in which the discerning factor is the telos (maqṣad) underpinning the ḥīla. 
This trifurcation grants that the overlap is a natural consequence of normative legal pluralism, 
and at the minimum suggests that wherever a preponderant maṣlaḥa can be perceived, leeway 
should be granted. All of the ḥiyal which are the subject of the polemic fall into al-Shāṭibī‘s 
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middle category. Ibn Taymiyya, for example, focuses on the taḥlīl and bayʿ al-ʿīna, whilst 
also mentioning the ḥiyal of zakāt and shufʿa. In fact, these four ḥiyal are the most 
controversial and in order for al-Shāṭibī to give credence to his approach, he provides 
teleological explanations for both taḥlīl and bayʿ al-ʿīna. Although he, himself, does not 
subscribe to them, he does show that even these two ḥiyal, which are the most controversial, 
can be reconciled with the general purposes of the Sharīʿa. His formula of deploying the 
maqāṣid as a yardstick of differentiation has been widely accepted and utilised in the work of 
recent scholars and researchers.
213
 Some researchers have used al-Shāṭibī‘s formula to 
examine ḥiyal beyond the limited number of controversial ḥiyal which tend to dominate the 
ḥiyal discourse. This provides a more balanced account of the genre as a whole as opposed to 
the limited focus of the polemic.
214
 
 
In the work of the Orientalists, we note that, it is these controversial ḥiyal, which are most 
frequently mentioned. Schacht, for example, refers to bayʿ al-ʿ īna, taḥlīl and shufʿa and 
Coulson to bayʿ al-ʿīna, waqf and taḥlīl. 215 The opponents of the genre are therefore 
characterising the genre by its most controversial aspects.
216
 It is clear that these single 
instances do not portray an accurate picture of the genre as a whole; but rather are a limited 
number of disputed exits. Some of which, like taḥlīl in its brazen form, are not advocated in 
any ḥiyal work.  It is untenable then that these marginal examples should be the basis for 
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assessing the entire genre. The Orientalists, however, have insisted on attempting to 
scandalise the genre through these limited examples. Schacht, who played the leading role in 
that process, asserts that: 
This voluntary quasi-abdication of theory from practically the whole field of commercial law in favor of 
custom was facilitated by the sacred and inscrutable character of Islamic legal theory, which called for 
the observance of the letter rather than the spirit. … The great Ḥanafī authorities Abū Yūsuf and 
Shaybānī, elaborated such devices and put them at the disposal of the public. One such book, which is 
credited to Khaṣṣāf … enables us to discern, through the thin veil of its legally unobjectionable forms, 
the realities of practice in that time and place.
217
 
It is noteworthy that Schacht completely ignores the maṣlaḥa discourses in his monolithic 
characterisation of Islamic legal theory. For Schacht, there can be no teleological reading of 
the fiqh, as he and his mentor Hurgronje, have already determined it to be a deontology; both 
sacred and inscrutable. The ḥiyal were therefore considered by them to act as a modus 
vivendi; accommodating the sacred law to the exigencies of real life. The genre, however, as 
has been demonstrated, is not reflective of these polemics but rather of the endogenous 
account given to it by its authors. They are not a modus vivendi, as they reflect nothing but the 
normative School doctrine. What distinguishes them and justifies their compilation as a 
distinct genre is their functional utility as exits. The substantive content of these works is 
therefore typified, not by covert violations of the law, but rather by systematically consistent 
formulations of ḥiyal as makhārij. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
THE USURY CIRCUMVENTS: BAYʿ AL-WAFĀʾ  
AND BAYʿ AL-ʿĪNA 
 
 
 
The assertion of the Orientalists is that interest based debt financing was a necessary part of 
medieval commerce, and that Muslims jurists recognized this by formulating the ḥiyal to 
circumvent the ribā prohibition. Acting as a modus vivendi this allowed the jurists to silently 
acquiesce to the demands of commercial realities whilst maintaining their religious moral 
authority. The ḥiyal were hence deemed to be nothing but juridical devices which sought to 
create a veneer of legality to the prevalent commercial practices which were in overt violation 
of the law. In this chapter we will assess these claims and investigate the assumptions which 
lie beneath them. 
 
The principal ḥiyal which relate to the ribā injunction are the bayʿ al-wafāʾ and the bayʿ al-
ʿīna. Both of these will be examined in detail and the juridical discourse regarding them will 
be presented. The purpose of the discussion will be to understand how the jurists understood 
and explained these ḥiyal. We will examine a wide range of Ḥanafī sources to determine 
where, when and how these ḥiyal came about, and whether the jurists were merely glossing 
over what were accepted usurious norms, or whether they were responding to pressing 
exigencies based upon the teleological principles discussed in the previous chapter. 
 
5.1 Usury Circumvents 
In this section we will deal with the main circumvents which were used to evade the 
prohibition of ribā; namely the bayʿ al-ʿīna and the bayʿ al-wafāʾ. The bayʿ al-ʿīna is 
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essentially a double-sale consisting of two consecutive transactions, which individually are 
sound, but ultimately combine to create the effect of a usurious loan. The Schools of law 
differ both in explicating its various forms and its legal ruling. The Ḥanafīs discuss a variety 
of double-sales in their works and only one of these is generally regarded as the ʿīna 
transaction. They differ in this with the other Schools as we shall see. We will discuss three 
generic forms of the double-sale in the following order: 
1) ʿīna 
2) tawarruq 
3) muʿāmala 
 
5.1.1 Bayʿ al-ʿĪna 
There are many forms of the bayʿ al-īna, but in essence this transaction involves a buy-back 
sale with a pricing differential. The pricing differential is based upon one of the sales being a 
credit sale and the other a cash sale. The end result of both transactions is that one of the 
parties acquires cash in hand together with a debt for a higher amount. If one looks only at the 
end result it is clear that the double-sale leads to a situation analogous to a usurious loan. 
Again, as in our previous discussions, the approach of the different Schools is premised 
ultimately on their respective juridical methodologies. We will briefly explicate their views 
before examining the approach of the Ḥanafīs. 
 
The prohibition for the ʿīna sale has been inferred from the following ḥadīth: 
ʿĀliya bint Ayfaʿ said: I performed the pilgrimage with Umm Muḥibba and when we entered upon 
ʿĀʾisha – may Allah be pleased with her – Umm Muḥibba said to her: O Mother of the believers, I used 
to own a slave girl and I sold her to Zayd ibn Arqam for 800 dirhams due [at the time of]ʿaṭāʾ. He then 
intended to sell her, so I purchased her from him for 600 dirhams cash. She (ʿĀʾisha) said: What an evil 
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sale and purchase; let Zayd ibn Arqam know that he has nullified his Jihād with the Messenger of Allah 
(pbuh) unless he repents.
1
 
What is important regarding the sale mentioned in this ḥadīth is that it is fortuitous, as 
opposed to a premeditated double-sale. The slave girl was sold for 800 dirhams on credit 
whereas in the buy-back sale the price was 600. The result of the sale meant that the article of 
sale had returned to its original owner although Zayd (ra) still had a debt of 200 dirhams. That 
Sayyida ʿĀʾisha (ra) interpreted this as a usurious transaction can be inferred for the following 
reasons. Firstly, the strength of her reproval indicates the transaction constituted a major sin. 
Secondly, in an addendum to this narration, Umm Muḥibba asks whether she may retain her 
capital (i.e. the slave) and forego the extra 200; ʿĀʾisha (ra) responds by reciting the verse 
relating to the ribā prohibition which permits one to retain the capital while foregoing the 
additional usury. Her citing of this verse implies that she (ra) viewed their buy-back contract 
as an infringement of the ribā rules. 
 
In the discourse of the jurists this specific transaction is known by the lengthy term shirāʾ mā 
bāʿ bi-aqall mimmā bāʿ qabl naqd al-thaman, which means to repurchase for less than the 
original sale price, prior to receiving payment. Most of the jurists regard this transaction as a 
form of ʿīna although the Ḥanafīs technically do not. 
 
5.1.1.1 Bayʿ al-ʿĪna and the Mālikīs 
The Mālikīs regard this tradition as a corroboration of the jurisprudential tool of blocking the 
means (sadd al-dharāʾiʿ). As mentioned earlier, it is clear from the ḥadīth, that the buy-back 
sale was fortuitous which precludes an accusation of unlawful intent. If neither of the parties 
intended to engage in a usurious transaction, then the only reason it should be prohibited is 
because it is considered to be a means to usury and hence it must be blocked. al-Qurṭubī states 
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that the transaction in its outward form is permissible, but, because it leads one to fall into the 
unlawful it is hence prohibited. The Mālikīs, he says, are opposed by the majority of the 
jurists who argue that legal rules must be premised only on the outward form of a transaction 
and not upon suspicion or conjecture. His response is that the Mālikī opinion is based upon 
sadd al-dharāʾiʿ. The ruling of ʿĀʾisha (ra) in the above mentioned ḥadīth, is therefore used to 
prove the legitimacy of both this jurisprudential technique and its application to contracts 
which may lead to usury.
2
  
 
What is important to understanding the Mālikī approach, is the jurisprudential basis of their 
understanding of the term ribā. As discussed in chapter one, the Mālikīs were noted for taking 
the position that the term ribā in the Qurʾān is ʿāmm and hence refers to a specific transaction 
which is premised upon a debt which demands an increase over the principal. The ʿīna 
transaction is clearly not such a transaction and hence it cannot be regarded as ribā. The 
Mālikīs, however, show that because it leads to analogous results it can be prohibited based 
upon the principle of sadd al-dharāʾiʿ.  
 
The Mālikīs consider this transaction (as mentioned in the ḥadīth) to be the archetype of what 
they call buyūʿ al-ājāl. Buyūʿ al-ājāl literally means credit sales, although what the Mālikīs 
are discussing are double-sales which begin with a credit sale and are then followed by a buy-
back sale. Under this rubric, they present a plethora of different possible forms depending on 
the form of the buy-back sale. The variants relate either to the price in the buy-back and/ or 
whether it is a credit sale and if so its duration. In general, nine different forms are discussed, 
out of which, two are prohibited. What is surprising, is that they allow the original seller to 
repurchase at a lower price if he does so using a credit sale in which the payment is due at the 
                                                 
2
 al-Qurṭubī, Aḥkām al-Qurʾān, vol. 3, 359. 
THE USURY CIRCUMVENTS: BAYʿ AL-WAFĀʾ AND BAYʿ AL-ʿĪNA 
 
202 
 
same time of the original sale. Although this will lead to a disparity in the prices they allow it 
because there is no time lag connected to the extra time. al-Shaybānī, although concurring 
with most of their rulings on the nine forms, specifically objects to this one. He argues that the 
disparity in prices represents an undue excess (faḍl) since the article ultimately returns to the 
original owner.
3
  
 
The Ḥanafī approach will be discussed later on, but for now, what can be noted is that for the 
Mālikīs, whether there is an excess or not, is not the point because in essence this transaction 
is not ribā and its prohibition is based upon a suspicion (tuhma) that it could lead to actual 
ribā. The latter is principally characterised by a time delay with an increase in the debt. If it is 
clear that there is no time delay, then whether there is an excess or not is immaterial as it 
cannot lead to ribā and hence the sadd al-dharāʾiʿ principle need not be invoked. 
 
5.1.1.2 Bayʿ al-ʿĪna and the Shāfiʿīs 
In our previous discussions we have noted that the Shāfiʿīs do not take intent into 
consideration and give their legal rulings based only upon the outward conformity of contracts 
to the law. al-Shāfiʿī, himself, articulates this:  
The principle of my approach is that every transaction which is outwardly sound, I do not invalidate 
[either] due to suspicion or the customary practices of the two parties; [rather] I permit them [based 
upon] the soundness of their outward [form]. I [do, however] dislike any intention which, if it were 
made apparent, would invalidate the sale‘.4 
                                                 
3
 al-Shaybānī, al-Ḥujja, vol. 2, 746-754. 
4
 al-Shāfiʿī, Kitāb al-Umm, vol. 3, 90. 
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The transaction mentioned in the ḥadīth is hence upheld, not only due to its being analogically 
consistent with their general approach, but also, becomes al-Shāfiʿī deems the ḥadīth 
mentioned earlier, to be weak.
5
 
 
Although Shāfiʿī regards the ḥadīth as weak, he gives a number of other important arguments 
for upholding the sale. Firstly, he argues that even if the ḥadīth were sound, it does not 
necessarily oppose his ruling due to the fact that Zayd ibn Arqam is also a Companion of the 
Prophet (pbuh), and the very fact that he engaged in this transaction can be taken to mean that 
in his opinion it was a permissible transaction. al-Shāfiʿī, therefore regards this as a genuine 
difference of opinion between two Companions. This must be judged according to the rules of 
jurisprudential preference, which, he argues, demand that the opinion which is closest to 
analogy is upheld.
6
 He demonstrates the analogical consistency of his view using the 
following four points:  
1. If the second sale had been made to someone else it would have been unanimously 
permitted.  
2. If the resale had been for the original price, or for a higher price, it would also be 
unanimously upheld.  
3. If the second sale was annulled then it would not affect the first sale and the debt 
would still be due and the item in the hands of the initial buyer. This, he avers, 
demonstrates that the two contracts are independent of each other. 
He also deals with the problem of the suspicion which the transaction entails, and says that 
there is less suspicion in the owner than there is in you, i.e. the interlocutor. By this, he means 
that the jurist himself should be wary of preventing a person from repurchasing an item he 
                                                 
5
 al-Shāfiʿī argues that it is weak because one of the narrators is unknown. See ibid, vol. 3, 47-48. The editor, 
however, notes that the narrator is not unknown and this ḥadīth was accepted by a number of jurists and 
traditionists. See ibid, vol. 3, 48, n. 1. 
6
 Ibid, vol. 3, 95. 
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regrets having sold, even if the repurchase price is higher than the original. The jurist should 
remember that trade has been permitted outright and only ribā prohibited, and this transaction, 
he argues, is not ribā.7 
 
al-Shāfiʿī‘s first argument is crucial as it shows that he regards the sale of the article to its 
original owner as similar to its sale to a third party. The sale to third person is known as 
tawarruq and it is clear from al-Shāfiʿī‘s argument that he permits both īna and tawarruq. In 
fact, al-Shāfiʿīs approach is the most analogically consistent; he makes no exceptions to his 
rules based upon arbitrary suspicions or customs. He even goes so far as to explicitly reject 
that customs, or promises which precede or follow a transaction, should impact the legality of 
any transactions.
8
 Having said this though, it should be noted that some later Shāfiʿīs found it 
difficult to uphold this strict application; Abū Isḥāq al-Isfrāyīnī and Abū Muḥammad both 
said that if it became an individuals habitual practice then the second sale would be regarded 
as a condition of the first, and hence both sales would become invalid.
9
  
 
What is crucial to understanding al-Shāfiʿī‘s approach is to understand the difference between 
the judicial and religious realms, reflected in the parlance of the jurists as qaḍāʾ and diyāna. 
For al-Shāfiʿī the law is based upon the outward forms of contracts, it is not for the judge to 
pursue the intents of the parties or to annul their contracts based upon his suspicions or 
possible outcomes which it may or may not lead to. The contract in question, namely ʿīna is 
nothing but a name given to two sale contracts performed between two people for the same 
article. al-Shāfiʿī argues that had the first sale been a cash sale and the subsequent second sale 
occurred sometime in the future, nobody would question its legitimacy, and how could they? 
                                                 
7
 Ibid, vol. 3, 95.  
8
 ‗Laysa li-al-ʿāda allatī iʿtādahā maʿn yuḥill shayʾ wa lā yaḥarrimuhū wa kadhālika al-mawʿid in kān qabl al-
ʿaqd aw baʿdahā‘. See ibid, vol. 3, 48. 
9
 Abū Zakariyya Yaḥyā ibn Sharaf al-Nawawī, Rawḍa al-Ṭālibīn (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 2000), vol. 
3, 86. 
THE USURY CIRCUMVENTS: BAYʿ AL-WAFĀʾ AND BAYʿ AL-ʿĪNA 
 
205 
 
To suggest that articles cannot be bought back by at any time in the future by the original 
owner would be ludicrous. The ʿīna is hence nothing but two transactions which lead to a 
result which is perceived to be similar to ribā.  
 
Although his detractors would argue that ʿīna can be a ḥīla for ribā, what al-Shāfīʿī is 
arguing, is that it is not necessarily so. In fact, in the ḥadīth mentioned above, it is clear that 
the consecutive transactions occurred fortuitously and were not pre-planned; how then could 
there be an accusation of this transaction being a ḥīla. For al-Shāfiʿī, accusations, suspicions 
and possibilities do not determine the law, as they are nothing but subjective and arbitrary 
judgments. Law, is rather, the application of objective legal science to concrete facts and 
realities. al-Shāfiʿī is also not alone in permitting bay al-ʿīna; the Ẓāhirīs also permit it, as do 
the Ibādīs, a branch of the puritan Khawārij.10 These jurists are noted for their strict adherence 
to the texts and its literal interpretation. Upholding bayʿ al-ʿīna was not, therefore, based upon 
commercial needs and the usage of ḥiyal, but was rather a consequence of these jurists‘ 
specific legal methodology. 
 
5.1.1.3 Bayʿ al-ʿĪna and the Ḥanbalīs 
The transaction mentioned in the above ḥadīth is stated by Ibn Qudāma to be the ʿīna 
transaction and like the Mālikīs, he argues for its prohibition on the grounds that it leads to 
ribā.11 What is significant in Ibn Qudāma‘s presentation is that he mentions that according to 
the School‘s eponym Aḥmad, ʿīna was the practice of a merchant to sell his goods only on 
credit and not on cash. Ibn Qudāma quotes him as saying that ‗I dislike for a man that his 
trade should not be [anything] other than ʿīna and [that] he does not sell for cash‘. Ibn 
                                                 
10
 Ersilia Francesca, ―Religious Observance and Market Law in Medieval Islam. The Controversial Application 
of the Prohibition of Usury According to some Ibâḍî Sources,‖ Revue des Mondes Musulmans et de la 
Méditerranée 99-100 (2002): 199-200, n.9. 
11
 Ibn Qudāma, al-Mughnī, vol. 4, 256-57. 
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Qudāma is quick to point out that credit sales per se are unanimously permitted and what is 
disliked is for a merchant to restrict himself to credit sales while refusing to sell for cash.
12
  
 
It is not unusual that Aḥmad should have had a different understanding of the term ʿīna. In the 
ḥadīth compendium of Ibn Abī Shayba, we find that a number of Successor jurists also 
differed as to its precise meaning which led to a number of different rulings being issued in 
regard to its validity. This varies from holding it to be a mere credit sale to the double-sale 
mentioned in the ḥadīth.13 Although different interpretations are given to the form the ʿīna 
transaction might take, what is common to all of them is that it supplies a person with 
immediate cash through a sale transaction which ultimately leaves him with a larger debt.
14
 
This is the case in an ordinary credit sale, in that credit sales are generally more expensive 
than cash sales. So a person in need of immediate cash, may purchase an item on credit, say 
for £100, and then proceed to sell it on the market for, say, £80. The credit sale is thus used to 
provide him with cash, although the amount he receives is less than the debt he incurs. 
Although this latter technique would later acquire the technical name tawarruq, in the early 
period such terminological differentiations were ostensibly absent. 
 
Ibn Qudāma then goes on to discuss the scenario of a double-sale in which a cash sale occurs 
first followed by a buy-back credit sale with an increase in the price. It is evident that this is 
                                                 
12
 Ibid, vol. 4, 257. 
13
 See the chapters relating to the concessions and pledges used in al-ʿīna, in Ibn Abī Shayba, al-Muṣannaf, vol. 
4, 455-56. 
14
 The practice of buying on credit and selling for cash on the market, as a way of raising immediate funds was a 
common practice in medieval Europe. To the avoid suspicion of the use of a double-sale as a cover for usury this 
was a more subtle alternative. Postan notes with regard to the double-sales that: If a fictitious sale of this kind 
could easily be distinguished from a legitimate commercial bargain, it had to be but slightly modified to become 
absolutely indistinguishable from a genuine sale. How could anybody detect the real nature of similar 
transactions when they are carried out by three parties instead of two, when goods were brought on credit from 
one man and sold for cash to another? The raising of funds by means of a three-cornered sale was common in 
this country and abroad. It was employed by Bruges, Leiden, and other continental towns, and by English kings, 
notably Edward III, in their transaction with wool‘. See M. M. Postan, Medieval Trade and Finance (Cambridge: 
CUP, 1973), 11-12. 
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the reverse of the transaction mentioned in the ḥadīth. Ibn Qudāma notes that this transaction 
resembles the ʿīna transaction, although, he says, it is possible that it could be permissible 
even if it is resold for a higher price. He argues that if it is based upon a pre-agreement, or is 
used as a ḥīla, then it is prohibited, otherwise a transaction like this may also occur 
fortuitously. Such a coincidence is not sufficient to render it impermissible as the principal 
rule of sale is permissibility.
15
 It is noteworthy that he differentiates between this case and the 
former, even though they are very similar and lead to similar results; the former, he argues, is 
prohibited based upon the ḥadīth and also because it is more likely to lead to ribā as opposed 
to the latter. 
 
5.1.1.4 Bayʿ al-ʿĪna and the Ḥanafīs 
The Ḥanafīs, like the Ḥanbalīs, differentiate between the two transactions, i.e. the one 
mentioned in the ḥadīth and its converse. The first transaction, mentioned in the ḥadīth, is 
generally not referred to as ʿīna but rather by the longer formula ‗shirāʾ mā bāʿ bi-aqall 
mimmā bāʿ‘. The second transaction, in which a cash sale precedes the credit sale, is what 
they refer to as ʿīna. For the Ḥanafīs this differentiation is not based upon one transaction 
being a greater means to ribā than the other, but because for them, the first transaction is 
considered to be actual ribā whereas the second is not. The second transaction is hence known 
as ʿīna because it is not actual ribā, but a transaction which stands in lieu of it. 
 
The Ḥanafīs argument is that in the ḥadīth, the first sale is a credit sale and the second sale 
occurs while the original buyer is still in debt. If there is a price differential, this means that 
even though the article of sale returns to the owner, the original buyer ends up with a larger 
debt in lieu of a smaller amount of cash. In the case of the ḥadīth the slave was sold on credit 
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 Ibn Qudāma, al-Mughnī, vol. 4, 257-8. 
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for 800 dirhams and then repurchased for 600 dirhams cash. Once the slave has been 
returned, the result is that the original buyer owes 800 dirhams in the future, while acquiring 
600 dirhams cash. The Ḥanafīs say that based upon maqāṣṣa, restitution of debts, the debt 
obligations of both parties meet and cancel each other out with an excess left over.
16
 This is 
explained by the fact that in the second sale, before the price is delivered it is considered to be 
a debt, and hence the transaction is viewed as a debt of 800 dirhams in lieu of a debt for 600 
dirhams.  This excess is riba according to the Ḥanafī definition of the term, irrespective of the 
fact that the debts do not fall at the same time. 
 
As we discussed in chapter two, ribā was originally an ambiguous term (mujmal) which was 
subsequently defined according to the Qurʾān and the Sunna. al-Jaṣṣāṣ, after explicating the 
meaning of ribā, mentions that from the meanings of ribā intended by the Qurʾānic verse is 
the shirāʾ mā bāʿ bi-aqall mimmā bāʿ transaction. After quoting the ḥadīth mentioned above, 
he infers from ʿĀʾisha‘s (ra) recital of the verse of ribā, that this transaction is actual ribā. He 
also quotes the Madīnan jurist Saʿīd ibn Musayyab‘s saying that this sale is ribā. He 
concludes that the judgements of ʿĀʾisha (ra) and Ibn Musayyab both indicate that this 
transaction results directly in the ribā prohibited in the Qurʾān.17 The transaction is thus 
prohibited not because it leads to ribā, but because it actually is ribā.  
 
The ʿīna transaction, as discussed by the Ḥanafīs, is the converse of the double-sale 
mentioned in the ḥadīth, and hence begins with a cash sale followed by a buy-back sale on 
credit. Clearly there is no question of debt restitution as there is no existing debt at the time of 
the second sale. For this reason the Ḥanafīs do not declare bayʿ al-ʿīna to be a ribā 
transaction, although it is clear that the outcome is not so dissimilar. If, for example, X sells a 
                                                 
16
 al-Kāsānī, Badāʾiʿ, vol. 5, 326. 
17
 al-Jaṣṣās, Aḥkām al-Qurʾān, vol. 2, 175-6. 
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car to Y for £1000 cash, then immediately buys it back for £1500 on credit; it is clear that the 
article of sale returns to its original owner, X. The outcome is that X receives £1000 cash 
from Y, while incurring a debt of £1500. The Ḥanafīs also mention an alternative form of al-
ʿīna for a person who has no item to sell. This form of ʿīna is similar to the transaction 
mentioned in the ḥadīth in that the first sale is a credit sale. However because of the injunction 
mentioned in the ḥadīth, the buyer sells the item at a lower price to a third party, who then 
sells it to the original owner at that same lower price.
18
 Again the outcome is that the article 
returns to the original owner whereas the buyer has incurred a debt larger than the amount of 
cash he has received. 
 
Like the Shāfiʿīs the Ḥanafīs do not annul contracts based upon suspicions or possible 
outcomes, as it is possible that such eventualities may occur coincidentally as part of normal 
business practice. Although it is also possible that this arrangement can be used as a ḥīla to 
evade the ribā proscription, the contract cannot be invalidated merely on that basis. Nor do 
the Ḥanafīs subscribe to the doctrine of sadd al-dharāʾīʿ by which they could pre-emptively 
prohibit it. This should mean that, like the Shāfiʿīs, they too uphold the validity of the 
transaction irrespective of its possible misuse. Abū Ḥanīfa, however, held the contract to be 
reprehensible as did his student al-Shaybānī. The latter‘s following statement accurately 
reflects his sentiments: This sale [weighs] in my heart like the mountains; [it is truly] 
blameworthy; contrived by the consumers of ribā.19 
 
                                                 
18
 Kamāl al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wāhid al-Sīwāsī ibn al-Humām, Sharḥ Fatḥ al-Qadīr (Riyadh: Dār 
ʿĀlam al-Kutub, 2003), vol. 5, 424-5. 
19
 Ibid, vol. 5, 425. 
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The contemporary Damascene jurist al-Zuḥaylī, regards Abū Ḥanīfa as having violated his 
principles in censuring this transaction.
20
 He contrasts this with al-Shāfiʿī who staunchly 
abides by his principles and upholds the ʿīna sale.21  The Ḥanafīs however claim that ʿīna is 
an exception to the general principles. They justify this by alluding to a specific mention of 
ʿīna in a Prophetic ḥadīth which forewarns the Muslims about this transaction.22 The general 
principles are hence sacrificed in favour of this specific textual indication. 
 
Abū Yūsuf however, is reported to have not only regarded ʿīna as valid, but also as a 
commendable act due to it being a means for the poor to escape from ribā. He argued in 
favour of it due to its being practiced by a number of Companions.
23
 Just what Abū Yūsuf is 
referring to as ʿīna will be discussed later on, but an important point which can be gleaned 
from his argument is that he identifies the purpose behind the sale as an exit for the poor; a 
reason which ultimately may contribute to its justification. In the renowned Hanafī textbook 
al-Hidāya, the author al-Marghīnānī also alludes to this fact when he states that ʿīna is 
reprehensible as it implies a reluctance by the creditor to grant a gratuitous loan and also 
because it is essentially premised upon a censurable miserliness.
24
 Although the author 
apparently takes a different stance to Abū Yūsuf, what is crucially important is the rationale 
which underpins their respective opinions. They both reason based upon the relationship 
between the use of ʿīna and its Islamic replacement, the gratuitous loan. 
 
 
                                                 
20
 He explains that Abū Ḥanīfa left his principle and made his judgement using the principle known as istiḥsān 
and based upon the ḥadīth cited earlier. al-Zuḥaylī, al-Fiqh al-Islāmī, vol. 5, 3455. 
21
 al-Zuḥaylī, however, later on rejects al-Shāfiʿī‘s opinion as it fails to account for the indications of custom and 
usage. See ibid, vol. 5, 3456-7. 
22
 See Ibn Taymiyya Bayān al-Dalīl, 44-455, n.1. 
23
 See Fakhr al-Dīn Ḥasan ibn Manṣūr al-Ūzjandī, Fatāwā Qāḍī Khān printed on the margins of vols. 1-3 of 
Niẓām al-Dīn and a group of Indian scholars, al-Fatāwā al-ʿĀlamgīriyya (also known as al-Fatāwā al-Hindiyya) 
(Queta: Maktaba Rashīdiyya, 1983), vol. 2, 279-280. 
24
 Burhān al-Din ʿAlī ibn Abī Bakr ibn ʿAbd al-Jalīl al-Marghīnānī, al-Hidāya (Pakistan: al-Miṣbāḥ, nd), vol. 2 
123. 
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5.1.2 Tawarruq 
Tawarruq is not the name of a group of transactions between two people, as ʿīna is, but rather, 
the name of two transactions made by one individual with two different parties. The first 
transaction is a credit sale, subsequently followed, by a cash sale. A person who requires 
£1000 in cash, for example, purchases an item for £1200 with payment due in six months. 
However, because purchases on credit generally have a higher price, the immediate cash value 
of the item is only £1000. The purchaser then takes this item to the market and tries to sell it 
for as much as possible. The result is that the purchaser will acquire the cash he needs in the 
short term, although in the long term, he will have to pay the debt which is inevitably more 
than the cash he has acquired. 
 
The term tawarruq is used almost exclusively by the Ḥanbalīs, whereas the other Schools 
mention this transaction merely with reference to its form and often in connection with ʿīna.25 
The Schools differ regarding its permissibility as one would expect from their differing legal 
methodologies. The Shāfiʿīs, self-evidently, permit tawarruq and in fact, it is mentioned as an 
argument to justify ʿīna; hence, both are permissible according to them and this agrees with 
their principles. The Mālikīs, who rely on the principle of sadd al-dharāʾiʿ, regard it as 
reprehensible due to the possibility that it could lead to ribā.26 The Ḥanbalīs permit it in the 
main, pace Ibn Taymiyya, who regards it as similar to ʿīna.27 Ibn Taymiyya argues that the 
rationale underpinning the ribā prohibition is not only present in this transaction, but the latter 
also carries an additional encumbrance.  This requires the borrower to buy an item solely for 
the purpose of selling it at a loss; the Sharīʿa, he avers, does not prohibit a minor harm and 
                                                 
25
 Aḥmad Saʿīd Ḥawwā, Ṣuwar al-Taḥāyul ʿalā al-Ribā wa Ḥukmuhā fī al-Sharīʿa al-Islāmiyya (Beirut: Dār ibn 
Ḥazm, 2007), 140; Aḥmad Fahd al-Rashīdī, ʿAmaliyyāt al-Tawarruq wa Taṭbīqātuhā al-Iqtiṣādiyya fī al-Maṣārif 
al-Islāmiyya (Amman, Dār al-Nafāʾis, 2005), 19-21.  
26
 Some Mālikis, such as Ibn Juzayy, appear to have permitted it. See Ḥawwā, Ṣuwar al-Taḥāyul, 143-4; Aḥmad 
Fahd, al-Rashīdī, ʿAmaliyyāt al-Tawarruq, 65-6. 
27
 Ibn Taymiyya, Kitāb al-Ikhtiyārāt al-Fiqhiyya, 75, where he narrates that it is prohibited according to Aḥmad. 
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permit a greater one.
28
 He also argues that the victims of ʿīna are the poor who are compelled 
into the transaction in order to meet their living expenses. The avarice of the wealthy prevents 
them from giving the poor gratuitous loans and hence the poor have no alternative. He 
supports this assertion by quoting a Prophetic ḥadīth which prohibits the sale of those under 
compulsion.
29
 The poor, who find themselves in such circumstances, must not therefore be 
compelled into transactions which are detrimental in the long term and any such transactions 
are a priori annulled. 
 
The Ḥanafīs unanimously uphold the permissibility of tawarruq. Although they do not 
mention it by name, they do refer to it; either in their discussions on ‗shirāʾ mā bāʿ bi-aqall 
mimmā bāʿ‘,30 or with regard to ʿīna. The Ḥanafīs, however, do not give blanket approval to 
this contract as it is evident that, although both īna and tawarruq may occur coincidentally, 
they may also be pre-planned. As Ibn Taymiyya previously mentioned, these contracts are 
usually the result of compelling circumstances, which the poor are forced into when charitable 
loans are not forthcoming. Tawarruq may therefore be the result of a situation in which a 
needy person is refused a gratuitous loan and instead offered a credit sale with an inflated 
price.  The Ḥanafī jurist Ibn al-Humām rules that if the trader‘s refusal to furnish a gratuitous 
loan is based upon his greed for material gain then the transaction is reprehensible. 
Alternatively if the trader has a valid excuse for not giving the loan, then his offer to sell on 
credit is regarded as merely inappropriate (khilāf al-awlā).31 
 
Ibn ʿĀbidīn reports that Ibn al-Humām‘s verdict was corroborated by a number of later 
authoritative authors. He also adds that the ottoman Shaykh al-Islām Abū Saʿūd interpreted 
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Abū Yūsuf‘s opinion on the permissibility of al-ʿīna as referring to tawarruq.32 This is not 
surprising given that, as mentioned earlier, the term ʿīna had not acquired a highly specific 
meaning in the early period of Islamic jurisprudence, but was rather used loosely to refer to a 
range of sales transactions. At that early stage, it was not tawarruq that was used by the jurists 
to refer to credit sales but ʿīna. Abū Saʿūd may well be correct then, to say that Abū Yūsuf‘s 
opinion of permissibility refers to tawarruq and not to al-ʿīna, in its later technical sense. 
  
5.1.3 Muʿāmala 
The muʿāmala transaction is important to this study as it was referred to extensively in the 
Ottoman cash waqf controversy. The difficulty with the muʿāmala is in attempting to define 
exactly what it refers to. The term is used mainly by the Ḥanafīs and al-Khaṣṣāf, it appears, is 
the earliest source in which it is mentioned. In his ḥiyal treatise, the muʿāmala refers to three 
different transactions: 1) ʿīna, 2) sale with a loan and 3) sale with a promise of resale.33 
Schacht, who edited al-Khaṣṣāf‘s treatise, dismisses the term as a euphemism for ʿīna.34 The 
contemporary Syrian jurist Muṣṭafā al-Zarqā, using the work of Ibn ʿĀbidīn, however, 
identifies it as a transaction consisting of a sale with a loan: ‗to buy something of little value 
for a high price in lieu of a loan from the seller‘.35 al-Zarqā regards this is a straight forward 
ḥīla for ribā. In a more recent work, Aḥmad Ḥawwā attempts to account for its variant forms, 
by suggesting that muʿāmala has a dual usage; in general it refers to all ḥiyal used to avoid 
ribā and more specifically it refers to a ‗sale with a loan‘.36 This latter meaning concurs with 
that given by al- Zarqā. We will examine the Ḥanafī doctrine on transactions combining a sale 
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 Muḥammad Amīn ibn ʿĀbidīn, Radd al-Muḥtār ʿalā al-Durr al-Mukhtār Sharḥ Tanwīr al-Abṣār (Beirut: Dār 
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with a loan, and then return to assess the meaning of the term muʿāmala and its juridical 
significance.  
 
5.1.3.1 Sale with a Loan 
There are two basic forms of a ‗sale with a loan‘, depending on which of the two precedes the 
other: 
1. A sale followed by a loan; an article worth £20 is sold for £40 on credit and the seller 
also gives the buyer a loan of £60. The buyer thus incurs a debt of £100 and acquires 
£60 cash and an item which can be sold for £20, thus giving him £80 in total. 
2. A loan is given to the buyer followed by a sale; essentially the same as the previous 
transaction except that the loan precedes the sale. 
With regard to the second form in which the loan precedes the sale, the Ḥanafī ruling is that if 
the sale is a condition of the loan, then it is reprehensible as it violates the maxim that ‗any 
loan which brings a benefit is ribā‘.37 If, however, it is not a condition then it is regarded by 
al-Karkhī as permissible. al-Khaṣṣāf, however, disliked it, and al-Ḥalwānī went one step 
further and prohibited it.
38
 Although al-Karkhī‘s opinion was generally upheld, this difference 
of opinion amongst the jurists reflects their dual concern of prohibiting transactions based 
upon mere suspicion or doubt, which may actually occur fortuitously, and of upholding the 
legal maxim prohibiting any benefit accruing from a loan. 
 
The first transaction differs from the second in that the sale precedes the loan. In real terms, 
however, there is little difference in the final outcome and many of the Ḥanafīs hence give it 
the same ruling and deem it to be reprehensible. Three scholars, however, allowed this 
transaction; Muḥammad ibn Salama, al-Khaṣṣāf and al-Ḥalwānī. Ibn Salama argued that this 
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transaction was not a loan bringing a benefit but rather a sale bringing a benefit, namely a 
loan.
39
 Other scholars, detecting the possibility that this could be abused, ruled that if both 
transactions took place at once, i.e. at the same time and place, then it would be reprehensible. 
If, however, they occurred at separate instances, i.e. fortuitously, then there was no harm.
40
 
 
5.1.3.2 The Muʿāmala Transaction 
It has already been mentioned that this term was used liberally in the Ḥanafī texts, although 
some authors have linked it to the specific form of a ‗sale with a loan‘. Schacht believed it to 
be a euphemism for ʿīna perhaps due to the similar widespread use of ʿīna to refer to all 
transactions used as a ḥīla for ribā. The term muʿāmala, however, was also used in reference 
to the bayʿ al-wafāʾ.41And bearing in mind that the Ḥanafīs refer to only one type of double-
sale as ʿīna, it is clear that, for them, muʿāmala is not merely an aesthetic synonym for ʿīna. 
Ibn ʿĀbidīn notes that the bayʿ al-wafāʾ is similar to other transactions under the muʿāmala 
rubric in that a profit is made from a debt.
42
 
 
In all, the term muʿāmala represents an ambiguous term, by which a person in need of a loan 
conveys to a lender that he is willing to engage in a transaction which will allow the lender to 
profit from the loan. In juridical terms this means that at the point of sale, the buyer and the 
seller have not made reference to a prohibited transaction, or to ʿīna, even though they intend 
to proceed with that very same transaction, or a similar one. However, for the Ḥanafīs, it is 
important for their systematic consistency that at the time of the contract no condition can be 
made in the contract which binds the other party to the second transaction as this violates their 
rules on contractual stipulations and would render it prohibited. Using specific names of 
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contracts is tantamount to imposing the conditions that accompany that type of contract. Thus 
by using this ambiguous term they avoid this infraction, but also ensure that the parties to the 
contract are not legally bound in the first sale to engage in the second. 
 
Now, it may be that although the parties do not mention the second sale as a condition of the 
first, it is highly likely that they have agreed to it, prior to the transaction. This becomes 
patently obvious, as the jurists, themselves, acknowledge in regard to the muʿāmala that a 
needy person who requests the transaction offers to give the creditor a profit through the sale. 
al-Khaṣṣaf, for example, mentions someone who says to a trader: ‗I need goods worth 100 
dīnārs and I will profit you in that by 50 dīnārs‘.43 This being the case, is it realistic to expect 
that the parties would understand the legal subtlety in distinguishing between an explicit 
contractual stipulation and a mutual understanding outside the contract. 
 
In al-Khaṣṣāf‘s work it appears that this distinction was only too well understood. Consider 
the following example: a person wants to borrow 100 dīnārs and repay 150 dīnārs, but he 
only owns a slave with a value of 20 dīnārs. The muʿāmala transaction in this situation would 
be that he should sell this slave to the lender for 100 dīnārs cash and then buy it back from 
him for 150 dīnārs on credit. In this way, the slave returns to him and he acquires 100 dīnārs 
cash, while he owes the creditor 150 dīnārs. In this procedure it is appears that the slave is 
merely an intermediary vehicle for the sale transaction and irrelevant to the final outcome.  
 
However, a question posed to the author suggests the sales were genuine and not mere fronts: 
‗What if the lender does not feel secure that should he make the first sale, thereby acquiring 
the slave (worth twenty dīnārs) for a price of 100 dīnārs and then be left with him‘. This 
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means that the seller may walk away with the 100 dīnārs without performing the second half 
of the transaction. al-Khaṣṣaf‘s response is that the lender should buy the slave from its owner 
for less than twenty dīnārs and then resell it to him for thirty. If the transaction is done in this 
way, even if the seller walks away without performing the second transaction, the creditor 
will not have lost out as his purchase reflects the price he paid. al-Khaṣṣāf suggests that he 
perform this transaction five times if the seller wants to acquire the 100 dīnārs cash. The 
interlocutor then asks him whether he considers this to be licit, to which he replies ‗as long as 
it is not an agreement (muwāḍaʿa)‘.44 
 
These questions by the interlocutor are crucially important, not only in shedding light on the 
realities of these transactions, but also on how they were dealt with by the judges. It is clear 
from al-Khaṣṣāf‘s answer that the creditor had no legal recourse should the seller renege on 
the second transaction. This would have been understood by all the parties concerned and is 
the very cause of both the question and also for a solution which does not, and cannot, 
guarantee that this will not occur. This reality also explains the use of an ambiguous term like 
muʿāmala, whose lexical meaning implies nothing more than a bilateral interaction. By using 
this term the parties did not commit themselves to a specific transaction. In fact, the term 
muʿāmala in the works of jurisprudence is used to refer to a type of sharecropping, otherwise 
known as musāqā.45 It use in these ḥiyal transactions is therefore to avoid the use of the word 
ʿīna or another term linked exclusively to a specific ḥīla, as this would mean that the contract 
would be legally enforceable as a whole. As a whole, however, it would be held invalid and 
prohibited a prior. The muʿāmala transaction is thus an ambiguous term which allows those in 
need to acquire immediate funds through the use of a double-sale. The use of this term means 
that the parties are not committed to both transactions legally, although without a doubt this 
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was the intention of the parties concerned and would have occurred more often than not. For 
the Ḥanafīs, this term allows them to maintain their systematic consistency whilst also 
providing a solution for those in need. 
 
5.1.4 Conclusions Regarding Double-Sales 
Having examined the three main generic forms of the double-sale, we will summarise the 
results to aid our discussions regarding these transactions later on. Regarding ʿīna, we noted 
that the form of ʿīna which the other Schools took as their archetype was discussed by the 
Ḥanafīs under the heading ‗shirā mā bāʿ bi-aqall mimmā bāʿ‘. They ruled that this transaction 
was outright ribā as it caused an excess without a countervalue which according to their 
definition was the actual ribā prohibited in the Qurʾān and the Sunna. The reverse of this sale 
which is the actual meaning of ʿīna for the Ḥanafīs, was ruled to be prohibitively disliked and 
reprehensible. 
 
With regards to tawarruq, the Ḥanafīs permit this outright as a fortuitous transaction. If, 
however, the transaction is instigated by the refusal of the seller to provide a gratuitous loan, 
then this transaction is also disliked unless the seller has a mitigating circumstance for not 
supplying the loan. In this scenario the seller‘s offer to make a credit transaction is still 
regarded as inappropriate, as ultimately he is seen to be exploiting the situation of an 
individual in dire need by offering him a credit sale at an inflated price. 
 
Finally, the muʿāmala transaction is a general term used to designate any double-sale used to 
profit from a debt. In its more specific usage it refers to a ‗sale with a loan‘. The Ḥanafīs 
regard it as reprehensible if the loan precedes the sale. If, however, the sale precedes the loan, 
three Ḥanafī authorities permit the transaction, although the majority do not. The ruling of 
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permissibility is further qualified by some scholars to apply to a situation when the contracts 
occur on separate, but consecutive occasions, i.e. fortuitously, as opposed to both transactions 
being conducted in one meeting (majlis). 
 
5.1.5 Bayʿ al-Wafāʾ 
The bayʿ al-wafāʾ is a sale in which the buyer gives the seller a promise to resell the former 
his property at the sale price when he acquires the necessary funds to buy it back. Although 
this is a sale transaction, it can also be interpreted as an antichretic pledge. Antichretic loans 
are those in which the interest on a loan is paid through a grant of usufruct. If property is 
given in lieu of a loan, the interest on the loan is taken by either benefiting directly from the 
property or by renting it out. It has been suggested that in ancient Babylonia the antichretic 
loan combined with the pledge to form the antichretic pledge.
46
 This meant that the loan 
generated interest and was also secured in case of default. Interest bearing loans were legally 
permitted in ancient Mesopotamia and this contract was not therefore a subterfuge for interest, 
but rather, an alternative method of taking the interest on a loan.  
 
The bayʿ al-wafāʾ resembles the antichretic pledge in terms of its ultimate results and this is 
the source of the controversy which surrounds it. A person, who sells his house for £1000 
only to repurchase it later on for a £1000, may well be viewed as someone who has borrowed 
a sum of money only to pay it back later on. Ownership of the sale item does not, in reality, 
transfer to the buyer, as his purpose is to hold it as security and also to benefit from it. Islamic 
law permits the taking of pledges per se, but does not permit the lender to exploit the pledge 
for his own gain as this can be viewed as a benefit on a loan. In the ensuing jurists‘ debates, 
those who view the bayʿ al-wafāʾ as a pledge deem it to be a usurious transaction, whereas 
                                                 
46
 Aaron Skaist, The Old Babylonian Loan Contract (Jerusalem, Bar-Ilan University, 1994), 220-5. 
THE USURY CIRCUMVENTS: BAYʿ AL-WAFĀʾ AND BAYʿ AL-ʿĪNA 
 
220 
 
those who view it as a genuine sale uphold the right of the buyer to benefit from his purchase. 
However, even for the latter scholars, the question arises as to how they permit the seller to 
make the original sale conditional on a resale. We have already seen in chapter two that the 
Ḥanafīs do not permit contracts with conditions which result in a tangible benefit for one of 
the parties, as it is considered to be a form of ribā.  
 
The jurists differed extensively regarding the bayʿ al-wafāʾ both in regards to its legal ruling 
and its juridical interpretation. This can be observed in the nine different opinions on the bayʿ 
al-wafāʾ presented by the Crimean jurist Ibn al-Bazzāz in his fatāwā work.47 These opinions 
revolve around three main approaches: 
1. Those who deem it to be a pledge (rahn), in which case the sale is regarded as a 
subterfuge for ribā. 
2. Those who regard it as a sale, but also demand that its validity rests upon its 
conformity with the requirements of a valid sale contract.  
3. Those who say the sale may be regarded as a composite of a pledge and a sale. This 
means that different aspects of the transactions are judged according to either of these 
two categories.  
Category one represents those who oppose the bayʿ al-wafāʾ and do not permit it, whereas 
categories two and three represents those who uphold the sale but differ as to its juridical 
structure. In category two, the method is to make those who conduct the sale conform to the 
standard Ḥanafī sale doctrine. The approach in category three, alternatively, is to create a 
novel hybrid structure which allows the judiciary to uphold the contract as it is and allot the 
necessary rights and duties of the parties as they themselves had envisioned. 
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In the next section we will attempt to explain the difference of opinion of the Ḥanafī jurists 
regarding these two transactions, i.e. al-muʿāmala and bayʿ al-wafāʾ. This will be done by 
presenting an analytical model which will account for their usage and the dynamic tension 
between the ḥiyal, commercial practice and social exigency. 
 
5.2 The Ḥiyal Dynamic: Commercial Practice and Social Exigency 
Schacht claimed that although Muslims were mindful of violating the prohibition of ribā 
‗there was an imperative demand for the giving and taking of interest in commercial life. In 
order to satisfy this need and at the same time observe the letter of the ribā prohibition, a 
number of devices were developed.‘48 He goes on to discuss the ʿīna, as an example, and 
concludes his discussion with the following:  
The giving and taking of interest corresponded indeed with a requirement of commercial practice, but a 
requirement that the Koran, and Islamic law after it, had explicitly and positively banned. The legal 
devices represented a modus vivendi between theory and practice: the maximum that custom could 
concede, and the minimum (that is to say, formal acknowledgement) that the theory had to demand.
49
  
Schacht together with other Orientalists claim that Islamic commercial law is a reflection of 
customary practice and where practice disagrees with Islamic law, the ḥiyal are used to justify 
and permit the practice thereby accommodating it to the dictates of the theory.
50
 We have 
already discussed the problem of identifying just what is meant by the theory and practice of 
Islamic law. What needs to be discussed now is the precise role of interest in an economy and 
what Islamic law proffers as its alternative. We will note how these alternatives were taken up 
in Islamic history and the role of the ḥiyal vis-à-vis these alternatives. 
 
                                                 
48
 Schacht, Introduction, 79. 
49
 Ibid, 80. 
50
 Udovitch, Partnership and Profit, 11-12; Jerome N. D. Anderson and Norman J. Coulson, ―Islamic Law in 
Contemporary Cultural Change,‖ Saeculum 18 (1967): 35. 
THE USURY CIRCUMVENTS: BAYʿ AL-WAFĀʾ AND BAYʿ AL-ʿĪNA 
 
222 
 
5.2.1 Interest and its Alternatives 
Schacht‘s assertion is that interest is a necessary facet of commercial life and that Islamic law 
either had nothing to offer in its place, or whatever it did have to offer was not taken up by 
medieval merchants. This assertion is incorrect in a number of aspects. The first and most 
important point to note is that interest bearing loans can be functionally divided into two 
categories; those which serve commercial purposes and those which are for personal use. In 
the former category, merchants avail themselves of these loans for the provision of capital, 
whereas in the latter, the poor and needy members of society make use of interest bearing 
loans to provide themselves with immediate funds in times of dire need. These two general 
categories are distinct both in their dynamics and in the alternatives which Islamic law has 
provided. 
 
In commercial practice, Islamic law has prescribed that trading be conducted on the basis of a 
division of risk. Interest bearing loans guarantee for the lender that his money will be returned 
whatever the outcome of the business venture and hence represents a risk-free return on 
capital. In lieu of the loan, the lender is given a return in the form of interest payments. In 
financial theory it is well known that the expected return of a risk-free interest bearing loan is 
lower than the return on an equity investment which entails risk.
51
 Islamic law mandates that 
investment be based on equity and not upon debt, and that the partners share in both the risk 
and the rewards. This philosophy is embodied in various partnership forms endorsed and 
prescribed by Islamic law. The most important of which are the muḍāraba and shirka 
contracts, known as commenda and partnership respectively. We have already discussed the 
importance of the commenda contract earlier with respect to its presence in Europe and how 
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its juridical structure stands in stark contrast to usurious loans. What remains to be examined 
is the economic dynamic between the commenda and interest bearing loans. 
 
Besides their commercial utility, interest bearing loans are also used to provide funds for the 
poor in times of dire need. Islamic law, however, proscribes such loans and as an alternative 
advocates the gratuitous loan, qarḍ ḥasan. This loan is made without any expectation of an 
increase in the capital lent and is an act of charity; a philanthropic gesture in which the lender 
seeks his reward with God and not in a short-term temporal gain. The poor and needy are 
clearly open to exploitation from usurers and moneylenders and in this regard the gratuitous 
loan is seen as an alternative which suffices the short term needs of the poorer members of 
society. 
 
5.2.2 The Analytical Model  
In order to explain the dynamics of interest vis-à-vis its alternatives, we will use the model of 
Tag el Din propounded in his article on the elimination of ribā as a method of poverty 
alleviation.
52
 In his article, Tag el Din argues that the elimination of ribā is premised upon the 
simultaneous promotion of an irfāq (philanthropic) sector. He justifies this claim based upon a 
verse of the Holy Qurʾān which specifically declares that the former will be deprived of all 
blessings whereas the latter will be made to increase.
53
 He goes onto argue that the prohibition 
of ribā would have little meaning in an economy which is strictly utilitarianist. His 
proposition is that in order for poverty alleviation to be effected by the ribā prohibition, there 
must be an irfāq sector into which funds can flow once the prohibition comes into effect. 
Islamic economies are hence urged to develop an irfāq sector in order to create an economic 
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climate in which a ribā prohibition would be capable of achieving a change in the levels of 
poverty. What underpins his theory is the premise that: 
Since there are competing alternative uses for any scarce resource, the financing of the irfāq sector must 
be met by shifting resources away from alternative uses[;] … away from strictly utilitarianist dealings to 
strictly non-utilitarianist dealings. That is, from ribā transactions in money markets, to the financing of 
pressing human needs in the irfāq sector.54 
 According to this model, when surplus wealth is given out as a usurious loan, the latter is an 
alternative use of capital. This means that when the ribā prohibition comes into effect, it 
results in a decrease in the alternative uses for surplus capital, which inevitably leads to an 
increase in the contributions flowing into the irfāq sector. He suggests that in the presence of 
an irfāq sector, holders of surplus funds would automatically understand this.55 
 
Although Tag el Din‘s article is aimed at developing an Islamic economy using an irfāq 
sector, it can be used analytically to understand the dynamics of the ḥiyal and their place in 
the social and commercial landscapes of the past. There are two main aspects of this model 
which are relevant to our work: 1) The notion of competing alternative economic uses and 2) 
the relationship of the irfāq sector to the ribā prohibition. Tag el Din did not discuss ribā in 
its commercial usage as his main focus was on promoting the irfāq sector as an alternative 
system. We will examine the dynamics of ribā with regard to both sectors; the commercial 
and the philanthropic, and discern the role of the ḥiyal within them. 
 
5.2.3 The Commercial Sector 
It has already been mentioned that the Islamic alternative to the use of ribā in the commercial 
sector is equity finance in the form of commenda contracts and partnerships. In chapter four, 
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we mentioned the work of a number of researchers in the field who had noted the widespread 
use of these contracts throughout Islamic history and even their impact on neighbouring 
Europe. The purpose of our previous demonstration was to establish that Islamic commercial 
law was not a ‗dead letter‘ as suggested by some Orientalists, but rather, a dynamic reality by 
which trade was conducted for centuries. In this section we will note the impact of this sector 
on the prevalence of usury. 
  
 The analytical model suggests that there are competing alternative uses for surplus funds and 
in the commercial context, the competition would have been for investors (holders of surplus 
capital) to either give out usurious loans or to engage in commenda contracts or partnerships. 
Our assertion is that the presence of these latter alternatives, which secured a higher return 
than interest bearing loans (as per financial theory), was sufficient to render usurious loans in 
commercial life obsolete. This can be substantiated by observing the historical record of trade, 
not only in the Muslim lands, but also in Europe, where usurious loans were equally 
anathema.  
 
In the work of Udovitch and Goitein, both researchers noted the conspicuous absence of any 
documents recording usurious contracts.
56
 Udovitch mentions the possibility that ḥiyal may 
have been used to evade the prohibition but contends that this option was not exercised 
because: 
numerous other commercial techniques were available which played the same role as interest-bearing 
loans and so made the significant use of loans unnecessary. … More importantly because these alternate 
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forms of investment and credit were a socially more congenial and effective means of economic 
connection, they were preferred over loans.
57  
The results of Udovitch and Goitein‘s work are explicit on the point that usury was made 
obsolete for both religious and economic reasons. In religious terms, usury was prohibited and 
would have weighed heavy on the conscience of those who indulged in it, especially when 
there were licit alternatives. These alternatives were not only extremely popular but more 
crucially, they also had an economic advantage in terms of the revenue they generated. 
 
In chapter four we noted the similarity of the muḍāraba with the European commenda, and it 
was proposed by numerous authors that the latter was based upon the former. It is no surprise 
then to find that as the commenda made headway into Europe it would compete with the 
usurious sea loan as an ‗alternative use‘. The economic historian Frederic Lane writes that in 
Venice the commenda was in use in the tenth century, although it was unfamiliar to the 
Roman lawyers.
58
 He reports that according to surviving documentary contracts; this contract 
‗almost completely displaced‘ the usurious sea loan.59 In Genoa a similar result is shown 
where the commenda contract rose in prevalence from twenty two percent to ninety one 
percent at the beginning of thirteenth century.
60
 Lane completes his article with what appears 
to be a corroboration of the model being presented by Tag el Din: 
When we inquire concerning the effect of the usury doctrine on economic growth, the most important 
question is whether it discouraged the kind of loans to consumers which were unproductive socially. To 
the extent that it did so, the doctrine created pressure on men possessed of liquid wealth to find some 
other way in which to make their wealth yield income. It thus encouraged the flow of capital into 
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commerce. It is logical to conclude then that the usury doctrine in so far as it was effective stimulated 
economic growth.‘61 
Loan suggests that the usury prohibition resulted in investors turning away from usurious 
loans to the needy and towards its ‗competing alternative uses‘ as suggested by Tag el Din. In 
this situation though, the investors turned not to the irfāq sector, but rather to the commercial 
sector and the alternative licit forms of financial investment.  
 
Previously it was shown that Islamic commercial law was the established framework for 
commercial enterprise throughout Islamic history. In this section, it has additionally been 
shown that usury was not evidenced in the documentary record. Its absence is based upon 
both the religious prohibition and the dynamic of competing alternative uses. These 
alternatives were able to triumph over the use of usury in commerce as they were religiously 
conscionable and economically superior. This is the opposite of what Schacht and his ilk 
suggested. For Schacht, interest was a necessity of commercial practice to which the jurists 
would inevitably succumb, a phenomenon actualised in the ḥiyal.62 On the contrary though, 
what has been shown is that usury was not a necessary component of commerce and with the 
appropriate alternatives it could realistically be replaced and rendered obsolete. This was 
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observed both in the Islamic world and in the Italian city states, who, it appears, borrowed the 
licit alternatives from their eastern neighbours. 
 
5.2.4 The Irfāq Sector 
Having shown that the ḥiyal of ribā did not have a utility in the commercial sector, we will 
now try to show that the jurists‘ discourse regarding the ḥiyal and usury were in regard to the 
irfāq sector. We have already mentioned the views of Abū Yūsuf regarding the ʿīna 
transaction and how he regarded it as a virtue. It is clear that the virtue lies in the fact that a 
person in need has no other source of funds and whoever allows him to purchase goods on 
credit provides him with a temporary reprieve from his difficulty. The author of al-Hidāya, al-
Marghīnānī also makes it clear that the reason that ʿīna is reprehensible is that it shows an 
aversion to charity. The reasoning of both of these scholars is critical as it bears testimony to 
the context of their opinions. Clearly, the central concern of these jurists was not the use of 
this ḥīla in commercial transactions, but rather as a substitute for what should have been 
charitable loans. 
 
Scholars from the other schools also made similar observations; Ibn Taymiyya, for example, 
noted that the majority of ʿīna transactions are made by individuals who are compelled by 
their circumstances and use them to meet their basic living costs.
63
 The tenth century Yemeni 
Shāfiʿī jurist Ibn Ziyād also mentions his contemporaneous local situation in which the rich 
refused to offer gratuitous loans except with an increase on their capital.
64
 This was achieved 
through a transaction known as the bayʿ al-ʿuhda, which was very similar to the bayʿ al-
wafāʾ. This transaction had become very common at that time and was the subject of much 
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debate in the Shāfiʿī School.65 Ibn Ziyād mentions a number of other similar transactions and 
opines that they are all acceptable as long as they fulfil the formal criteria of a valid sale. This, 
he says, will not be considered ribā.  
 
He then goes on to discuss the situation when a person in dire need is refused an interest-free 
loan but instead is offered a usurious loan. If the needy person takes the loan, Ibn Ziyād warns 
him that he will still be sinful because there are alternative ways of paying the extra amount to 
the lender using legally valid forms.
66
 In essence, Ibn Ziyād is giving the exact formula being 
suggested here, namely that the ḥiyal are justified when they are used as exits by those in dire 
circumstances to avoid falling into ribā. It is patently clear that he draws a line of distinction 
between these ḥiyal and actual ribā. In fact, the latter cannot be sanctioned in any 
circumstance due to the availability of these ḥiyal. This point by Ibn Ziyād is critically 
important against those who would argue that the ḥiyal are tantamount to overt ribā. Ibn 
Ziyād has given a juridical verdict which delineates between the two, and later on, we will 
also see that the historical trajectories of both are not the same. 
 
 These statements of the various scholars collectively demonstrate, together with our previous 
presentation, that the ḥiyal discourse relating to ribā was solely in relation to the irfāq sector 
as opposed to the commercial sector. 
 
5.2.5 The Ḥiyal and the Irfāq Sector 
According to the model of Tag el Din, the prohibition of ribā would lead to the channelling of 
funds to competing alternative uses. This, he avers, would lead to an increase in charitable 
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loans as long as an irfāq sector exists and the economy is not purely utilitarian. Having 
examined the dynamic between commercial practice and ribā, we now need to consider the 
dynamic between charitable loans and ribā. As stated previously, although Tag el Din‘s 
model is a prescription for the future design of an Islamic economy, we can use it analytically 
here to examine the past. In the past, however, the existence of the irfāq sector can be 
assumed. If this is the case, then the question arises as to why there was a need for these ḥiyal 
in the first place. We will examine two scenarios in which these ḥiyal were known to have 
been used and examine the historical socio-economic conditions which influenced their 
justification and usage. The first scenario relates to the city of Balkh where the ‗sale with a 
loan‘ transaction was known to have been advocated. The second example relates to 
Transoxania where the bayʿ al-wafāʾ gained prominence.  
 
5.2.5.1 The Muʿāmala in Balkh 
It has already been mentioned that Muḥammad Ibn Salama was one of the three Ḥanafī 
authorities who permitted the muʿāmala transaction of a ‗sale with a loan‘. The sale 
transaction involves the selling of an item on credit for a higher price than it is worth, together 
with a loan. Thus X, for example, sells an article for £40 on credit to Y, although the item has 
a market value of only £20. Together with this sale he also gives him a £60 loan. The result is 
that Y owes X a total of £100, while having acquired £60 cash and an item worth £20. Ibn 
Salama is reported to have permitted this transaction. What is also interesting is that he is also 
reported to have rebuked his contemporary market traders saying that the ʿīna transaction 
forewarned in the Prophetic tradition was better than most of their transactions.
67
 The other 
scholars of Balkh, although they did not agree with Ibn Salamah on the permissibility of a 
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‗sale with a loan‘, also expressed similar sentiments regarding the trade practices in the 
markets of Balkh.
68
  
 
The comments of these scholars are important as they allow us to view the contemporary 
market conditions and also inform us of the attitude of the incumbent political rulers vis-à-vis 
the implementation of Islamic law. In Balkh, it is evident that the rulers had little or no 
interest in regulating the market and hence transactions violating the law were common. A 
second aspect of Balkh we can note is regarding the distribution of zakāt. Some scholars of 
Balkh had ruled that because the rulers who were collecting the zakāt were not distributing it 
to its needy recipients that individuals should give their zakāt for a second time.69 This shows 
us that the needy were being neglected by the state and even the alms-tax which should have 
contributed to ameliorating their condition was not forthcoming. In such a situation the poor 
would have faced heavy exploitation at the hands of the usurers. Ibn Salama may well have 
justified his opinion in allowing this transaction in order to prevent the neediest falling prey to 
the usurers and their exploitative rates. This would also have allowed them to avoid the sin of 
ribā, as the transaction does not technically fall under its rubric. 
 
This short analysis, although certainly not comprehensive, allows us to develop Tag el Din‘s 
analytical model and incorporate some other factors. There are two key aspects that can be 
noted: 1) the role of zakāt in the irfāq sector and 2) the significant impact of the ruling 
authorities‘ attitude in enforcing the prohibition of ribā. With regard to the former, that zakāt 
has a role to play in the irfāq sector is self-evident although it is an important additional factor 
to keep in mind in our ensuing discussions. The second point is more important and represents 
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the crux of the issue. Both points will be borne in mind as we now take up the discussion on 
the bayʿ al-wafāʾ. 
 
5.2.5.2 The Bayʿ al-Wafāʾ in Transoxania 
Both al-Zarqā and Ḥawwā have noted that the bayʿ al-wafāʾ transaction appeared in the fifth 
century in Transoxania, although Ḥawwā also give references to its generic form, as a sale 
with a condition of repurchase, in earlier works.
70
 These earlier references are important in 
that they show that the transaction itself was known and present from the earliest periods. His 
first reference is to the ḥadīth compendium of Ibn Abī Shayba, where a question regarding 
such a sale is put to the Successor jurist Ibrāhīm al-Nakhāʿī (d. 96). In another reference a 
similar question is posed to Aḥmad (d. 241). This shows that the generic form of the 
transaction was known and perhaps in use, although it certainly was not widespread. 
 
As we have already said the bayʿ al-wafāʾ is nothing other than an antichretic pledge, which 
was an alternative means of granting an interest bearing loan in use since the Babylonian 
period. Its use was also recorded in Sassanian Iran, where interest was also permitted.
71
 This 
transaction would have been present in many regions of the world where Islamic rule would 
subsequently come to apply and it is not unexpected that some people may have continued to 
use it. It is clear that it was not widespread as no detailed treatment was given to it in the early 
works of Islamic jurisprudence. In Transoxania, however, the usage of this transaction 
appears to have increased and it was here that it acquired its sobriquet as the bayʿ al-wafāʾ. 
 
The first scholars to address this transaction belong to the fifth century and not surprisingly to 
the lands of Transoxania. The sources all agree that three of the leading scholars took a firm 
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stance against the bayʿ al-wafāʾ. The chief judge of Bukhāra, ʿAlī al-Sughdī, the Samarqandī 
judge, al-Ḥasan al-Māturīdī and the jurisconsult, Abū Shujāʿ, all regarded this sale as a 
pledge.
72
 This meant that the buyer could not benefit from the pledge without the express 
permission of the seller. Also, because it was in reality a pledge and not a sale, this meant that 
the buyer was liable for the benefits which accrued to the pledge and also that the buyer 
would necessarily have to return the pledge once the debt was paid. al-Samarqandī relates that 
these scholars regarded this sale as a ḥīla for ribā and that at the time nobody challenged them 
in their verdict.
73
 These three scholars were contemporaries of the middle-late fifth century 
AH. The next generation of scholars, however, differed in their analysis and began the attempt 
to accommodate this transaction within the Ḥanafī juridical framework. 
 
The al-Fatāwā al-Sirājiyya records a certain Qāḍī al-Isbījābī who regarded the bayʿ al-wafāʾ 
to be valid and held that the promise of resale had to be fulfilled.
74
 In the juristic literature 
used in this work, al-Isbījābī was the earliest authority found to have permitted the bayʿ al-
wafāʾ. There are two scholars who relate to this time period who are designated as al-Isbījābī; 
1) Shaykh al-Islam ʿAlī (d. 535 AH), a scholar from Samarqand who was recognized as a 
leading authority,
75
 and 2) al-Qāḍī Abū Naṣr Aḥmad ibn Manṣūr who replaced Abū Shujāʿ as 
the School‘s jurisconsult in Samarqand and who was also a judge.76 The first of these has not 
been mentioned as a judge in the biographical literature and hence the second may tentatively 
be taken to be the scholar mentioned in the al-Fatāwa al-Sirājiyya. This means that in the late 
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fifth or early sixth century the scholars of Samarqand were now ruling in favour of the bayʿ 
al-wafāʾ. 
 
Following this ruling the Scholars of Bukhārā also followed suit and as the discourse 
develops, the question became how to accommodate this transaction into the juridical 
framework. The foremost authority who addressed this subject was the renowned Qaḍī Khān, 
a judge of Bukhārā and a scholar known for his juridical noesis (fiqh al-nafs).  Qāḍī Khān 
applied the strict rules of sale to the bayʿ al-wafāʾ and ruled that if the parties mentioned any 
of the following three points, then the sale would be invalid: 
1. That the resale is a contractual stipulation of the first sale,  
2. that the sale was a bayʿ al-wafāʾ, 
3. that it was a permissible sale (bayʿ jāʾīẓ), implying thereby that it was non-binding. 
The only valid way for the sale to be effected was if the resale was mentioned, not in the 
contract, but as a separate promise. This promise, he goes on to say, is binding. He justifies 
this with reference to a maxim which renders promises binding based upon the needs of 
people.
77
 
 
Apart from Qāḍī Khān, other Transoxanian scholars also upheld the bayʿ al-wafāʾ; some 
using his technique others suggesting alternative methods. The main thrust for recognising 
this transaction appears to have been the need to protect the poor. In order to secure a loan 
they were being asked to provide their properties as security.
78
 Although the reality of the 
transaction was a pledge, it was conducted as a sale to avoid the charge of ribā. The jurists, 
who were reluctant to recognise this transaction, did so to ensure that the properties would 
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ultimately be returned to their owners. The juridical framework recorded by Ibn Māza clearly 
seems to indicate this. He mentions that some Samaraqandī jurists regarded that the 
transaction be treated as a sale from the perspective of the buyer (or lender) and as a pledge 
from the perspective of the seller. This would allow the buyer to benefit from the pledge, but 
because it was considered a pledge for the seller, he would not be permitted to sell it, or for 
his heirs to inherit it, and whenever the seller come to him with the original amount, he would 
necessarily have to accept it and return the property to its owner. In their defence the 
Samarqandīs said that this was done for the needs of the people who depended on the wealth 
of others and to prevent them from falling into ribā.79 
 
In permitting this ḥīla the Samarqandī jurists and Qāḍī Khān did so in reference to the needs 
of the people. The maxim which underpins their legal ruling allows the jurists to regard the 
promise of redemption as legally binding. This maxim is clearly an exception to the Ḥanafī 
systematic structure, as other texts make it clear that promises are not legally binding.
80
 These 
jurists were aware that this was not a normative maxim by the fact that it is begins with the 
particle ‗qad‘, meaning sometimes. The maxim thus reads: sometimes promises are made 
binding due to peoples‘ needs.81 The question that this raises is whether this constitutes an 
infraction of the systematic rules or not. This question is vitally important, as the ḥiyal, in 
their capacity as makhārij and not concessions, are premised upon their systematic 
consistency with the normative doctrine. It is by virtue of their congruity with the standard 
doctrines that they acquire their status as normative exits. What we have, in this situation, 
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however, is the use of a maxim which appears to be a concession from the systematic 
requirements.  
 
In our earlier explication of the application of the ribā rules into the various branches of 
commercial law, we noted that the Ḥanafīs put the requirements of the ribā doctrine at the 
forefront of their concerns. In regard to contractual stipulations, shurūṭ, they make it the sine 
qua non of determining contractual validity. Now, it may well be argued, that a promise is not 
equivalent to a stipulation, and in this regard, we can recall that al-Shāfiʿī, who takes full 
regard of explicity mentioned stipulations, disregards promises either prior to, or immediately 
following, a sales transaction. Additionally, Mufti Taqi Usmani, a leading jurist in Islamic 
finance, has attempted to demonstrate substantive juridical differences between a promise and 
a stipulation.
82
 However, it must also be recalled that, unlike the Shāfiʿīs, the Ḥanafīs do 
regard accepted customs as tantamount to contractual stipulations, despite the fact that the 
former are not articulated at all, neither prior to the contract, nor after its conclusion. This 
means that a promise, although not quite a stipulation, cannot escape the systematic rules as 
they, at a minimum, constitute more than an unexpressed custom. 
 
The purpose of drawing this conclusion is vital for circumscribing the juridical remit of this 
ḥīla. Unlike the makhārij which have a normative role in jurisprudence, the bayʿ al-wafāʾ 
represents an infraction of the systematic rules and henceforth, cannot be regarded as a 
normative exit i.e. a makhraj. Rather it is to be regarded as a concession (rukhṣa) in the form 
of a ḥīla, whose legal validity is limited to the extent of its function as a final resort in saving 
one from falling into ribā. Rukhṣas, unlike the makhārij, are transitory in nature, and have no 
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legal utility beyond the dire need which occasions their use. Such ḥiyal cannot, and are not 
intended to, form the normative basis of an Islamic economy. 
 
5.2.5.3 Bayʿ al-wafāʾ, the Jurists and the rulers of Transoxania 
The question that needs to be addressed now is what factors led to the widespread use of this 
ḥīla for ribā and how can it be explained in terms of the analytical model suggested earlier. 
What is key to the analytical model is the political and economic climate of the time and to 
discern what specific changes occurred at that time which may have occasioned the need for 
this transaction. The most significant change that occurred, relative to the time period in 
question, was a change in the ruling dynasty. Transoxania had been under the 
semiautonomous rule of the Persian Sāmānids since the late third century, with Bukhārā 
serving as their capital.
83
 The Sāmānids were devout Muslims and as supporters of Sunni 
Islam they actively spread the faith amongst their northern Turkish neighbours in the central 
Asian steppe.
84
 The Sāmānids‘ rule, however, was contested by the neighbouring power of the 
Qarakhānids. The Qarakhānids were Turkish and had only recently converted to Islam. The 
head of their western Khanate Satuk Boghra Khān (d. 344 AH) became a Muslim at the 
invitation of a jurist.
85
 The historian Ibn al-Athīr relates that later on, in the year 349 AH, 
200,000 ‗tents of the Turks‘ also converted to Islam.86 At the end of the fourth century in 389 
AH the Qarakhānids defeated the Sāmānids and occupied their Transoxanian territories. 
Although the earlier Qarakhānids were noted for their strict piety, their Islamic credentials 
dissipated later on, as their relationship with the resident scholars worsened. 
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the authority of the Ṭāhirid governors of Khurasān. In 287/900 the Sāmānid Ismāʿīl defeated the Ṭāhirid ʿAmr 
ibn Layth at Balkh and was recognised by the ʿAbbāsid caliph as the sole ruler of Transoxania and Khurasan. 
See Richard N. Frye, ―The Sāmānids,‖ in The Cambridge History of Iran. Vol. 4: The Period from the Arab 
Invasion to the Saljuqs, ed. Richard N. Frye (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 136-8. 
84
 Ibid, 153; D. G. Tor, ―The Islamization of Central Asia in the Sāmānid Era and the Reshaping of the Muslim 
World,‖ Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 72, no. 2 (2009): 279-99. 
85
 Peter B. Golden, ―The Karakhanids and early Islam,‖ in The Cambridge History of Early Inner Asia, ed. Denis 
Sinor (Cambride: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 357. 
86
 Ibid, 357-8; EI
2
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In 461 AH the Qarakhānid ruler executed the juridical authority Ismāʿīl al-Ṣaffār for 
‗exhorting the Khān to observe the ordinances of religion and eschew forbidden things.‘87 
Additionally, in the life of al-Sarakhsī (d. 490 AH) we read that he was thrown into a well by 
a local governor for a ruling he issued. He spent such a long time there that he dictated his 
magnum opus, al-Mabsūṭ to his students who gathered around him and compiled his lectures. 
al-Sarakhsī, himself, makes reference to the rulers of his age and regards them as tyrants who 
took the wealth of the people illicitly and did not spend the zakāt on those whom deserved 
it.
88
 The conflict between the leading scholars and the Qarakhānid rulers reached a peak and 
the former appealed to the Seljuk ruler Malikshāh to intervene. In 482 AH the Seljuks 
marched into Transoxania and deposed the Qarakhānid incumbent Aḥmad Khān, and reduced 
the region to a vassal state.
89
 The leader of the jurists at this time was Ibrāhīm al-Ṣaffār (son 
of Ismāʿīl who had been killed by the Qarakhānid ruler), who, in all probability, was 
responsible for the plea to the Seljuks. The biographical literature portrays him, like his father, 
as a fearless upholder of religious norms.
90
 The arrival of the Seljuks may appear to have been 
a victory for Ibrāhīm and his religious cause. This, however, was not to be the case; the son of 
Malikshāh, Sanjar visited Transoxania in 495 AH and deposed Ibrāhīm as the imām of 
Bukhāra and replaced him with ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz ibn Māza.  
 
This then is the political history of the time which corresponds to the juridical discourse 
regarding the bayʿ al-wafāʾ. The Qarakhānids took control of Transoxania in 389 AH and 
would have brought with them a large number of new Muslims and non-Muslims, such as 
Uighurs and Turks. The Qarakhānid rulers of the eastern Khanate were not Muslims, and 
Turks, Mongols and Uighurs would have travelled freely between the two halves of the 
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 EI
2
, s.v. Ṣadr. 
88
 al-Sarakhsī, al-Mabsūṭ, vol. 1, part 2, 241; Calder, Exploring God’s Law, 70. 
89
 Golden, The Karakhanids and early Islam, 367. 
90
 See al-Qurashī, al-Jawāhir al-Muḍīʾa, 27. 
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Khanate. A mass migration of these peoples into Transoxania would have meant the arrival of 
a host of un-Islamic trade practices.It was approximately sixty years after the arrival of the 
Qarakhānids into Transoxania, when the three jurists who opposed the bayʿ al-wafāʾ took 
their stance. It is clear that it was in this time that the ḥīla had become widespread. The 
Scholars who spoke against it would have witnessed its rise and perfusion. Their objections, 
however, would have been ignored by the ruling authorities who were in conflict with the 
scholars and who, it seems, were not concerned with upholding the law. al-Sarakhsī also 
makes it clear that they were not distributing the zakāt and hence the needs of the poorest 
members of society were not being accommodated.  
 
This account corresponds with the dynamic analytical model proposed earlier. What is being 
observed is that the law is not being upheld and hence illicit transactions which are only ever 
on the margins of the economy begin to come to the foreground. The apathy of the rulers 
emboldens the perpetrators and others to exploit the situation. On the other hand, the poor are 
not only unable to access charitable loans as the greed for usurious gain remains unchecked, 
but are also denied their legitimate entitlement to the proceeds of the zakāt. To save the poor 
from getting into ribā transactions the scholars give them recourse to the ḥiyal. Qāḍī Khān, 
who was one of the leading authorities who permitted the ḥiyal, wrote an entire chapter in his 
Fatāwā work dealing with the ḥiyal for escaping from ribā. This is a significant point, in that, 
although most of the jurists discussed the bayʿ al-wafāʾ as a single phenomenon, this jurist 
recognized that there was an underlying problem which was causing people to enter into this 
transaction. His chapter thus provides multiple ḥiyal for escaping from ribā. 
 
What is perhaps more telling though, is that before getting into the actual ḥiyal he mentions a 
number of other issues which indicate the state of the market place at his time: 
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 The rules regarding purchases made with money acquired through illicit means and 
whether the food purchased with such food is permissible or not.  
 The situation when a ruler buys something and pays for it with money taken unjustly 
from the people, the jurists, he says, dislike that anyone should partake in their food 
to serve as a rebuke to them for their oppression.  
 If an investor makes a commenda with a trader ignorant of the Sharʿīa rules, the profit 
is licit for the investor as long as he does not have certain knowledge that the trade 
was illicit. 
 In response to the question, is it necessary for a customer to ask the trader whether his 
goods are licit or not, he says that it depends on the time and the place; if the majority 
of the trading activity in a specific market place is licit then there is no need to ask, 
whereas if the opposite is true and the market place is dominated by illicit trade then 
one should observe precaution and enquire about the legality of the goods.  
 In regard to a person who passes away and his wealth is from illicit sources, he says 
that the inheritors should search for its rightful owners and return it to them otherwise 
if they can not be traced it should be given in charity.
91
 
 
Although some of these are standard issues mentioned in other works, the fact that the author 
has brought them together under a single heading indicates that he was addressing a number 
of contemporary problems all linked to a serious decline in the morality underpinning the 
local trade practices. It is clear that he regarded the prevalence of ribā as the major cause of 
the problem as that is the title heading and ultimately what he hopes to help the masses avoid.  
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 ‘Faṣl fī-mā yakūn firār ʿan al-ribā‘, Fatāwā Qāḍī Khān, vol. 2, 278-9. 
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Why there should have been such a dramatic change in that specific time period can be 
understood by noting the impact of demographic change on the norms of trade practices. A 
very pertinent example which demonstrates this precise phenomenon can be observed 
following the Mongol invasions of Central Asia. Large numbers of Mongols and Uighurs 
arrived with the invading armies and settled in Central Asia, bringing with them their usurious 
practices. In the chronicles of the Persian historian Rashīd al-Din, he notes the effect of these 
immigrants and the rise in usurious practices and the use of the ḥiyal.92 What this historian 
also notes is that together with usury, a whole host of additional corrupt economic practices 
were on the rise. At the point that the situation becomes critical to the functioning of the state, 
the ruler Maḥmūd Ghazān addresses these practices in an attempt to restore the Islamic trade 
norms.
93
 Rashīd al-Dīn reports Ghāzān‘s analysis of the situation and its remedy, saying that 
he  
‗realized that [the basic ingredient in] all of these types of corruption [was] the giving  and taking of 
interest and that [once] he [had] prohibited [this], he would at one and the same time be both reasserting 
the Prophet‘s law and bringing [humanity] back to the Divine Guidance and away from the precipice of 
eternal perdition, while [ever so many] varied and great disorders would be averted in the future through 
the blessings accruing from the prohibition of usury.‘94   
 
                                                 
92
 The historian notes that: ‗One of the disorders arising out of the [paying] of usury was … that those persons 
who were giving out money for interest at [that time] were for the most part Mongols and Uiǧūrs, and these had 
the means to enforce their claims…. The outcome of the matter was that the wretches [were] unable to pay back 
the Mongols and Uiǧūrs and remained caught up in the hapless condition of being their bondmen together with 
their wives and children – and it was only through the fortunate circumstances [that] the Emperor of Islām … [is 
a just monarch] that vile practice of debt-slavery has been removed [as a threat to] the people of Islām.‘ See A.P. 
Martinez, ―Third Portion of the History of Ǧāzān Xān in Rašīdu ‘D-Dīn‘s Ta‘rīx-e Mobarak-e Ǧāzānī. 
Comprising Narratives and Documents Relating to the Agrarian-Fiscal, Financial, and Monetary, Judiciary, 
Military, Religious and Other Reforms Instituted by Ǧāzān Xān Together with Some Notes on His Personal 
Qualities and Character. Part Two: The Twentieth, Twenty-First, and Twenty-Sixth Sections Concerning 
Standards and Weights and the Prohibition of Interest and Dishonest Credit Transactions, Especially those 
Involving the State or its Ministers, Together with Ǧāzān Xān‘s Decree on Standards, Weights and Measures,‖ 
Archivum Eurasiae Medii Aevi 8 (1994): 171. 
93
 Ibid, 178. 
94
 Additions to the text in the square brackets are from the translator and the italics in his translation have been 
removed. See ibid, 177-78. 
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As mentioned earlier, an important aspect of the analytical model is the role of the political 
authorities in upholding the religious norms of trade and preventing the spread of usury even 
among its non-Muslim citizenry. That Ghazān was forced to take this action, indicates the 
point at which the utility of the ḥiyal are exhausted. At this point an alternative course must be 
sought which restores the commercial and philanthropic norms as prescribed by Islam and 
abolishes the exploitative practices that can so easily spread. Following Ghāzān‘s decree the 
situation is reported to have changed markedly from the previous corrupt and usurious norms, 
such that Rashīd al-Dīn wrote: ‗how shall those persons who [are born] hereafter and have not 
seen them even be able to even imagine the benefits of this single decree.‘95 
 
5.3 The Teleology of the Ḥiyal  
According to the model proposed by Tag el Din there exists a dynamic relationship between 
usury, Islamic law and charity. Tag el Din‘s model proposes that as the prohibition of ribā is 
applied to an economy, the funds previously allotted to usurious loans, will be diverted to 
alternative competing uses. An Islamic economy should hence create an irfāq sector to absorb 
these funds once the prohibition takes effect. In Tag el Din‘s account there are three factors 
which are considered; 1) the application of the law, 2) the use of usurious contracts, and 3) the 
irfāq sector. In our presentation we have expanded the model to demonstrate that the Islamic 
forms of equity investment are also an important alternative use and that an additional 
component of the irfāq sector is the correct distribution of the zakāt.  
 
In an ideal Islamic economy, this model suggests that once the prohibition of ribā comes into 
effect, the funds previously set aside for it, would look for alternative uses. These would exist 
                                                 
95
 Ibid, 182. He goes onto mention that immediately following the decree, some people attempted to use the ḥiyal 
again, and so Ghāzān issued a further decree saying that unless the practice was completely abandoned, he would 
prevent the creditors from not only claiming the interest, but also the principal (p.182-83).  
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in two domains; 1) equity investments such as muḍāraba and shirka, and 2) the irfāq sector. 
The irfāq sector would be established through the collection and distribution of zakāt and by 
an extensive waqf system. Once ribā has been eliminated, a portion of the funds would go 
into the equity investments and a portion would go into the irfāq sector. This model has been 
used analytically to understand the use of the ḥiyal in two distinct regions and periods in 
Islamic history. The purpose of applying this model was to observe the variables within the 
dynamic of the analytical model and to therefore delineate the role of the ḥiyal within the 
model. The first important point we noted was that the investment sector was viable 
throughout Islamic history in the form of commenda and partnerships. Schacht had posited 
that it was the inadequacy of Islamic commercial law which premised the utility of the ḥiyal. 
This was shown to be completely unfounded and contradicted by the documentary record as 
explicated in subsequent research. The necessary implication is that the ḥiyal were invoked 
for their utility in the irfāq sector and not in commerce. 
 
In order to appreciate how this had occurred, the other variables in the dynamic were noted. In 
both areas where these ḥiyal had been permitted, Balkh and Transoxania, there appeared to be 
a distinct lack of enforcement of Islamic commercial law. We also noted that in both areas the 
zakāt was not being distributed to the rightful and most needy recipients, and hence the irfāq 
sector would have been severely undermined. The neediest members of society, who would 
normally have relied upon institutions such as zakāt and charitable loans, would have found 
neither forthcoming. The apathy of the rulers meant that usurers, mainly non-muslims, would 
have stepped in to exploit the situation. The jurists therefore permitted these ḥiyal to prevent 
the poor from falling into ribā and the hands of the usurers. 
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This, then, is the underlying teleology of the ḥiyal of ribā and can be added to the model of 
Tag el Din to enhance its scope. The benefit of explicating this teleology is that it can serve to 
both delimit the remit of the ḥiyal and also confine their utility to the irfāq sector. What is also 
critical to recall is that the ḥiyal of ribā are not to be regarded as normative makhārij. This is 
because the former do not uphold the systematic consistency which is vital to the Ḥanafī 
juridical superstructures, whereas the latter do. The result is that their usage in these situations 
is in the capacity of a transitory concession. Concessions to Islamic prohibitions are justified 
only in the most desperate circumstances and their juridical utility is strictly limited to the 
causes which occasion them. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
THE CASH WAQF IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 
 
 
 
The waqf is a religious philanthropic institution which played a crucial role in the provision of 
public facilities in pre-modern Muslim societies. An abundance of research now exists on 
most facets of the waqf; from its legal structure, social role, key benefactors and beneficiaries, 
to its ultimate demise at the behest of colonialist imperatives.
1
 What concerns us in this 
chapter is to examine a specific form of the waqf in which the endowment was in the form of 
cash and which became popular in the Ottoman Empire. The cash waqf was a novel institution 
and its method of revenue generation is what is most relevant here. Benefactors using this 
type of waqf had, in the main, specified that the capital was to be employed in profit 
generating transactions with a stipulated percentage return on the initial capital. Receiving a 
percentage return on the capital is more akin to usury than to equity investments. In the latter, 
the norm is for the investor to stipulate a proportion of the profit, and not the capital. More 
significant than this though, is that the capital was not given on the basis of equity, but rather 
as a debt, and therefore liability was devolved to the borrower, while the capital of the waqf 
was assured. It is no wonder, then, that the cash waqf caused a controversy among the 
Ottoman jurists, occasioning both critical and apologetic tracts.  
 
In this chapter we will give a brief introduction to the waqf as a legal structure and discuss the 
jurists‘ views regarding the validity of endowing movables and cash. We will then explore the 
Ottoman polemic regarding this institution, noting its contemporaneous usage and spread in 
the Ottoman lands. The specific modes of profit generation which it employed will be dealt 
                                                 
1
 Miriam Hoexter, ―Waqf Studies in the Twentieth-Century: The State of the Art,‖ Journal of the Economic and 
Social History of the Orient 41, no. 4 (1988): 474-495.  
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with in the context of our preceding presentations regarding the ḥiyal. From this, we can 
assess the view of the Ottoman jurists vis-à-vis the ḥiyal and also the reality of their 
application and its subsequent socio-economic impact. The cash waqf was a novel institution 
and both, its reception into the law and the methods which were used to accommodate it, are 
important in the contemporary discourse on the ḥiyal and their modern day usage in the 
Islamic financial landscape. 
 
6.1 The Waqf 
Although the waqf was a hugely popular institution, its early acceptance by the jurists was not 
easily secured. A number of jurists were concerned about the impact of the waqf on the 
inheritance laws. Property sequestered in perpetuity would clearly deny the inheritors their 
rightful share and facilitate attempts to circumvent their rights. Certain ḥadiths are quoted to 
substantiate this position, which explicitly mention that there can be no sequestration of 
property which impinges on the mandated inheritance share allowance.
2
 The Kufan Judge 
Shurayḥ is reported to have said that the Prophet Muḥammad (pbuh) came to sell sequestered 
property.
3
 The implication of this last point being that any property sequestered for charitable, 
or otherwise purposes, remains the property of its owner and hence he may sell it or give it 
away and upon his death it will be part of his estate. This clearly violates the very notion of 
the waqf which is premised upon the property being put into perpetual inalienability and its 
revenue dedicated towards some charitable end.  
 
Abū Ḥanīfa hence held the opinion that if someone endowed his property, he was still 
considered to be its owner and following his demise, the property would go to his heirs. 
                                                 
2
 ‗Lā ḥabs ʿan farāʾiḍ Allāh‘; see al-Kāsānī, Badāiʿ, vol. 6, 346-7. 
3
 ‗Jāʾa Muḥammad bi-bayʿ al-ḥabīs‘; see al-Kāsānī, Badāʾiʿ, vol. 6, 346-7; Peter Hennigan, The Birth of a Legal 
Institution: The Formation of the Waqf in Third-Century A.H. Ḥanafī Legal Discourse (Leiden: Brill, 2004), 
intro xvii-xx. 
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Although there were a number of waqf precedents, he explained these away through 
alternative legal forms. He therefore regarded the waqf as a vow (nadhr), in which an owner 
obliges himself to give away the income of a waqf in charity, but retains full ownership of the 
thing endowed. Precedents in which the waqfs operated beyond the lives of their owners were 
explained as charitable bequests, whereby the owner bequests that the income from some of 
his property be given to specific recipients.
4
 This meant that the waqf, just as in a bequest, 
was limited to a maximum of one third of the deceased‘s estate. The crux of Abū Ḥanīfa‘s 
position is that he denied the founder of a waqf the ability to make it legally binding (lāzim). 
In the Ḥanafī juridical works, Abū Ḥanafī is thus regarded to have held the waqf to be merely 
permissible (jāʿiz) though not legally binding. 
 
Abū Ḥanīfa did, however, say that if a judge gave a verdict on a specific waqf that it was 
legally binding, then according to him it would be so. Therefore, if an individual wished to 
have his waqf made legally binding, he could do so by raising it to a judge and have him rule 
that the waqf was permanently sequestered. This opinion is based upon the principle that a 
judge‘s ruling on an issue in which the jurists have a difference of opinion (al-mujtahad fīh), 
settles the dispute and establishes one opinion.
5
 Although this is an accepted general principle, 
its application in specific instances, such as the cash waqf, may yet cause controversy. 
 
The majority of jurists, however, disagreed with Abū Ḥanīfa‘s views and upheld the right of 
the individual to create a legally-binding waqf. This was based on certain traditions and also a 
large number of precedents which reported the endowments of the Companions and the 
Successors.
6
 From the students of Abū Ḥanīfa, Zufar agreed with the Imām, whereas Abū 
                                                 
4
 al-Kāsānī, Badāʾiʿ, vol. 6, 346; al-Sarakhsī, al-Mabsūṭ, vol. 6, book 12, 34; Abū Bakr Aḥmad ibn ʿAmr al-
Khaṣṣāf, Aḥkām al-Awqāf (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1999), 93-4. 
5
 Muḥammad Abū Zahra, Muḥāḍarāt fī al-Waqf (np.: Maṭbaʿa Aḥmad ʿAlī Mukhayyar, 1959), 47. 
6
 See, for example, al-Khaṣṣāf, Aḥkām al-Awqāf, 5-17. 
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Yūsuf and al-Shaybānī disagreed and took the opinion of the majority. Later on al-Ṭaḥāwī 
would note in his epitome that it was the opinions of Abū Yūsuf that were to be relied upon.7  
 
6.2 The Waqf of Movables 
One of the conditions for a valid waqf is that it should be endowed perpetually (taʾbīd) and 
hence waqfs which are endowed for a specific period are not recognized. The whole purpose 
of the waqf is for it to be a form of continuous charity (ṣadaqa jāriya), providing its 
benefactor with a source of heavenly reward after his death. As a result, waqfs, generally 
speaking, consisted of properties whose rental income was distributed to the recipients as an 
act of charity. Properties or land, were considered as ideal candidates for the basis of 
perpetual philanthropy. al-Kāsānī hence says that it is due to the condition of perpetuity that a 
waqf of movables is not permitted.
8
  
 
There are, however, some exceptions to this rule; both Abū Yūsuf and al-Shaybānī allow the 
waqf of weapons and horses due to reports that the Companions (ra) had done so. Abū Yūsuf 
also allows movables when they are endowed as adjuncts to immovables, so farming tools and 
animals may be endowed together with farm land. al-Shaybānī, who agrees with Abū Yūsuf 
on that point, also permits the waqf of a movable if there is an established practice of 
endowing specific items, amongst people (taʿāmul al-nās).9 Abū Yūsuf disagrees with al-
Shaybānī on this point as the rules of analogy cannot be suspended, according to him, unless a 
tradition supports the exception. al-Shaybānī‘s argues that analogy is often disregarded due to 
an established practice, such as in the contract of manufacture (istiṣnāʿ) and hence the waqf of 
                                                 
7
 ‗al-Qawl fī hādhā kullihī ʿindanā kamā qāla Abū Yūsuf‘, al-Ṭaḥāwī, Mukhtaṣar, 136-7. 
8
 al-Kāsānī, Badāʾiʿ, vol. 6, 349. 
9
 al-Marghīnānī, al-Hidāya, vol. 1, 639-40; al-Kāsānī, Badāʾiʿ, vol. 6, 349. For a detailed presentation of the 
opinion of a great number of Ḥanafī authors on this subject, see A. al-Maʾmūn Suhrawardy, ―The Waqf of 
Moveables,‖ Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Bengal n.s. 7 (1911): 323-430.  
THE CASH WAQF IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 
 
249 
 
movables maybe permitted merely due to its widespread practice. al-Shaybānī‘s argument is 
important as it plays a critical role in the Ottoman cash waqf polemic. 
 
Although there is some disagreement regarding movables in general, Abū Ḥanīfa, Abū Yūsuf 
and al-Shaybānī all agree that the waqf of cash is not permissible. Another student of Abū 
Ḥanīfa, Zufar is, however, reported to have permitted the endowment of dirhams, food and all 
other items sold by weight and volume. He advised that the dirhams should be invested in a 
muḍāraba; the profits are given to the beneficiaries and the original capital reinvested.10 By 
suggesting this formula, in which the capital is recycled in subsequent investments, both a 
semblance of perpetuity is achieved and the beneficiaries receive a continuous income. 
 
The other schools of law have also mentioned the issue of the cash waqfs in their works and 
there appears to have been a difference of opinion within the various schools.
11
  The cash 
waqf was not significantly employed prior to its Ottoman usage and its mention in the jurists 
work would have been more theoretical than practical. As a practice, the cash waqf was 
insignificant if not obsolete in comparison to the dominant mode of waqf in the medieval 
Muslim world, that of waqf of property. It is only in the Ottoman lands that the cash waqf 
began to compete with its more traditional rival, and it was there that the controversy began. 
 
6.3 The Cash Waqf in the Ottoman Empire 
The major cities of the Ottoman Empire such as Istanbul and Edirne, which were previously 
under the dominion of Christian rulers, were subsequently imbued with Islamic culture 
                                                 
10
 See Ibn Māza, vol. 8, 503-4; Burhān al-Dīn Ibrāhīm ibn Mūsā ibn Abī Bakr al-Ṭarābulusī, al-Isʿāf fī Aḥkām 
al-Awqāf (Beirut: Dār al-Rāʾid al-ʿArabī, 1981), 26. 
11
 Maḥmūd Aḥmad Abū Layl, ―Waqf al-Nuqūd fī al-Fiqh al-Islāmī,‖ Majallat al-Sharīʿa wa al-Qānūn 12 (1999): 
33-36. 
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through the medium of the waqf.
12
 In the Balkans, the role of the waqf was even greater: 
researchers have noted that not only did the Ottomans built over a hundred new cities in the 
Balkans, but also that this was achieved through the use of the waqf.
13
 In fact, of all the cities 
in present-day Bosnia-Herzegovina over 80 percent were built in the sixteenth century 
through the awqāf system.14 The capital of Bosnia, Sarajevo, which was created and 
developed by numerous waqfs, became one of the largest cities in the Balkan Peninsula.
15
 
From Thessaly in Greece to Plevne in Bulgaria, the same model was deployed: waqfs were 
established which provided a variety of public amenities, such as a mosque, a madrasa, a 
soup kitchen, a traveler‘s lodge, a market place with shops and stalls, public bridges and 
footpaths, libraries and public baths.
16
 In fact, it can confidently be claimed that the waqf 
system represented nothing less than the public policy of the Ottomans in the Balkans.
17
  
 
The earliest recorded cash waqf in the documentary waqf record of the Ottoman Empire 
occurs in the city of Edirne in 1423.
18
 Edirne is a city in the easternmost part of the Balkan 
Peninsula and it was in the Balkans that the cash waqf would find its most extensive use and 
support. The first recorded cash waqf consisted of 10,000 akçe which was dedicated to the 
                                                 
12
 ‗It can safely be said that the reconstruction process of Ottoman Istanbul depended essentially on the Islamic 
institutions of waqf and ʿimāret‘, Halıl Inalcık, ―Istanbul: An Islamic City,‖ Journal of Islamic Studies 1 (1990): 
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payment of three Qurʾān reciters. The founder stipulated that the money should be used with a 
return of ten percent. In 1442 another cash waqf in Edirne is recorded; this time with an 
endowment capital of thirty thousand akçe and again with a stipulated rate of return of ten 
percent.
19
 al-Arnaʾūṭ reports that over the succeeding centuries the volume of investment 
increased into the hundreds of thousands and by the sixteenth century into the millions.
20
 The 
waqf madrasa complex of Ghazi Khusraw-bek in Sarajevo, for example, consisted of a 
number of estates each containing houses, shops, gardens, but also, and more importantly the 
waqf held seven hundred thousand akçes. The waqf document (waqfiyya) stipulates that four 
hundred thousand was to be used to build the madrasa according to the prescriptions 
contained therein and to purchase books for its library. The remaining three hundred thousand 
akçes was to be used to generate profit (istirbāḥ) on a ratio of 1 to 10, i.e. 10 percent over a 
year. The founder mentions that the money should be invested in a legitimate way (nahj 
sharʿi) free from any doubt of usury and in which there was no possibility of loss.21 
 
Cash waqfs not only increased in their capital, but also in their usage throughout the Balkans 
as reflected in the quantity being registered.
22
 Constantinople, which was conquered by the 
Ottomans in 1453, saw its first cash waqf in 1465, following which it rapidly grew in 
popularity.
23
 In the archives for the year 1546, the records show that almost forty percent of 
all waqfs in Istanbul were cash waqfs.
24
 Mandaville plotted the growth of these waqfs and 
noted that there was a particular increase in their number which coincided with the 
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appointment of Abū al-Saʿūd, intially as the qāḍī of Istanbul and subsequently as the military 
judge (kadiasker) of the Balkans (Rumeli).
25
 What is equally interesting in Mandaville‘s 
graph is that the number of cash waqfs decreased when Abū al-Saʿūd‘s opponent to the cash 
waqf, Çivizade, was appointed to the post of chief jurisconsult (shaykh al-Islam) and declined 
further still when he was dismissed from this post and reassigned to the military judgeship of 
the Balkans.
26
 This period of decline marked the outset of the cash waqf controversy between 
these two judges as will be discussed shortly. Prior to that, we will examine the actual nature 
of the cash waqf and how it operated. 
 
6.3.1 The Cash Waqf and its Modus Operandi 
It has already been mentioned that the only scholar to have permitted the cash waqf from the 
Ḥanafīs was Zufar. When asked how it would operate, he recommended that the capital be 
invested in a muḍāraba contract: The accruing profits are given to the designated recipients, 
while the original capital is reinvested to generate further profits. In this manner the capital 
will serve, in theory, to perpetually provide a source of income for the beneficiaries. In 
practice, however, it is clear that a limited amount of capital would face considerable risk and 
would be liable to decrease, if not lost completely. The notion of perpetuity (taʾbīd) being a 
condition sine qua non of the waqf meant that the cash waqf was not even seriously 
considered as a viable form throughout most of Islamic history. It is not surprising then that 
its inauguration into the waqf landscape was accompanied by significant changes in its modus 
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operandi which would attempt to alleviate the risks involved and give it a realistic claim to 
perpetuity. 
 
Two aspects were introduced into the cash waqf’s operative procedure; firstly the capital was 
not given on muḍāraba but rather on contracts stipulating a fixed percentage return, and 
secondly the founding documents often stipulated that the money was not to be given without 
security, either in the form of a pledge or a reputable guarantor. In the waqfiyya of the 
Sarajevo madrasa complex established by Khusraw bek, all of these elements can be seen. It 
has already been mentioned that the waqfiyya stipulated that the cash was to be given out on 
the basis of an annual return of ten percent. It also states that the money should be invested 
based upon a robust pledge (al-rahn al-qawī) and/or a wealthy guarantor.27 The waqfiyya goes 
one step further and identifies the type of clientele the manager should invest his funds in; 
traders, artisans, and farmers are specifically mentioned and amongst them, those who are 
wealthy, trustworthy and well-known for their good dealings are to be preferred. It also 
proscribes that the cash be given to governors, rulers, madrasa teachers, judges, army 
personnel, tax farmers, corrupt and iniquitous individuals, all government personnel, and 
anyone who is suspected of fraud and greed from whatever profession they may be.
28
 
Sucesko, in his study of the cash waqfs of Sarajevo, concludes that the main form of security 
taken was in the form of personal guarantors as opposed to pledges of real estate, and that 
loans given without any form of security were a rarity.
29
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Çizakaça, investigating the cash waqfs of Bursa over a 268 year time span (1555-1823), 
examined the longevity of these institutions and found that approximately twenty percent of 
the cash waqfs lasted for more than a century (148 out of 761). A study by Barkan showed 
that in a period of less than forty years, over seventy one percent of cash waqfs had 
disappeared from the register.
30
  In order to assess their relative perpetuity however, these 
results need to be compared with the longevity of real estate waqfs. Çizakaça is unable to 
provide comparative figures, but does suggest that real estate waqfs were not as stable as 
previously assumed; the loss of property rights over long periods of time being the greatest 
impediment to their existence.
31
 What Çizakaça‘s research does, however, show is that some 
degree of success was achieved in achieving perpetuity, which may be attributable to the 
changes effected in the modus operandi of the cash waqfs. 
 
The question of perpetuity aside, the main questions relevant to our study are to examine two 
main aspects of the cash waqf; firstly its users, both the clientele and the beneficiaries and 
secondly its method of revenue generation. 
 
6.3.2 The Cash Waqf’s Clientele and Beneficiaries 
It has already been mentioned that the Balkan waqf documents strictly stipulated the target 
clientele for the money of the waqf. An important group amongst them was the merchants. In 
the Venetian state archives a document has been examined which contains a register of 
Bosnian merchant debtors owing money to individuals as well as to cash waqfs.
32
 Notably, 
one of the waqfs mentioned as a leading creditor to the merchants is the very same madrasa 
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complex of khusraw bek mentioned earlier.
33
 This shows just how well the intentions of the 
founders and their waqfiyyas corresponded to the realia of local social and economic praxis. 
The economic impact of these waqfs in creating a vibrant economy through the extension of 
credit to merchants was a crucial factor in the growth of the Balkan cities. Suceska notes that 
the three hundred thousand dirhams cash waqf of the madrasa of Khusraw Bek in the local 
currency would amount to 1.2 million akçes, representing a staggering amount of available 
credit to the nascent business community. This waqf, he suggests, was tantamount to small 
bank.
34
   
 
These results in the Balkans however differ to those observed in the Anatolian city of Bursa. 
There Çizakaça noted that the magnitude of the loans given was ‗modest‘ and that only 0.75 
percent of people had taken more than one loan. From these facts he concluded that the 
borrowers were consumers as opposed to entrepreneurs.
35
 This was corroborated by his 
research into the financing of the silk trade where he observed that the silk trade made almost 
negligible use of the cash waqfs as a source of commercial finance.
36
 The difference between 
the Balkan and Anatolian practices needs to be explained. Çizakaça suggests that his results 
may need to be qualified by the findings in the Venetian archives even though his results have 
been corroborated by a similar study he, himself, mentions of the cash waqfs of Istanbul.
37
  
 
Faroqhi, however, proffers an alternative explanation: Knowing that the normative mode of 
commercial investment finance was the muḍāraba, she asserts that due to the inherent dangers 
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of trading with the Venetians in the Adriatic, a model of mutual risk sharing would have 
meant that private owners of capital would not have been forthcoming: 
Therefore Sarajevo traders doing business in Venice seem to have had trouble finding people willing to 
enter into mudârabes, for the latter would have had to sustain the loss in case the capital came to grief 
through no fault of the travelling partner. Thus traders were reduced to finding the necessary cash under 
conditions relatively disadvantageous to themselves, and borrow from pious foundations‘.38  
Faroqhi‘s explanation accords with what other researchers have already shown regarding the 
vitality of the Islamic forms of partnerships throughout the Ottoman period. There would 
therefore have been little need for interest based finance in Anatolia, especially when the 
terms of the muḍāraba were in the merchants‘ favour, as mentioned by Faroqhi. In conclusion 
it can be said, then, that the situation in Anatolia differed from that in the Balkans; in the 
former money was given for consumption purposes whereas in the latter the funds were 
targeted for commercial use. 
 
Having discussed the clientele of the cash waqf, the main beneficiaries also need to be 
identified. Many of the waqfiyyas clearly stipulate their intended recipients. We have already 
seen how the first cash waqf set up in Edirne was for the purpose of paying three Qurʾān 
reciters. This was not an uncommon phenomenon and one which reveals the intention behind 
these waqfs.
39
 In fact in many instances the main beneficiary of the cash waqfs was the local 
mosque, or a school/madrasa or a dervish lodge.
40
 In a detailed analysis of the Bursa court 
records Çizakaça has recorded numerous other recipients, including, inter alia, buying food 
for the poor, relieving the tax burden, provision of water and other social services. Çizakaça 
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asserts that ‗it goes without saying that the entire cash waqf institution had a religious 
significance.‘41  
 
The question that this raises is what was the need for the cash waqf and what distinct purpose 
did it serve. Faroqhi has attempted to explain the growth and popularity of the cash waqf in 
Istanbul by the fact that within the city walls there would have been little real estate available 
for those wishing to make a pious endowment. She substantiates this by noting that the 
women of Istanbul formed a sizeable percentage of those making waqfs, while they would 
have had relatively less real estate than their male counterparts and hence they turned instead 
to endowing cash, jewellery or other movables.
42
 This is confirmed in a study by Baer in 
which he has shown that in the city of Edirne one third of all the cash waqfs were endowed by 
women.
43
 The relevant point to note, however, is the pious motives of the founders; those 
unable to endow property for charitable causes turned instead to movables, cash, jewellery, 
books etc.
44
 A good example of such pietist motivations is the cash waqfs established by two 
sufi women with considerable capital to support Naqshbandī sufi lodges.45  
 
But what is most striking about these cash waqfs is the point noted by Suceska that the 
income of these waqfs was never added to the capital base in order to expand it.
46
 This meant 
that these charitable foundations maintained their religious identities over and above their 
functions as providers of credit. This contrasts sharply with the European analogue of the cash 
waqf known as the Monte di Pietà. 
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6.3.3 The Cash Waqf and the Monte di Pietà 
The monte di pietà have been described as ‗charitable civic pawnshops offering loans against 
pawns at low interest rates‘.47 Franciscan friars had proposed the setting up of these 
institutions as a way of curbing the usurious practices of the Jews. The first monte di pietà 
was established in Perugia in 1462, only shortly after the first cash waqf.
48
 There are 
important differences between the system of charitable foundations found in Christianity and 
the system of awqāf of the Muslims, which are ultimately traceable to their respective 
theologies.
49
 What is of concern here is how the development of this institution differed 
markedly from that of the cash waqf.  
 
The cash waqf was essentially the philanthropic gesture of an individual, it did not seek to 
provide a specific service to society, but rather blended into the general system of waqfs. 
Additionally, the cash waqf did not seek to expand its capital nor did it attempt to co-ordinate 
its creditor activities with other cash waqfs to provide large amounts of credit for commercial 
requirements. Most critically though the cash waqf, being the act of an individual, was 
restricted to the endowed capital it began with. The monte di pietà differed in a number of 
ways to the cash waqf; firstly, the act of endowment was not that of an individual but an act of 
the commune; a collective act by the corporative medieval Italian city state. The capital which 
formed the basis of the monte di pietà was sourced from public and charitable sources, in 
some cases the Jews were ordered to provide interest free loans to enable the establishment of 
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a monte.
50
 The monte also differed in that it loaned out money on a moderate interest rate, as 
opposed to the ḥiyal employed by the cash waqf. Church legislation in the Fourth Lateran 
Council of 1215 had been moving towards defining a moderate permissible rate of interest as 
opposed to an excessive rate.
51
 Effectively, this institution was to provide loans at interest in 
medieval Christian societies which had hitherto been completely anathema.  
 
The monte spread rapidly throughout Italy perhaps due to its receiving successive papal 
approval.
52
 Its popularity meant that the limited funds provided in its initial set up were 
insufficient and in the mid sixteenth century it was permitted to accept deposits and pay 
interest to those depositors.
53
 This was a huge step forward in the financial landscape of 
medieval Europe; the monte was an institution which was taking deposits and paying interest 
to the deposit holders and then giving out the funds on interest bearing loans at a higher rate. 
Critically, the monte was at this time lending to businessmen and not only to the poor as 
originally envisaged.
54
 Discussing the role of the monte vis-à-vis the Church‘s usury doctrine 
Noonan writes that: 
The acceptance of charitable lending institutions leads to the acceptance of noncharitable lending 
institutions … In this way, by the acceptance of the mons pietatis, professional lending becomes 
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accepted… While formally maintaining the usury prohibition, they seem to have left no limit to the 
possible gain on a loan licit in practice‘.55 
The monte was remarkably similar in some of its functions to a modern Bank and indeed has 
been posited as its medieval precursor.
56
 
 
Many authors have questioned why the cash waqf did not follow the evolutionary trajectory of 
the monte and lead to the development of an indigenous Muslim bank.
57
 There appear to be 
two critical points of difference between the two institutions; the first relates to its juridical 
structure, the monte had a corporate structure, a juridical personality of its own, whereas the 
cash waqf was bound by its founding document and did not have a legal personality 
independent of the waqfiyya. The second major difference relates to the Church‘s sanctioning 
of a lower interest rate.
58
 This point however needs to be examined further as the widespread 
use of the ḥiyal with the cash waqf caused many observers to think that interest was a 
normative aspect of the Ottoman Economy. 
 
6.3.4 The Cash Waqf and the Ḥiyal 
The issue which needs to be examined now is how the capital of the cash waqf was invested. 
It has already been mentioned that Zufar had originally envisioned that the capital should be 
invested in muḍāraba contracts. This prescription, as we shall see, was not the model adopted 
in the Ottoman Empire. al-Arnaʾūṭ presents the stipulations of twenty three waqfiyyas from 
the Balkan cash waqfs; of these eighteen specify the rate of return on the capital according to 
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which it must be invested. Twelve of these stipulate a ten percent return and the remainder 
oscillate between eleven and fifteen percent.
59
 Çizakaça investigated the possibility that these 
stipulations were for contracts of muḍāraba without a guaranteed fixed rate of return on the 
capital. His results however showed that the return on the vast majority (1559 out of 1663) of 
the cash waqfs was between nine and twelve percent. From this he concluded that ‗although 
the financial instruments utilized by the cash waqfs were considered to be legal and approved 
by the courts, these constant ratios strongly suggest that an economic interest prevailed‘.60 By 
economic interest Çizakaça attempts to separate it from judicial interest, the former being 
through methods i.e. ḥiyal approved by the jurists, with the latter representing overt usurious 
contracts. Suceska‘s work on the cash waqfs of Sarajevo also reveals that the returns on the 
capital were extremely constant and thus indicative of the use of ḥiyal under the rubric of 
muʿāmala sharʿiyya, as opposed to muḍāraba.61  
 
We have already discussed the meaning of the term muʿāmala in the previous chapter and 
how it is used in a general sense to refer to the ḥiyal used to circumvent the ribā prohibition 
and more specifically to refer to a ‗sale with a loan‘. The ambiguous nature of this term was a 
crucial aspect of its juridical utility. In the context of the cash waqf the ḥiyal which 
predominated were the bayʿ al-wafāʾ, bayʿ al-istighlāl and ‗sale with a loan‘.62 The bayʿ al-
istighlāl differs from the bayʿ al-wafāʾ in that in the latter the property is purchased and the 
buyer benefits from it until the debt is repaid, whereas in the former the purchaser leases the 
property back to the original owner and the rent he receives represents his profit.
63
 The ‗sale 
with a loan‘ was also used extensively; the court records show that loans given by the cash 
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waqfs were accompanied by sales of nominal items, such as wool, cloth or honey. These 
clearly do not equate in pecuniary value to the amount added to the debt, although more 
crucially, they do represent a fraction of the loan, which is generally ten percent.
64
 A loan, for 
example, of 3600 is accompanied by a sale of honey at a cost of 360.
65
 In another case a loan 
of 5333 is made together with the sale of cloth for 667, i.e. eight percent of the total.
66
  
 
From the abundant documentary record, it is evident that the use of these ḥiyal was the norm 
for investing the capital of the Ottoman cash waqfs. What, then, was the response of the 
Ottoman jurists to this phenomenon and how did they view the increasing popularity of the 
cash waqf. In the middle of the sixteenth century, as these waqfs were spreading through the 
Balkans and subsequently in to Anatolia, a controversy erupted among the Ottoman jurists 
which brought into question the very validity of the cash waqfs.  
 
6.3.5 The Cash Waqf as a Novel Institution 
The cash waqf controversy is instructive in a number of ways. Firstly, the cash waqf was a 
novel institution in the history of Islamic philanthropy; its treatment demanded from the 
scholars a very critical response and what has been seen by some as an act of ijtihād.67 The 
polemic is therefore a witness to the reaction of the jurists to the twin concerns of religious 
morality and social exigency. Secondly, the polemic also reveals the view of the Ottoman 
jurists regarding the modus operandi of the cash waqf and their views regarding the ḥiyal and 
its actual practice. Our presentation will focus on these two aspects; we will note how the 
jurists integrated the cash waqf into the existing juridical framework and the debate which this 
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generated, and their reaction to, and understanding of, the ḥiyal. The controversy of the cash 
waqf will show us how the jurists built their respective arguments and how they understood 
their historic role in the development of the School‘s doctrine. 
 
6.3.6 The Cash Waqf Controversy 
Mandaville, in his seminal article on the cash waqf controversy, informs us that sometime 
between 1545 and 1547 a legal ruling was issued by the Military Judge (qāḍīʿasker) of 
Rumeli, Çivizade, declaring that the practice of the cash waqf was illegal.
68
 Çivizade later 
suffered an unprecedented dismissal from the post of shaykh al-Islām, which led some to 
believe that it was his stance against the cash waqf which was responsible for his downfall.
69
 
This assertion, however, has been rejected although his influence on the cash waqf is 
recorded. In the graph presented by Mandaville there is a correlation between his time in 
office, his dismissal and his later fatwā to the number of cash waqfs established in Istanbul. 
During his period of office there appears to have been a decline in the number of cash waqfs 
established, whereas in 1543, two years after Çivizade‘s dismissal, a sudden rise is observed. 
With the issuing of his opposing fatwā as military justice of Rumeli, the numbers of cash 
waqf again decline. 
 
Following his dismissal, Çivizade retired from issuing rulings and returned to an academic 
post in one of the prestigious madrasas of Istanbul.  His retirement was, however, short-lived 
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and not long after, in 1545, he returned to the judiciary as the Military Judge of Rumeli.
70
 In 
the Balkans the cash waqf was far more prominent than in Anatolia, and it was here that 
Çivizade would issue his fatwā declaring the cash waqf an illicit practice. Sulayman the great, 
the contemporary Ottoman sultan, agreed with his ruling and give a decree banning it.
71
 This 
was despite the fact that the incumbent shaykh al-Islam Abū al-Saʿūd had not only given a 
fatwā permitting it, but had also composed a lengthy treatise defending the practice and  
demonstrating its legal validity in the Ḥanafī School.72 In response to Abū al-Saʿūd‘s treatise, 
Çivizade wrote a response in Turkish, questioning the jurisprudential basis of Abū al-Saʿūd‘s 
arguments. Çivizade, however, died shortly afterwards in 1547 just as the controversy was 
heating up and in 1548 the Ottoman sultan reversed his decision and permitted the cash waqf 
once again.
73
  
 
The sultan, in overturning his decree, may have been influenced by the letters of Bali Efendi, 
a sufi of the Khalwatī order. Bali Efendi wrote a number of letters directly to Sultan Sulayman 
urging him to reverse his decision. His arguments are critical in understanding the nature of 
the controversy. Bali Efendi was based in Sofia and was well aware of the role the cash waqfs 
had played in urbanizing the Balkan Peninsula and it was from this vantage point that he laid 
out his objections to the prohibition: 
Since the conquest of Rumeli, for nearly three hundred years, it has been practiced, by order of the 
padiĢahs and the general agreement of the scholars. … I plead to my padiĢah; let an order be given that 
will cut through the doubts. This waqf supports the activities of the Friday services. If it were lost 
Friday would have no direction, the preacher and the prayer caller would be lost. Friday prayers would 
be abandoned.
74
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Bali Effendi‘s arguments were not merely with regard to the role the cash waqfs had played in 
the Balkans but more critically, with the consequences of the sultan‘s decree prohibiting 
them: 
Faithful brothers! Certain hospice complexes (‗imaretler) in Rumeli, certain schools and most of the 
mosques there are based on the cash waqf. It was decided that they all be horse stables, and it won‘t be 
easy to rebuild them. The watercourses of the cities and towns are all cash waqf based. It has been 
decided to dry them up. For long, new mosques, hospices, schools, and other good works have been 
built; now few are started. In how many places have the people given up the everyday practice of 
religion!
75
 
Çivizade had been the Military Judge of Rumeli for only a short period when he issued his 
verdict against the cash waqfs. His previous appointment had been as the Military Judge of 
Anatolia where the cash waqf had not played, and did not play, such a crucial role and as a 
result he may well have been unfamiliar with the importance of the cash waqf in Balkan 
society. Bali Efendi thus pressed his vantage point ‗Ah if Çivizade Efendi had known how 
Islam was settled in Rumeli, then he would have known whether or not cash waqfs were 
wrong!‘76 Bali Efendi‘s letters were not strict juridical arguments but rather an appeal to the 
sultan to maintain the status quo, which had proved to be successful up to that time. In his 
letters he admits that he speaks not through ‗analogy or individual reason‘ but rather through 
the ‗sense of the sharīʿa‘, asserting that the divine law had no other purpose that to grant ease 
from the exigencies of the time.
77
  
 
The Sultan, in his subsequent decree, supports his reversal by mentioning that a number of 
previous and incumbent Military Judges, together with the incumbent Shaykh al-Islam Abū 
al-Saʿūd and a number of other leading jurists had all united in their opposition to Çivizade. 
He thus ruled that: ‗In matters such as this, there is no harm in acting on the basis of a weak 
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authority‘.78  Çivizade did not, however, respond to these developments as he had passed 
away before the subsequent decree was issued and it appeared that the controversy, without its 
central figure, would now abate. This, however, was not to be the case as Muḥammad al-
Birgivī would take up the challenge and over a period of twenty years would compose no less 
than five treatises arguing against the legality of the cash waqfs.
79
 al-Birgivī was a skilful 
jurist and easily capable of matching the arguments adduced by Abū al-Saʿūd in his earlier 
treatise and it is to these jurisprudential arguments that we will now turn. 
 
6.3.7 The Legal Debate 
There are two aspects to the legal debate regarding the cash waqf; the first relates to its 
legality as an institution and the second to its modus operandi. The first issue is thus a 
discussion of the soundness (ṣiḥḥa) and irrevocability (luzūm) of the cash waqf, and the 
second relates to the use of the muʿāmala contract to generate its profit. Both aspects of the 
debate will be presented below. 
 
6.3.7.1 The Legality of the Cash Waqf 
It was mentioned earlier that a waqf of movables were generally not permitted and that Abū 
Yūsuf and al-Shaybānī had allowed exceptions to this rule. The former had limited those 
exceptions to those mentioned either in traditions or to movables that served as adjuncts to 
larger immovable waqfs. al-Shaybānī in addition to these exceptions also permitted cases 
where there existed an established practice amongst people (taʿāmul al-nās) for endowing 
specific items. This concept of referring to taʿāmul was crucial to the protagonists of the cash 
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waqf.
80
 It should also be recalled that apart from these two authorities, there is an opinion 
attributed to Zufar which explicitly permits the cash waqf. Zufar was one of the leading jurists 
in the circle of Abū Ḥanīfa and his opinion was certainly held in high esteem, although not on 
a par with the opinions of Abū Yūsuf and al-Shaybānī.81 In justifying the cash waqf, the 
Ottoman jurists would thus use a two-pronged approach: The opinion of Zufar would be cited 
due its explicit sanction of the cash waqf, but in recognition of his lower ranking in the 
epistemic hierarchy they would also use the opinion of al-Shaybānī and argue that endowing 
cash was a widespread phenomenon in the Ottoman lands and thus constituted an instance of 
taʿāmul al-nās. 
 
Mullā Khusraw, a renowned Ottoman jurist and Shaykh al-Islām between 1472-3 and 1480,82 
authored an important textbook of Ḥanafī jurisprudence known as the Durar al-Ḥukkam; a 
commentary on his earlier Ghurar al-Aḥkām. In this work Mullā Khusraw dealt with the cash 
waqf although not in detail and limited himself to the two arguments mentioned above, i.e. the 
opinion of Zufar and al-Shaybānī‘s concept of taʿāmul.83 Later on, Mullā Khusraw‘s student 
Akhīzāda also gave the same summary justification for the cash waqf.84 This was, in fact, the 
standard treatment of the cash waqf by the Ottoman jurists and signalled their approval of the 
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practice. With the onset of the polemic, however, the argument would become far more 
detailed. 
 
6.3.7.1.1 Çivizade‘s Attack on the Cash Waqf 
With the onset of the polemic these two arguments were directly attacked. Çivizade rejected 
that cash came under the rubric of movables (manqūl) such that taʿāmul could even apply to 
it. al-Shaybānī‘s granting an exception based upon taʿāmul was for movables, and money was 
not including under the rubric of movables.
85
 With regards to Zufar‘s opinion, two points 
were adduced to oppose it; first was the evident fact of Zufar being a lower ranking authority 
and hence his opinion was not to be taken when the other authorities had expressly limited the 
scope of the waqf of movables, and second, as mentioned earlier, Zufar, like Abū Ḥanafī, did 
not regard the waqf as binding, and hence, even if Zufar‘s opinion was taken, it would only 
permit a non-binding cash waqf and not a perpetual one, as was the contemporary practice.
86
 
 
This last point by Çivizade was important in that it essentially charged the opinion permitting 
the cash waqf of being an amalgam of inharmonious opinions. The authority (Zufar) who 
permitted the cash waqf did not regard the waqf as binding, whereas the authorities (Abū 
Yūsuf and al-Shaybānī) who regarded the waqf as binding had opposed the cash waqf. This 
lead to the charge of talfīq, which implied that the practice of a binding cash waqf was an 
eclectic composite which did not accord, in its entirety, with the opinion of any single 
authority. The charge of talfīq was not merely an academic point in the juristic polemic it was 
more crucially linked to the everyday practice of the cash waqf.  
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Previously it was mentioned that Abū Ḥanīfa allowed a waqf to be established in perpetuity if 
an individual judge confirmed it as such. This meant that in order for an endower to ensure 
that his waqf could not be challenged later by someone using Abū Ḥanīfa‘s opinion of waqfs 
being non-binding, the endower should have someone legally challenge him in regard to the 
waqf. The waqf will then be raised to a judge who would rule according to Abū Yūsuf and al-
Shaybānī‘s opinion, thus settling the matter once and for all. This method was part of both the 
jurists‘ own formulas and the judicial reality.87 What underpinned this method was the notion 
that in areas of ijtihād a judge had the right to take a position from the various different 
opinions and give judgment accordingly. 
 
In the case of the cash waqf the practice involved two judgments; the first was to rule in 
favour of its soundness based upon the opinion of Zufar and secondly, to rule that it was 
binding according to the opinion of Abū Yūsuf and al-Shaybānī. The problem with this 
process is that the judge, as opposed to giving a single judgment based upon a specific 
position of an earlier authority, was in this instance taking opinions from both sides and 
combing them to give a result which neither side fully endorsed. According to the theory of 
juristic hierarchies this would require the judge to be a mujtahid such that the composite 
would not be viewed as an act of talfīq, but rather as an expression of his own creative 
opinion. The protagonists of the cash waqf, however, wanted to avoid the idea that the novel 
institution was a product of their own juristic exertion, they preferred, rather, to present it as a 
manifestation of a widespread regional practice. 
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6.3.7.1.2 Abū Saʿūd‘s Defence 
Abū al-Saʿūd begins his treatise by laying down the Ḥanafī doctrine of the waqf of movables 
and then moves on directly to the issue of the cash waqf.
88
 It is clear from the outset that he 
intends to take the position of al-Shaybānī which permits a waqf of movables subject to 
taʿāmul. Firstly, he quotes some authoritative texts from the Ḥanafī School which permitted 
the cash waqf outright without mentioning the condition of taʿāmul.89 He commends, 
however, that these opinions be interpreted in light of al-Shaybānī‘s principle of taʿāmul 
while also acknowledging that outright permissibility has been attributed to Zufar.
90
 He then 
mentions that al-Bukhārī narrates an opinion from the Successor jurist Ibn Shihāb al-Zuhrī in 
which he permits the cash waqf. After this short introduction he asserts that the clearest way 
forward is to take the opinion of al-Shaybānī in order to facilitate the process of creating the 
waqfs for the judges and to make their recording and governing straightforward.
91
 
 
It is clear that Abū al-Saʿūd wants to avoid the charge of talfīq and hence steers clear of 
invoking Zufar‘s opinion as an authoritative source. In the ensuring pages he goes on to show 
how the opinion of al-Shaybānī has held sway throughout the Ḥanafī juristic tradition and 
how it has been applied in disparate regions. His purpose is thus two-fold: To present al-
Shaybānī‘s doctrine as the dominant opinion in the major Ḥanafī legal texts and secondly, to 
demonstrate how taʿāmul, as a critical factor, was invoked in disparate regions to justify the 
waqf of various movables.
92
 He also attempts to show that the term ‗movables‘ is a general 
term encompassing all items without restriction. His purpose is to subsume cash under the 
category of movables and show that this is an acceptable interpretation of al-Shaybānī‘s 
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doctrine. To do this he quotes various rulings from the fatāwā literature which show the 
jurists using the word movables to refer to cash or employing the latter as an example of the 
former.
93
  
 
More critical, however, is his attempt to show that there is no meaningful difference between 
cash and other movables. The contention he faces here is that the waqf is understood to be the 
sequestration of an essence and the donation of its accruing benefits.
94
 In a cash waqf, the 
essence of the waqf itself must be employed in order to realise any benefits, which means that 
a cash waqf has no corporal existence. Abū al-Saʿūd, demonstrates his juristic capabilities 
here, and dives into the Ḥanafī legal tradition to show how the capital of the cash waqf may be 
considered a perpetual essence. In our earlier presentation of ribā it was noted that the 
Ḥanafīs took the view that a monetary loan is designated theoretically, as a return in specie 
although in reality it is a debt. This fact is used by Abū al-Saʿūd to argue that although the 
capital of a cash waqf is used in specie, it could also be regarded as being returned in specie, 
and theoretically speaking, the specific capital of the waqf acquires a perpetuity.
95
  
 
The next problem Abū al-Saʿūd has to contend with is the fact that many of the Ḥanafī legal 
texts explicitly prohibit the cash waqf with some going so far as to claim a consensus of the 
jurists in this regard.
96
 Abū al-Saʿūd, however, is unperturbed and maintains his stance by 
interpreting this merely as a ruling given in the absence of an established practice. For Abū al-
Saʿūd, al-Shaybānī‘s principle takes precedence in interpreting the jurists‘ rulings. He justifies 
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this by asserting that similar absolute rulings were previously given regarding the waqf of 
animals, only to be later qualified by taʿāmul.97  
 
Abū al-Saʿūd then sets out to answer the argument that the taʿāmul which sanctions a 
departure from analogy is that which is recognised by a master jurist, a mujtahid. He, 
therefore, clarifies that taʿāmul itself ‗is a perceptible phenomenon in which there is no doubt 
regarding its existence nor does anyone waver in recognising it and [thus] it is not dependant 
upon the opinion and acceptance of a mujtahid.‘98   It is he surmises: ‗The agreement of the 
majority and their concurrence in relation to a specific practice.‘99 Abū al-Saʿūd does not want 
to claim that his opinion is an act of ijtihād or that he is a mujtahid and hence his attempt to 
argue that the opinion he is defending contains no novelty in terms of its legal structure, but 
only in so far as it is a reflection of an established regional practice which deserves to be 
recognised by the Sharīʿa. 
 
Having spent a good portion of his treatise establishing the legality of the cash waqf based 
upon taʿāmul, Abū al-Saʿūd then turns to the other vital issue of irrevocability (luzūm). 
Having argued for al-Shaybānī‘s opinion as the basis for legality Abū al-Saʿūd has avoided 
the charge of talfīq, as al-Shaybānī together with Abū Yūsuf both ruled that a waqf would be 
binding immediately upon its legal formation. To avoid the difference of opinion within the 
School, Abū al-Saʿūd suggests that the endower raise the case to a judge who can then give a 
verdict using the opinion of al-Shaybānī. In this way the issue of those who oppose the 
soundness of the cash waqf and its irrevocability will be settled.
100
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Although Abū al-Saʿūd‘s opinion makes good sense and would facilitate the process of 
making a cash waqf, it must be recalled that although he was the chief jurisconsult, his 
opinion was nothing more than that. Judges were free to take any opinion they preferred and 
were not bound by the preferences of the incumbent muftī. The Sultan, himself, when issuing 
his decree also mentioned the permissibility of using the opinion of Zufar when the situation 
demanded. Judges of the empire had both historically and contemporarily used the opinion of 
Zufar and would indeed continue to do so.
101
 The challenge for Abū al-Saʿūd was thus, not 
only to proffer his own legal solutions, but also to account for the past and contemporary 
practice of the Ottoman judiciary. He thus sets out to show how the cash waqf can be made 
binding using the opinion of Zufar. The procedure is the same as before, in that it is raised to 
the judge who gives a verdict making it legally valid. Once the verdict that it is valid has been 
issued, it is raised again to the judge by the endower challenging the manager over its 
irrevocability. The judge then rules according to the opinion of Abū Yūsuf and al-Shaybānī 
and it becomes binding.
102
  
 
Abū al-Saʿūd is not unaware of the charge of talfīq and sets out the contention in that regard. 
As mentioned earlier, the main problem is that the judge is combing two opinions which are 
incongruous to each other. Abū al-Saʿūd avoids this charge by claiming that the judge does 
not combine two opposing opinions, but rather, that he issues two consecutive verdicts which 
are separate and unrelated. His main argument is that when the judge makes his verdict of 
validity according to the opinion of Zufar, the legality it effects is one which is accepted by 
all.
103
 This is due to the principle that the judge‘s verdict creates a legal fact (res judicata). 
This fact is then accepted as so and becomes the basis for legal effects. Abū al-Saʿūd argues 
that when the second verdict according to the opinion of Abū Yūsuf and al-Shaybānī is given, 
                                                 
101
 ʿAbd al-Ḥalīm, Ḥāshiyat al-Durar ʿalā al-Ghurar (Istanbul: Dar Saʿādat, 1311 AH), vol. 1, 433-4. 
102
 Ibid, 50-52. 
103
 Ibid, 54. 
THE CASH WAQF IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 
 
274 
 
it is on the basis of the waqf‘s legality established through the judge‘s ruling and not the 
opinion of Zufar.
104
 The resulting composite is thus not between the opinion of Zufar and the 
opinion of Abū Yūsuf and al-Shaybānī, but rather between the latter two and the legal fact 
created by the judge. 
 
Throughout Abu al-Saʿūd‘s treatise one can see that he presents his arguments, not as a 
mujtahid setting forth a new doctrine, but rather, as a jurist clarifying the meanings found in 
earlier authoritative works and working them into a coherent framework which ultimately 
embraces the novel institution he is seeking to defend. In his defence, one can see that he is 
attempting to align his work with the normative Ḥanafī doctrine and avoid charges of talfīq or 
ijtihād. This gives us an inside view of the methodology of the later Ḥanafī jurists. Abu al-
Saʿūd‘s arguments show us not only that a specific methodology was used, but more crucially 
that, as a leading representative of the Ottoman Ḥanafī establishment, he was sensitive to the 
methodology he employed.  
 
6.3.7.1.3 al-Birgivī takes up the Challenge 
Abū Saʿūd‘s leading opponent after the demise of Çivizade was Muḥammad al-Birgivī; a 
preacher and law professor who avoided a career in the judiciary.
105
 al-Birgivī wrote five 
treatises in total arguing against the cash waqf. His polemic went to the heart of Abū Saʿūd‘s 
treatise and attempted to extirpate the very core of his Abū Saʿūd‘s foundation. al-Birgivī 
focused his refutation around two main themes; firstly, a highly nuanced exposition of 
taʿāmul and secondly, the issue of talfīq. al-Birgivī begins the discussion of taʿāmul by 
locating it within the hierarchy of probative legal sources. The jurisprudentially recognized 
taʿāmul for which a departure from analogy is sanctioned and regarded as a cause for istiḥsān, 
                                                 
104
 Ibid. 
105
 ʿAwnī Iīlkhān, ―Shakhṣiyyāt Islāmiyya: Muḥammad Efendī al-Birgivī,‖ in İmam Birgivî, ed. Mehmet ġeker 
(Ankara: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı Yayınları, 1994), 128-30. 
THE CASH WAQF IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 
 
275 
 
he enunciates, is based upon consensus; either actual or tacit.
106
 This, he argues, is because the 
sources of the sacred law are four without exception as stated in the uṣūl al-fiqh.107 This 
means that no other source can be countenanced unless it is rooted in one of the four agreed 
upon sources. Ta’āmul is hence a type of ijmāʾ, which itself is specific to the mujtahidīn. This 
interpretation is mandated by the uṣūl and hence can not be obfuscated; rather, he proffers, 
any statements in relation to taʿāmul must be interpreted in such a way that they conform to 
this viewpoint.
108
 Therefore, the taʿāmul which al-Shaybānī intends, he argues, is the practice 
which occurred between the prophetic era and al-Shaybānī‘s time. 
 
In order to demonstrate that his interpretation of taʿāmul concurs with the earlier Ḥanafī 
masters he takes up the standard example of istiṣnāʿ (contract of manufacture). This contract 
is generally validated based upon taʿāmul even though it goes against analogy. al-Birgivī then 
presents various statements of the jurists who explain the nature of the taʿāmul underpinning 
istiṣnāʿ. He quotes for example the author of al-Hidāya who states that istiṣnāʿ is permitted 
due to an istiḥsān which is based on the established consensus (al-ijmāʿ al-thābit) of an 
existing practice (taʿāmul).109 The commentator of al-Hidāya, Ibn al-Humām explicates this 
further saying that the taʿāmul is based upon an unopposed ‗consensus by praxis‘ (al-ijmāʿ al-
ʿamalī), from the time of the Prophet (pbuh) to the present day.110 
 
al-Birgivī then goes on to try to explain the various probative examples of taʿāmul in the 
works of the jurists. As Abu al-Saʿūd had earlier shown, the principle of taʿāmul had been 
invoked throughout Ḥanafī legal history to justify the waqf of different movables, such as 
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particular animals or certain religious books. In order to explain these instances, al-Birgivī 
develops a complex model to show how a particular practice came to be accepted after the era 
of the mujtahidīn. He explains that a regional practice maybe admitted through the process of 
ilḥāq, which is to connect a new particular with an established principal on the condition that 
the two are similar in all aspects which are relevant to the ratio.
111
 The practice of endowing 
books, for example, is permitted by taʿāmul. According to al-Birgivī, this means that it is 
appended through ilḥāq to a principal already approved.112 In this example, there already 
existed a practice of endowing copies of the Qurʾān in the era of the mujtahidīn which was 
accepted by consensus. Books are thus considered similar to the Qurʾān, as far as the ratio is 
concerned, and hence as a local practice it is validated by ilḥāq. 
 
al-Birgivī explains that for ilḥāq to occur with regards to the waqf, three aspects are 
considered to be relevant to the waqf‘s ratio: 
 perpetuity of the essence (baqāʾ al-ʿayn), 
 a pious motive (qurba maqṣūda), 
 a general need of the people (ḥājat al-nās).  
The latter aspect, he elaborates, is measured using the barometer of taʿāmul and therefore the 
degree of practice reflects the extent of societal need. The jurists refer to taʿāmul not as a 
probative source, but rather because it expresses society‘s need for an institution, and it is this 
latter point which is consequential in juristic discourses. What is important to realise, 
however, is that all three conditions need to be met otherwise taʿāmul alone is not a sufficient 
condition.
113
 Having said that, it will be noticed that in the cash waqf two of the conditions are 
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immediately met, namely that of taʿāmul and pious motive. What remains is the first 
condition of the perpetuity of the essence. 
 
We have already seen how Abū al-Saʿūd attempted to use Ḥanafī legal analysis to argue for 
the conceptual perpetuity of capital in a cash waqf. al-Birgivī, however, directly confronts 
Abū al-Saʿūd‘s example and notes that it is an exceptional rule based upon necessity and is 
not a jurisprudential norm. In fact, as he goes on to show, there are many instances where the 
jurists have regarded cash as an in specie item, although this always refers to instances when 
the cash is not employed as a currency but as a chattel. What al-Birgivī is demonstrating is 
that the Ḥanafī legal tradition has already dealt with this possible question and that Abū al-
Saʿūd is therefore mistaken in his application of an exceptional rule to the cash waqf.114 
Effectively, al-Birgivī is arguing that to apply the notion of taʿāmul to the cash waqf is 
unjustified and goes against the principles of the Ḥanafī School. By grounding his arguments 
in precise quotes from the works of the earlier Ḥanafī jurists, he justifies his nuanced 
articulation of taʿāmul and denies Abū al-Saʿūd the very principle upon which he sought to 
vindicate the practice. With al-Shaybānī‘s principle of taʿāmul removed from the discourse 
the only avenue left for permitting the cash waqf is the opinion of Zufar; this however leads to 
the charge of talfīq. 
 
al-Birgivī quickly moves on to deal with the position of Zufar and how it is being utilised by 
the judges to create the cash waqf. He points out, as mentioned earlier, that if the opinion of 
Zufar becomes the basis for the legal validity of the cash waqf and the opinion of Abū Yūsuf 
and al-Shaybānī is used to effect the irrevocability, then the combined effect is to create a 
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third unprecedented opinion.
115
 He rejects Abū al-Saʿūd‘s argument that the judge makes two 
successive rulings which are independent of each other and argues that when the judge makes 
the first ruling permitting the cash waqf on the basis of the Zufar‘s opinion, his ruling 
necessarily includes Zufar‘s viewpoint on irrevocability, otherwise the judge would be ruling 
that the cash waqf is valid irrespective of irrevocability; and that is an opinion which no one 
holds.
116
 This means that Zufar‘s opinion on irrevocability becomes an integral part of the 
initial ruling, and implicitly contradicts the subsequent ruling. He also questions the way the 
principle of using a judges ruling to override difference of opinion, is used, and argues that 
this principle only applies to differences of opinion among the Companions and Successors, 
and there is no difference of opinion is among them in regards to the cash waqf.
117
 
 
al-Birgivī‘s treatise is a sustained analysis with a plethora of arguments dealing with all of 
Abū al-Saʿūd‘s arguments, both major and minor. The major arguments of both jurists have 
been presented here as an indication of the nature of later Ḥanafī juristic discourse vis-à-vis a 
novel institution which demanded a response from the jurists. Although the cash waqf was 
destined to survive the polemics of its detractors, the questions raised by al-Birgivī attracted 
the attention of later scholars and assume a critical dimension in view of the contemporary 
Islamic financial landscape.  
 
The charge of talfīq was clearly an important concern for the jurists who belonged to a 
tradition where systematic consistency was the hallmark of their School. Ibn ʿĀbidīn deals 
with talfīq in a discussion regarding the combination of a cash waqf with a personal waqf.118 
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This, he says, is a composite ruling (ḥukm mulaffaq) and the scholars have differed on the 
issue of talfīq. He refers to Ibn Quṭlūbughā who said that a composite ruling is not be legally 
effected and also related that talfīq is prohibited by consensus. Ibn ʿĀbidīn also cites, through 
a number of works, from the Fatāwā al-Shilbī whose author permits talfīq, although his 
source is none other than Abū al-Saʿūd.  Ibn ʿĀbidīn offers a solution to these opposing 
viewpoints and suggests that the prohibited type of talfīq relates to selecting opinions from 
across the different madhāhib, whereas the permitted type is when it is limited to combining 
opinions from within a particular School.
119
 Methodologically this makes sense as it ensures 
some degree of systematic consistency and prevents egregious eclecticism. However, even 
with this approach, the degree of difference within a School can be significant such that 
selecting opinions even within a particular School can challenge juridical consistency if left 
unrestricted.
120
 
 
6.3.7.2 The Cash Waqf and the use of the Muʿāmala 
The cash waqf, which began in the Balkans, soon spread to Anatolia and with it came an 
increase in the usage of the maʿāmala contract. The Ottoman fatāwā literature endorsed the 
use of the muʿāmala, and the Sultan set a maximum profit limit initially of five percent and 
then later on of fifteen percent.
121
 This official endorsement of the use of the muʿāmala with a 
maximum limit on the percentage return was viewed positively in the sense that it restricted 
the degree of exploitation possible through this contract, but it also had the effect of granting 
it official sanction. This legal recognition was an endorsement which would only see its use 
proliferate. Studies on the use of such contracts have demonstrated that throughout the 
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Turkish Ottoman lands the use of the muʿāmala was widespread.122 From the works of the 
Ottoman jurists the validity of this contract seemed to be unquestioned.
123
 
 
In Mandaville‘s account of the cash waqf controversy, the first person to mention the spread 
of usury as a problem of the cash waqf, is al-Birgivī.124 This, however, is contradicted by 
Çivizade‘s contemporary biographer al-Kafawī who quotes him as saying: Whoever 
undertakes the administration of awqāf not knowing the principles of the legal transactions 
(al-muʿāmala al-sharʿiyya), nor complying with the requirements thereof, leads to the 
opening of the gates of usury.‘125 This means that right from the outset of the controversy the 
problem of usury was a point of concern for the jurists. What is noteworthy is that Abū al-
Saʿūd does not mention the use of the muʿāmala at all in his defence of the cash waqf and also 
that Çivizade, although highlighting the problem of usury, accepts the muʿāmala as the norm 
which needs to be adhered to. Indeed in Çivizade‘s argument it appears that his main 
complaint was of people not knowing how to use this contract correctly which lead them to 
forming usurious contracts. The muʿāmala contract itself was not called into question. In the 
polemic of al-Birgivī, however, he challenges this status quo and calls the prevailing practices 
into question. 
 
al-Birgivī presents three problems with the usage of the muʿāmala; firstly, he says that the 
ignorant do not understand how to use this contract as per its explication in the fatāwā books; 
secondly, and more egregious than the first, are the iniquitous who care little for they way 
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they make their profit such that they dispense with the ḥiyal and engage directly in ribā.126 
These first two points are argued much in the same fashion as Çivizade, in that they 
apparently endorse the use of the muʿāmala as the normative alternative to ribā; taking the 
prescriptions of the earlier fatāwā books almost as positive legal norms. al-Birgivī, being a 
critical reformer however, mentions without hesitation that the use of these contracts is 
reprehensible. He points out that according to the Ḥanafī texts the capital of the cash waqf 
should be invested in muḍāraba contracts, but that in his time, people profit from the capital 
using the ʿīna contract. This contract, he says, was censured by the Prophet (pbuh) and also 
explicitly denounced by the scholars who warned people: ‗beware of the ʿīna for surely it is 
accursed‘.127 In another work al-Birgivī mentions various leading Ḥanafī authorities who 
opposed the ʿīna; al-Zaylaʿī and al-Bābartī and the authors of al-Hidāya and al-Kāfī.128 al-
Birgivī‘s plea is that these ḥiyal are not permitted outright, but rather, that they are 
reprehensible and their permissibility is limited; a viewpoint which accords with the teleology 
discerned earlier on in this study. 
 
al-Birgivī was not alone in his viewpoints; an anonymous manuscript in the Esad Efendi 
library written as a part of the cash waqf polemic, mentions the arguments of both Çivizade 
and al-Birgivī and critically notes that: ‗in our age the bayʿ al-ʿīna has spread throughout the 
land and to all people‘.129 The author also exposes the tension between the authorities quoted 
by al-Birgivī, who regarded the ʿīna as reprehensible, and Qāḍī Khān who allowed this 
transaction as a means of avoiding ribā. He, however, concludes that Qāḍi Khān‘s opinion is 
stronger, albeit with the caveat that an extortionate profit should not be allowed in order to 
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protect the poor. He then goes on to explain why this should be the case: ‗Most of those who 
are afflicted by [this contract] are none other than the poor and they are compelled [by their 
circumstances] into [buying] recklessly at high prices. Perhaps for this [reason] a sultanic 
proscription was issued.‘130 The author goes on to say that the Ottoman muftīs have ruled that 
those who go beyond the limits set by the Sultan will be severely punished and the additional 
amounts will be returned even if the borrowers had freely consented to the extra amount.
131
 
 
This comment on the contemporary conditions and usage of the maʿāmala are crucial in 
understanding the nature of the debate occurring between the Ottoman jurists. What is clear is 
that the teleology of the ḥiyal is still being invoked although its increasing usage has become 
a cause of concern for the jurists. This introduces an important factor into the dynamic of the 
model of the ḥiyal and suggests that the teleology which permits their usage must be balanced 
against both their increasing usage and their adoption as a normative method of finance for 
the poor. 
 
6.4 The Cash Waqf in the Arab Lands 
In his seminal article, Mandaville asserted that the cash waqf was an ‗extraordinarily popular 
form in much of Anatolia and Rumeli … [but] that it rarely if ever was carried out anywhere 
in the Islamic world before them or in many parts thereafter.‘132 In his conclusion he also 
notes that it was used insignificantly in the Arab lands.
133
 This assertion however was 
challenged by Çizakaça who claims that the cash waqf did indeed spread to the Arab lands 
and even further. Çizakaça attempts to show that cash waqfs existed in Syria, Egypt, Sudan, 
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Iran, Iraq, India, Pakistan and also in the Malay world and in Singapore.
134
 When examining 
Çizakaça‘s references, however, it is clear that these developments are not a result, or 
continuation, of the Ottoman cash waqf practice, but rather independent developments. In his 
references for Egypt, for example, what the authors are referring to is the waqf of joint-stock 
companies and not cash waqf per se.
135
 Similarly with regards to India and Pakistan, the 
discussion is primarily related to the waqf of shares in joint-stock companies.
136
 In fact, 
almost all of the countries mentioned by Çizakaça reflect the situation in the early twentieth 
century and are not related in anyway to the Ottoman practice.
137
   
 
The only place where the practice can realistically be claimed to have spread to, is the Levant 
(bilād al-Shām) and it is here where Çizakaça‘s reference actually stands up to scrutiny. 
Çizakaça refers to the work of Bruce Masters who demonstrates from the sixteenth century 
Ottoman court records the presence of numerous cash waqfs.
138
 Masters also notes that these 
waqfs differed from their pre-Ottoman counterparts in their unabashed mentioning of a 
chargeable profit rate.
139
 In addition to the presence of the cash waqf in Aleppo, al-Arnaʾūṭ 
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has also noted their presence in Jerusalem.
140
 The question that needs to be asked, however, is 
whether their presence in these two cities justifies the conclusion that the cash waqf spread 
throughout the Arab lands. 
 
Aleppo lies in the northernmost part of Syria virtually at the periphery of what the Ottomans 
called ʿArabistān. Naturally, and more than any other Arabian city, it would have been 
influenced by Ottoman contemporary practice and perhaps facilitated by the number of non-
Arabs from the Turkish lands who had settled there.
141
 Further south, in the cities of Hama 
and Homs, a study of waqfs in the sixteenth century showed no cash waqfs present.
142
 
Additionally, Ibn ʿĀbidīn states that the cash waqf is a practice of the Turkish lands (bilād al-
rūm) as opposed to our lands; presumably referring to the Levant in general or perhaps 
Damascus in particular.
143
 Their large presence in the city of Jerusalem is therefore surprising 
and according to al-Arnaʾūṭ, their presence here is more significant than their presence in 
Aleppo.
144
  al-Arnaʾūṭ‘s detailed studies of the waqf records in Jerusalem reveal the true 
nature of the spread of the cash waqf in the Arab lands.  
 
al-Arnaʾūṭ notes that it is no coincidence that the arrival of the cash waqf into Jerusalem 
occurred at the same time as an influx of Turkish officials arrived to staff the new Ottoman 
administration. In fact, the first cash waqf recorded was endowed by the District Governor 
Farūkh Bek and subsequent cash waqfs are also noted to be connected to Turks. Cash waqfs 
continued to increase in number until they represented almost half of all the waqfs of 
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Jerusalem.
145
 He also notes that from among the female endowers, all but one, were Turks.
146
 
What is more interesting is the fact that after two centuries of growth, the cash waqf almost 
disappears from Jerusalem as local Arab families begin to rise to prominence, signalling the 
demise of the Turkish hold on local institutions. al-Arnaʾūṭ concludes from his study that the 
absence and presence of the cash waqf in Jerusalem is demonstrably linked to the arrival and 
subsequent demise of the Turkish Ḥanafīs.147 That the cash waqf did not take hold amongst 
the indigenous Arabs and was not continued after the demise of the Turks, suggests that 
Mandaville was justified in his conclusion that the cash waqf was a singularly Turkish 
phenomenon. 
 
6.5 The Use of the Muʿāmala 
It is clear from the preceding presentation that the cash waqf began in the Balkans and then 
subsequently spread into Anatolia. In the Arab lands its usage was limited and contingent on 
the presence of the Turks. The question to be addressed now is to why the institution arose in 
the first place and the conditions which justified the use of the ḥiyal. When discussing the 
Ottoman‘s in the Balkans, it must always be remembered that the Ottomans were conquering 
Byzantine territory where the norms and customs were those of the Orthodox Church as 
opposed to the Catholic Church. Additionally, the Muslims who lived in the Balkans were a 
minority and the process of conversion to Islam was a slow one.
148
 The first cash waqf, it will 
be recalled, was established in Edirne in 1423, a city which belonged to a district in which the 
percentage of Muslims was between twenty five and fifty in the year 1525.
149
 Not only were 
the Muslims in a minority in the Balkans, but it must also be noted that the doctrine of usury 
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was not applied by the Orthodox in the same manner as it was by the Catholics. The Orthodox 
Church was not as dogmatic as the Catholic Church in its opposition to usury and in some 
countries Orthodox clerics and monasteries openly engaged in usurious practices.
150
 In 
Byzantine lands, the interest rate was generally observed to be 11.11 percent from the 
thirteenth century until the period of the Ottoman conquest.
151
 This meant that the Muslims 
living in the Balkans would have found themselves in an environment where usury was a 
norm and not a peripheral activity. In addition, recent converts would have maintained many 
of their previous customary practices and their usurious practices may well have been 
couched in the ḥiyal which would have allowed them to function much as before. This can be 
observed most clearly in the tradition of loaning the money of orphans out on interest.
152
 The 
Orthodox Church made a clear exemption from the usury laws for the wealth of an orphan 
and later on we find that in the Balkans this tradition was also continued by some Muslims.
153
  
 
What is clear though, is that these ḥiyal we not used for self-enrichment, but rather for 
charitable ends and it is perhaps this fact, more than any other, which justified to the 
Ottomans their continued usage. As has already been mentioned the profit generated by the 
use of the muʿāmala was used to pay for a variety of pious endeavours. This often included 
aid for the poor in paying the various taxes levies upon them.
154
 Guilds would also lend out 
surplus capital using the muʿāmala contract, using the profit generated to help the poor pay 
their taxes.
155
 Gabriel Baer, in his study on Turkish guilds reported that their capital was often 
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lent to members of the guild. The rate of return, charged at one percent, was assigned to 
charitable causes, such as distributing food, aiding the sick and paying funeral costs, and also 
to religious causes such as Qurʾān recitation.156  
 
Historians and Ottomanists reporting on the usage of the ḥiyal do not differentiate between 
the use of these ḥiyal and the overt practice of usury.157 It is evident, however, that this was 
not the view of the Ottomans and this can be seen both in terms of their usage of the ḥiyal and 
in the jurists‘ discussions regarding them. The jurists make a strict delineation between 
contracts where the muʿāmala has been practiced properly and contracts in which they are 
neglected. In the al-Fatāwā al-Khayriyya a question is posed regarding a man who dies owing 
money to a waqf which, although is recorded as using a muʿāmala with a profit, was actually 
devoid of any specific recognized ḥīla. al-Ramlī answers that the manager of the waqf can not 
claim anything above the capital as it is usury pure and simple.
158
 Gerber also found a similar 
approach in the works of the Turkish jurists: 
Several fetvas reveal that because the sale was not a real one, people had the tendency to skip some 
semi-ceremonial parts of the sale that were obligatory according to Islamic law – for example, the 
actual physical handing over and receiving of the object sold. A number of fetvas reveal that in the eyes 
of the muftis such omissions invalidated the entire transaction, thereby also showing that the exact letter 
of the law, not just or even the mainly social relations behind it, was crucially important for them.
159
 
In addition to the differentiation made by the jurists, the overwhelming charitable nature of 
the usage of these contracts suggests that Turkish Muslims were conscious of the limited role 
and validity of these transactions. That they were averse to engage in usurious trade can be 
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observed by that fact that the central usurious trade of money lending was completely 
dominated by Jews, Greeks and Armenians.
160
  
 
As was mentioned in the previous chapter, the enforceable promise underpinning the bayʿ al-
wafāʾ represented an infraction of the Ḥanafī systematic juridical structure. The legal 
recognition afforded by the Ottoman‘s to the ḥiyal of ribā, equally represents, if not more so, 
an infraction of the ribā rules. The consequence of this infraction, it will be recalled, is that 
the ḥīla loses its normativity and becomes concessionary. The latter have a highly restriced 
juridical remit and must be prevented from becoming a norm. The Ottoman‘s use of the ḥiyal 
therefore, signifies an extension of the original justification of the ḥiyal. As a historical 
example of the widespread usage of the ḥiyal, many lessons can be learnt from both its 
economic and social repercussions and also from its attendant legal discourse. 
 
6.6 Conclusion: The Tension between Concession and Norm 
The Ottoman practice of the cash waqf utilising the muʿāmala is instructive in a number of 
ways and can be used to develop the analytical model discussed in the previous chapter. Their 
usage of the ḥiyal was not only far more extensive than in previous eras, but was also 
officially endorsed through a decree of the Sultan and the fatāwās of the leading Ottoman 
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jurists. These factors are critical in understanding the usage and subsequent growth of the 
ḥiyal. The justification for the use of these ḥiyal with the capital of the cash waqf in the 
Balkans would have been clear; Muslims were a minority and in need of funds both for 
consumption and productive purposes. The cash waqf fulfilled that need together with the fact 
that it provided funds whose additional return did not enrich the lender, but was rather spent 
on further charitable causes.  
 
The Sultanic decree limiting the amount of return that could be stipulated was intended to 
restrict the abuse of the muʿāmala contract and prevent usurers from camouflaging their 
exploitative practices. Although the government took an active role in preventing the spread 
of usury, its endorsement of the cash waqf and its modus operandi conceded that the usage of 
the ḥiyal was an acceptable norm within the Ottoman lands. Inalcik, for example, reports that 
although in the waqf documents and hisba records the profit rate never exceeded ten percent, 
some individuals did make contracts on a twenty five to fifty percent profit-rate.
161
 Even more 
egregious than these high rates was the practice of compound profits, known as murābaḥat al-
murābaḥa.162 This, it is assumed, was the ḥiyal equivalent of compound interest, whereby the 
dues from one murābaḥa were subjected to another murābaḥa in lieu of deferring the 
payment. In response to these excesses, the Sultan would personally expose such cases and 
order the local authorities to punish the perpetrators. But what this really demonstrates is that 
the increased usage of the ḥiyal in the long term is counterproductive and ultimately that it 
contradicts the very telos which presupposes them. The proliferation of their use, thus led to 
the subsequent reaction of the Ottoman jurists to the institution as a whole. Both Çivizade and 
al-Birgivī blamed the cash waqf for opening the door to usury. Evidently the jurists‘ 
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prescriptions for the use of the ḥiyal was interpreted by some people as a mere name changing 
exercise and led to people stipulating a fixed return without going through the actual 
procedure of the ḥiyal. 
 
The Sultanic decree also meant that in non-Turkish lands the courts would have to uphold the 
usage of these ḥiyal despite there being little or no reception of the cash waqf as a practice 
there. Rafeq notes that in Hama in particular and in Syria in general, loans recorded in the 
Sharīʿa courts were always interest free. The Ottoman decree permitting the use of the ḥiyal 
up to a maximum rate was therefore a point of contention between local jurists and their new 
rulers.
163
 When the Ottoman decree came into force the Syrian judges would absolve 
themselves in their court rulings by stating that it was a ‗requirement of the Sultanic decree 
which entailed that ten should be[come] eleven and a half‘ (i.e. fifteen percent).164 The 
Sultan‘s decree meant that the ḥiyal were now recognised in the legal system. This inevitably 
resulted in an increase in the usage of these transactions in Syria, and is reflected in the 
contemporary court records.
165
  
 
The Sultanic decree together with the Ottoman jurists‘ approval thus played a crucial role in 
establishing the use of the ḥiyal as an acceptable norm. Although it may have been justified in 
the Balkans where the Muslims were a minority and had little prospect of attracting business 
investors or charitable loans, this was not the case in the central Ottoman and Arab lands. The 
ḥiyal were initially justified based upon their usage with the capital of the cash waqf, where it 
was evident that self-enrichment could not take place. This charitable bent to the institution 
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may well have been a justifying factor, although one which was absent from later uses of the 
ḥiyal. This development represents the critical dilemma which the ḥiyal create: at what point 
does their concessionary nature become an exploited norm.  
 
Part of Ibn al-Qayyim‘s critique against the ḥiyal was that they produce the same results as 
the overt practice they seek to evade. This notion, of the ḥiyal of ribā replicating the socio-
economic repercussions of a usurious economy, can be used as a useful benchmark for 
delimiting the remit of the ḥiyal. The first observation to be made, and which perhaps justifies 
their usage is that they do not equate to the overt practice of usury. The European experiment 
of permitting monte di pietà to lend money using low interest rates created a norm of usurious 
lending which ultimately led to the creation of the European Banking industries. The Ottoman 
practice did not evolve along a similar trajectory. Although the ḥiyal may replicate the effect 
of these transactions it does not remove the moral reproval of even the slightest amount of 
usury. And although a few individuals may exploit the ḥiyal to openly engage in usury, 
Çizakaça makes the point that ‗it was one thing for an individual entrepreneur to disregard the 
law and quite another for an institution that violated the law to emerge‘.166 Usurious 
institutions were hence anathema to the Ottoman financial landscape as opposed to the trends 
developing in contemporaneous Europe. The second observation which counters their use is 
their increased uptake as they become an established norm. This produces the kind of debt 
proliferation that is common to usurious economies and precisely what the Islamic prohibition 
of ribā seeks to avoid. Mandaville, for example, notes that indebtedness to the cash waqf was 
commonplace and in the Balkan city of Monastir, the records show that of the 176 villages in 
the judicial district, 90 were collectively in debt to cash waqfs.
167
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The validity of the ḥiyal should therefore, at best, only be regarded as ephemeral, and 
additionally be contingent on the efforts of both jurists and political authorities to provide 
solutions for changing the very environment which permits their use. The ḥiyal should thus be 
viewed as a self-limiting institution as opposed to a self-perpetuating one. As a self- 
perpetuating institution, the ḥiyal, once legally sanctioned become an economic norm 
embedded in the financial landscape. In the long term, economic conditions analogous to a 
usury-based economy begin to emerge. Although not totally mimicking the latter, serious 
negative consequences are observed. Alternatively, as a self-limiting institution, the ḥiyal are 
granted limited official transitory sanction as concessions and not as normative exits. This 
concessionary nature demands that concurrent to their contingent legitimacy, alternative 
solutions are actively sought. These alternatives seek to restore the Islamic philanthropic and 
commercial norms and ultimately annul the justification for the usage of the ḥiyal. The 
teleology of the ḥiyal, as originally envisaged by the original proponents of the ḥiyal, 
necessitates that the model to be adopted is the latter and not the former. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
This inquiry set out to establish a framework for the ḥiyal as a jurisprudential technique. The 
widespread use of the ḥiyal in Islamic finance requires that their legitimate remit be 
understood and delineated to prevent the system exploiting this technique and skewing the 
evolution and development of this nascent industry. In order to provide that framework, the 
task of this study was to enquire whether the ḥiyal were a part of the normative doctrine of its 
most prolific proponents, the Ḥanafīs. To answer this question, a three-pronged approach was 
adopted which dealt with; first, the theory of ribā; second, the notion of the ḥiyal as a literary 
phenomenon; both as a polemic and as a distinct legal genre; and third, the ḥiyal as a 
historical practice. 
 
In the first part of this inquiry, we delved deeply into the Ḥanafī jurisprudential theory of ribā 
and demonstrated the degree of systematic consistency which underpinned their approach. 
The first point to be noted was that their hermeneutical strategy in defining the term ribā, 
sought not to differentiate between the ribā proscribed in the Qurʾān and that proscribed in the 
Sunna, but rather, to differentiate between ribā which could be objectively determined 
through the legal measures of weight and volume, and that which could not. The former is 
regarded as ribā proper and the latter as quasi-riba (shubhat al-ribā). Having elaborated their 
definition of ribā, we then observed how ribā impacted the various other branches of 
commercial law. What transpires is that the Ḥanafīs paid high regard for the systematic 
application of their concept of ribā in all branches of the law. The reason why ribā was so 
influential was perhaps due to their understanding that its prohibition was not a distinct 
exception to the permissibility to trade, but rather, a specific manifestation of the normative 
requirement of contractual equality, the wujūb al-mumāthala. This norm precludes all forms 
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of inequity and therefore those disparities which are quantifiably discernable are categorically 
prohibited. The fact that ribā is understood as a specific manifestation of a well established 
norm, leads to the perfuse application of their doctrine. This notably results in their refusal to 
allow the possibility of any concessions to it and also in their prohibition of contracts which 
involve the valorisation of time. 
 
In the second part of this inquiry we examined the ḥiyal as a literary phenomenon. This began 
with a presentation of the ḥiyal polemic among the Islamic jurists. The significant conclusions 
which were drawn from this polemic were; 1) that the juridical methodology of the jurists in 
relation to the role of intents and motives was responsible for the attitudes of both sides; 2) the 
ḥiyal polemic developed diachronically and its opponents began to use the maqāṣid to argue 
against the ḥiyal while also recognising that their definition of the ḥiyal related to the 
egregious ḥiyal and those which were controversial. As far as the egregious type was 
concerned, none of the jurists permitted them, and as for the controversial type, their role was 
disputed. It was left to al-Shāṭibī to confront the controversial ḥiyal, such as taḥlīl (in its non-
egregious form) and ʿīna and suggest that even these ḥiyal could be underwritten by the 
teleology of the maqāṣid. At the apex, then, the polemic yielded that the vast majority of what 
the proponents were advocating were not ḥiyal proper, but more accurately, valid makhārij. 
The few ḥiyal which were controversial were given the benefit of the doubt as having being 
premised upon a valid Sharīʿa telos. 
 
The Ḥanafīs defence of the ḥiyal begins with a demonstration of why the makhārij are a part 
of the normative explication of the Sharīʿa. This demonstration rests on two pillars; firstly, 
that the Sharīʿa does not prohibit something without providing a licit alternative, and 
secondly, that the jurists must provide exits to those who require them. For the Ḥanafīs, 
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prescribing exits, taʿlīm al-makhraj is a juridical technique observable in the Qurʾān and the 
Sunna and one which the jurists should embrace in their capacity as exponents of the law. 
Instead of granting concessions in mitigating situations, the Ḥanafīs prefer to rely on the 
method of prescribing legal exits. The former represent a suspension of the substantive rules, 
whereas the latter a strict adherence to them. The Ḥanafīs, prefer to provide makhārij as 
opposed to concessions, although they do accept a role for the latter when all else fails. This 
teleological anchoring in their approach is clearly discernable in their articulation of the ḥiyal 
and their circumscription of its juridical remit. 
 
Having dealt with the polemic, we then moved on to deal with the ḥiyal as a distinct legal 
genre. To sharpen the analysis here, we mentioned the Orientalist Joseph Schacht‘s claims 
regarding the function of the ḥiyal genre. He asserted that the ḥiyal functioned as a modus 
vivendi which allowed the jurists to appease their consciences by bringing the discordant 
theory of Islamic law in line with the actual social practice. This was necessary according to 
the Orientalists because Islamic law was not practicable; whole swathes of the law, such as 
commercial law were dismissed by them as a ‗dead letter‘. In this regard, Schacht averred that 
the taking of interest was a commercial necessity which the jurists themselves duly 
acknowledged by permitting the ḥiyal.  
 
The various components of this theory were evaluated by challenging their central premise 
that Islamic commercial law was a ‗dead letter‘ and that commerce was conducted according 
to customary practice as opposed to religious prescription. It was shown that the prescriptions 
of Islamic commercial law corresponded to the actual practice of the merchants as attested to 
by the documentary record. The muḍāraba was noted to have been used widely throughout 
the Muslim lands and also to have lasted upto the modern period. The success of this specific 
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investment form was attributed to it being both economically superiour to interest bearing 
loans and of course religiously conscionable. Its European analogue, the commenda was also 
noted for its impact on reducing the usage of the usurious sea loan. The muḍārba was also 
shown to be more than a Muslim customary practice, in that its very nature was determined by 
the ribā prohibition. Islamic commercial law, was thus deemed to be critically influential in 
enthusing Islamic investment ethics into the trade practices of Muslim (and non-Muslim) 
merchants. 
 
Following this, the Kitāb al-Ḥiyal attributed to al-Shaybānī was examined and an attempt was 
made to determine its authorship. It was noted that al-Shaybānī‘s authorship of this work was 
disputed by some of his students while endorsed by others. Ultimately, their disagreement was 
resolved by four observations: 
 The treatise attribute to al-Shaybānī was distinct from the earlier Kitāb al-Ḥiyal which 
was unanimously condemned. 
 The negation of his authorship referred either to that latter work, or to the use of the 
word ḥiyal in al-Shaybānī‘s actual treatise. 
 The treatise reflected a specific section in al-Shaybānī‘s al-Aṣl dealing with makhārij. 
 Two of al-Shaybānī‘s other students also wrote works on ḥiyal and makhārij. 
From these points, we inferred that the al-Shaybānī‘s Kitāb al-Ḥiyal was most probably put 
together by his student Abū Ḥafṣ, who restricted himself to the specific makhārij found in al-
Shaybānī‘s al-Aṣl.  
 
Ascertaining that the treatise is primarily based upon al-Shaybānī‘s chapter on makhārij in the 
al-Aṣl does not, however, answer the question of whether these makhārij were in line with the 
normative doctrines or not. This was ascertained through two further observations: firstly, a 
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large number of ḥiyal were explicitly noted by the subsequent ḥiyal authors to have been 
expounded in al-Shaybānī‘s authoritative works, the ẓāhir al-riwāya. This means that the 
makhārij originated in the normative doctrines and were subsequently appropriated into the 
distinct ḥiyal genre. Secondly, the importance given by the ḥiyal authors to maintaining 
systematic consistency demonstrated that the makhārij were consonant with the principles of 
the School, and where there was a juristic difference in the principles this had a corresponding 
impact in the makhārij. Strict systematic consistency is both the method of the Ḥanafīs and 
their justification for the exits. As solutions premised upon a systematic extension of the rules, 
they contrast this with the method of granting concessions, which result in a suspension of the 
rules. The systematic application of the rules applies throughout the various Ḥanafī makhārij, 
even in the most controversial ones relating to taḥlīl, shufʿā and Zakāt. These three ḥiyal were 
discussed at length and the concern of the jurists to uphold their systematic consistency while 
also providing legitimate exits was demonstrated. It was also observed that the Ḥanafīs were 
aware of the possible exploitation of their doctrines, which they addressed by explicitly 
censuring those acting mala fide. 
 
When it comes to the ḥiyal used to avoid ribā, these are noteworthy for their departure from 
the strict systematic doctrines. al-Khaṣṣāf, is perhaps the most cautious in his approach, as his 
ḥiyal are not legally enforceable and are therefore based upon their non-binding nature. Later, 
on we see that in Balkh, Ibn Salama uses a ḥīla which is highly disputed amongst the jurists. 
Eventually we arrive at the bayʿ al-wafāʾ in which there is a specific infraction of the 
systematic rules, in that the additional benefit on the loan is secured through a binding 
promise to effect a sale redemption. As in the makhārij we noted that these ḥiyal also had an 
underpinning teleology and that they were used solely to aid the poor in accessing immediate 
funds. These ḥiyal differ, however, from their makhārij counterparts in that they represent an 
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infraction of the systematic rules, and are therefore determined to be concessionary and not 
normative. This means that their sanction and usage must necessarily be transitory. Their 
remit is thus restricted to the telos which presupposes them and it is incumbent on the jurists 
and authorities to utilise this transitory period to deal with the political, social, and economic 
circumstances which occasion them. 
 
In the final chapter, the Ottoman cash waqf and the controversy that surrounded its legal 
acceptance, was examined. Its proliferation in the Ottoman lands was observed, as was the 
concomitant rise in the use of the ḥiyal. This increase in usage was unjustified given the 
original reasons for its validity and consequentially, the detriments of its use were observed as 
large numbers of people fell into debt and higher rates of return were demanded. The 
institution of the cash waqf was also compared to the European monte di pieta. The latter was 
noted for lending out money at low interest rates which ultimately lead to a weakening of the 
moral censure of usury. They, therefore, played a critical role in the development of the 
European banking system, both as an institutional precursor and as a backdoor for usury to 
enter mainstream economic activity. Their economic and social repercussions differed to the 
cash waqf, which, although allowed the use of ḥiyal and led to an increased uptake in their 
usage, did not lead to the development of usurious banking institutions. The historical impact 
of these institutions indicates that the use of these ḥiyal, when teleologically justified, does 
not equate to the overt practice of a low interest rate, as ultimately the former preserves the 
moral censure of usury whereas the latter erodes it. This does not, however, amount to an 
open licence in the use of these ḥiyal, as they also ultimately lead to serious negative 
economic consequences in the long term. As has been witnessed, following prolonged usage 
these ḥiyal resulted in the usage of compound profits, higher rates of borrowing, and debt 
proliferation; all of which are the hallmarks of a usurious economy. 
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Throughout this study we have maintained that Islamic commercial law provides viable 
alternatives to usurious finance, and that the ḥiyal do not have a remit in this arena. The 
Ottoman cash waqf, however, did provide finance in the commercial sector, albeit limited to 
the Balkans. In their eyes, this may have been justified as no individual personal enrichment 
occurred from the revenue that this generated.  The proceeds were instead spent on charitable 
causes. The use of these ḥiyal in Islamic finance is historically unprecedented in that Islamic 
financial institutions are commercial entities providing finance for both personal and 
commercial use. In conclusion to the final chapter, we suggested that the ḥiyal should be 
regarded as a self-limiting institution as opposed to a self-perpetuating institution. This 
conclusion, however, is challenged by the commercial nature of the Islamic finance 
institutions which currently benefits from the increased usage of certain ḥiyal. This self-
perpetuating usage completely undermines the teleology of the ḥiyal, and although the use of 
the ḥiyal maybe justified in certain economic conditions, they certainly do not have a 
normative role in an Islamic economy.
1
 It would be anathema to the original Ḥanafī exponents 
of the ḥiyal that such transitory concessions could form the backbone of an Islamic finance 
industry.
                                                 
1
 Usmani, An Introduction to Islamic Finance, 15-24. 
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 eht htiw layiḤ-la īf jirāhkaM-la s‘īnābyahS-la fo sretpahc eht setalerroc elbat sihT
 .lṣA-la fo noitces jirāhkam gnidnopserroc
 tpircsunaM lṣA-la layiḤ-la īf jirāhkaM-la
 oiloF lṣA-la ni gnidaeH retpahC hC gP gnidaeh retpahC hC
 b675 تاب انٕجّ فٙ انطلاق ٔانثمح فٙ رنك 11 1 تاب انذٛم فٙ انطلاق ٔالاسرثُاء 1
 a175 تاب انذٛم فٙ اجاسج انذٔس 1 9 تاب انذٛم فٙ اجاسج انذٔس 2
 – sm eht ni dnuof ton saw retpahc sihT – 31 تاب انذٛم فٙ انٓثح 3
 a175 تاب اجاسج الأسضٍٛ ٔانثمح فٙ رنك 2 91 انذٛم فٙ اجاسج الأسضٍٛتاب  4
فٙ انخذيح ٔفضٕل  تاب انذٛم 5
 أجٕسْى ٔاجاساذٓى
 b175 تاب انٕجّ فٙ انخذيح 3 12
 12 تاب انذٛم فٙ انٕكانح 6
 52
 4
 54
 تاب انذٛهح فٙ انٕكانح ٔانثمح فٙ رنك
 تاب انٕجّ فٙ انزيٙ ٕٚصٙ إنٗ انًسهى
 b175
 b585
 b275 تاب انصهخ ٔانذٛهح فٙ رنك 5 62 تاب انصهخ 7
تاب انذٛم فٙ انصهخ يٍ دك عهٗ  8
 سٍْ أٔ عهٗ كفٛم 
 a475 تاب انصهخ يٍ دك عهٗ سٍْ أٔ كفٛم 7 23
تاب انذٛم فٙ انثٛع ٔانششٖ فٙ  9
 انذٔس ٔانشلٛك ٔغٛش رنك
 63
 
 73
 83
 
 83
 
 
 93
 04
 
 
 14
 
 14
 
 24
 24
 34
 34
 32
 
 42
 62
 
 a13
 
 
 72
 82
 
 
 92
 
 03
 
 b13
 23
 33
 43
تاب انٕجّ فٙ انششٖ ٔانثٛع فٙ انذٔس ٔيا شثٓٓا 
 ٔانثمح فٙ رنك
 تاب انٕجّ فٙ تٛع انذاس ٔانذشو ٔانثمح فٙ رنك
تاب انٕجّ فٙ ششٖ انعثذ َفسّ يٍ يٕلاِ ٔانثمح 
 فٙ رنك
إرا أساد أٌ ٚهجأ تعضٓى (تاب انٕجّ فٙ الأجشج 
ٔانٕسثح تعضٓى إنٗ تعض أٔ انًشأج إنٗ اتُٓا 
 1)إنٗ تعض ٔانثُٛح فٙ رنك
 تاب انٕجّ فٙ انششاء تانششط ٔانثمح فٙ رنك
ٚكٌٕ نّ انذاساٌ ٚشٚذ تٛع (تاب انٕجّ فٙ انشجم 
أدذًْا ٔلا ٚشٚذ الأخشٖ ٔانٕجّ فٙ انشجم 
 2)ٚشرش٘ يٍ سجم غشٚة
فٙ انًساكٍٛ صذلح (تاب انشجم ٚجعم غهح داسِ 
 3)ٚجٕصتعذ يٕذّ ٔٚكرة تزنك كراتا 
يٍ دعٕٖ فٙ داس ادعاْا (تاب انٕجّ فٙ انصهخ 
 4)سجم نُفسّ أٔ لإتُّ ٔانثمح فٙ رنك
 )a03(جضء يٍ انثاب انساتك 
 تاب ششٖ انذٔس ٔغٛش رنك ٔانثمح فّٛ
 تاب انسًساس ٔغٛش رنك ٔانٕجّ فّٛ
 تاب اجاسج انخذو ٔانكشٖ إنٗ يكح ٔانثمح فٙ رنك
 a975
 
 a975
 b975
 
 a085
 
 
 b975
 b975
 
 
 a085
 
 a085
 
 a085
 a085
 b085
 b085
تاب اكشاِ انهصٕص ٔانثمح فّٛ ٔانشجم ٚذهف  53 34 تاب انذٛم فٙ انًٍٛٛ ٔالاسركشاِ 01
 تانعرك
 b085
                                                 
1
 ,idnefE rihsĀʿ ,09 SM :lṣA-la bātiK eht fo tpircsunam rehtona morf nekat si sisehtnerap ni liated lanoitidda ehT 
 .detanigap ton si tpircsunam sihT .lubnatsI
2
 .dibI 
3
 .dibI 
4
 .dibI 
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 103
 
تاب انذٛم فٙ انًٍٛٛ انرٙ ذسرذهف  11
 تٓا انُساء أصٔاجٍٓ
 34 44
 
تاب الأًٚاٌ انرٙ ٚسرذهف فٙ انُساء أصٔاجٍٓ 
 تٓا ٔغٛش رنك
 a485
 
 a675 تاب آخش فٙ انُكاح ٔٔجّ انثمح 9 84 انُكاح تاب 21
 a585 تاب انٕصٙ ٔانٕصٛح ٔانثمح فٙ رنك 44 94 تاب انٕصٙ ٔانٕصٛح 31
 a575 تاب انُكاح ٔٔجّ انثمح فّٛ 8 35 تاب انذٛم فٙ انُكاح 41
 75 تاب انذٛم فٙ انششكح 51
 85
 06
 11
 21
 31
 تاب ٔجّ انثمح فٙ انششكح فٙ انرجاسج
 ششكح انشجهٍٛ فٙ انعثذ ٔٔجّ انثمح فٙ رنكتاب 
 تاب فٙ َمض انًٕالاج َٔكادّ فٙ رنك
 a775
 a775
 b775
تاب انضًاٌ ٔانكفانح ٔانرخشج  61
 يًُٓا
 16
 26
 26
 36
 
 36
 41
 51
 61
 71
 
 81
 تاب انٕجّ فٙ انضًاٌ ٔانثمح فٙ رنك
 تاب ٔجّ ششكح انًفأضح َٔمضٓا
 ايشأج يال تاب انثمح فٙ انشجهٍٛ ٚكٌٕ نًٓا عهٗ
تاب انٕجّ فٙ انشجهٍٛ ٚكٌٕ نًٓا انعثذ فثإرٌ 
 أدذًْا فٙ انرجاسج فٙ َصٛثّ ٔانثمح فٙ رنك
 تاب  انٕجّ فٙ انًٍٛٛ فٙ انضًاٌ ٔانثفح فٙ رنك
 b775
 a875
 a875
 a875
 
 a875
 a875 تاب انٕجّ فٙ الأًٚاٌ فٙ انكسٕج ٔانهثس 91 36 تاب الأًٚاٌ فٙ انكسٕج 71
 76 فٙ انششٖ ٔانثٛعتاب انذٛم  81
 76
 86
 02
 12
 22
 تاب انٕجّ فٙ انذهف ٔتٛع انثٛاب
 تاب انٕجّ فٙ ششٖ انشلٛك ٔتٛعّ ٔانثمح فٙ رنك
تاب انٕجّ فٙ انشجم ٚذهف عهٗ أٔل شٛئ ًٚهكّ 
 ْٕ فٙ انًساكٍٛ
 b875
 b875
 a975
 86 تاب انًساكُح ٔدخٕل انذاس 91
 96
 63
 73
 رنك تاب انًساكُح ٔدخٕل انذاس ٔانٕجّ فٙ
 تاب انذخٕل ٔانٕجّ فٙ رنك ٔانخشٔج ٔانًساكُح
 b085
 b185
 b185 تاب انًٍٛٛ فٙ انرماضٙ 83 27 تاب انًٍٛٛ فٙ انرماضٙ 12
 b185 تاب انطعاو ٔانششاب 93 47 تاب انطعاو ٔانششاب 12
 a285 تاب انًضاستح ٔٔجّ انثمح فٙ رنك 14 67 تاب انًضاستح ٔانخشٔج يُٓا 22
 b285 تاب انذٍٚ ٔانثمح فٙ رنك 14 87 ٔانذٕانحتاب انذٍٚ  32
 a385 تاب انٕجّ فٙ انشفعح ٔانثمح فٙ رنك 24 18 تاب انشفعح 42
 b375 تاب انصهخ  فٙ انجُاٚاخ ٔٔجّ انثمح ف رنك 6 48 تاب انصهخ فٙ انجُاٚاخ 52
 a975 5تاب انًساكُح ٔدخٕل انذاس 52   
 lṣA-la dna layiḤ-la īf jirāhkaM-la nosirapmoC A .3 elbaT
 :era nosirapmoc siht fo stcepsa tnatropmi ehT
 .lṣA-la eht ni dnuof si jirāhkaM-la eht fo retpahc eno tub lla tahT 
 aqiht dna hjaw drow eht ecalper ot esitaert tnednepedni eht ni desu si layiḥ drow ehT 
 .lṣA-la eht ni
 retpahc eht dna ,rettam tcejbus eht fo tnemegnarraer tnacifingis a neeb sah erehT 
 .decuder sgnidaeh
                                                 
5
 lapicnirp eht taht sebircs eht morf eton a htiw ,ssm htob ni ecaps knalb a yb dewollof saw gnidaeh retpahc sihT 
 .gnidaeh siht rednu ecaps ytpme na dah osla morf deipoc gnieb
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-la fo txet eht ni decalper neeb evah aqiht dna hjaw sdrow eht woh swohs elbat sihT
 .jirāhkaM-la s‘īnābyahS
 layiḤ-la īf jirāhkaM-la tpircsunaM lṣA-la
 .gP sdrow gnidnopserroC oiloF gnidrow lanigirO .oN
 9 - a075 كٛف انثمح فٙ رنك  1
 9 - b075 كٛف انثمح نّ فٙ رنك 2
 9 ْم فٙ رنك دٛهح b075 ْم فٙ رنك ٔجّ ثمح 3
 9 - b075 يا انٕجّ فٙ رنك 4
 9 كٛف ٚصُع b075 كٛف انثمح 5
 11 كٛف ٚذرال b075 كٛف انثمح 6
 11 كٛف ٚذرال b075 كٛف انثمح فٙ رنك 7
 11 ْم فٙ رنك دٛهح b075 ْم فٙ رنك ٔجّ ثمح 8
 21 ... ْم عُذكى دٛهح فٙ  a175 ْم عُذكى فٙ ْزا ٔجّ ثمح 9
 21 سأند أتا دُٛفح  عٍ انذٛهح  a175 سأند أتا دُٛفح  عٍ ٔجّ انثمح فٙ رنك 01
 21 كٛف انثمح a175 كٛف انثمح 11
 91 ْم فٙ رنك دٛهح a175 ْم فٙ رنك ٔجّ ثمح 21
 91 ْم فٙ رنك دٛهح a175 ْم فٙ ْزا ٔجّ ثمح 31
 91 ْم فٙ ْزا شٛئ أٔثك a175 ْم فٙ ْزا ٔجّ أٔثك 41
 91 كٛف انذٛهح فٙ رنك a175 كٛف انذٛهح فٙ رنك  51
 91 ْم فٙ رنك دٛهح a175 ْم فٙ رنك ٔجّ ثمح 61
 12 كٛف انذٛهح فٙ رنك b175 كٛف ٔجّ انثمح 71
 12 ْم فٙ رنك دٛهح b175 ْم فٙ رنك ٔجّ ثمح 81
 12 - b175 انثمح فٙ رنك 91
 22 كٛف ٚصُع a275 انٕجّ فٙ رنك 02
 32 ْم فٙ رنك دٛهح a275 ْم فٙ رنك ٔجّ ٚسرمٛى 12
 32 كٛف ٚصُع a275 كٛف ٚصُع 22
 32 انز٘ ٔصفد نك دٛهح a275 انز٘ ٔصفد نك دٛهح 32
 32 انذٛهح فٙ رنك a275 انٕجّ فٙ رنك ٔانثمح 42
 42 كٛف ٚصُع a275 كٛف انثمح نّ ٔانٕجّ فٙ رنك 52
 42 ادرال a275 ٔجّ ثمح 62
نى ٚكٍ انز٘ ٔصفد ٔجّ ثمح ٔلا  72
 ادرٛاط ٔلا دٛهح
 42 دٛهحنى ٚكٍ رنك انز٘ ٔصفد  a275
 42 كٛف ٚصُع a275 كٛف انٕجّ فٙ رنك 82
 52 كٛف ٚصُع a275 كٛف ٚصُع 92
 52 كٛف ٚصُع b275 كٛف انٕجّ ٔانثمح 03
 52 كٛف انذٛهح فٙ رنك b275 كٛف انٕجّ ٔانثمح 13
 52 أٌ ٚصُع يا ركشخ ٚصُع b275 أٌ ٚصُع يا ركشخ 23
 52 كٛف ٚصُع b275 انٕجّ فٙ رنك 33
 52 كٛف ٚصُع b275 كٛف ٚصُع 43
 62 كٛف ٚصُع b275 كٛف ٚصُع 53
 62 يا ٚصُع يٍ رنك b275 يا صُع فٙ رنك 63
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37 حمثنأ كنر ٙف حهٛذنا فٛك 572b كنر ٙف حهٛذنا فٛك 26 
38 حمثنأ ّجٕنا فٛك 572b كثٕرسٚ فٛك 26 
39 كنر ٙف حمثنأ ّجٕنا فٛك 572b حهٛد كنر ٙف مْ 27 
40 كنر ٙف كثٕرنا فٛك 573a كنر ٙف كثٕرنا فٛك 27 
41 كنر ٙف حهٛذنا ّجٔ فٛك 573a حهٛذنا فٛك 27 
42 كنر ٙف حهٛذنا 573a - 27 
43 كثٕرسٚ فٛك 573a كثٕرسٚ فٛك 28 
44 كنر ٙف حمثنا 573a كنر ٙف حمثنا 28 
45 كنر ٙف حهٛذنا اي 573a حهٛد ازْ ٙف مْ 28 
46 حمثنا ّجٔ فٛك 573a حهٛذنا فٛك 29 
47 حمث كنر 573b حمث كنر 31 
48 حمث ّجٔ ازْ ٙف ىكذُع مْ 573b - 31 
49 حمثنا ّجٔ فٛك 573b كنر ٙف حهٛذنا فٛك 31 
50 كنر ٙف ّجٕنا 573b - 31 
51 حمث ّجٔ كنر ٙف مْ 573b - 31 
52 حمث ّجٔ ازْ 573b - 31 
53 حمث كنر 573b - 31 
54 حمثنا ّجٔ فٛك 573b كثٕرسٚ فٛك 31 
55 كثٕرسٚ فٛك 573b كثٕرسٚ فٛك 31 
56 حمثنأ كنر ٙف ّجٕنا 573b - 31 
57 حمثنا ّجٔ فٛك 573b كثٕرسٚ فٛك 31 
58 كنر ٙف حمثنا ّجٔ 573b - 31 
59 حمثنا ّجٔ فٛك 573b حهٛذنأ كنر ٙف حمثنا فٛك 31 
60 كنر ٙف ّجٕنا 573b - 31 
61 حمثنا ّجٔ فٛك 574a حمثنا فٛك 85 
62  ّجٔكنر ٙف حمثنا 574a - 85 
Table 4. The use of the word Ḥīla in al-Aṣl and in al-Makhārij fī al-Ḥiyal 
In total, 62 instances of euphemisms for makhārij were recorded from the beginning of the 
manuscript. These were then checked against the corresponding formula in the treatise. Out of 
the 62 instances 14 had no corresponding sentence. Their deletion was probably to keep the 
treatise to a minimum. From the 48 remaining formulas, 16 remained the same, and in the 
remaining 32 a change was observed. Out of these 32, the following words were used in place 
of the original: 
 ḥīla, twenty times,  
 kayfa yaṣnaʿ, six times, 
 kayfa yastawthiq, three times, 
In two instances the word thiqa and wajh were dropped from the original. In fact, as can be 
seen from the table, the word wajh has been completely dropped from the treatise, and the 
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word thiqa kept to a minimum; four times. It is evident that the notion of the ḥiyal is being 
inscribed into the Ḥanafī juridical lexicon. Take, for example, entry number 10, where, 
originally, the interlocutor asks Abū Ḥanīfa for a trusted or safe way, wajh thiqa. In the 
treatise, this is rephrased as: ‗I asked Abū Ḥanīfa for a ḥīla‘. 
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